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Since the Whig orthodoxy was dethroned the historiography of the English electoral system in the 
first half of the nineteenth century has been somewhat confused, with three main problems. First, opinions 
differ over the impact of the reform acts of 1832. Second, it is unclear whether the system was opening up or 
closing down. This goes deeper than disagreements over 1832: different methodologies point in conflicting 
directions; for example, electorate statistics suggest a system opening up, whilst applications of post-modem 
critical theory suggest the opposite. Third, the determinants of electoral behaviour are unclear, as epitomised 
by the debate over DC Moore's deference theories. 
This diversity of opinion has been fostered by the absence of a clear national framework: local studies 
have usually been preferred to the construction of national statistics. This thesis, though, uses Yorkshire not 
as another case study, but to create and inform a national framework, used to examine the electoral system's 
vitality. 
The thesis first examines the electorate in 1800-50; its size and levels of turnout in particular. 
Following 1832 participation increased greatly, but with falling turnout and much non-registration. Vitality 
was significantly enhanced by conflict within electoral elites, which raised registration and turnout. Then 
deference and corruption are considered, with an emphasis on the complexities of the behaviour involved 
and the limitations on their impact. Next MPs and candidates are considered. Many MPs did little and were 
immune to electoral pressure. There was more to being an MP than Parliamentary activity. 
The picture is of a system possessing vitality, much of it driven by conflicts between electoral elites. 
But at the same time wider forces were working to close the system down. Within this, 1832's impact was 
mixed. It provided great opportunities for increased vitality, but these were often not fully exploited. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Historiographical background 
The Whig orthodoxy regarding the English electoral system in the first half of the nineteenth 
century has long dominated historians' views, and was most famously expounded by Thomas Babington 
Macaulay and George Macaulay Trevelyan. ' Their orthodoxy of constitutionalism, liberalism and progress 
was rooted in the radical critique of the pre-1832 electoral system which had produced many of the first, and 
most comprehensive, studies of that system. These radical studies contain such an abundance of information 
that they are a frequent and vital source of reference for historians, and this aided the passing of the radical 
critique into historiographical dominance. 
As a result a central feature of not only the Whig historiography, but also many of its subsequent 
critics, has been to take delight in describing the more extreme and grotesque parts of the electoral system, 
with little attempt to put them into context. Even where buttressing statistics do exist, they have often been 
uncritically used. For example, tales of mass creation of freemen to pack electorates have been popular, as in 
the Porritts' work. This has a long and detailed section on freemen boroughs, complete with examples of 
mass creations, but they are scattered across two hundred years, with no attempt made to estimate how 
typical they were. Rather, individual anecdotes have been presumed to represent wider trends, and any such 
creations have automatically been assumed to have been bad. The emphasis was on narrative history, not 
social science history. 
The picture was of an electoral system with elections involving only a narrow range of people, a 
politically unaware public, few electors being able to vote freely and votes often seen simply as a means of 
earning money at election time. Elections rarely turned on issues or policies, but rather were dominated by 
local influence, coercion and the distribution of money, goods and favours. 
After the "Whig triumph" of 1832 matters were meant to have changed: money mattered less, issues 
mattered more, electors were freer and the system more liberal and representative. The 1832 legislation was 
another example of the beneficial progress and triumph of liberalism that typified Whig histories. It was a 
1 For example, T. B. Macaulay, The History ofEnglandfrom the Accession of James 11, original edition 1849, Macmillan 
and Co., London, 1913 and G. M. Trevelyan, Lord Grey of the Reform Bill: Being The Life Of Charles, Second Earl 
Grey, 2nd edition, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1929. Macaulay was a prolific and avid Whig writer. Elected to 
Parliament in 1830, in March 1831 he made one of the finest speeches in support of Parliamentary reform. Frequent 
speaking and writing, along with good connections, meant his views were widely disseminated. They were carried on by 
his nephew George Otto Trevelyan and great-nephew George Macaulay Trevelyan. 
2 For example, T. H. B. Oldfield, A Complete History, Political And Personal, Of The Boroughs Of Great Britain; 
Together with the Cinque Ports, To which is now first added The History of the Original Constitution of Parliaments, 
From The Time Of The Ancient Britons To The Present Day. With A State Of The Representations, And An Account Of 
Contested Elections, &c. &c.. new edition, B. Crosby, London, 1805,3 volumes. 
3 E. and A. G. Porritt, House Of Commons: Parliamentary Representation Before 1832, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1903, p. 58-84. Another example is the way estimates of the number of MPs returned by patronage often 
varied without apparent rhyme or reason, and have been quoted with an undue aura of authority: F. O'Gorman, Voters, 
Patrons and Parties: The Unreformed Electoral System of Ilanoverian England 1734-1832, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, 
p. 18-19. 
4I use this phrase, rather than "Reform Act, " to indicate inclusion of the Boundary Act, that is both 2 Will. IV c. 45 and 
2&3 Will. IV c. 64. 
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historiography that emphasised the importance of electoral law, and indeed laws generally. For those like 
F. W. Maitland Whig history was legal history. Progress, inevitable and beneficial, was rooted in statutes. As 
Cox argued in 1868, "A concise history of English civilisation might be deciphered from the Statute Book 
alone"' 
Though the Whig view has now been battered from almost every direction, its major early critics - 
Namier and Butterf ield - did not challenge the idea of the pre-1832 electoral system being narrow, closed 
and a matter for ridicule? Indeed, they strengthened this picture by, for example, giving emphasis to 
corruption rather than public opinion in the 1784 election. Revisionists like Namier did not challenge the 
attitude of those like Butler, who wrote in 1914, 
The passing of the Great Reform Bill takes us suddenly into another air ... The old aristocratic system begins to crumble, and the feet of the nation are set in the path that leads to democracy. 3 
Gash, however, questioned the importance of 1832.4 For him, continuity rather than change 
dominated. Like Kitson-Clark' he stressed the continuities around 1832, and they both clearly sympathised 
with the Tories, especially Peel, rather than the Whigs. 
More recent work has left the impact of 1832 unclear. 6 O'Gorman, by stressing the open nature of 
the pre-1832 system, has played down the impact of 1832.7 He emphasises global statistics and problems of 
patron control. Like Joyce and Hanham for later periods, ' he stresses the importance of local events over 
national ones, and continuities over change. By contrast Phillips, examining the behaviour of individual 
electors, concludes that the debates and legislation of 1831-2 created strongly party-partisan electors. 
Consistent voting for one party became the norm, and party organisation became an integral part of local 
contests. 9 
The uncertainty over the impact of 1832 has intensified the uncertainty regarding the electoral 
system's overall tendency: was it becoming more open or not? This doubt has been exacerbated by Vernon's 
111. Cox, A History Of The Reform Bills Of 1866 And 1867, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1868, p. 1. 
2 For example, H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation Of History, original edition 1931, W. W. Norton, New York, 1965 
and L. Namier, The Structure Of Politics At The Accession Of George III, 2nd edition, original edition 1928, Macmillan, 
London, 1957. 
3 J. R. M. Butler, The Passing Of The Great Reform Bill, new impression, original edition 1914, Frank Cass, London, 
1964, p. vii. 
4 N. Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel: A Study in the Technique of Parliamentary Representation 1830-1850, Longmans, 
London, 1953. 
5 G. Kitson Clark, The Making of Victorian England: Being the Ford Lectures Delivered Before the University of 
Oxford, Methuen, London, 1962 and Peel And The Conservative Party: A Study In Party Politics 1832-1841,2nd edition, 
Archon Books, Connecticut, 1964. 
6 Further, assumptions regarding a relatively smooth and inevitable progression towards a "modern" and "rational" two- 
party electoral system interestingly became less common after 1970, when the British electoral system began both to lose 
some of its two-party nature, and to have that nature increasingly questioned. 
7 Notably in O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties. 
8 P. Joyce, Work Society and Politics: The Culture of the Factory in later Victorian England, Harvester, Brighton, 1980 
and li. J. llanham, Elections and Party Management: Politics in the time of Disraeli and Gladstone, Longmans, London, 
1959. 
9 Particularly J. A. Phillips, Electoral Behaviour in Unreformed England: Plumpers, splitters and straights, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1982 and The Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs: English Electoral Behaviour, 1818-1841, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992. 
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application of post-modem critical theory. He argues that more general trends - in particular in the means 
and language of communicating political ideas and the rise of tightly organised politics - resulted in an 
increasingly closed system. ' 
Finally, besides these doubts over 1832 and the system's tendencies, the question of what motivated 
participants in the system has also proved problematic. Both Gash and Namier stress the importance of 
desires to wield power. More recent work on high politics has often taken a rather different view, giving 
more space to the influence of ideological and religious beliefs? At the constituency level the two seminal 
works are those by Nossiter and Moore. Nossiter introduced the idea of a motivational trio of money, 
influence and issues, 3 and Moore put forward his controversial deference thesis 4 Both stress the role of 
factors other than simple cravings for power. Nossiter's approach has, like many an influential methodology, 
become so widely used as to appear obvious .5 It 
is more a tool than a new explanation, a way of organising 
evidence without, in itself, answering many questions. By contrast, the theory of deference has had a 
controversial life and has tried to answer many questions. Debate has focused on two issues: did a belief in a 
deferential mode of electoral behaviour shape the 1832 reform legislation, and to what extent did actual 
electoral behaviour fit the deferential model suggested by Moore? Moore suggests the Whig triumph of 
opinion over in did not happen until much later in the nineteenth century, if at all. 6 
In part these problems - the impact of the 1832 legislation, the electoral system's tendencies and the 
motivation of participants - are a reflection of the evidence used. A clear national framework within which to 
place individual constituencies' experience is lacking. For example, Moore's examples are overwhelmingly 
drawn from an atypical handful of counties. 7 Though O'Gorman has begun to construct a replacement, he 
1 J. Vernon, Politics and the People: A Study in English Political Culture and Communication, 1808-68, Manchester 
PhD, 1991, and Politics And The People: A study In English political culture, c. 1815-1867, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1993. All the citations of Vernon below are of the book rather than the thesis of the similar name. 
2 For example, R. Brent, Liberal Anglican Politics: Whiggery, Religion, and Reform, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987 and 
L. G. Mitchell, "Foxite Politics and the Great Reform Bill, " English Historical Review, Volume 108,1993. 
3 T. J. Nossiter, Influence, Opinion and Political Idioms in Reformed England:: Case Studies from the North-East 1832- 
74, l Iarvester, I Iassocks, 1975. 
4 Especially D. C. Moore, "The Other Face of Reform, " Victorian Studies, Volume 5,1961, "The Sociological Premises 
of the First Reform Act: A Reply, " Victorian Studies, Volume 14,1971 and The Politics of Deference: A study of the 
mid-nineteenth century English Political System, Harvester, I cassocks, 1976. Examples of his critics include E. P. 
ilennock, "The Sociological Premises of the First Reform Act, " Victorian Studies, Volume 14,1971, IH. A. Ellis, 
"Aristocratical Influence and Electoral Independence: The Whig Model of Parliamentary Reform 1792-1832, " Journal of 
Modern History, on demand supplement, Volume 51 Number 4,1979 and F. O'Gorman, "Electoral Deference in 
'Unreformed' England: 1760-1832, " Journal of Modern History, Volume 56,1984. 
5 For example, his approach is implicit in the work of both O'Gorman and Phillips. 
6 Joyce's work on factory towns suggested a strongly deferential picture: World Society and Politics. However, Joyce 
only looked at the system bequeathed by 1867 and, as Davis's Buckinghamshire work suggests, deference may have 
increased after 1867: R. W. Davis, "The Mid-Nineteenth Century Electoral Structure, " Albion, Volume 8,1976, p. 152. 
7 Moore's three counties in Politics of Deference were Cambridgeshire, I luntingdonshire and Northamptonshire, that is 
adjacent, southern, regularly polled and heavily agricultural counties. Given this atypicality, unsurprisingly many of his 
critics have drawn different conclusions from different counties; e. g. R. W. Davis, "Yes, " Journal of British Studies, 
Volume 15 Number 2,1976, D. Eastwood, "Toryism, Reform, and Political Culture in Oxfordshire, 1826-1837, " 
Parliamentary History, Volume 7 Part 1,1988 and E. Jaggard, "Cornwall Politics 1826-1832: Another Face of Reform?, " 
Journal of British Studies, Volume 22,1983. Though Moore recognises that his counties may not be typical, he curiously 
argues that, "without a contest there can be no poll book, without a poll book there can be no evidence. " Leaving aside 
some minor quibbles - such as the usefulness of canvass returns in place of poll books - the more important critique of 
this comment is the narrow view of electoral history it implies. Neither is he very helpful as to what the impact of this 
atypicality may have been. For example, regarding the atypically large number of polls in his sample, he says this may 
either have served to strengthen electoral blocs, or to have weakened them! See Politics of Deference, p. 23. 
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stops in 1832. Without a national benchmark, it is difficult to make sense of the plethora of local case 
studies: ' how typical are the events they describe? 
By contrast, this thesis is not another set of local case studies. Yorkshire is taken as a useful sample 
of England as a whole, but this is not exclusively a study of Yorkshire, 2 nor even of local politics mainly 
drawn from Yorkshire. Rather, it is a study of the national (English) electoral system, using Yorkshire to 
create and inform a national framework. Create in that many of the available national statistics are 
incomplete and ambiguous, needing local colour to fill gaps. Inform in that understanding how the system 
worked in practice, and what views were held of it, also frequently requires local colour. In particular, it will 
become clear that meanings can be attached to parts of the electoral system that are different from those 
meanings the Whig orthodoxy attached. 
The national framework allows local studies to be put into context and the electoral system to be 
appreciated as more than the sum of individual constituencies' behaviour. The framework is often heavily 
reliant on the electoral system's mechanics. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such detailed 
examinations of the workings of the electoral system were the vogue. Since then, the "subjective" side of 
politics, particularly the cultural background, socio-economic edifices and electoral discourses, have come to 
the fore. Yet, even for this aspect of politics, an understanding of the electoral system's technicalities can 
reveal much. Just as there is more to economic history than growth rates, so there is more to political history 
than the electoral structure. But it is between the mental state of people and their political activities that the 
system's mechanics intrude. Furthermore, it is only by seeing these mechanics at work and under strain that 
politics more generally can be put in context. 
1.2 Period and place 
The period 1800-50 has been chosen as being both narrow enough to be considered within one 
thesis, yet wide enough to allow 1832 to be seen in perspective. Yorkshire, which mixed bustling and 
growing industry with remote moorlands, has been chosen as an area rich in evidence, whilst also moderately 
typical of England. It contained some of the better known parts of the electoral system and had a prominent 
role in some aspects of national politics. In the famous 1807 election, in 1830 with Brougham's election, and 
in the West Riding in the 1840s with the activities of the Anti-Corn Law League, Yorkshire elections were 
national events. Along with its famous highlights, it also had many of the lesser-known foothills. Across the 
Yorkshire rural hinterland was scattered a mix of boroughs, often market towns, ranging from open 
constituencies like York to closed boroughs like Aldborough. There were both economically exuberant 
constituencies like Hull, and stagnant backwaters like Iledon. There was a socio-economic diversity, from 
'For example, A. C. Bennett, The General Election Of 1837 In The East Riding Of Yorkshire, Hull Special Subject 
Dissertation, 1989, J. A. Jowitt and R. K. S. Taylor (eds), Nineteenth Century Bradford Elections, Bradford Centre Occasional 
Papers No. 1, University of Leeds, 1979, J. Markham, Nineteenth-Century Parliamentary Elections In East Yorkshire, East 
Yorkshire Local History Society, Beverley, 1982 and RK. V. Radice, Identification Interests and Influence: Voting 
Behaviour in Four English Constituencies in the Decade Aller The Great Reform Act, Durham PhD, 1992. 
2 Though the emphasis is upon Yorkshire, it seems unnecessarily pedantic to exclude useful evidence merely because it 
originates from the wrong side of a county boundary. 
3 For example, J. Lambert, "Parliamentary Franchises, Past and Present, " The Nineteenth Century, Volume 26,1889 and 
C. Seymour, Electoral Reform in England and Wales: The Development and Operation of the Parliamentary Franchise 
1832-1885, original edition 1915, David and Charles, Newton Abbot, 1970. 
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the rapidly industrialising West Riding, with the likes of Leeds and Sheffield, through the rather more 
genteel, placid and agricultural North Riding and on to the East Riding, heavily agricultural, without coal, 
minerals or many fast-flowing streams to provide industrial power. Yorkshire's social and economic 
diversity meant there were nobles, weavers, gentry and manufacturers aplenty. 
Before 1832 England had 196 boroughs returning two MPs, five returning one MP and two 
returning four MPs. ' Yorkshire had fourteen boroughs (7% of the total), all returning two MPs. The 
distribution of franchise types in Yorkshire differed somewhat from the national norm (Table 1.1). Burgage 
boroughs were over-represented, Yorkshire having 19% of the burgage boroughs. Concomitantly, 
corporation boroughs were under-represented: only 4% of them were in Yorkshire. Although Yorkshire had 
no freeholder or householder boroughs this is not a serious drawback as both were few in number nationally. 
Further, both were franchises dependant on the occupation of property, and hence similar to scot and lot 
boroughs. 
Of the fourteen pre-1832 Yorkshire boroughs, three (21%) were abolished in 1832 (Aldborough, 
Boroughbridge and Hedon), two (14%) were reduced to one MP in 1832 (Northallerton and Thirsk) and nine 
(65%) were left with two MPs (Beverley, Hull, Knaresborough, Malton, Pontefract, Richmond, Ripon, 
Scarborough and York). In England as a whole fifty-five two-member boroughs were abolished (28% of the 
195 two-member boroughs), one one-member borough was abolished (20% of the five one-member 
boroughs), thirty lost one member (15% of the 195 two-member boroughs) and 110 (56%) were left 
unchanged. In 1832 three new one-member boroughs were created (Huddersfield, Wakefield and Whitby) - 
16% of the nineteen created nationally - and four two-member boroughs (Bradford, Halifax, Leeds and 
Sheffield) - 18% of the twenty-two created nationally. 
2 Again, then, Yorkshire was roughly representative of 
England as a whole, though containing as it did areas of industrialisation and urbanisation it did relatively 
well from the creation of new constituencies. 
The county of Yorkshire originally had two MPs, gained two when Grampound was disfranchised, 
and was split into three in 1832. Each of the three Ridings henceforth returned two MPs. Hull and part of 
York were counties in themselves, out of nineteen in total in England and Wales. Overall, Yorkshire moved 
from thirty-two MPs in 1831, with fourteen boroughs and one county constituency, to thirty-eight MPs after 
1832, with nineteen boroughs and three county constituencies. 
Whilst Yorkshire was not an exact microcosm of England - no county was - it was fairly 
representative, encompassing the diversity of electoral structures on which many national themes were 
displayed. Both Whig and Tory land-owning families, with large estates and political influence, lived there. 
The most powerful individual family were the Whig Fitzwilliams. Although they were not typical of large 
1 After Grampound's 1821 disfranchisement there were 195 two member boroughs. Its MPs were transferred to the 
county constituency of Yorkshire. In total England had 203 boroughs, 40 counties and 2 universities in 1800. After 1832 
the figures were 189,68 and 2. Two boroughs were disfranchised in 1832-67: Sudbury (1844) and St Albans (1852). 
Their seats were not reallocated to other constituencies until 1861, when, inter alia, the West Riding was split in two and 
received 2 more MPs. 
2 The twentieth one-member borough created in 1832 was in Wales - Merthyr Tydvill. 
3 For more on county boroughs see p. 132ff and Appendix 5. 
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landowners - most notably in the 5th Earl's support of the repeal of the corn laws - the spread of relatives and 






Householder 10 None 
Freeholder 4 None 
Scot and Lot 39 Aldborough, Malton, Pontefract 
Freeman 91 Beverley, Hedon, Hull, York 
Corporation 27 Scarborough 
Burgage 32 Boroughbridge, Knaresborough, Northallerton, Richmond, 
Ripon, Thirsk 
University 2 None 
Table 1.1: Distribution of borough constituencies 1804-211 
This diversity was also reflected in the constituency politics of the county. Relatively closed and 
quiescent boroughs like Aldborough and Boroughbridge coexisted with the tumultuous politics of Hull and 
Beverley. The money-laden politics of Hull and Beverley in turn coexisted with the strident religious 
disputes that were regular features of Bradford, and occasionally county, politics. 
I have not concentrated consistently on any particular constituencies within Yorkshire. Rather, 
depending on the topic involved and the evidence available, I take those which are most appropriate. The 
problem is one of a diversity of sources and electoral experiences; places that provide evidence for, and are 
enlightening examples of, one aspect of the electoral system, do not necessarily have appropriate evidence 
for others. This is not a matter of choosing examples to fit the argument, but rather constituencies with 
evidence helpful in considering one question do not necessarily have the evidence to consider different ones. 
Concentrating only on places that have a good overall level of evidence left in the archives would both run 
the risk of atypicality and would mean some parts of the argument having little evidence or appropriate 
examples. The existence of many poll books for a particular constituency indicates merely that it went to the 
polls more frequently than the average. Whilst technically impressive computer-aided analysis can do much 
with such a run of poll books, any results suffer from the fact that the very ability to produce them is stark 
evidence of their atypicality. Similarly, regarding different types of evidence, rather than concentrating on 
family papers, poll books or some other type of evidence per se, I have used those most appropriate for the 
points under examination. 
1 These dates were chosen as in 1804 Aylesbury changed its franchise type and Grampound was disfranchised in 1821. 
Appendix I contains more on franchise types. 
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis does not pretend to answer fully all the questions in the electoral arena of 1800-50. 
Rather, it concentrates on a few, presenting a context and building a framework on which other work can be 
hung. The framework is focused on the question of the electoral system's vitality. The use of "electoral" 
rather than "political" is deliberate as, although the two are inter-linked, it is the likes of elections rather than 
coalitions between factions of MPs, and voting systems rather than monarchical influence, that are dealt with 
herein. 
In Dahl's terminology, ' electoral vitality is a measure of a political system's inclusiveness or 
participative nature, whilst political vitality also includes the extent and importance of political competition. 
Electoral vitality is a blend of how many electors there were, how often they voted (or had the opportunity to 
vote) and what circumstances caused them to vote or not vote. The meanings and impact, or otherwise, of 
their votes is not central here, nor is the meaningfulness of the choice between different candidates. Those 
whom votes were cast for - candidates and MPs - are only considered in as much as they can throw further 
light onto electoral participation and vitality. 
It is through the lens of vitality that the three problems outlined above - the impact of 1832, where 
the electoral system was going, and the determinants of participants' behaviour - are examined. The vitality 
of the system is not simply a matter of numbers. Thus, whilst Chapters 2 and 3 largely examine numbers, 
Chapters 4-6 concentrate on how people behaved: how effective were methods of influencing behaviour, 
why did people, especially MPs and candidates, participate and, finally, to what extent were electoral 
activities driven by electoral motivations, or were they subordinate to wider interests and concerns? 
Chapter 2 examines the electorate of 1800-50. Whilst it shows that 1832 increased the electorate by 
about 40%, it then increased by another 40% by 1840, as conflicts within the political elite drove up 
registration levels. Even then, though, registration levels fell far short of 100%. Thus, whilst 1832 opened up 
the system, it also provided further opportunities which were only utilised when elite conflicts produced an 
eagerness to bring more people into the system, and even then many such opportunities were unrealised. 
A similar picture emerges in Chapter 3, which examines turnout in 1800-50. Turnout was high 
before 1832, but subsequently declined. This was despite several aspects of 1832 that acted to increase 
turnout. Again, elite conflicts often led to electors being mobilised as allies, but those being mobilised were 
frequently reluctant, and became more so as time passed. Though more people voted, this too was a 
reflection of elite conflicts, which caused an increased number of polls. 
Emphasis on political elites in these Chapters does not extend to the question of party development. 
Whether two elites, in different constituencies but with the same broad political labels, should be considered 
1 R. A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Yale University Press, London, 1971. 
2 Polls and contests have often been used interchangeably. I take them to be different. A contest is when there were more 
candidates than vacancies to fill, even if some of them withdrew before polling. A poll is when a poll occurred. An 
election without a poll could still involve much politics and campaigning, as shown by the virulent 1826 Yorkshire 
election. Such an election is an unpolled contest. Two articles on unpolled contests are P. D. Brett, "The Newcastle 
Election of 1830, " Northern History, Volume 24,1988 and D. Foster, "The Politics Of Uncontested Elections: North 
Lancashire 1832-1865". Northern History, Volume 13,1977, though as his title shows he uses a different terminology. 
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as being parts of a unified party, or merely as ships passing in the night, is an interesting question, but not 
answerable within the limits of this thesis. One can leave its answer open, whilst still arguing for the 
importance of these elites within their constituencies, in registering and mobilising electors and in causing 
polls. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine possible impediments to vitality. Chapter 4 studies deference. In addition 
to looking at some of the more conventional aspects of this debate, attention is paid to the publication of poll 
books, the accuracy of canvassing and the possibility of a more complicated relationship that both involved 
landlords sometimes following the wishes of tenants, and sometimes having to pay a price to ensure that 
deferential behaviour occurred. The questions of both poll book publication and canvassing were important 
props to Moore's arguments, but I claim that his interpretations were too restrictive. The picture, rather, is of 
a complex phenomenon, with electoral behaviour determined by a multiplicity of motives, often not related 
to the electoral process and mixed in with questions of local tradition and heritage. The confusion over the 
1832 urban penetration clauses shows both how, even if they had wanted to, it was not possible for 
politicians to pursue only a deference-inspired course, and also the levels of muddle and diversity even 
within political elites. 
Chapter 5 examines corruption, arguing that it has been over-rated as an impediment to vitality. 
Indeed, on occasion corruption increased it, particularly with the creation of freemen. Again vitality was 
driven by conflicts within the electoral elite, as much as by 1832 itself. Further, the methods of corruption 
often had other benefits, such as making electors richer without influencing their votes. Behind corruption 
lay a multiplicity of motives and local traditions. 
In Chapter 6 some of the participants in the electoral process are examined - candidates and MPs. 
The picture is of an electoral elite, but one open to youth, talent and money. The system itself contained 
sufficient confusion and amateurism to provide scope for individuals to force their way in, and make a 
difference. Many MPs, however, had motivations other than those of aspiring Cabinet ministers, and were 
relatively immune to electoral pressure. It is a picture of vitality, mixed motivations and local traditions. 
18 
2. The Electorate c. 1800-50 
2.1 Introduction 
Discussion of the electoral system's openness, its degree of popular involvement and other aspects 
of its vitality relies, in part, on the electorate's size. This is a basis for calculations regarding turnout, 
registration and the numbers voting. Yet the size of the English electorate in 1800-50 has been somewhat 
neglected. ' This neglect of the electorate, especially its size, by Namier and many subsequent historians, has 
recently been tackled by O'Gorman, who commented: 
It is surprising how little the electorate figures in Namier's work, which is, after all, a portrait of how the 
local oligarchy controlled the political system. It is significant that almost all his research on 
constituencies concentrated upon small and anachronistic strongholds of electoral malpractice? 
The conventional picture has been of a big increase in the electorate after 1832, an increase that was 
moreover caused by the 1832 legislation. But, there are problems with this picture. The electoral system was 
not as closed, and as limited in numbers involved, as may appear. This is not only because the interpretation 
put on the electorate's size is misleading, but also because the numbers and evidence are often erroneous. 
First, the size of the electorate should not be taken out of context. The number of people involved in, and the 
health of, electoral systems do not necessarily go together. Assuming that the electoral process rather than 
the end product is paramount seriously skews historical works by assuming the traditional Tory emphasis on 
stability and results (rather than process) to be wrong. As Vatel argued, 
All legitimate authors who have written on the constitution of government invariably hold that when a 
government is settled and established - the great desideratum in a state - and it fulfils the ends and 
purposes of its institution, nothing can justify an alteration in the slightest part of its constitution. 
Whilst the electorate's size is of interest, judging the system overwhelmingly by the size of the electorate is 
an approach many contemporaries did not take. 
Further, the openness of an electoral system is not solely dependent on the electorate's size. Other 
factors, like the number of contests, restrictions on who can stand and the ease of voting, also affect it. A 
system of universal suffrage in a one-party state would demonstrate the limits of merely looking at the 
electorate's size. Indeed, as Chapter 3 shows (p. 108), changes in the number of people who actually voted in 
general elections were not only caused by changes in the electorate's size. Changes in the number of 
constituencies that went to the poll also had important effects. 
Second, not all constituencies were like Old Sarum or Dunwich; the vast majority covered places 
that had stonework other than ruins, and were not in the sea. It is hard to square the mammoth 1807 
Yorkshire election, or boroughs like York and Hull with sizeable and lively electorates, with the stereotypical 
rotten system. Even small burgage boroughs that appear ripe for mockery, like Knaresborough, often, under 
1 For example, in R. G. Thome, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1790-1820, Secker and Warburg, 
London, 1986 the individual constituency sections contain estimates of their electorates, but very little is said about 
them, and the figures are not aggregated to provide national statistics. 
2 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 2 n2. 
3 Porritts, House OjCommons, Volume 1, p. 88. 
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closer examination, appear rather different. In this case burgages only granted votes if buildings were in 
good condition. ' No piles of stones granted votes here. Similarly, though the burgage borough of Richmond 
had many non-resident electors, this was not due to electoral manipulation. Rather, burgalte houses were 
bought by farmers to avoid corn tolls 2 Also, burgages that had been divided or demolished did not grant a 
vote 3 
Third, people without votes could still influence the outcome. At the most extreme, a mob of 
unenfranchised people could block or intimidate someone with a vote. Indicative of this is the electoral 
propaganda that was either aimed at, or came from, non-electors. ' 
Fourth, increases in the electorate after 1832 should not necessarily be directly attributed to the 
impact of the 1832 legislation. Constituency activity in the 1830s, and the Anti-Corn Law League in the 
1840s, did much to increase the total number of entries on registers, as seen below. Whilst the 1832 
legislation, with its encouragement to political organisation in its registration clauses, may have been partly 
responsible for this, there were other forces at work. In particular, there was an important role for conflicts 
within political elites in making the possibilities offered by the 1832 legislation be (at least partially) 
fulfilled. 
There are major problems with the statistical evidence regarding the electorate. Primary evidence, 
such as poll books, Parliamentary returns and election results handbooks, usually suffers from one, or both, 
of two recurrent difficulties. First, the survival rates of documents like poll books and electoral registers are 
patchy. Second, the evidence often contains errors. In Parliamentary returns and papers, a fruitful but under- 
used source of information on almost every aspect of the system, there is the particular difficulty that 
requests for information were often poorly and/or ambiguously worded. There are many traps for the 
unwary, but it is this that makes a detailed study of one county productive. Using an eclectic range of sources 
often allows comparisons to be made that highlight errors, and estimates to be made to fill gaps. The need for 
care and detail is reflected in the frequently inconsistent evidence quoted by historians (illustrated by the 
range of figures in Table 2.1). Another example of the careless use of numbers is that of the size of the 
electorate of Gatton, a scot and lot borough and favourite example of a decayed, unreformed borough that is 
easy to ridicule. Depending on whom you read, it either had two voters or six voters or seven voters, with no 
evidence or dates for these figures being produced! 
Confusion also often arises when the phrases "electorate" and "voters" are used without it being 
made clear what they mean, or even used interchangeably. In fact they can mean very different things. 
"Electorate" is often (apparently) used as a collective noun for voters, despite there being a legitimate 
' MD 6798/1-6, p. 6, Sheffield Archives. 
2A Return Ojthe Number of Resident Electors in each of the Boroughs named in Schedule (B. ) of the Reform of 
Parliament (England) Bill, 1831 (134) XVI. 
3 R. T. Fieldhouse, "Parliamentary Representation In The Borough Of Richmond, " Yorkshire Archaeological Journal, 
Volume 44,1972, p. 208. 
4 E. g. an 1847 Bradford election poster titled, "To The Electors Of Bradford, In Behalf Of the Non-Electors": DB 13 c35, 
Bradford Archives. This matter is considered further on p. 152152. 
s J. A. Phillips, "The Structure of Electoral Politics in Unreformed England, " Journal of British Studies, Volume 19 
Number 1,1979, p. 100, D. G. Wright, Democracy and Reform 1815-1885, Longman, Barlow, 1970, p. 7 and E. J. Evans, 
The Great Reform Act of 1832, Routledge, London, 1983, p. 4. 
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distinction between the two. I use voters to mean those who actually voted in an election, whilst the 
electorate is those who were qualified to vote at an election. As turnout was normally under, sometimes far 
under, 100% these two groups are far from identical. ' 
After 1832 an additional complication was that not all those who could have registered did. Though 
formal electoral registers did not exist before 1832, the pre-1832 situation was similar in some 
constituencies. For example, in freemen boroughs there may have been people who met the necessary 
qualifications to be freemen, but had not got themselves enrolled, and hence could not vote. So, there is a 
group, the potential electorate, who met all the qualifications, except for being on the required register and 
doing those things immediately linked with being on the register. 
Section 2.2 examines, and estimates, the pre-1832 electorate's size. The estimate is relatively large, 
larger even than O'Gorman's estimate (which in turn was substantially larger than the previously popular 
estimate of Cannon). Section 2.3 examines freemen boroughs in the years up to 1832 more closely, and show 
how a common accusation - that of corrupt freemen creations - does not stand up. Section 2.4 examines the 
electorate after 1832. A clear increase was caused by the 1832 legislation. However, the legislation made 
possible an even bigger increase, and it was only as electoral elites fought each other that more of the 
potential was taken up. The overall picture is one of vitality, but vitality often dependent on elites looking for 
allies in their disputes, rather than vitality being driven by popular enthusiasm. Indeed, it is a vitality that 
often waned quickly in the absence of such disputes. 
2.2 Size of the electorate 1800-32 
For a few constituencies, for a few (usually non-consecutive) years, the size of the electorate is 
known. From these constituencies typical turnout levels can be ascertained, and applied to other 
constituencies where only the number voting is known, to estimate those constituencies' electorates. This 
approach, with a few tweaks, allows the national electorate to be estimated. 
For a long time the standard estimate of the 1831 electorate was Cannon's. He provides figures for 
the highest number of voters (for the period 1800-31) in each constituency. 2 For counties, and making some 
adjustments for counties that had no poll in 1800-31, this totals 188,250. He claims these figures are unlikely 
to exclude many freeholders as, "most of the polls continued ten or fifteen days, " and hence turnout would 
have been nearly 100%. This, though, is a very narrow assumption about why people might not have voted. 
Moreover, he assumes that not many members of the electorate did not vote (hence he uses highest poll 
figures), and then argues that estimates of the electorate's size are unreliable as they require, inter alia, a 
guess as to the number that did not vote, though he has just claimed this number was insignificant! Cannon's 
English borough figure of 156,000 is an average of the sum of the highest poll in each constituency since 
1 An example of the confusion created when "voters" and "electorates" are muddled is on p. 105. 
2 There are some constituencies which had no polls in this period. Numbers for these can be derived by consulting with, 
and guessing from, wider evidence: see J. A. Cannon, Parliamentary Reform 1640-1832, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1973, p. 290-1. 
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1800 (with estimates also used where necessary) - 145,000 - and estimates made by Returning Officers in 
1831-167,829. ' 
For these figures to be reasonable estimates of the electorate not only requires that the highest poll 
in each county was accompanied by 100% turnout, but also that Cannon's averaging of the borough numbers 
coincidentally implies the right borough turnout level. 2 Therefore, instead I employ my turnout calculations 
t Ile distrusts the Returning Office's estimates, pointing out that in 1831 there was an incentive to inflate figures in an 
effort to save constituencies from the reforming axe. Ile gives three examples of why such distrust is warranted: Cannon, 
Parliamentary Reform, p. 290-2. However, these cases are not straightforward. 
In Berwick the Returning Officer estimated an electorate of 1135, with the maximum number of votes cast having 
(probably) been the 860 of 1826. Cannon finds the difference between 860 and 1135 sufficiently large to believe the 
1135 was an exaggeration. Yet, it implies a turnout of 75%, compared to an average freeman borough turnout of 81% 
(see p. 78). This is not unreasonably low. 
For Wareham Cannon dismissed the professed electorate of 338, stating that, "the previous highest poll was said to be 
20" (sic): Parliamentary Reform, p. 290. This is wrong. Wareham polled twice in 1715-1832. In 1734 559 votes were 
cast and in 1747 938 votes were cast: L. Namier and J. Brooke, The House Of Commons 1754-1790, I1. M. S. O., London, 
1964, Volume 1, p. 237. Even assuming there were no plumpers, this means comfortably over 250 and 450 voters 
respectively. In reality, with some plumping, there would have been even more voters. Indeed, the source Cannon 
apparently cites states, "The number of Votes polled at the contested Election in 1772 was upwards of 700. The present 
number of Voters at this time is 338, ": A Return of the Number of Voters Polled at the last contested Election for every 
Borough now returning Members to Parliament, and the probable Number of Voters at this time; - also, A Return of the 
Number of Freemen in every Corporate Town which now returns Members to Parliament, whether the Right of Voting be 
in the Freemen or not; - also, A Return of the Number of Persons admitted to their Freedom in those Cities and Boroughs 
in England which send Members to Parliament in each Year, since 1800 to the present time; - also, the Amount of Fee 
raised upon every admission, and how appropriated: - so far as the same Returns can be obtained, 1831-2 (112) XXXVI, 
p. 106. Thus, the claim of an electorate of 338 is reasonable. Further, had one wished to exaggerate the electorate's size, 
the higher number of voters at previous elections would have provided a convenient cover. 
Malton is more complicated. Its highest poll had been 456 in 1807. The Returning Ofcet's claim in 1831-2 (92) 
XXXVI (A Return from all the Boroughs (120) enumerated in the Paper (10 ordered to be printed on the 15th of December, 
of the following Particulars: the Parish in which such Place may be wholly or partly situate, the Amount of Population, and 
the Number of Houses, in each Parish, and each present Borough, and each proposed Borough respectively, according to 
the Census of 1821 and 1831; distinguishing the Number of Houses rated under £10, or at and above £10, Annual Value; 
with the estimated Extent in Acres of every such Parish, Borough, or proposed Borough, distinguishing in Boroughs the 
parts built from those not built on; together with the present Number of Electors in the present Borough, and a Summary of 
what the Returning Officer considers the Right of Voting for such Boroughs; - so far as the said Particulars can be furnished 
by the Returning Officers) that the electorate was 809 is on the unsustainable side of high. I lowever, another return -A 
Statement of the Number of Houses, in each City, Borough, and Town in England and Wales sending Members to 
Parliament, and the greatest Number of Electors polled at any Election within the same at any period during the last 
Thirty Years, so far as the same can be ascertained from the Returning Ofcers, 1830-1 (204) X- estimates Malton's 
electorate at 625. This compares with an electorate in 1807 of 500: E. A. Smith, "Earl Fitzwilliam and Malton: a 
Proprietary Borough in the Early Nineteenth Century, " English Historical Review, Volume 80,1965. An increase of 
20% since 1807 is credible as the number of houses in Malton increased by 28% in 1801.31: cf Smith, "Fitzwilliam and 
Malton, " p. 53 and 1830-1(204) X. Now, 625 is certainly less than 809 but it is also rather more than 456. Thus, whilst 
Cannon is right to dismiss the 809 figure, it does not follow that 456 is a reasonable estimate for the electorate; 625 is 
plausible. 
As can be seen from the Yorkshire constituencies in Appendix 9 some claims as to electorate size made in 1830-1 
were high, but they were a minority. In Yorkshire only Pontefract and Malton have such dubious claims. And, against 
them, must be held the claims for Ripon's electorate in 1831-2 (126) XXXVI (A Return from all the Boroughs (120) 
enumerated in the Paper (II) ordered to be printed on the 15th of December, of the following Particulars: the Parish in 
which such Place may be wholly or partly situate, the Amount of Population, and the Number of houses, in each Parish, and 
each present Borough, and each proposed Borough respectively, according to the Census of 1821 and 1831; distinguishing 
the Number of Houses rated under £10, or at and above £10, Annual Value; with the estimated Extent in Acres of every such 
Parish, Borough, or proposed Borough, distinguishing in Boroughs the parts built from those not built on; together with the 
present Number of Electors in the present Borough, and a Summary of what the Returning Officer considers the Right of 
Voting for such Boroughs; - so far as the said Particulars can be furnished by the Returning Officers - Boroughs of 
Bletchingley and Ripon) and Knaresborough's highest poll since 1800 in 1830-1 (204) X, both of which are clearly large 
underestimates. By no means were all the opportunities to exaggerate taken. 
2 Cannon did not give turnout as his reason for his averaging, but the averaging may have accidentally given the right 
answer. 
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from Chapter 3 (p. 78-79) to move from statistics for the number of voters, based on the known highest polls 
in constituencies in 1800-31, to estimating actual electorates. One could object that my turnout figures are for 
average turnout, whilst turnout would have been higher than average in one of these polls. I do not find this 
convincing for four reasons. First, some polls are the highest poll by virtue of being the only poll in the 
period, rather than being the highest amongst several; in these circumstances there is no reason to believe 
that turnout would have been abnormally high. Second, some polls are the highest polls by virtue of the only 
other polls being abnormally low, as when a candidate withdrew during polling; the same argument as for 
the first point applies. Third, when a constituency had several polls it is only occasionally that one poll saw 
many more voters than the others. Fourth, my turnout figures (77% in counties and 78% in boroughs) may be 
a little high anyway (p. 78). 
The calculation goes as follows. For boroughs and counties I take Cannon's figures for the total of 
the highest poll in each constituency (with his adjustments for constituencies without any polls in the 
period). ' This means I use his borough figure of 145,000, rather than his 156,000 final borough figure. This 
is in contrast to O'Gorman, who used the latter figure in his estimation of the 1831 electorate. I prefer to use 
the 145,000 as otherwise one is effectively adjusting for turnout twice as Cannon effectively adjusted for 
turnout in reaching his 156,000 number, by averaging his voters figures with the Returning Officers' 
electorate estimates. 
Thus, we get the English electorate in 1831 to be: (188,250 / 0.77) + (145,000 / 0.78) = 430,000.2 It 
is unclear how this corresponds to O'Gorman's estimate. He only gives combined figures for England and 
Wales, 3 and some of his explanatory text is obscure .4 However, assuming that 
he made proportionately the 
same adjustment to Cannon's figures for Wales and England, then his English electorate figure would be 
413,100.5. 
My figure, then, is somewhat larger than O'Gorman's, which has replaced Cannon's as the standard 
estimate. Given the margins of error involved one should not take exact figures too seriously but it is clear 
1 Cannon, Parliamentary Reform, p. 290-2. 
21 only give this figure to three significant figures as, given the margins of error involved, pretending to any greater 
accuracy is meaningless. 
3 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 179. 
4 Lambert's estimate for the total English and Welsh electorate was 435,391: "Parliamentary Franchises. " (Note, though, 
that it would appear that he simply lifted this number from Franquet Dc Franqueville, Le Gouvernement Et Le Parlement 
Britanniques, Paris, 1887 who gives an identical number as his estimate of the English and Welsh electorates. Indeed, 
Lambert cites this work. De Franqueville ascribes the number to "a statement, prepared for the government during the 
discussion of the law of 1885 and never published. " It is unlikely this unpublished paper contains evidence of much use 
as, for example, when an estimate of the 1815 electorate was required for A Return of the Number of Electors in all the 
Cities and Parliamentary Boroughs in England and Wales, In the Years 1815,1830,1832-3 and 1859-60, with the Total 
Number in each Year, and showing, for the two latter Periods, the Comparative Increase or Diminution, and the Number 
of Members; also, the Qualification in each City and Borough prior to the passing of the Reform Bill, 1860 (129) LV 
numbers were simply taken from Oldfield). 
O'Gorman quotes the 435,391 figure but describes it as being Lambert's estimate for English boroughs (only), rather 
than the total English and Welsh electorate: Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 180. He then adds 20,000 for Welsh boroughs 
"like Cannon. " In fact, Cannon added 22,000 for the Welsh county and borough electorate, neither of which does he 
think individually equalled 20,000. Further, O'Gorman calls this sum the total electorate for England and Wales, despite 
having including nothing for the English and Welsh counties' electorate. 
s For England and Wales O'Gorman starts with Cannon's 366,000 and ends up with 439,200, an increase of 20%. 
Assuming he increased Cannon's individual figures for England and Wales each by 20%, this gives an English figure of 
344,250 plus 201/o, i. e. 413,100. 
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that O'Gorman's figure was an under-estimate. For example, adding one percentage point to my turnout 
estimates would reduce my electorate estimate to 425,000, a number still above O'Gorman's estimate. 
Further, my figure is still somewhat of an underestimate of the true picture: as the electorate was growing in 
1800-31, and some of the estimates for 1831 are based on poll figures from before 1831, these estimates will 
be under-estimates. 
The potential electorate would have been even higher than 430,000. In counties voting rested with 
40% freeholders, ' who had, within the previous six months been assessed or charged for the land tax, with 
exceptions for redeemed and exempted land. 2 But not all land was assessed, exempted or redeemed. If a 
freeholder did not fall into any of these categories and wished to vote they not only had to make an extra 
effort, but they also risked incurring extra taxes. Hence, for example, in the late 1820s many Manchester 
freeholders did not have the vote. Not all the land that should have been assessed was, both due to the usual 3 
problems of variable local officials, and also because there was little incentive to keep up to date with parcels 
of land that only had a small (potential) land tax yield. This problem was exacerbated by towns like 
Manchester being assessed at a relatively small quota, so those who were paying did not have any strong 
incentive to push for a fuller assessment. 4 Matters were further confused when holdings of redeemed, 
exempted or land-tax free land were sold on, divided up or merged with other holdings, processes with which 
land tax records did not keep up. 5 Thus, land tax assessment lists were not de facto electoral registers, though 
sometimes they were used as such 6 In 1827 a Commons committee recommended the creation of county 
electoral registers as, inter alia, 
The Land Tax Assessment, which is the only legal List of Freeholders at present existing, has been a 
very defective criterion since the redemption of the Land Tax was permitted by law; and this 
imperfection of the Land Tax was permitted by law; and this imperfection is increasing every year, by 
fresh property being exempted, and by the sale and division of property, on which the Land Tax has 
been already redeemed. ' 
1 That is, those with a freehold of a clear annual value of at least 40/-. This was set by 81len. VI c. 7 (1429). It did not 
disturb the residency requirement, for voters and MPs, that had appeared in I IIen. V c. 1 (1413). 101len. VI c. 2 (1432) 
removed an anomaly in the 1429 act, which permitted someone resident in a county to vote, even though their 40/- 
freehold was located in another county. From 1432 the freehold had to be situated in the county someone voted in. The 
residence requirements were repealed by 14 Geo. III c. 58 (1774), though the residence requirements for county voters 
had long fallen into disuse: E. Porritt, "Barriers Against Democracy In The British Electoral System, " Political Science 
Quarterly, Volume 26 Number 1,1911, p. 2-3. 
2A law of 1802 (42 Geo. 1lI c. 116) allowed redeemed land to grant votes. It was clarified in 1811(51 Geo. III c. 99). 
3 M. Brock, The Great Reform Act, Ilutehinson, London, 1973, p. 30. 
4 Some other problems with the land tax are not a matter of concern in the electoral field. Acts of 1693 and 1798 made 
people whose estates were valued at less than £1 annual value exempt. Ilowever, as 40/- equals £2, only a trivial number 
of, if not no, people were exempt from the land tax on the basis of value and still managed to sneak in a county vote. 
Similarly, another problem with the land tax returns - the lumping together of small properties - is unlikely to have led to 
many potential county electors being omitted from the returns. 
s Some freeholds were created free of land tax (i. e. the owner of the principal estate retained responsibility for paying the 
land tax). But, as years passed, land changed hands and holdings merged and split it became increasingly difficult to 
prove that a freeholder whose freehold was not paying land tax was a freeholder such as this, as opposed to one who had 
simply never been assessed for the land tax. The electoral significance was that whilst the former type of freehold could 
grant a vote, the latter could not. 
6 E. g. EA. Smith, "The Yorkshire Elections Of 1806 And 1807, " Northern History, Volume 2,1967, p. 75. Further, an act of 
1780 required the Clerk of the Peace, or a deputy, to have copies of land tax assessments at county polls to help resolve 
disputes. 
7 Report From The Select Committee on County Election Polls, 1826-7 (349) IV, p. 2. 
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As in counties, there were people in boroughs who could have joined the electorate, but did not. As 
the next Section shows this is crucial to understanding what went on in freemen boroughs. More generally, 
though, the evidence is not available to estimate the potential electorate. 
2.3 Freemen 
Freemen boroughs elected nearly half the English borough MPs before 1832. Supporters of reform 
frequently alleged, and this allegation has seeped into the historiography, that in freemen boroughs 
corporations could, and did, manage the creation of freemen so as to influence the result of elections. 
Freemen could be created by four methods - by virtue of birth, marriage, by apprenticeship or by 
order. ' Boroughs varied as to which methods they allowed. Allegations were most commonly made against 
creations by order. This complaint was reflected in two statutes. The Durham act allowed freemen created by 
order to vote only if they had been freemen for at least twelve months before the election. After 1832 
freemen created in the future by apprenticeship or birth could still gain the vote in freemen boroughs, but 
freemen created by order could not. 3 One of the more extreme claims was that of Veitch, who wrote, 
Whenever 
... an election seemed likely to go against the wishes of the majority of the governing 
corporation, it was always possible to turn a minority into a majority by creating enough freemen of the 
right political colour to make up the deficiency. 4 
This claim falls within a well-worn historiographical tradition. It is, even in its own terms, somewhat 
paradoxical. If this happened frequently, it implies there were many occasions on which local elites faced 
electoral defeat, which does not fit the general picture of a decayed and closed system that Veitch and similar 
historians drew. If it did not happen frequently, then it is not a great criticism of the system. 
What has been lacking so far is a close examination of the statistical record. Clear prima facie 
evidence exists for a large increase in freemen creations just before elections, as the investigations into 
municipal corporations in the 1830s found. However, the matter becomes more complex on closer 
examination. Did such increases really occur? If they did, were they indicative of an electoral elite 
manufacturing a malleable electorate to suit its ends? Was what happened "bad"? 
An analysis of freemen creations is possible due to a Parliamentary Paper containing information on 
freemen creations in freemen boroughs in 1800-31 s Years with polls saw substantially more freemen created 
I use by order to include other methods like "by purchase, " "by grant" and "honorary. " They all share an essential 
common feature: a person could become a freeman by one of these methods without requiring an additional 
qualification, in contrast, to, for example creation by birth, where having the right parents was required. "Servitude" is 
sometimes used instead of "apprenticeship, " and "patrimony" instead of "by birth. " 
23 Geo. III c. 15 (1763), which was named after an infamous Durham election where the corporation created over 200 
honorary freemen. London and Norwich were excluded from its provisions. This act, by requiring Returning Officers to 
keep records of those entitled to vote, probably contains the first statutory electoral registration requirements. Bills were 
(unsuccessfully) introduced in 1785 and 1786 to inaugurate county electoral registers. They were briefly introduced in 
1788-9 (following 28 Geo. III c. 36), but soon were abandoned in the face of administrative costs and difficulties. 
32 Wil1. IV c. 45, clause 32. 
4 G. S. Veitch, The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform, with introduction by R. Muir, Constable, London, 1913, p. 6. 
Others examples are Porritts, House Of Commons, Volume 1, p. 65-8 and Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 34. An excellent 
introduction as to why scepticism is justified is Phillips, "Electoral Politics, " p. 96-7. 
s 1831-2 (112) XXXVI. I have used figures for 66 freemen boroughs, plus 1 householder and 6 scot and lot boroughs 





than other years: on average 463% more freemen were created in a constituency in a year with a poll than 
other years. ' However, as Phillips pointed out, "an impending election is a motivating influence that can be 
expected to expand the electorate if it can be expanded; corruption need not be involved . 
Given the Durham Act, freemen creations by order had to occur at least twelve months before a poll 
for the new freemen to have been able to vote. There are only a few examples of significantly above average 
numbers of freemen created in a calendar year before a poll occur. Further, in many of these cases the poll 
occurred early in the next calendar year, so less than twelve months would have expired since the creations 
of most of these freemen. Thus, it is unlikely that these peaks were caused by nefarious creation of freemen 
by order. 
This is confirmed by those boroughs where freemen creation figures are broken down by type. The 
fluctuations in freemen creations in years of polls was caused by increases in the numbers created by birth or 
apprenticeship. In other words, people who could have been freemen often did not take up the opportunity 
until an election came along to prod them into action. There were several reasons for someone not becoming 
a freeman even if able to. First, they may have been living in a different part of the country, or even 
practising their trade in one of those parts of the City that lay outside the corporation's jurisdiction. Second, 
becoming a freeman cost money. Third, participating in corporations' affairs, even simply by being a 
freeman, could result in someone being lobbied, pressured or even appointed to an unwanted office, 
avoidance of serving in which might require a fine to be paid.; 
Thus, the picture is not one of the creation of malleable electorates for electoral elites to manipulate, 
but rather of the interest and generosity generated by elections persuading people to become freemen. 
Sometimes candidates paid their fees for them. However, even if freemen's fees were paid by others, and 
even if they were attracted largely by the possibility of receiving largesse from candidates in financial and 
edible form, it is not clear this was "bad. " It resulted in more people being brought into the electoral system, 
with financial help from the richer part of society. Further, these people were not just anybody; they were 
people who all met other requirements (such as having a freeman father or having been apprenticed to a 
freeman). The surge in freemen creations was no more "corrupt" than modem politicians going around with 
electoral registration forms and signing people up to the electoral register. This system may also have aided 
social stability, by drawing into the electoral system a wider social spectrum than would otherwise have been 
(.. continued) 
1715 to 1847, compilation of 3 volumes published 1844-50, Political Reference Publications, Chichester, 1973 is my 
source for whether polls occurred. I have adjusted the years in which Bristol is tagged as having a poll to allow for its 
figures not being for calendar years, but the twelve months commencing 29 September. No allowance has been made for 
unpolled contests. For example, the large number of freemen created in Newcastle in 1830 was due to the fierce electoral 
contest there that year; a contest, however, which was resolved without a poll. Although it would be nice to make such 
an allowance the amount of research required - there are no convenient lists of contests that did not result in polls - was 
not practicable. The figures from York come from my own tally of the records (D4,5 and 25, York City Archives). 
There are no numbers for Maldon 1800-09 as its charter was only restored in 1810. This (and possibly interest in 
controlling the new corporation) probably explains the large numbers of freemen created in 1810 and 1811, which I have 
therefore excluded from my calculations on the number of freemen created in typical non-poll years. Data saved as 
fmcre. mtp and fmcre2. mtp. 
1 In only four constituencies is the mean for poll years smaller than that for non-poll years. 
2 Phillips, "Electoral Politics, " p. 96. 
3 For some York examples see A. J. Peacock, York In The Age Of Reform, York DPhil, 1973, p. 25. 
4 For example see p. 153. 
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the case. Large freemen boroughs like York often were relatively quiet, or at least had peaceful working- 
class politics. ' 
The overall impact, in terms of increasing the size of the electorate, was noticeable. A meaningful 
estimate is hard to make given that larger freemen boroughs, with larger annual freemen creations on 
average, were also more likely to poll. The total difference between constituency means for years with and 
without polls is 7508. Assuming that at a typical general election around 40% of freemen boroughs polled 
(as implied by Appendix 1), this would mean about 3,000 electors being added at each general election, 
probably more given the greater penchant of larger freemen boroughs for polling. This is equivalent to 
adding roughly the size of York's electorate to the English electorate at each general election; a noticeable, 
though not mould-breaking, increase. 
2.4 The reformed system 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The electoral system's vitality before 1831 was reflected in the electorate's size, which was often 
increased by electoral contests, precipitated by conflicts within political elites. I now turn to the impact of 
1832, and whether a similar picture existed into the mid-century. The first question is: what did 1832 do to 
the electorate's size? The usual comparison has been that of the 1831 electorate with the electoral register 
totals for 1832.2 However, this comparison falls down in several ways 
3 
2.4.2 Multiple entries and multiple electors 
People could be entered more than once on an electoral register for a particular constituency. If a 
register were divided into different townships or parishes, and a person had qualifying property in more than 
one, he was often entered more than once. Similarly, if someone qualified in a borough under both the £lOer 
and the ancient right franchises his name might be down more than once. The number of such multiple 
entries could vary greatly from one year to another. This could so produce misleading trends in electoral 
register totals, as in Beverley where the number of multiple entries was 2 in 1836 (1062 register entries) and 
219 in 1839 (1273 entries). 4 So, although the register total increased in 1836-9 by 211, the number of 
individuals on the register declined by 6 (from 1060 to 1054). The occurrence of borough multiple entries 
was increased by the fact that freemen lists were assembled by town clerks, whilst the rest of the registers 
were done by overseers. There was also an incentive to have multiple entries. The more entries a person had 
1 For a different explanation of the lack of violence in Coventry Chartism - another large freeman borough - see P. 
Searby, "Chartists and freemen in Coventry, 1838-1860, " Social History (ffuli), Volume 2,1977.1le stresses the importance 
of lavish charities and how being a freeman divided freemen from other Chartist supporters. 
2 Electoral registers were in force for twelve months, running from 1 November (later 1 December), and so cut across 
two calendar years. I refer to registers by the year they came into force. For example, the electoral registers that ran from 
1 November 1836 to 31 October 1837 I call 1836 registers. Many others either do not follow this scheme, or are 
inconsistent, so care must be taken in comparing my figures to others. 
3 Also, there is the problem that different sources give different figures for the total size of the electoral registers in 1832. 
Figures from Appendix 9. Multiple entries have been referred to by historians as "double entries" and were often 
referred to by contemporaries as "joint qualifications. " However, on some occasions people were on registers three, or 
even more, times and "joint qualifications" is easy to confuse with qualifications based on property jointly held by more 
than one person. Thus, I have coined the phrase multiple entries. 
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on a register, the more likely it was he would be able to vote: a successful objection against one entry did not 
automatically invalidate the others. ' Further, the same person might be registered in more than one 
constituency; such people I term multiple electors. 2 
2.4.3 Administrative difficulties 
There was a sharp rise in numbers on registers in the 1830s (p. 63-71). It is too sharp to be attributed 
to rises in population and wealth, and often occurred in the wrong areas for such an explanation, such as 
those with falling population. Rather, whilst the 1832 legislation provided opportunities to join the 
electorate, many people did not utilise them immediately. This is unsurprising given that traditionally a 
qualified person could simply turn up and vote, without any need to have registered beforehand. This habit 
did not die overnight. As the Edinburgh Review commented, people "have always voted without being 
registered and did not see why they should have anything of the kind to do now. "4 Additionally, the system 
was neither clear nor simple to operate - witness the proliferation of registration advice in the press and 
published manuals - and there was no prospect of a general election in the near future after 1832, so it is 
unsurprising that not everyone who could get on the register did so at the first possible occasion! 
There is a sharp contrast between the design of the registration machinery, drawn up in expectation 
of many applications from those who were not qualified, and the reality of many who were qualified not 
applying. The level of enthusiasm for participation in the system was less than expected, but even then the 
administration often could not cope. An 1843 Commons committee concluded, 
From ignorance and inattention, the Parish Registers of Electors have been, in many cases, most 
incorrectly, and in others not at all made out ... many 
instances have occurred of great neglect or wilful 
misconduct ... Frauds of the grossest description were committed 
by interested agents and by overseers 
of the poor, and by persons connected with them ... which never came to the 
knowledge of the Revising 
Barristers 6 
Administrative difficulties could increase, as well as depress, electoral registers' sizes. Confusion sometimes 
resulted from the use of old registers as the basis for compiling a new one. In boroughs a person had to make 
a new claim each year, even if he was already registered and his qualification had not changed from the 
previous year. The overseers were meant to compile a new list each year, though, not unreasonably, often 
relied heavily on the old list. It is not obvious that they were efficient at removing entries for people who had 
1 This could be an objection either at the time of register compilation, or when the person attempted to poll. An objection 
that someone had received poor relief would, if upheld, stop someone from voting regardless of the number of their 
entries. However, an objection such as that a piece of property was inaccurately described would only apply to an entry 
relevant to it. 
2 "Plural voters" has occasionally been used to mean the same thing, but as it has also been used to mean other things I 
have coined the phrase multiple electors. 
Moore found no overall correlation between changes in population and changes in number of register entries: Politics 
of Deference, p. 250-1. 
Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 116. 
There is a further short-term technical reason that was popular with some contemporaries: there was little time between 
the England and Wales reform bill receiving royal assent and the deadline by which taxes had to be paid in order to be 
able to register. 
6 Report from the Select Committee on Election Expenses; With the Minutes of Evidence and an Appendix, Government, 
Elections, Volume 1,1834 (591) IX, p. xvi-xvii. 
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moved, died or whatever. ' The lists also suffered from sometimes being made by unthinkingly copying out 
the occupiers' column from rate books? Boroughs suffered further from the lack of provisions in the 1832 
legislation for defraying the costs of drawing up freemen lists. 3 In counties once someone was on the 
register, he could stay there without any further actions for ever. He need only take further action if the 
nature of his qualification changed or was challenged. This meant that each year a large part of the previous 
register was simply rolled over in counties; this was a method likely to produce an accumulation of out-of- 
date entries. With the lack of public enthusiasm for participating in the registration process the system was 
not a recipe for accurate registers, and meant that registration, though nominally done by local officials, in 
practice was on occasions largely a matter for political organisations to sort out. 
Recycling old registers meant there could be one, or even more, defunct entries for a person on a 
register. As well as providing problems for calculating the size of the electorate, this also provided an 
opportunity for fraud or personation. Suppose someone moved from one polling district to another, and was 
registered for both polling districts. As polling for the different districts took place at different booths, if not 
different places, this meant that even if officials were aware of a person having duplicate entries, it was 
difficult to stop votes being cast for both entries - how, in an age without telephones, could officials 
conveniently check when someone came to vote under that name at one booth whether someone had voted 
under that name in the other? Conversely, at Beverley in 1847 there were three occasions on which someone 
voted at the wrong booth, and then when people with similar names later appeared at that booth to vote they 
were refused as the officials believed they had already voted ý 
Although simpler in intent than the previous electoral system, that ushered in by 1832 was in many 
ways more complicated, with more idiosyncrasies. This needs stressing as it has been common for historians 
to make comments like, 
The framers of the Reform Bills ... substituted a rational uniformity for the chaotic and arbitrary diversity which had prevailed in the past' 
The new system was non-uniform both because property values varied around the country, and also because 
there were sufficient grey areas for the different practices in different places of officials to make for 
effectively different franchises. This was a cause of the lack of simplicity of the new system. Whilst for 
historians it is simpler to, for example, write of a uniform £10 franchise than of the variety of pre-1832 
franchises, it was often the case within any individual constituency that the new franchise was more 
complicated. This was not merely because of the large grey areas, but also because it took time for new local 
precedents and practices to be generated. Their presence before 1832 had often made the "complicated" and 
"diverse" earlier franchises clear-cut. Where there were matters of genuine dispute, they had often been 
1 Or even efficient at anything. Many overseers were "very illiterate and uninformed persons": 1834 (591) IX, p. 25. 
2 This problem was sharply brought to my attention when I attempted to locate York electors registered as fI Oers in the 
1830s in York rate books. Frequently as many as 20-30% of them were not in the rate books for the properties they had 
qualified for. A significant part of this is explained by the failure of rate books to list every occupier of a property. 
3I Iowever, many municipal officers (illegally) claimed sums for their part in the registration process: 1834 (591) IX. 
4 Beverley 1847 poll book. 
s A. S. Turberville and F. Beckwith, "Leeds and Parliamentary Reform, 1820-1832, " Thoresby Miscellany, Volume 12, 
1954, p. 45. 
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settled by the House of Commons, which had the final say. ' Further, the old franchises were not abolished 
outright, but curtailed; thus, a new, complicated franchise not merely created its own problems, but had to 
run in tandem with a different franchise system in constituencies, except for the boroughs newly created in 
1832 where there were no ancient righters. 
In counties, the 1832 legislation added three new headings under which people could qualify, and 
while there were many types of freehold pre-1832 they were normally well known and resulted in little 
litigation? The legislation of 1832 did little to simplify the question of what was, or was not, a freehold. 
Indeed, probably the most widespread dispute - over whether dissenting ministers could count their salary as 
a freehold - occurred after 1832.3 More dramatic circumventions of the spirit of the law, as with claiming a 
vote in respect of a freehold share in a cemetery or a bridge, were also of increasing popularity after 1832. 
Other, more subtle, difficulties were also added in 1832. For example, leases frequently came into force on 
Michelmas Day (29 September), which meant that someone had to hold such a lease for 22 months before 
meeting the legislation's requirements, which nominally required only 12 months. After 1832 there were 576 
types of qualifying freehold in counties 4 There were 400 different kinds of title that could confer a copyhold 
qualification and 250 kinds of title that could count as a leasehold. 5 This was not a simple system. 
These complexities and ambiguities were magnified by officials who made interpretations and 
rulings, often in ignorance of their brethren's decisions and with little outside guidance. This was not 
conducive to consistency across time or place. Even things as apparently straight-forward as residency 
requirements hid many complexities. If it referred to the normal place of residence of a person, it meant they 
did not actually have to live there, but if it referred to where they actually lived this opened up all sorts of 
possibilities for disputes over who slept where and when. And did residency have to be of all of the property 
that qualified someone for a vote, or was residence of only part of it sufficient? Thus, for example, one 
1 Under the Last Determinations Act (7&8 Will. III c. 7,1696, strengthened by 2 Geo. II c. 24,1729) Parliamentary 
elections had to be conducted according to the last determination of the House of Commons as to that constituency's 
constituency. This legislation is an example of the often paradoxical nature of the electoral system's vitality. It often 
clarified and simplified the system, but also entrenched restricted franchises and made challenges to them harder. Thus, 
for example, the Porritts lament this legislation as safeguarding the grip of borough patrons: "opposition inside the 
borough from the unenfranchised inhabitants, and opposition from outside by men desirous of breaking down his 
domination, were effectually warned off": Porritts, (louse Of Commons, Volume 1, p. 10. The Last Determinations Act 
was relaxed in 1788 (28 Geo. III c. 52) when it became permissible, within twelve months of the Commons making a last 
determination for a constituency, to petition against that determination. The twelve months was cut to six by 53 Geo. III 
c. 71 (1813). 
2 The variety of items which could qualify as freeholds has been a favourite target for historians' ridiculing the pre-1832 
franchise. I iowever, the triviality of this question regarding one of their favourite targets - church pews - is demonstrated 
by the lateness of the major cases on this issue - Hinde v. Charlton in 1866 and Brumfitt v. Roberts in 1870. 
3 If they derived their salary from land or houses and were appointed for life it could be argued this was a freehold which 
could grant a vote. Ilowever, they were often appointed both for life but also only "during their good behaviour. " As this 
meant they could be removed it was arguable that it was not really an appointment for life, in which case it could not 
grant a vote. This ambiguity produced different rulings in different places. 
4 Brock, Reform Act, p. 326. 
5 Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 17-18. 
6 The difficulty was exacerbated by the infrequency of intense contents or registrations, which meant that most officials 
built up little experience. It was this problem that made the Yorkshire Under-Sheriff to publish a book after the 1807 
contest to pass his experience on: J. Wolstenholme, An Account Of The Manner Of Proceedings At The Contested 
Election For Yorkshire, In 1807, Chiefly Relating To The Office Of Sheri(ß J. Wolstenholme, York, 1818. Matters 
regarding the efficacy of officials were so bad in 1836 that an act had to be passed to legalise a special one-off laxer 
time-scale for electoral registration: 6&7 Will. IV c. 101. Checks on officials were also tightened up by, for example, 
6&7 Vict. c. 18 (1843). 
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Yorkshire revising barrister was reported in 1833 as deciding that he had been too strict the previous year in 
interpreting residence requirements. ' Likewise the ability of trustees to qualify in respect of trust property 
proved problematic, with differing interpretations of the interaction of Clauses 23 and 26 of 2 Will. IV c. 45. 
Another example of the electoral system's ability to make almost anything a point of contention was 
the delivery of objections to those claiming to be on a register. For some years it was debatable whether an 
objection notice had to be served personally by an objector or if a servant could deliver it; 2 similarly, did an 
objection form have to be fully filled-in before it was signed? The difficulties faced by local officials in 
running the system was exemplified by Baring's lament, 
The Overseers of the poor were to fulfil all the provisions of a clause which had puzzled the greatest 
lawyers in the House. 
These problems were exacerbated by the low performance of many officials 4 
In brief, the system introduced in 1832 suffered from complexity and relying on officials who often 
were either ill qualified or did not put in much effort. In some cases this did not matter greatly; if active 
registration organisations existed then such errors regarding the organisations' supporters were quickly 
picked ups. 
2.4.4 Compounding 
A somewhat technical feature of the 1832 registration machinery has been a favourite with 
historians, and frequently flagged as a case where large numbers of people who could (and should) have 
been in the electorate were deprived of their democratic voice by a quirk of legislative detail. 
An 1819 act, along with various local acts, allowed parish vestries to instruct that rates below a 
certain value be paid by landlords rather than occupiers .6 In turn, 
landlords would add rates to the rent bill for 
their tenants - compounding the two charges. The intention was to save collection costs, and as a result 
discounts of 20-25% were often given for compounding. However, it meant that only the landlord's name 
appeared in the parish rate-book. Yet, in boroughs where poor rates existed they formed the basis for the 
electoral register. ' The 1832 legislation allowed people to demand to be rated, and thereby listed in rate 
1 Markham, Nineteenth-Century Parliamentary Elections, p. 16. 
2 Objections could only be posted aller 6&7 Viet. c. 18 (1843). 
3 J. Prest, Politics In The Age of Cobden, Macmillan, London, 1977, p. 14. 
For example, see J. D. Chambers, The New Bills For The Registration Of Electors Critically Examined With A View To 
The Principles On Which They Should Be Foundea And The Evils And Defects They Propose To Remedy, Saunders and 
Bening, London, 1836, p. 5-6. It is no coincidence the Graham's 1843 reforms (6&7 Vict. c. 18) included provisions for 
prodding local officials into action. The difficulties were not restricted to Parliamentary elections. In Leeds the Poor Law 
Commission suspended elections for the Board of Guardians for seven years after the Overseers messed up the 1837 
elections: J. Knott, Popular Opposition to the 1834 Poor Law, Croom I Ielm, London, 1986, p. 147 and 173 n5. 
s Prest, Politics In The Age Of Cobden, has a wealth of detail about the workings and non-workings of the registration 
system. 
6 59 Geo. II1 c. 12, clause 19. It only allowed compounding on properties in the £6-£20 rent range. 
7 Compounding was a genuinely useful administrative measure, and its abolition in 1867 resulted in a wave of protests, 
and its subsequent restoration. 
$ The legal situation was more complicated as it could be claimed that a person was rated, but simply using the landlord 
as an agent, or conduit, for paying. In general, however, though such arguments kept lawyers entertained, not being 
entered in a rate book was an extremely serious drawback if someone wished to register. 
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books. ' This made it harder for compounded tenants to claim a vote, especially after the Court of Common 
Pleas ruled that an occupier must claim every time rates were due - usually four times a year, though up to 
six in some areas. Although Clay's 1851 Acte cut this requirement to claiming annually, a problem remained, 
especially as Clay's Act required people to both make their claims and pay their rates personally. 
However, it is unclear how big a problem compounding was. The standard (and much quoted) 
source in situations like this is Seymour. Seymour thought compounding was a major problem, claiming that, 
"In general the houses for which the rates were compounded and paid by the landlord ranged in annual value 
from ten to eighteen pounds. "3 Were this true, it would mean compounding could have had a substantial 
impact in stopping people joining the electorate. However, his source for the above claim - Hansard's report 
of a speech by Clay - actually says something rather different. It reported Clay as saying, 
There existed a class in London, and, he believed, in almost every large town in the country, who, 
though inhabiting houses of the value of 101. and upwards - often as high as 181. - had not their names 
on the rate-book, and for this reason, that in many parishes the local Acts enabled the owners of houses 
to compound the rates of the tenants 4 
Clay was claiming that some houses in the £10-18 annual value range were compounded; this is very 
different from Seymour's claim that, in general, all compounded houses fell into this range. 
Seymour gave evidence of the supposed seriousness of the compounding problem in several 
constituencies, drawn from claims made by MPs. 5 In the absence of other evidence we need to be wary about 
partisan claims provided without well-sourced supporting evidence, especially as Seymour quotes 
approvingly a clearly erroneous speech by W. Williams. Williams compared the numbers rated to the poor 
at £10 p. a. or more with the numbers registered. However, being rated to the poor at £10 was no guarantee 
that someone had property with an annual value (on which the franchise was based) of £ 10 
7 Furthermore, 
Williams assumed that anyone rated to the poor at £10 would have been, were it not for compounding, able 
to register. e This ignores women, those who had moved, non-payers of taxes and, in fact, anyone who fell 
foul of any of the (many) other requirements to register. Even if all these £ 10 poor-rated people really did 
have £ 10 annual value property, many of them would have fallen foul of these other requirements. And even 
if they did not, they still might not have registered. Thus, the type of calculations that Williams makes - 
naively comparing the number of people in a particular type of property with the number registered - has 
little meaning. 
12 Will. IV c. 45, clause 30. It is not clear if they were therefore liable to pay the rates they had claimed to be rated for, 
nor, if they were, whether they had to pay the full amount or if the compounding discount still applied. Finally, there was 
still the inconvenience of having to pay the sums oneself, and the possibility that rents would not be cut by an amount 
equal to the rates now being paid by tenants. 
2 14&15 Vict. c. 14. 
3 Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 149-50. 
4 Ilansard, 3rd series, Volume 113, c. 188,24 July 1850. 
s Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 150-1. 
6 Hansard, 3rd series, Volume 115, c. 902,2 April 1851. 
7 Appendix 2 has more details on the different types of property valuation. 
6 Or rather, he does in the cases where it is clear what he is talking about. In some cases it is not at all clear what his 
numbers are meant to refer to. 
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Finally, Seymour's statistics are suspect. ' He claimed that, "of the entire body of £10 householders 
before the second Reform Act, more than ten per cent were disenfranchised" because of the compounding 
issue and their non-use of the legal loopholes. This is based on a misinterpretation of the evidence. The 
number of £ 10 householders he quotes - 644,5223 - was in fact the number of male occupiers at a gross 
estimated rental of at least £ 10 p. a. 4 Note again the slip away from annual value to another form of property 
valuation. The problem of gross estimated rental not being the same as annual value is demonstrated by the 
case of Hull. In 1866 there were 1143 men compounding at a gross estimated rental of at least £ 10, of whom 
only 238 were registered. But, of the others a full 649 were in properties with annual values of under £10 s 
Returning to Seymour's figures, of the 644,522,95,120 compounded under local acts at a gross 
estimated rental of at least j10.6 Of them 25,004 were registered, and 70,016 were not. 7 Seymour thus claims 
the impact of compounding was to disfranchise these 70,016. However, gross estimated rental is not the 
same as annual value, and not everyone who could register did. To allow for these factors, I take the 1866 
English borough electorate - about 500,000 (Table 2.1) - and compare it to the number of men in £10 gross 
estimated rental properties - 644,522. In other words, about 475,000 (500,00 - 25,004) non-compounders 
were registered, compared with about 550,000 (644,522 - 95,120) non-compounders with £10 gross 
estimated rental property. This suggests a hit rate of about 86%. So, if compounding had no effect, one 
would expect to find about 86% of the 95,000 compounders with £ 10 gross estimated rental property 
registered, or about 82,000. Given the actual figures was 25,004 this produces a registration short-fall of 
about 57,000. This is noticeably smaller than Seymour's 70,116, and is an estimate likely to be too high: 
compounders were likely to be at the poorer end of society (being in smaller, lower value properties, as those 
Brock's figures (Reform Act, p. 326) have similar problems. 
2 Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 155. 
Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 155 n1. 
4 Returns showing in respect of the several Parliamentary Boroughs in England and Wales, the Number of Boroughs in 
which the Small Tenements Rating Act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 99), the 39 Geo. 3, c. 12, or any local Act for Rating the Owners 
instead of the Occupiers, is in force in all or any of the Parishes, distinguishing those Boroughs in which the Small 
Tenements Rating Act is wholly from those in which it is partly in force, and distinguishing in like manner those 
Boroughs in which there is a Local Rating Act: The Number of Male Occupiers within the Limits of Value prescribed by 
those Acts respectively (showing separately the Number at and over a Gross Estimated Rental of f10): And the Number 
of Male Occupiers not within such Limits, and the Total Number of Male Occupiers within each Borough, 1867 (136) 
LVI. 
s Returns of the Parliamentary Boroughs or Parts of Boroughs under Local Acts for the Composition of Rates: Of the 
Number of Male Occupiers at £10 and upwards whose Rates are Compounded for in each of them: And of the Number of 
such Persons Registered and Unregistered respectively, 1867 (305) LVI. 
6 1867 (305) LVI. The actual number was somewhat higher, as Manchester and London's returns were incomplete. 
Compounding under 13&14 Vict. c. 99 (1850) is probably not relevant here as that had a maximum value of £6 rateable 
value for which property could be compounded, and this is unlikely to have equalled an annual value of £IO in any 
cases. A different potential problem is compounding under 59 Geo. III c. 12 (1819), but Returns of the Number of 
Parishes in each Parliamentary City and Borough in England and Wales: Of the Number and Names of such Parishes in 
each such City and Borough in which the Composition of Poor Rates under any Local or General Act, or otherwise, 
exists, or has been adopted or allowed; specifying such Act, and the limit of Rateable Value to which such Composition 
Applies, 1862 (33) XLIX Part I suggests this rarely occurred. See also A Return of the Proportions to the Rent or actual 
Value at which the Parochial Assessments are made in each Parish or Township within the Limits of the several Places 
intended hereafter to send Representatives To Parliament; distinguishing those adopted in case ofAssessment of 
Landlords, under the Authority of the Act 59 Geo. Ill. c. 12, from those in other cases; also specking the Period at 
which the last General Valuation or Assessment was effected therein; and stating, as far as it may be practicable, 
whether such Rates are equally and fairly apportioned, or otherwise, according to the Value of Property in such Town 
or Parish, 1831-2 (444) XXXVI. 
1867 (305) LVI. 
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were the ones that compounding applied to), and it is a common feature of electoral studies in other places 
and other times that such people take a less active part in electoral politics. Also, the 95,120 compounders in 
question were distributed amongst merely 21 English boroughs. ' 
Though 57,000 is a noticeable figure and many of these 21 boroughs were large places, we should 
beware of being seduced by the lure of big cities. In some large urban sprawls compounding was a serious 
problem when it came to registration, but in most places it was a trivial matter. For example, in Yorkshire 
constituencies in 1862 compounding was not a major issue. In all of Bradford, Halifax, Hull, Leeds, Malton, 
Northallerton, Pontefract, Richmond, Ripon, Scarborough, Thirsk and York there were only two parishes 
where compounding both existed and applied to property up to a rateable value of more than V. 
Further, it is not clear that full use was made of the possibilities available to get around the 
compounding problems. In 1860 the Clerk to the Birmingham Board of Guardians commented, 
It is remarkable, however, that although this Act [14 & 15 Vict. c. 39] was passed so long since [1851], 
until the year 1859, whether from ignorance of the law or from want of appreciation of the privilege, I 
know not, there were no claims made from occupiers to be rated; but during the year 1859, in 
consequence of some efforts made, I believe, by gentlemen feeling some interest in the matter, and who 
made the enactment in question publicly known, as many as 1,360 compound occupiers availed 
themselves of their right 3 
Public apathy had a major role in exacerbating the impact of compounding; to a degree the impact of 
compounding was a voluntary, self-induced phenomena which it required activity generated by political 
contests to overcome. Compounding was not as great a problem as often thought, and it is another example 
of how conflicts between electoral elites could produce an opening up of the system, though in the absence 
of such conflicts apathy often won. 
2.4.5 Costs of registering 
The reluctance of many to register was reinforced by the financial charges for registering. Claims to 
be registered in counties cost 1/-. There was no further cost in future years for a person who retained the 
same qualification 4 In boroughs there was an annual charge of 1/- leviable on all those on the register and 
the sums were collected as part of the poor rates .5 It 
is hard, and not particularly fruitful, to convert those 
costs into 1990s prices given the great inequalities of income distribution in the nineteenth century and the 
great variety in the rises in prices of different goods since then. However, some indication can be given by 
1 Birmingham, Brighton, Bristol, Canterbury, Chatham, Finsbury, Greenwich, Ilull, Lambeth, Leicester, London, 
Maidstone, Manchester, Marylebone, Oxford, Plymouth, Rochester, Southampton, Southwark, Tower I lamlets, 
Westminster. 
2 These were the Bull parishes of Itoly Trinity and St Mary (£8) and Sculcoates (£10): 1862 (33) XLIX Part 1. I am 
confident that the usual compounding limit of £6 rateable value did not equate to an annual value of £10. This is not 
simply because of the gap between six and ten, but also because compounding was designed to include only the lowest 
properties, whilst the electoral franchise was designed to exclude just such properties. 
3 Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Elective Franchise in Counties and Boroughs &c.; 
Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, 1860 (455) XII q. 2708. 
Though Clay's Act made it easier for compounders to register, it had still been possible before 1851. 
2 Will. IV c. 45, clauses 37 and 56 and Schedule 11 No. l. 
2 Will. IV c. 45, clause 56. This was a charge per elector rather than per register entry, so there was no financial 
incentive to avoid multiple entries. There were failed bills in 1834 and 1835 to restrict the fee to the first year of an 
elector's registration. 
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using wheat prices. In 1780 wheat cost £8.92 per tonne, in 1850 £9.55 per tonne and in 1987 1113.9 per 
tonne. 1 Therefore, wheat has risen by around eleven-fold since then and the 1/- fee would now be 11 
shillings, or just over 50 new pence. But, national income in 1831 was approximately £350 million. It is now 
approximately £450 billion, or an increase of around 1300-fold. This would make 1/- now equivalent to 1300 
shillings, or £65. A third comparison is that the typical English factory operative worked a 69 hour week for 
11 shillings in the 1840S. 2 If we compare this with a weekly wage of £230 in the present, this would make 1 
shilling equivalent to nearly £21. 
Regardless of the precise size of the charge, it was unpopular. As one local official commented in 
1834, 
I have found many complaining, and in many instances parties have wilfully refrained from paying their 
taxes that they might not be on the register ... 
[Many in my parish] would not give in their claims, 
because of that charge. 3 
The collection of the money did not go smoothly. The initial problems were so great that they were one 
reason for an 1834 Commons committee recommending ending the charges. It concluded: "in many of the 
Metropolitan Parishes the Shilling cannot be collected, " whilst in counties the requirement to send payment 
in with a claim was, in an age without cheques and credit cards, problematic. 4 Nevertheless, the money was 
often paid .3 
In addition to its financial costs, registering took time, and could cause inconvenience. For example, 
a claim to be registered might be objected to .6 Even 
if the claim went smoothly, the fact of being registered 
might increase the interest of political activists in the person. This might not be unpleasant - like the offering 
of free food and drink - but it might be, particularly if the elector were caught between conflicting pressures. 
A way to avoid electoral pressure was to not register at all. 
2.4.6 Review 
Simply comparing the 1831 electorate with the total number of electoral register entries in 1832 
reveals little: the number of register entries does not measure the number of electors, and using 1832 assumes 
that the full electorate-expanding effects of 1832 came into reality in the new system's first year of operation. 
Finally, the electorate would have carried on growing even without the 1832 legislation 
Adjusting for multiple entries and multiple electors, and using, say, 1836 rather than 1832, deals 
with some of these problems. However, even using 1836 does not reveal much regarding how many of the 
opportunities offered by 1832 were actually taken up. Even in 1836 it cannot be assumed that everyone who 
could register was actually registered. As contemporaries put it, 
1 H. F. Marks, ed D. K. Britton, A Hundred Years ojBritish Food & Farming: A Statistical Survey, London, 1989, p. 40. 
2 C. R. Weld, Statistical Companion To The Pocket Book, John W. Parker, London, 1843, p. 10. 
3 1834 (591) IX, p. 48. By delaying payment of taxes a person could fall foul of one of the electoral registration 
requirements, fall off the register and save 1/-. 
4 1834 (591) IX, p. xvi. 
s E. g. see Bradford, Ripon, Tavistock, Thetford and Warrington in Appendix 2 of 1834 (591) IX. 
6 One exchange in 1834 (591) IX went: "May not the trouble given to electors be sufficient to deter them from 
prosecuting their votes? - Decidedly": p. 78. 
35 
Persons who might easily qualify themselves frequently omit to do so, merely from ignorance, 
forgetfulness, or laziness, ' 
and, 
You are placed in this dilemma - unless the excitement of a pending contest operates at the moment, 
voters will not register themselves; and yet the main use of the registry is to have their claims decided 
when men's passions are not roused. 2 
Yet, the core of the system - property-based franchises and electoral registration - remained, and 
was largely unchallenged, except by those who wanted universal suffrage. This core gave rise to numerous 
problems (what is property? how do you value it? etc. ), but it was only these - rather than the core - that 
reform efforts were directed towards. This suggests that problems were, to a degree, inevitable rather than 
flaws that can be ridiculed and could have been solved. 
Notably, the core of the system was not even challenged in the Hertford bill (1834). This former 
householder borough, in which freemen had also had the vote, saw great corruption in 1832. The result was a 
Parliamentary bill, but its terms did not go to the heart of the system. Rather, they were simply to 
disfranchise householders and introduce the ballot 3 
The confusion and complexity outlined above bred opportunity, particularly for the Tories in the 
1830s and the Anti-Corn Law League in the 1840s. Faced with many a potential elector who, in Brougham's 
words, "did not care for his vote and if left to himself would not go to register it, " political organisations had 
great scope to make a difference. Conflicts within political elites produced a desire to work the electoral 
system to gain favourable results, and hence provoked an opening up of the system and more efforts being 
made to register people 4 It was all done with a jaundiced political eye, and a desire to win political power. 
t E. W. Cox and S. G. Grady, The New Law And Practice Of Registration And Elections; Comprising The Representation Of 
The People Act 1867, The Registration Act 1868, The Corrupt Practices Act 1868; Incorporating The Reform Act and the 
Subsequent Statutes, The Decisions Of The Court Of Common Pleas Upon Appeals To The Present Time; With Instructions 
For The Management Of Elections In Counties, Cities, And Boroughs, For The Management Of Registration, And For 
Returning Officers, With Precedents Of Books, Forms, Etc., And The Law Of Election Petitions, 10th edition, Law Times and 
Horace Cox, London, 1868, p. lxxiv on boroughs. 
2 Edinburgh Review, Volume 56, January 1833, p. 544. 
3 The latter was defeated 82-132 and the whole bill fell with the 1834 dissolution. This interpretation of the Hertford bill 
is at odds with that in V. Rowe, "The I Iertford Borough Bill of 1834, " Parliamentary History, Volume 11 Part 1,1992. She 
claims the bill, "would have given I lertford a franchise different from that of every other borough in the country. " This is 
wrong. Ilertford had been the only borough where, before 1832, freemen and householders could vote. Thus, after 1832 it 
had a unique franchise of £10ers plus (some) freemen and householders. The bill, by abolishing householders' votes and 
with a description of the £10 franchise almost word-for-word identical to that of the Reform Act (cf A Bill For preventing 
Bribery and Corruption in the Election of Members to serve in Parliament for the Borough of hiertfora in the County of 
Hertford As Amended By The Committee, 1834 (138)1I, clauses 6-9 with 2 Will. IV c. 45 clause 127; the differences are 
semantic rather than meaningful), would have replaced the unique franchise with one the same as that of all those boroughs 
where freemen had been able to vote previous to 1832. 
Rowe is also wrong in her interpretation of the clauses 6-9 added in the committee stage of the bill (cf 1834 (138) 11 and A 
Bill For preventing Bribery and Corruption in the Election of Members to serve in Parliament for the Borough of Hertford 
in the County of Hertford, 1834 (11) II). Before the addition of these clauses 2 Will. IV c. 45 clause 27 would have applied. 
Clauses 6-9 repeat this clause nearly word-for-word, and were added simply to permit a registration procedure with different 
deadlines for the year in which the bill would be passed. After that, and apart from these different dates, there was to be no 
change from the system of 2 Will. IV c. 45. Even the provision that a revising banister could not serve in Parliament within 18 
months of having done this job - which Rowe pokes fun at and ascribes to "a bitter experience for the Whigs in I lertford" 
(p. 101) - was in fact just a repetition of the original 1832 provision (cf 1834 (138) II clause 11 and 2 Will. IV c. 45 clause 49). 
4 Another aspect of this was the creation of votes, as with the Anti-Corn Law League's splitting of freeholds to create 
county votes. however, a rummage in the recesses of the 1832 legislation reveals an important restraint to this 
behaviour. For freeholds or tenements worth between 40/- and £10 annually, above all rents and charges, they had to be 
occupied, or acquired via marriage, marriage settlement, devise or promotion to an office or benefice. This occupation 
(continued) 
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Thus, registration agents often used forms to summarise the revisions to a register, with columns for marking 
whether someone was Liberal or Conservative. ' Reports of changes in electoral registers were often couched 
in terms of Tory and Liberal gains or loses. As Peel said of registration, it was, "a perfectly new element of 
political power' .3 
The importance of local activity is demonstrated by the great variety of trends in electoral size in 
different constituencies. The difference a few years of intense activity could make is demonstrated by the 
large increase in Leeds' electorate during the 1830s. Though 1833 saw little Tory activity, and the Liberals 
withdrawing all their objections as a symbol of goodwill, in 1834 the revising barristers sat for 22 days while 
hearing 1,500 cases and by 1838 over 6,000 cases had to be covered by the revising barristers 4 The high 
annual expense included £600 by the Reformers in 1835. By 1840 there were 2532 objections and 400 
claims made in the annual registration process! Lyndhurst's comment that in 1835 superior Conservative 
registration activities had given them MPs in Leeds and Ripon6 is reflected in their register totals. 
Such rivalry sometimes just increased the work of revising barristers, and sometimes even reduced 
the electorate. Political activists were not averse to pulling such tricks, as long as their opponents were the 
losers. Thus, a favourite tactic of the Anti-Corn Law League was to post objections en masse and at the last 
moment, hoping that the Post Office would not be able to deliver them all in time, and so that some of them 
would be upheld by default. In Leeds in 1834 the net impact of the claims and objections was to knock 658 
off the electoral register - the Liberals and Tories were much better at objecting to each other than at entering 
new claims. Similarly, whilst the West Riding's electoral register increase of the early 1840s can largely be 
ascribed to organisational activity, so can the decline in Tower Hamlets. Nevertheless, political activity 
(normally) meant that more people were brought into the registered electorate. Even in cases of decline, it is 
instructive how often it was electoral conflict and organisations that were the catalyst for turning theoretical 
possibilities into reality. ° 
(.. continued) 
requirement, like that for sub-lessees and assignees (which were also potentially fruitful sources of vote creation), 
restricted the possibilities of vote creation. I Iowever, vote creation from before 1832 received an effective pardon: a 40/- 
freehold if seised before 7 June 1832 whether in actual occupation, or only in receipt of rents, could still grant a vote. 
t Moore, Politics of Deference, p. 3 10. The standard election manual Cox and Grady, The New Law and Practice Of 
Registration And Elections, contains an example of a "general register book" to be used for such purposes: p. lxxxi. 
2 E. g. Proceedings ofAnnual Meeting of West Riding United Reform Association: report on activities 1849-56, DDWA 
736-7, Doncaster Archives and list of Rishworth (West Riding) 1835 electors, IIASB/B/9/3/2, IIalifax Antiquarian 
Society MSS, I lalifax Archives. 
3 Evans, Reform Act, p. 39. 
4 D. Fraser, "The Fruits Of Reform: Leeds Politics In The Eighteen-Thirties, " Northern ! Eistory, Volume 7,1972, p. 99 
and p. 101. 
s Report of Committee on defects of Parliamentary and Municipal registration under the 2nd William 4 C45 & 5&6 William 
4C76; Presented to Sub Committee of Leeds Registration Association, Leeds, 1841, p. 5-8. 
6 D. I L Close, The General Elections of 1835 and 1837 in England and Wales, Oxford DPhil, 1964, p. 196 
7 The Times, 16 October 1834. 
This role had even been recognised by the Commons committee which had recommend county electoral registers in 
1827. It emphasised the purative effect of contests and ease of making objections for removing unwarranted register 
entries: 1826-7 (349) IV. 
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As Graphs 2.1-2.24 show, there were many different constituency electorate histories in Yorkshire. ' 
However, that some constituencies had declining electorates after 1832 should not be taken as a sign of a 
general lack of vitality. The overall national picture is stark and clear, as is the impact bursts of electoral 
rivalry could have. Two examples drawn from these graphs illustrate this point. First, the West Riding 
electorate only increased from 29,456 to 31,215 in 1835-40, but then hit 36,084 in 1845, an increase in the 
second five-year period that was almost three times the increase in the fast period. The explanation is simple: 
the Anti-Corn Law League. Though their West Riding registration activities were neglected in many of the 
early histories of the League, its impact is clear. Second, there is York. Here, the electorate languished 
around the 2,900 level in 1832-7, but in 1839 was 3,326 and by 1845 3,920. Again, this increase coincided 
with revived intense party rivalries and organisations. 
The figures in Table 2.1 should be taken as only approximate - there are some internal 
inconsistencies, some of the sources are not precise, there is inconsistency over constituencies like 
Monmouth (is it English? is it Welsh? ), the English universities (are they boroughs? ), and there are some 
problems with interpreting the figures given in Parliamentary Papers. Frequently when Parliamentary Papers 
provide a more detailed breakdown, e. g. of people registered under each type of franchise, the breakdown 
does not have a total equal to the claimed total electorate elsewhere in the same document. There is the 
problem of multiple entries. Sometimes local officials returned the number of people on their electoral 
register, and sometimes they returned the total number of entries. Although some specify the number of 
"joint qualifications, including those registered under more than one qualification" this does little to clarify 
matters. Some constituencies did not, or said they were unable to, answer this question. Some took joint 
qualifications to include people registered more than once under the same type of qualification (e. g. 
registered twice as a £10), and some did not. There are many other problems, such as misprints and the 
mixing of figures from different years within one Parliamentary Paper. Given all the problems, a comment 
from an attempt in 1834 to read the electoral registers' runes is appropriate; the numbers "although not quite 
accurate, will afford a tolerably correct general view. "2 
Data saved as elect. mtp. For post-1832 the electorate's size is taken to be the number of register entries. Lines are only 
drawn between points where data exists for successive years. 
2 1834 (591) IX, p. iv. My figures are given to three significant figures as claiming any greater degree of accuracy is mere 
fantasy and whimsy. A particularly tricky problem is when figures are given for £lOers, ancient righters and multiple 
entries. It is frequently unclear whether or not those in the latter category have been counted in the middle category. And 
if not, one has to add not merely the number of multiple entries but double (assuming they are all double entries) their 
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The totals in Table 2.1 include some adjustments for multiple entries and multiple electors, based on 
the limited evidence available. ' The immediate impact of the 1832 legislation was to increase the 
electorate by around 40%. (Table 2.1's last column indicates an increase of just under 40%, but the 1831 
figure is not adjusted for multiple electors and so is a little generous). Whilst the electorate languished at 
around the same level in the next few years, when electoral and political activity was given new life by the 
revival in Tory morale and organisation leading up to the 1835 election, the electorate grew sharply, putting 
on 100,000 in 1834-6. Taking 1836 as our bench-mark for the post-1832 system, this points to an increase of 
over 63% arising from the 1832 legislation. Across a longer period - 1831 to 1862 - we see the electorate 
increase by over 100%. This compares to a population growth for England and Wales in 1831-61, according 
to the censuses, of 44%. 
The sharpness of the post-1832 growth, quicker than the increase in population and wealth, suggest 
that registration rates were initially relatively low and increased during this period. It was only when party 
organisations became involved in registration tussles in the 1830s in a search for electoral supremacy that 
registration rose to more respectable levels. Again, it was a matter of public apathy only being overcome 
when political organisations set to. 
All these figures make no allowance for growth that would have occurred anyway in the old system, 
even if nothing had happened in 1832. A very rough estimate can be made of the importance of this factor. 
Assuming that the electorate would, had there been no Reform Acts, have increased after 1832 at the same 
rate as it grew in 1754-1831, the increases caused by the 1832 legislation come down to 62% for 1831-6 and 
88% for 1831-62. 2 
As this image of a large and vibrant electorate is rather different to the picture recently drawn by 
Vernon, 3 it is worth taking a moment to discard his evidence. He reasonably makes the point that 1832 did 
not occur against the background of a static electoral system, but rather one where the electorate was already 
growing. However, his evidence for the rate of growth in the electorate before 1832 -a mere two 
constituencies, and moreover both boroughs - is grossly atypical. 
1 If one wishes to compare such figures to the population it must be remembered that imbeciles, criminals, aliens, peers 
and various office-holders (such as revenue officers) could not vote. For example, in 1841 there were 1,116,523 paupers, 
rising to 1,333,245 in 1843 and about I in 666 of the English population were lunatics: Weld, Statistical Companion, 
1843, p. 42 and Statistical Companion To The Pocket Book, John W. Parker, London, 1844, p. 25. 
2I have taken O'Gorman's electorate figures for 1754 and 1831 (338,000 and 439,200): Voters, Patrons and Parties, 
p. 179. These figures are for England and Wales. I assume the average growth rates in both countries were the same. I use 
O'Gorman's figures throughout, so that like is being compared to like. The preferred comparison would be of my 1831 
figures with 1754 figures calculated in a similar manner, but the latter do not exist. 
3 Vernon. Politics And The People. 
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Notes for Table Z. 1: 
1. The 1831 figures are from p. 23-24. The other sources are: "Miscellaneous, " Journal Of The Statistical 
Society Of London, Volume 1,1839, p. 122, T. C. Anstey, 'Notes Upon The Representation Of The People Act, 
1867'. (30 & 31 VICT. C. 102. ) With Appendices Concerning The Ancient Rights, The Rights Conferred By 
The 2&3 Will. IV. C. 45, Population, Rental, Rating And The Operation Of The Repealed Enactments As To 
Compound Householders, William Ridgway, London, 1867, T. C. Banfield and C. R. Weld, Statistical 
Companion To The Pocket Book, Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, London, 1848, T. C. Banfield, 
Statistical Companion To The Pocket Book, Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, London, 1852, Brock, 
Reform Act, p. 229, p. 312 and p. 361-2, F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1832-1885, 
Macmillan, London, 1977, and British Electoral Facts 1832-1987,5th edition, Parliamentary Research 
Services, Dartmouth, 1989, p. 66-7, De Franqueville, Le Gouvernement Et Le Parlement Britanniques, 
Volume 2, p. 3 08-9, C. R. Dod, Electoral Facts From 1832 To 1853 Impartially Stated: Constituting A 
Complete Political Gazetteer, original edition 1853, edited with an introduction and bibliographical guide to 
electoral sources 1832-55 by H. J. Hanham, Harvester Press, Brighton, 1972, p. xvii, Evans, Reform Act, p. 50, 
J. R. Fisher, "Issues and Influence: two by-elections in South Nottinghamshire in the mid-nineteenth 
century, " Historical Journal, Volume 24,198 1, p. 159, Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p. 94 n 13, Hanham, 
Elections and Party Management, p. 35, Lambert, "Parliamentary Franchises, " p. 958, Moore, Politics of 
Deference, p. 249-50, J. B. Martin, "Electoral Statistics: a Review of the Working of our Representative 
System from 1832 to 1881, in view of Prospective Changes therein, " Statistical Society Journal, Volume 47, 
1884, Newmarch, "On the Electoral Statistics of the Counties and Boroughs, " p. 171-85 and p. 315-8, 
Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 78 n2, p. 83 n2, p. 84 nl and p. 533,1834 (591) IX, 1844 (11) XXXVIII, 1846 
(284) XXXIII, 1847 (751) XLVI, 1849 (616) XLV, 1850 (345) XLVI, 1865 (195) XLVII. I have adjusted 
figures to compensate for missing constituencies and different interpretation of "England. " 
2. The continuance of large numbers of ancient righters is largely due to the large numbers of freemen on 
electoral registers after 1832; for example, in 1847 about 80% of the ancient righters on registers were there 
as freemen. This is explained by the oft-overlooked fact that many freemen created of er the passing of the 
1832 legislation could register and vote. They could do so as long as they were freemen in respect of 
servitude, or if their right to be a freeman came through a person who was a freeman (or entitled to be one) 
before 1 March 1831. 
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The boroughs are Boston and Lewes. In the former the electorate grew by 258% in 1790-1830 and 
in the latter by 214%. ' If these two boroughs were typical then, given the 1831 English electorate of 415,000, 
this would mean that the total English electorate in 1790 was under 125,000.2 By contrast, other evidence 
points to an electorate in 1754-90 of very comfortably over 300,000.3 Thus, we can safely discard the notion 
of Boston and Lewes forming a representative sample of the pre-1832 system. 
Turning to the impact of the 1832 legislation, Vernon claims, "the enfranchisement of £ 10 copy- 
holders, leaseholders, and tenants-at-will paying no less than £50 per annum did little more than officially 
formalise the notoriously generous interpretation of the "freehold" qualification that had long existed within 
the unreformed counties. "4 My calculations give an English county electorate in 1831 of 244,000 and a 1832 
county electorate of 340-370,000 (Table 2.1). Even if we are generous to the point of foolishness, by taking 
the lowest figure (340,000), ignoring those electors who were not registered, and making a generous 
deduction of 10% for multiple entries, we have the county electorate increasing by 25%. Taking the figures 
for 1836 - 444,000 - and again lopping off 10%, and adding a generous 10% to the 1831 figure to allow for 
growth that would have happened without 1832 - gives an increase of nearly 50%. One can tweak these 
calculations in various ways, but regardless there was a large county electorate increase. 
Vernon's arguments regarding boroughs after 1832 again rely on Boston and Lewes. By 1852 their 
electorates were back to levels much like their levels of 1831. On the basis of these two boroughs Vernon 
concludes that, "had the unreformed electorate continued to grow at the same pace it had between 1790 and 
1832, there can be little doubt that it would have far outstripped its reformed counterpart by the middle of the 
century. "s In 1849 the English electoral registers totalled about 840,000 (Table 2.1). Picking 1849 is 
generous to Vernon's thesis, as the register totals were much higher even by 1851. Lopping off a generous 
10% for multiple entries gives 756,000. This compares to the 1831 figure of 430,000. Thus, Vernon is, in 
effect, claiming the unreformed electorate would have grown by over 75% in 1831-51, or at an annual rate of 
about 2.75%. However, it is hard to believe that the unreformed electorate really was growing at this rate. 
Such a growth in 1790-1831 would have meant, given the 1831 electorate of 430,000, a 1790 electorate of 
141,000. This is still unsustainably small, given the existing more reasonable estimate for 1790 of over 
300,000 (see above). 
' Vernon, Politics And The People, p. 33. 
2 The mean growth of the electorate in Boston and Lewes was 236% in 1790-1830. An English electorate in 1790 of 
123,512 would, if it grew by 236%, have given an electorate in 1830 of 415,000. Note that my 415,000 figure is actually 
for 1831; the figure for 1830 is slightly lower as the electorate was expanding. I lowever, if we plug a slightly lower 
number than 415,000 into the calculation, this simply makes the extrapolated figure for 1790 even lower. 
O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 179 Table 4.3 gives a figure of 338,000 for the English and Welsh electorate 
in 1754-90. Deducting a generous 30,000 for Wales leaves 308,000. This number is an under-estimate given the 
generous figure used for Wales, and given my findings that O'Gorman's later figures are on the low side this one too may 
need tweaking upwards. Note in this, and following, calculations I make no adjustments for electors who were electors in 
more than one constituency as this was a factor both before and after 1832.1 lowever, even if it this form of multiple- 
registration was more common after 1832, all my conclusions are sufficiently clear to easily withstand a tweaking of a 
few extra percent. 
4 Vernon, Politics And The People, p. 36. 
5 Vernon, Politics And The People, p. 39. 
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This picture is reinforced by individual constituency figures; not those for a tiny sample, but those 
for all of England. Craig's figures for the size of the electorate in each English constituency' show that 
between the registers of 1832-3 and 1846-7 the average growth in a constituency's electorate was 870, or 
30%. Graph 2.25, a histogram of the percentage changes in constituencies' electorates in this period, 
reinforces this picture. Some constituencies saw their electorates fall, but they are f irmly in the minority. The 
larger a constituency's electorate was in 1832, the larger its electorate's growth was likely to be (measured in 
absolute numbers rather than percentages) in 183246,2 though in terms of percentage growth there was no 
such clear relationship. 3 Thus whilst the mean constituency electorate increased by 37% (2400 to 3279), the 
median rose by less: 23% (1104 to 1357). Yet even the smaller constituencies grew on average; the dividing 
value between the first and second quartiles grew by 18% (from 457 to 539), compared to 35% for that 
between the third and fourth (3676-4955). 
Thus, my conclusions are not shaken by Vernon. Indeed, we have seen the utility of having a 
national framework against which individual constituencies can be compared. Two periods of particularly 
sharp increase in the national electorate reinforce the picture of vitality. The periods were the mid- I830s and 
then later in the 1840s. The first period is highly suggestive of initial registration rates being relatively low, 
with subsequent intense registration activities raising them. The importance of the mid- I830s is reinforced 
by the behaviour of revising barristers. There was a sharp increase in the number of days they sat at this time 
(Graph 2.26). 4 That the growth of the 1840s was subsequently possible suggests - population boom and rapid 
urbanisation notwithstanding - that noticeable degrees of non-registration persisted. So few people were 
registered immediately after 1832 that, even after all the mid-I 830s activities, there was still much slack that 
could be taken up in the 1840s. 
This leads to the question of how many electors were not registered. It is possible to make some 
estimates for Yorkshire boroughs as to the levels of registration. This involves estimating the number of £ 10 
annual value houses in Yorkshire boroughs, and making deductions for houses that were occupied by 
women, occupied by people in receipt of relief, empty etc. and so could not grant a vote. 
1 These figures are not consistent regarding multiple entries, usually including them but sometimes excluding them: see 
p. 88 but also p. 99. This would only affect the trend over time if there were significantly more (or fewer) constituencies 
where he excluded multiple entries in 1846 than 1832, or, if in the ones where he included multiple entries there was a 
significant trend in multiple entries over time. There is no reason to believe this is the case. Data saved as craig. mtp and 
elect3247. nitp. 
2 The regression equation is: Increase in electorate - -193 + (0.443 x 1832 electorate). R2-42.41/6, N-257. 
3 The regression equation in this case has an R2 value of only 2.4%. 
4 Data from A Return of the Names of Barristers appointed to revise the Lists of Electors In England and Wales, in the 
Years 1835,1836,1837,1838 and 1839; the Names of the Places or Districts to which the Revising Barristers were 
respectively appointed; the Number of Days employed in each Place or District, so jar as appears by their Accounts; the 
Amounts of Fees received, and the Amount of Expenses incurred by them respectively, 1840 (120) XXIX, A Return of the 
Names of the Persons appointed to be Revising Barristers for the several Counties and Boroughs In England and Wales, 
in the Summer of 1840, arranged according to Circuits, and stating the Name of the Senior Judge on each Circuit, 1840 
(Sess. 1) (11) XIII and A Return of the Names of Barristers appointed to revise the Lists of Electors in England and 
Wales, in the Years 1840 and 1841; the Names of the Places or Districts to which the Revising Barristers were 
respectively appointed,, the Number of Days employed in each Place or District, so jar as appears by their Accounts; the 
Amounts of Fees received, and the Amount of Expenses incurred by them respectively, in continuation of the Return 
prepared in 1840, -- Also, of the Aggregate Amount paid in each Year to such Revising Barristers from the Year 1835 
inclusive; - and, The Aggregate Number of Days in each Year for which such 
Revising Barristers were Paldfrom the 
Year 1835 inclusive, 1842 (151) XXVI. Data saved as revbar. mtp. 
68 
Graph 2.25 
This histogram shows the percentage changes in the size of English constituencies' electorates 
between 1832 and 1847. The first column shows the number of constituencies whose electorate 
fell by between 75% and 50%, and so on. 
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There are various contemporary estimates that exist regarding the appropriate deductions. An 1831 
Parliamentary Paper suggests docking 25% from the number of £ 10 annual value houses. ' In 1860 it was 
suggested the figure should be 33%2 Both include an allowance for multiple qualifications for the same 
person; i. e. they allow an estimation of the number of electors rather than the number of register entries. 
However, I prefer to estimate the theoretical total on the electoral register, without making any adjustments 
for multiple entries. This is because that would be too difficult; there is not sufficient evidence and it gets 
particularly messy when one factors in ancient-rights voters. As the former specifies that 5% of the 25% is 
for multiple entries, and assuming the 33% included a similar margin for multiple entries, this leaves a best 
estimate of around 25% being the correct deduction. 
The estimates for Yorkshire constituencies are as follows 4 Column [a] estimates the numbers of 
houses at an annual value of £10, minus the above 25% deduction. Column [b] estimates the number of 
electoral register entries in respect of the £10 franchise. Column [c] is [b] as a percentage of [a] 
[a] [b] [c] 
Beverley 1832-4 380 146 38% 
1847 540 449 83% 
Bradford 1832-4 1220 1225 100% 
1847 1830 2180 84% 
Halifax 1832-4 1000 648 65% 
1847 885 1022 115% 
Huddersfield 1832-4 920 671 73% 
1847 870 1142 131% 
Hull 1832-4 2350 2584 110% 
1847 2890 3118 108% 
Leeds 1832-4 5015 4774 95% 
1847 4670 6300 135% 
Malton 1832-4 300 345 115% 
1847 340 451 133% 
Copies Of Further Information Touching the Amount of Population, and the Number and Value ofh ouses in Towns or 
Districts now sending Members to Parliament, or proposed in the Reform Bill to send Members In future, 1831(68) XVI. 
The full estimate is 50%, but this includes some factors inappropriate here, as the estimate made there is for the number 
of new electors in new English boroughs. 
21860 (455) XII, q. 2967. 
3 This is at odds with M. I1. Rankin's claim that the number off 10 annual value houses is a "tolerably accurate" guide to 
the number of potential electors: Present State Of Representation In England And Wales; Being An Alphabetical 
Arrangement Of All The Counties, Cities, And Boroughs, Sending Members To Parliament: With An Appendix, 
Containing ,4 Summary Of The Representation In England And Wales, The Reform, And Boundary Acts, And A Copious 
Index, Baldwin and Cradock, London, 1832, p. 2. I Iowever, this is very much a lonely estimate. For example, in 1860 
(455) XII various other estimates for deductions are made - first for counties and females; second, for counties and 
females and unoccupied property; third, for boroughs for multiple assessments, deaths and changes of residence for 
property of 0-£6. All of these were in the 15-25% range, and well above 0%: q. 175,199,1402 and 1489. 
4 Data from Dod, Electoral Facts, Rankin, Present State Of Representation, Accounts of the Number of Houses in each 
City, Borough and County in England, Wales and of each County, Royal Burgh and Town in Scotland now returning 
Members to Parliament and of those not returning Members to Parliament distinguishing the Number of (louses 
Assessed to the Inhabitant Household Duty, from £10 to t19 inclusive, and from £20 to £39 Inclusive; and at 140 and 
upwards, 1830-1 (202) X, 1830-1 (204) X, 1831 (68) XVI, 1834 (591) IX and Appendix 9. 
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Northallerton 1832-4 220 230 105% 
1847 230 259 113% 
Pontefract 1832-4 390 380 97% 
1847 315 380 121% 
Richmond 1832-4 225 260 97% 
1847 225 269 120% 
Ripon 1832-4 300 350 117% 
1847 320 278 87% 
Scarborough 1832-4 380 385 101% 
1847 710 662 93% 
Sheffield 1832-4 3360 3587 107% 
1847 4140 4934 119% 
Thirsk 1832-4 235 267 114% 
1847 250 332 133% 
Wakefield 1832-4 630 617 98% 
1847 640 780 122% 
Whitby 1832-4 355 432 122% 
1847 260 403 155% 
York 1832-4 1605 625 39% 
1847 2260 1163 51% 
These figures are certainly a salutary warning against glib use of nineteenth century electoral 
statistics. They consistently contain cases where the number of register entries in respect of £ 10 properties 
was greater than the number of such properties. These figures are not the whole story. Part of the explanation 
lies in exactly what is being measured. Some register entries were in respect of not merely a house (or 
something similar), but in respect of other property or a combination of property, such as house plus garden. 
The figures for £10 properties do not appear to be consistent, but often exclude such combinations. Further a 
property worth, say £20, could qualify two people for a register entry each, but would only appear as one 
property in Column [a]. 
These figures, then, are limited. The figures for the number off 10 properties, with deductions for 
women, deaths etc., are not a reliable guide to the size of the £10er potential electorate (else all the 
percentages would have been under 100%). However, it is instructive that Column [c] contains 13 boroughs 
in which the percentage increased, and just 4 where it fell. Assuming that the problems mentioned in the 
previous paragraph did not change in magnitude between 1832 and 1847, this suggests there was a clear rise 
in the registration rate. The mean increase in the registration rate is 18%. In other words, if the registration 
levels of £l Oers in 1847 had occurred in 1832 the number of register entries in respect of £ l0ers would have 
been 18% higher. It is likely that the number of multiple entries would also have been higher as there is some 
evidence from electoral registers in places like York that part of the growth was caused by people who had 
both freemen and £10 qualifications being initially only registered as freemen, but then latter also acquire a 
£ 10er register entry. A rough estimate is that, taking this into account, having the 1847 registration levels in 
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1832 would have resulted in a borough electorate that was 15% larger. These figures compare reasonably to 
the smattering of contemporary estimates. In 1860 one witness hazarded that, 
I consider that a town of that size [Halifax] cannot register within 12 per cent. of its number ... In a large borough the per-centage of those who will not register is always very much larger than in a small 
borough 
... In Halifax I have put the per-centage of those who will not register at 12 per cent., where, as in Bradford, Leeds, and Sheffield, I should put it as high as 20 to 25 per cent. ' 
In 1860 the Government estimated that a deduction of 25% was necessary to get from the number of people 
who might be upon the register (in counties and boroughs) to the number who actually were .2 This, however, 
appears to be a figure that, even if accurate, hides a large degree of variation. In metropolitan boroughs 40% 
of occupiers at a gross estimated rental of at least £ 10 were not registered, and in rural boroughs of 
population in excess of 100,000 the figure was though to be 12%. 3 It is hard to credit all this variation to 
fluctuations in the relationship between gross estimated rental and annual value. 
This leaves the question of the county electorate. My figures do not have a direct bearing on the 
question. However, the smattering of contemporary comments4 I have found do not suggest that 
contemporaries thought non-registration was significantly less of a problem in counties. There is some 
emphasis on registration problems in large urban areas, but then some counties, such as the West Riding, 
contained such areas. 5 Making a cautious estimate that the comparable f igure to 15% for boroughs was 10% 
for counties, this suggests that, had the 1847 registration levels been present in 1832, the English electorate 
would have been about 670,000 (rather than 595,000) and that the 1832 legislation would then have brought 
about an increase of about 55% in the English electorate (rather than 40%). 
These figures are speculative, but do reinforce the picture that whilst 1832 increased opportunities 
substantially, many of those who could have taken part did not. Thus, there was a major role for electoral 
contests, which provided electoral organisations with the incentive to register and mobilise people who might 
otherwise not have voted or even registered even in the face of adverse global trends, such as the declining 
willingness to vote (Chapter 3). 
This is also reflected in the numbers of freemen on register, for whom there is a useful 1840 
Parliamentary return6 Like many such returns it has serious problems. Not all boroughs made a return. The 
wording of the request for information was poor. It asked for the "Number of Freemen or Burgesses ... in 
each Borough ... entitled to vote. " This 
is not the same as asking for the number of freemen or burgesses, 
registered under such ancient rights, on the electoral registers. Indeed, as the request went to all boroughs, a 
request for the number registered as freemen electors would have resulted in "none" or "not applicable" 
1 1860 (455) XII, q. 1601,1605 and 1606. 
2 1860 (455) XII, q. 1633-4. 
3 1860 (455) XII, q. 1637. 
O'Gorman has the distinction of being the only historian I have found to give figures for registration rates. They are 
67% in Ipswich (1832) and about 60% in Nottingham (1832): Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 183 n22. 
s E. g. The Times commented, 12 September 1832, that in the West Riding, "full one-third have neglected registering. " 
Interestingly, recommendations from a Commons committee for county registers included a note of concern that 
registration levels might be low: 1826-7 (349) IV, p. 3. 
6A Return of the Number of Freemen or Burgesses in each of the Boroughs of England and Wales, entitled to vote in the 
Election of Members to serve in Parliament for such Boroughs, under the several Registrations of the Years 1836,1837, 
1838, and 1839,1840 (379) XLI. 
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responses from most boroughs. But, many places like Bradford (created in 1832, so no ancient right voters), 
made a return other than "none" or "not applicable. " The numbers in the return were (sometimes) simply the 
electoral register total. ' Richmond's Town Clerk said he was, "uncertain as to what is the meaning of the 
expression `Freemen or Burgesses', " and queried whether it meant the electoral register total. This confusion 
arose from the multiple meanings of "burgesses. " In some contexts it simply meant "elector, " as in the 1835 
Municipal Corporations Reform Act. Even allowing for all these problems, some of the numbers are wrong. 
However, it is clear that some returns from ex-freeman boroughs were for the number registered by 
virtue of being freemen or burgesses (either because the number is too small to have been the electorate's 
size, or, for Yorkshire constituencies, because the number is consistent with my evidence in Appendix 9). 
Indeed, for Northallerton the case is quite clear as numbers are given for both freemen and the register total. 
This is not the only case of supplementary evidence in the return making the situation clear. 
It can be assumed that, for ex-freemen boroughs, where the number is not for the total electorate, it 
is for freemen registered qua freemen, rather than freemen regardless of how they got on to the register. This 
is because the former is readily obtainable from electoral registers, whilst the latter would have required 
laborious cross-checking of freeman rolls and electoral registers. This leaves the problem of deciding which 
boroughs were freemen boroughs, given the uncertainties over some borough pre-1832 franchise 
classifications (see Appendix 1). Looking at individual electoral registers to see whether freemen were 
registered qua freemen would solve the problem of which constituencies had freemen qua freemen on their 
electoral registers. However, electoral registers from this period have only survived erratically, and are 
scattered across the country. Using this Parliamentary Paper has the advantage that copies of it still exist, and 
its constituent parts are not scattered across the country. 
The problems with this Parliamentary return are a good example of how many of the participants in 
the electoral process, including MPs requesting information and local officials responding, did not really 
know very much about the system. It is also an example of the march through fog and over quicksand that 
lies behind many apparently simple and neat electoral statistics. Something can, though, be drawn from the 
Parliamentary return (Table 2.2). These numbers fit the global trend already seen, namely that freemen were 
in secular decline, with the number of freemen registered qua freemen falling after 1832, from about 65,000 
in 1832 to about 40,000 in 1865.3 However, against this secular movement it is clear that a burst of 
organisational activity, as in 1837-9, could buck the trend and increase the number of freemen. 
E. g. cf Bradford's return and Appendix 9. 
2 E. g. cf York's return and Appendix 9. 
3 "Miscellaneous, " Journal Of The Statistical Society Of London, Volume 29,1866, p. 160. 
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Year 1836 1837 1838 1839 
Number of such freemen 56,170 54,252 58,178 59,257 
Mean number of such freemen 
In a freemen borough 
791 775 819 859 
Median number of such 
freemen in a freemen borough 
360 372 381 394 
Number of freemen boroughs 
for which data available 
71 70 71 69 
Table 2.2: Number of freemen registered qua freemen 1836-9' 
2.5 Conclusion 
The electorate before 1832 had many signs of vitality, and was larger than even O'Gorman 
believed. Further, the creation of freemen should not be seen as a damper on vitality. With an electorate of 
430,000 in 1831,1832 caused an immediate increase of just under 40%, but by 1851 this increase on 1831 
was over 100%. Calculations of the potential electorate's size post-1832 are necessarily tentative, as any 
calculation of a non-existent entity from erratic evidence is likely to be. Yet, taken with contemporary 
estimates of levels of non-registration, and the large increase in the electorate in 1833-50 the picture is of 
initially low registration rates that subsequently rose sharply. In other words, many opportunities to 
participate were only taken up as electoral conflict intensified. The implications of this for wider 
interpretations of politics are important. It is against this background of voluntary non-involvement that the 
politics of Parliamentary reform agitation, Chartism and economic agitation need to be interpreted. In 
particular, urban areas and the lower end of the social spectrum appear to have seen the highest rates of non- 
registration. Though this may have been partly due to higher urban mobility rates and a higher incidence of 
compounding, the latter, at least, could have been circumvented with organisation and effort. Though it is 
clear that 1832 did not increase the electorate by as much as was believed before O'Gorman's figures, it is 
also clear that this failure was largely the result of people voluntarily deciding not to participate: 1832 
provided the opportunity and many did not take it up. People were given the franchise and passed it up. 
"Progress" was a multi-edged phenomenon. The legislation of 1832 did not rationalise or simplify 
the system, but that also meant that it provided more scope for political activists, be they party men or 
pressure group men. This encouraged vitality and diversity, especially in the 1830s with its elections of 
"unprecedented fury". 2 This scope for activity arose from a system with many quirks, many of which have 
been depicted as being inimical to vitality. However, many of these features have either been over-rated - 
such as the corrupt nature of freemen creations and the impact of compounding - or were so rare as to be of 
little importance. For example, whilst holding particular government jobs could stop people from voting, in 
' Derived from 1840 (379) XLI. Freemen boroughs with no returns were Derby, Exeter, Lymington and Newcastle- 
under-Lyme. I have excluded a few returns where it was not clear whether the return was for freemen qua freemen. The 
total number of such possible freemen only varies between 498 and 505 for any one year. Data saved as fmreg. mtp. 
2 London and Westminster Review, Number 2 Volume 3& 25,1836, p. 485. 
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1837 only nine Post Office employees across the whole country were dismissed for having voted. ' The net 
effect, then, was to provide far more possibilities for increased vitality derived from political organisation, 
than the few restrictions the quirkiness also carried with it. 
' Return of the Names of Persons in the Employ of the Post Office in Great Britain and Ireland against whom any 
Complaints have been made for having voted at the late Election of Members of Parliament; and of those who have been 




Turnout has been a hidden factor of nineteenth century elections, largely neglected by 
contemporaries and historians, yet also influential in the determination of election results. Levels of turnout 
may explain why the Tories kept on winning elections before 1830, why radical candidates failed to make 
greater progress in the 1830s or why Peel was able to lead the Conservatives back to power. We do not 
know. This Chapter is a first step towards banishing such ignorance. Specifically, it focuses on the question 
of vitality - what were the levels of participation by electors, how did they change and why? 
The word "turnout" is superficially straightforward, but, under closer examination, slippery. A 
casual definition is "the proportion of people who vote". In an age of universal suffrage the difference 
between "people" and "electorate" is normally sufficiently small to be ignored. I lowever, for nineteenth 
century England the difference is sufficiently large to require a more rigorous definition. 
For the period before 1832 - i. e. before the introduction of formal electoral registers - turnout is 
taken to be "the proportion of the electorate who vote. " Evidence, though, for the size of electorates is thin. 
For the period after 1832 the existence of electoral registers makes matters apparently easier. I[ere, crude 
turnout is taken to be "the proportion of the electoral register's entries for which a vote is cast. " 
It is crude because of the problems inherent in the registers. They were compiled annually, so an 
election occurring many months after a register's compilation might result in an apparently lower turnout due 
to, for example, people on it having died. Dead people could not vote, but their entries could not be removed 
until the next electoral register. In addition, there is the problem of multiple entries (see p. 27). As a person 
possessing multiple register entries could still vote only once, multiple entries mean that turnout figures 
based simply on the total number of register entries can be misleading. 
Though adjustments can be made for all these problems, the evidence for such adjustments is 
sporadic. Thus, while a fully adjusted figure may seem desirable, crude turnout has the advantage of being 
more widely calculable. These problems make a detailed examination of a sample of constituencies, from 
which national estimates can be derived, productive. This is particularly so since levels of turnout in this 
period have largely been neglected, and the calculations that have been made have largely been of individual 
constituencies, rather than of national trends over time. Moreover, the one clear national survey of turnout - 
that by Craig for post-1832 - is seriously flawed. 
Section 3.2 examines turnout in 1800-32; the paucity of evidence means that the net is thrown wider 
than Yorkshire. Section 3.3 reviews existing knowledge of turnout in 1832-50. Section 3.4 draws on the 
Yorkshire data to improve Craig's national picture, while Section 3.5 examines the contribution of political 
science theory. Section 3.6 examines the Yorkshire evidence in some detail, and Section 3.7 then compares 
the knowledge constructed of the pre- and post-1832 periods, and considers the impact of 1832. 
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3.2 Turnout 1800-32 
The absence of formal electoral registers before 1832 makes calculating constituencies' electorates, 
and hence their turnout, difficult. (By comparison, the patchiness of evidence regarding the number of voters 
in constituencies is a minor problem). ' The franchise requirements in some constituencies allow the 
electorate to be calculated. For example, in some the franchise lay with the Corporation. The size of most 
Corporations, and hence their electorates, is obtainable. 2 Further, knowledgeable locals sometimes recorded, 
principally in poll books, of whom the electorate was comprised. These sources are useful, though somewhat 
inconsistent in whether people disqualified for reasons such as receiving poor relief, or non-residence (where 
residence was required) are counted as being members of the electorate. It is arguable that such sources are 
atypical, in that polls with high turnouts (and hence fewer non-voters to list) may have been more likely to 
result in the recording of non-voters than other polls. However, looking at the range of polls I use this does 
not appear to be true. In particular, attention should be paid to the number of constituencies where such 
information was regularly given in poll books. It was not a matter of the effort required that determined the 
appearance, or otherwise, of this evidence, but rather what the local tradition for the content of poll books 
was. 
I have ascertained turnout for 136 polls in 1800-31.3 There is no discernible trend over time, with 
turnout habitually over 80% (Graphs 3.1-3.6). But there are clear differences between different franchise 
types. The mean turnout was 86% in 37 scot and lots polls, 83% in 1S corporation polls, 82% in S 
householder polls, 81% in 75 freemen polls, 77% in 5 county polls and 77% in 5 burgage polls. That turnout 
was lowest in those constituencies where electors typically had furthest to travel4 suggests that physical 
impediments to voting mattered; enthusiasm to vote could wane in the face of obstacles. A similar picture 
emerges in scot and lot boroughs that permitted freemen to vote, 3 where turnout averaged 69%, considerably 
less than the 85% in scot and lot boroughs overall. 
However, it is difficult to disentangle this influence from that of the keenness of contests. Freemen 
boroughs typically saw intense contests when they polled (and they polled more regularly than most 
boroughs), and were often also the site of financial largesse. These forces probably acted to increase turnout, 
and helps explain why turnout in freemen boroughs was not even lower in the face of non-resident freemen 
often being able to vote. 
From these numbers mean turnout at English polls in 1800-32 can be estimated. Given the 
difference in turnout between different types of constituencies it makes sense to differentiate between 
different franchise types, and weight the calculation accordingly: 
1 The principal difficulty here is that whilst records for the number of votes are fairly good, in most constituencies voters 
could cast one, two (or more) votes, so there is no constant relationship between the number of votes and voters. 
2 Principally from Appendix to the First Report of the Commissioners, Parts I-1V, 1835 (116) XXIV. There are some 
further problems, as a Corporation may have been short of its nominal strength at an election. and in some cases it is 
unclear which part of a Corporation elected MPs. 
3 Appendix 3 contains the full list of constituencies and turnouts. Data saved as pre32to. mtp. 
4 Freemen boroughs often permitted non-resident freemen to vote; counties were geographically large and had only one 
polling place, and burgage boroughs frequently had outsiders as electors (see p. 115). 
5 In my sample these are Gloucester, Leicester, St Albans and Worcester. 
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Mean turnout = [(number of freeman boroughs x turnout in freeman boroughs) + 
(number of scot and lot boroughs x turnout in scot and lots boroughs) + 
(number of burgage boroughs x turnout in burgage boroughs) + 
(number of householder boroughs x turnout in householder boroughs) + 
(number of corporation boroughs x turnout in corporation boroughs) + 
(number of freeholder boroughs x turnout in freeholder boroughs) + 
(number of university boroughs x turnout in university boroughs) + 
(number of county constituencies x turnout in counties)] 
+ number of constituencies 
In the absence of other information I have treated freeholder and university boroughs like burgage boroughs 
- in all three cases the franchise required an intimate connection with the constituency, but did not require 
residence. ' 
The actual figures are: [(86 x 0.81) + (44 x 0.86) + (21 x 0.77) + (11 x 0.82) + (25 x 0.77) + (8 x 
0.76) + (2 x 0.76) + (40 x 0.77)] + 245 - 78%. 2 This calculation is fairly robust; for example upping the 
county turnout to 87% only increases the overall figure to 79%. My 78% compares to O'Gorman's implied 
turnout figure of 83%. 
Thus, participation was relatively high before 1832, at least in those constituencies where there was 
a poll. Further, where turnout did drop this coincided with physical impediments, such as the distance needed 
to travel in order to vote; hence lower turnouts in counties and boroughs with out-voters. There are signs of 
vitality here, but signs that could easily wane. 
3.3 Turnout 1832-50: what is already known? 
Turnout in Parliamentary elections in 1832-50 is a neglected area. After 150 years, with extensive 
work done involving poll books, registers, Parliamentary papers, computers and a large number of historians, 
reliable answers to such elementary questions as, "What was turnout in the election of 1837? " are still 
wanting. The paucity of work suggests a more detailed look at Yorkshire can reveal new insights, especially 
as the work that does exist has serious problems. 
1 It could be objected that some of the other averages are based on a small number of polls - like the figure for 
householder boroughs. However, as there were also few boroughs of this franchise type the exact figure used for them 
makes little difference to the overall result. 
2 Mean turnout at general elections was not the same, as the different borough franchise types each had different 
propensities to poll. Weighting the calculation not by the number of each franchise type, but by the number of each 
franchise type that polled gives, for 1806 and 1818 respectively, 81% and 81%. These higher numbers are because 
constituency types with higher typical turnouts were also more likely to poll. Figures for the number of each borough 
type that went to the polls derived from Thorne, History of Parliament, Volume 1, p. 358-63 and listed in Appendix I. I 
have used my franchise classifications rather than his. The average is calculated by method A (see p. 89). 
3 In calculating the 1831 electorate O'Gorman talks of increasing the number of voters by "at least 20%" to get the 
number of electors, and he did increase Cannon's figures for the number of voters by 20%: O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons 
and Parties, p. 178-9. So, for example, if there were 200 voters O'Gorman believes this meant there were 240 electors, 
implying a turnout of 200 + 240 - 83%. Although in this calculation he is talking about the electorate in England and 
Wales, his evidence for the levels of turnout comes only from England, with nothing said of Wales, so it is likely he 
assumed England and Wales were similar and so the 83% figure can be applied to England alone: O'Gorman, Voters, 
Patrons and Parties, p. 183-191. 
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The literature falls into two parts. First, collections of individual constituency turnout numbers 
which, though highly variable in their quality, strongly suggest relatively high turnout - usually above 80% - 
and often no clear secular trend. Second, Craig's national numbers, which suggest a substantially lower level 
of turnout, and one which was declining. 
Amongst the literature of the first type, Nossiter provides the widest, easiest survey. lie listed 
turnout for the six northern English counties 1832-1886, ' apparently based largely on Bean's work. Bean's 
compendium, though a mine of useful information, is also a mine of errors and inconsistencies, and this is 
reflected in Nossiter's work. For example, Nossiter says his figures are uncorrected for deaths, multiple 
entries and removals, 3 yet gives the 1841 Beverley turnout as being 94.32%. But, an inspection of poll books 
makes it clear that Bean's figure for electorate size does exclude multiple entries, though there is no 
adjustment for deaths or removals. Calculating turnout for this election in the way Nossiter claims he did - 
dividing the number of entries on the register by the number voting - produces a figure of only 79% 4 The 
Bradford 1847 turnout is similarly suspicious. Nossiter's figure of 95.62% relies on Bean being right that 
there were 1871 register entries. However, the 1847 poll book gives the number as 2083, and a Parliamentary 
Paper gives it as being 2170.3 Even taking the 2083 figure, this still makes crude turnout plummet to 86%. 
Given problems like these, Nossiter's overall picture of turnout normally averaging over 80% at general 
elections (Table 3.1) is suspect. 
General election 1832 1835 1837 1841 1847 
Mean turnout (2 member seats) 86.16 82.44 76.82 80.59 81.16 
Mean turnout (1 member seats) 84.70 76.79 77.80 80.75 84.88 
Table 3.1: Nossiter's turnout figures for the six northern counties 1832-476 
Assuming that all of Bean's figures are adjusted for dead, multiple and removed does not solve the 
difficulty: some are adjusted for dead, some for dead and multiple entries, some for multiple entries only, 
none are adjusted for removed, and some are plain wrong. ? 
An apparently more reliable source is Mitchell's 1976 thesis! Mitchell appears to appreciate many 
of the evidential problems, but rather than provide the raw data his thesis contains only graphs, spread over 
several pages and scales, of individual constituencies, and, like Nossiter and others, little analysis. I its 
adjustment of turnout figures for death, disqualifications and multiple entries is inconsistent. Ile found 
1 Nossiter, Influence, Opinion and Political Idioms, p. 215-7. 
2 W. W. Bean, The Parliamentary Representation of the Six Northern Counties of England: From 1603 to the General 
Election of 1886, W. W. Bean, Ilull, 1890. 
3 That is, someone who had lost voting rights by having moved from the property in respect of which they qualificd. 
(Note that in some circumstances it was possible for people to move and retain their voting rights). 
4 My figures are not given to any decimal places as, with the amount of error and uncertainty in any of these calculations, 
giving decimal places is not only pointless but imparts a totally spurious veneer of accuracy. Appendix 9 has details on 
the sources for my numbers. 
Appendix 9. 
6 Nossiter, Influence, Opinion and Political Idioms, p. 217. 
7 Or rather, none in Yorkshire, which are the only figures of his I have dissected in detail. 
1 J. C. Mitchell, Electoral Change and the Party System in England 1832-1868, Yale PhD, 1976. 
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turnout in his sample (atypical due to their regular polls) to be consistently over 80%, rising in 1832-41 but 
then dropping in 1847. 
Two more recent, and more limited, sets of calculations have come from O'Gorman and Phillips. 
O'Gorman claims turnout was static after 1832 in the 80-85% range, as shown by his sample of four 
constituencies (Table 3.2). ' 
General election 1832 1835 1837 1841 1847 
Mean turnout (%) 81 85 81 81 83 
Number of polls 8 7 8 4 2 
Table 3.2: O'Gorman's turnout sample 1832-472 
Phillips's four constituencies show similar levels of turnout, though he found "perhaps ... 
increasing" turnout in Lewes and Maidstone! Phillips found turnout typically over 80%, and often much 
higher in the late eighteenth century and leading up to 1832 Further, he claimed that after 1832 "turnout 
rates were even higher. "' 
More recently, Radice has examined turnout in the general elections of 1835 and 1837, calculating 
turnout after subtracting multiple entries from electoral register totals .6 She concludes that turnout averaged 
just under 90% in English boroughs. This is somewhat higher than many of the above figures, but 
unsurprising given that she excludes multiple entries. For counties, she did not find turnout exceeding 90% 
in any county in 1835, and indeed in a quarter of them it was under 80%. Moreover, in 1837 nearly 60% of 
counties had turnout under 80%. 
1 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties, p. 187-8. On p. 182 he talks of "the spectacularly high turnouts of the years 
after 1832. " But, on p. 187-8 he writes, "After the Reform Act of 1832, turnout increased to a slightly higher statistical 
plateau ... Nevertheless most calculations of turnout 
in the reformed electoral system go no higher than 80-85%. This is 
not very much higher than the rates of turnout that prevailed before 1832. The different, in truth, is not great. " Given 
this, it is unclear what he saw as "spectacular" about the post-1832 turnout rates. In a later work ("Reply: The Electorate 
Before and After 1832, " Parliamentary History, Volume 12 Part 2,1993) O'Gorman claims turnout dropped after 1832; 
however, his evidence is the flawed Craig figures (see p. 88-89). 
2 Calculated from O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 189. 
3 Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, p. 88. 
4 Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, p. 88-9 and Great Reform Bill, p. 32-3. 
Phillips, Great Reform Bill, p. 33. I Iowever, at least one of his numbers is wrong (see p. 258). 
6 Radice, Identification, Interests and Influence, p. 399-402. The returns Electors For Counties: Return of the Number of 
Persons Qualified to Vote for Members Of Parliament, In England: Wales, and Scotland between Ist November 1835 
and 1st November 1836,1836 (190) XLIII and A Return, in Alphabetical Order, from every County, City, and Borough 
in England and Wales, of the Number of Electors Registered in each, for 1836 and 1837; classljying them under their 
respective Qualifications. Return of the Number of Electors who actually Polled In every County. City, and Borough of 
England and Wales at the late General Election; classifying them under their respective Qualifications. Return of the 
Number of Freemen in each City and Borough in England and Wales on the Register of 1837 as entitled to Vote in the 
Election of Members to serve in Parliament; specifying the Number of such Freemen who are entitled to Vote by virtue 
of any other Qualification for Members of Parliament; and the number of such Freemen who are not Municipal Electors. 
And a Return of the Total Number of Municipal Electors on the Register In each City and Borough returning a Member 
to serve in Parliament, in England and Wales, of er the revision of 1837; stating the Number of such Electors who are 
not also qualified to Vote for Members to serve to Parliament, and of those who are so qualified as Freemen only, 1837- 
8 (329) XLIV give information from which, for many constituencies, the number of multiple entries is clear. 
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In contrast to others Craig looked at turnout in a national context and over many years. His 
compilation of electoral results included figures for size of the electorate, and votes garnered by each 
candidate. ' In a later work they were used to calculate national turnout figures. 2 According to him turnout in 
England fell steadily between 1832 and 1847, and was consistently much lower than the individual 
constituency figures quoted above (Table 3.3). 






Table 3.3: Turnout at English general elections 1832-473 
However, these figures are problematic. Craig was too good an electoral statistician to not be aware 
of at least some of the problems, but his caveats are easy to miss. His figures for electorate size are erratic 
and inconsistent. For example, sometimes they include multiple entries in register totals, and sometimes 
exclude them: they are excluded from the Beverley figures for 1840 and 1841 but not from those for 1835, 
1837 or 1847.4 Indeed, he admitted that multiple entries meant his electorate figures, 
must, therefore, be regarded as only approximate ... A rise or 
fall in the electorate of a constituency may 
merely indicate that duplicate entries had been included or excluded from a particular set of figures! 
Further, to calculate turnout one needs statistics not only for the electorate's size, but also for the number of 
voters. To convert his data for the number of votes cast at a particular poll into the number of voters on that 
occasion he assumed everyone cast the maximum number of votes possible. 6 This is untrue, 7 though for his 
purposes it was a useful, even necessary, assumption, as it allowed calculation without necessitating further 
research. When calculating figures for the whole country over many years, not needing to know anything 
more simplifies matters. Thus, in two-member seats he halved the number of votes cast to get the number of 
"voters, " in three-member seats he divided by three, and in four-member seats by four. 
But this assumption is suspect. Consider a contest for a two-member constituency with two people 
on the register and no multiple entries. If one of them votes, and casts two votes, or if both vote, and each 
cast only one vote, Craig would have the turnout as being 50%: in both cases two votes are cast, so he 
assumes that one person voted out of two. However, clearly one desires to get a 50% turnout figure in the 
' Craig, Election Results 1832-1885. 
2 Craig, Electoral Facts, p. xv and p. 66-71. 
3 Craig, Electoral Facts, p. 66. England here excludes Monmouth constituencies and the University seats. 
4 Cf Craig, Election Results 1832-1885, p. 43 and Appendix 9. 
s Craig, Election Results 1832-1885, p. xiv. 
6 Craig, Electoral Facts, p. xiv-xv. 
7 Except in one-member constituencies, where if a person did not cast his maximum number of votes (one) he was not a 
voter. 
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first place, but a 100% figure in the second. The possible extent of this problem in reality is demonstrated by 
a random example from Yorkshire - Halifax's 1837 election. There, in a contest with three candidates for 
two seats, 793 people voted with a crude turnout level of 82%. However, using Craig's method the 
assumption is that only 645 people voted (half the total number of votes cast), which produces a crude 
turnout of just 66%. 1 This suggests that Craig's assumption may produce more than the "slight" 
underestimate of actual turnout he acknowledged. 2 
These difficulties - of electoral register size and divining the number of voters - are surmountable, 
though the amount of research required amongst diverse sources means this is only done for Yorkshire here, 
with those figures then used to estimate adjustments to the national numbers. 
The picture, so far, is unclear. The studies of individual constituencies often have problems, and, 
though they point to relatively similar levels of turnout they often diverge over what trend, if any, there was. 
Further, Craig's national figures generally show turnout to be much lower than the individual constituency 
figures, and show a steady decline until the second half of the century. 
3.4 Improving Craig 
In this section I improve Craig's figures. It is necessary to clarify what is meant by "average 
turnout" or "mean turnout" when talking of several constituencies. One can either average the turnout figures 
for each polled constituency (method A), or total the electorate and number of voters for all polled 
constituencies and then divide one by the other (method B). Craig used method B3 The following imaginary 
example illustrates the difference between the two methods. 
Constituency Electorate Number voted Constituency turnout 
Otterhampton 80 40 50% 
Pallaston 80 40 50% 
West Anglia 10,000 7,500 75% 
These two methods give very different answers. Method A gives (50 + 50 + 75) /3= 58.3%, whilst B gives 
(40 + 40 + 7500) / (80 + 80 + 10000) = 74.6%. The reason for this large difference is simple: using the 
former method small constituencies have a larger weight than under the latter method. In effect, method A 
gives the turnout of a typical constituency, whilst method B gives the chance of a typical elector voting. As 
Craig used method B, this means that comparing individual constituency turnout figures with Craig's figures 
is not comparing like with like. 4 While one can debate in abstract which method of calculating turnout 
1 For details see Appendix 9. 
2 Craig, Electoral Facts, p. xv. 
3 He did not make this clear, but I have reworked his Welsh figures, following his own methodology, and it is clear that 
this is the method he used. As with the hypothetical example, the two methods produce clearly different results: 83.0% 
compared to 76.3%. 
It also helps explain the difference between Craig's figures and those from others quoted in the previous section. Where 
I have calculated averages based on other people's figures I have used method A, and they too have probably used 
method A when calculating typical turnout levels based on their own work. 
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figures is superior, given the existence of many individual constituency turnout figures and the utility of a 
national benchmark to compare them to, I prefer method A. It is trivial, though a little arduous, to convert 
Craig's figures from method B to method A. 
First, however, it is essential to calculate the number of people who voted at polls more accurately. 
As evidence is not available for all English polls 1832-50 as to the number of people who voted, I use my 
Yorkshire evidence to make some assumptions about plumping, which allows a much superior estimate to be 
made of the numbers who actually voted in two-member constituencies. ' 
To do this, I use the Yorkshire polls of 1832-50 to estimate the levels of plumping in polls in two- 
member constituencies. A cursory examination of the data reveals a clear difference between contests with 
three candidates and those with four. This is unsurprising as in a three-way contest, for example, a Whig 
supporter might be faced with one Whig candidate and two Tories and so plump, whilst a four-way contest is 
most likely to arise from both sides putting up two candidates. Therefore, I have treated these two types of 
polls separately. 
For the former - three candidates in a two-member seat - there is no clear trend over time (Graph 
3.7) 2 Therefore, I have taken the mean proportion of voters plumping in these polls (41%) to be typical of all 
such polls. For the latter - four candidates in a two-member seat - there is a slight downward trend (Graph 
3.8). Therefore, I have taken best fit regression equation to be typical of all such polls. For simplicity, I have 
assumed that polls in two-member constituencies with more than 4 candidates typically had the same level of 
plumping as those with 4 candidates. 
With three- and four-member constituencies there is the added complication that voters had more 
than two votes. In a two-member constituency a voter was either a plumper (casting one vote) or cast two 
votes. However, in three- and four-member constituencies voters could cast either one, two or three, or one, 
1 The equations linking voters, votes cast and plumping rates are trivial. Votes cast - (Voters)(% of voters who plumped) 
+ 2(Voters)(1- % of voters who plumped), with the percentages expressed as fractions (e. g. 75%- 0.75). Rearranging 
this gives voters - Votes + (2 -% of voters who plumped). As the number of votes is readily obtainable - one simply 
adds up the number of votes that each candidates received - estimating the plumping rates allows the number of voters to 
be estimated. Data saved as plump. mtp. 
2 Regressing the levels of plumping on time for three-way contests gives a very poor fit: proportion of voters plumping 
in 3-way contest - 8.78 - 0.00455 Year (R2 = 2.9%, Ne 35). 















Plumping in three-candidate polls 
This graph is for all the polls in 1832-50 that took place in two-member Yorkshire constituencies and 
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Plumping in four-candidate polls 
This graph is for all the polls in 1832-50 that took place in two-member Yorkshire constituencies and 
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two, three or four votes respectively. As there are relatively few of these constituencies it is simplest to 
calculate their actual turnout figures, rather than make estimates of what proportion of voters cast what 
number of votes. ' 
Drawing all this together, I have reworked Craig's figures, adjusting for plumping, converting from 
method B to method A and adding Monmouth, Monmouthshire and Oxford and Cambridge University 
boroughs. The results are in Table 3.4, which has turnout numbers much at the levels individual constituency 
studies have suggested. However, there is also a clear decline in turnout, which indicates a problem with 
those studies, arising from their concentration on smaller constituencies with higher turnouts. 
General election Craig's figures - Initial Craig figures - adjusted 
1832 68.1 88 
1835 65.1 85 
1837 64.0 84 
1841 64.1 81 
1847 57.3 77 
Table 3.4: Craig's turnout figures adjusted 1832-472 
Hence moving Craig's figures from method B to method A produces national turnout figures that are much 
more similar to those arising from the study of individual constituencies. A more detailed explanation of 
what was happening can be provided by examining Yorkshire, but first some theory needs consideration. 
3.5 Political science's contribution 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Throughout this Chapter various ad hoc assumptions are made as to what it is plausible may have 
affected turnout, such as assuming that the harder it was for an elector to vote, the less likely they were to 
vote. This Section considers if the theoretical contributions of political science warrant such assumptions. 
For several decades "economic" models have been applied to aspects of political science. Most 
notably, in his seminal work Downs argued that aspects of politics could be modelled by, and testable 
hypotheses derived from, the use of rational, utility-maximising individuals of the type normal in modem 
economics 3 This assumes people weigh the costs and benefits of different possible courses of action, and 
take that which will maximise the net benefit to them. Some of these benefits and costs may be financial and 
1 These figures are derived from Smith, Parliaments of England. Though like many other contemporary sources this 
book has many errors and should be treated with caution, it has the advantage of containing more information on the size 
of the electorate than many of its rivals. In total there were sixteen contests in three- or four-member constituencies, for 
one of which I estimated the number voting as Smith was silent on the matter. 
2 Craig. mtp contains Craig's electorate and total votes cast for each English constituency at general elections 1832-50. To 
this I have added my own estimates of the number of voters and the English constituencies that Craig excluded (the 
Monmouthshire and University constituencies). I have given the adjusted Craig figures to two significant figures as the 
margins of errors involved make decimal places meaningless. 
3 A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 1957. 
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some not. Further, whilst some outcomes are guaranteed, not all are. Thus, the probability of those events has 
also to be taken into account. 
These approaches have been popular in political science, but their application to voting has been 
troublesome. Explaining why people vote at all has been a stumbling block. The problem, known as the 
paradox ofparticipation, was expounded by Olson. ' The difficulty arises from the outcome of an election 
being, in economists' terms, a public good. 2 For example, suppose an election results in a change of 
Government and hence an increase in spending on the army. This outcome is one which affects everyone, 
regardless of whether or not they supported it in the first place. Thus, even if someone did not vote for the 
good in the first place, they can still consume it. And if one can gain the benefits of the outcome of voting, 
and, moreover, any one person's vote has very little change of affecting the result, then why vote, given that 
the act of voting incurs some costs of its own? 
As people do vote, this is a problematic conclusion. Not surprisingly, there have been various 
attempts to circumvent this. This is because such models appear to have worked well in other areas, yet any 
definition of rational which cannot encompass voting is, at best, disturbing. Olson himself argued that 
participation in the political process was driven by a desire to gain benefits only available to participants. 
Subsequently, this idea has been somewhat modified and extended, to include not simply direct benefits, 
such as meeting similar people, but also the benefit of a feeling of civic duty fulfilled, and the desire to be 
personally efficacious. 
Further, the chance of an elector's vote deciding an election is not as small as might first appear. 
What matters is not the absolute number of voters, but the chance that the result will be sufficiently close for 
one vote to matter, 4 or rather the - pre-result - distribution of expected results. So, even, if the result of an 
election were not close, if beforehand electors thought it would be close this would increase turnout. Thus, 
this argument expands the definition of a "close" result. Yet, local elections - both in England and elsewhere 
- frequently have turnouts lower than those for Parliament, yet with a smaller constituency (ward) electorate 
in local elections, the chance of one vote deciding the outcome is, ceteris paribus, higher. s Although this 
point is largely absent from the literature, it is a serious flaw for such models. 
But, whilst the chance of a vote affecting the outcome might be low, it can be balanced by strong 
feelings about which outcome is preferred: if you really want one candidate to win, you might vote even if 
1 M. Olson, The Logic Of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 2nd edition, l larvard University Press, 
Cambridge Mass., 1971. 
2. Good" is used here as in "commodity" rather than as in "beneficial". 
3 E. g. J. Q. Wilson, Political Organisations, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1973, especially Chapter 2. 
4 Y. Barzel and E. Silberberg, "Is The Act Of Voting Rational?, " Public Choice, Volume 19,1973. 
s For example, between 1847 and 1854 turnout in Bradford municipal elections has been estimating as varying between 
about 27% and 95%, with a mean of 60% (A. Elliott, "Municipal government in Bradford in the mid-nineteenth century, " 
p. 112-61 in D. Fraser (ed), Municipal reform and the industrial city, Leicester University Press, Leicester, p. 139; the mean is 
a mean of the individual ward turnout figures). This compares to 79-86% turnout for Parliamentary elections 1835-47 
(figures from above). 
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you know that your vote is unlikely to make a difference. It is arguable that different levels of turnout in 
elections for different bodies is, at least in part, a reflection of different attitudes towards their importance. 
However, even taking these factors into account, any but the most trivial costs would still stop 
electors voting. Though the literature has focused on twentieth century elections, the situation for nineteenth- 
century English elections is substantially similar. Indeed, the costs of voting were substantially higher than in 
the elections considered in most of the literature - with the costs to register, the relative paucity of polling 
places and the possible rumbustiousness of elections. On the other hand similar rumbustiousness acted as an 
incentive to vote, by providing a cost for non-voting. Yet, this is unlikely to have been significant as secrecy 
- either with the Secret Ballot Act of 1872 or in local elections - does not seems to have affected turnout. In 
addition, motives like money and deference acted as an incentive to vote. 
Another batch of explanations is that electors do not think individually, but act as members of a 
bloc, which forces candidates to move their stance on issues, or at least articulates their view, and that to 
make this effective a high turnout is required to show the efficacy of the bloc, even if the result of the 
election is not close. 2 So, landlords with subservient tenants may have wished to wheel them out, even if it 
would not affect the result, to demonstrate their own electoral power. 
One can expand the benefits to an elector of voting beyond the chance that their vote might alter the 
outcome. ' Particularly, there might be a wholesome feeling of civic duty, or at least satisfaction from 
complying with the general social ethic or affirming satisfaction with the political system 4 Voting is a way 
of affirming loyalty and affection to a cause. Elections threw up many pressures and inducements, which can 
act as either extra benefits or costs. They were more than one long debauched bribery session. Duty, ritual 
and fun were also motivations to vote. Even apparent costs could be counted as benefits - having to make 
one's way through a hostile crowd can, to söme people, add to the fun of the electoral process .5 The last 
should not be under-estimated. Given the seven-year Parliamentary term, the lack of contests at 
Parliamentary elections, and the lack of contested non-Parliamentary elections, a Parliamentary contest was a 
relatively rare occurrence. Given the trappings of the campaign, including free alcohol, insults and gratuitous 
violence, they could be very enjoyable. Note, though, that the result may have been abstention. Multi-day 
polling and the willingness of candidates to provide transport mean abstention should not simply be 
I Indeed, research into turnout in British election between 1966 and October 1974 found higher levels of interest in politics, 
party identification etc. amongst people who voted most often: Denver and. I lands, Electoral Behaviour, p. 24-8. 
2 C. B. Foster, "The Performance of Rational Voter Models in Recent Presidential Elections, "American Political Science 
Review, Volume 78,1984, p. 679. 
3 The seminal article was W. H. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook, "A Theory Of The Calculus Of Voting, " American Political 
Science Review, Volume 62,1968. Moving beyond narrow cost-benefit analysis is also a major part of the "general- 
incentives" theory of Whiteley and Seyd: P. Seyd and P. Whiteley, Labour's Grass Roots: The Politics of Party 
Membership, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992 and P. Whiteley, P. Seyd & J. Richardson, True Blues: The Politics of 
Conservative Party Membership, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. 
4A major objection to Riker and Ordeshook is that saying, "that people vote because they derive satisfaction from voting for 
reasons entirely divorced from the hope that it will bring the desired results ... may well be true but it does not leave any 
scope for an economic model to come between the premises and the phenomenon to be explained. Instead, the question shifts 
back to: `Why do some people have this kind of motivations more strongly than others? '": B. Barry in G. S. Strom, "On the 
Apparent Paradox of Participation: A New Proposal, " American Political Science Review, Volume 69,1975, p. 909. 
$A more sedate version of this is the persistent tendency of some people to vote in present elections in person, rather than 
have a postal or proxy vote, to get the full enjoyment out of voting (going to vote, placing the ballot paper in the ballot box 
etc. ) even if physical impediments make it difficult for them. 
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dismissed as laziness. Abstaining and splitting were ways of reconciling different pressures - for instance 
from landlord and vicar. 
It is also arguable that a voter gains from having voted for a winner, and loses from having voted 
for a losing candidate. ' This can be both for "feel good" reasons, and because the winner may have power 
and patronage to wield. The implication of this for turnout is messy. Whilst the above would imply that an 
expected close result should produce high turnout, this implies the opposite - the clearer the result, the more 
sure one can be of voting for the winner, so the more likely an elector is to vote. 
An alternative answer is to use a different decision making theory to utility-maximising. One is 
mini-max regret 2 Many problems come from the introduction of probability: given the small probability of a 
vote being decisive, and the existence of costs of voting, why should anyone vote? Mini-max regret deals 
with this by ignoring probabilities. In the reality of risk and uncertainty not basing decisions on posited 
probabilities may be quite reasonable. Rather, the argument is that people decide to minimise the maximum 
amount of regret that could occur. A vote may very well not determine the result, but, consider an alternative 
possible outcome: "What if I didn't vote and my preferred candidate lost by one vote? I'd feel like killing 
myself .3 Thus, although this outcome may be unlikely to happen the fact that there is the merest chance of it 
doing so means that one votes. 
The problem with this is that it disregards the probabilities of different outcomes occurring, and 
would imply higher turnouts than occur. 4 Further, such a mini-max approach is not widely used by people in 
making other decisions. For example, travelling to a ballot station nowadays incurs a small chance of being 
killed or seriously injured in a motor accident, whether as pedestrian, passenger or driver. Assuming electors 
are not keen on injury, then minimising their maximum possible regret should lead to them all staying at 
firmly indoors and at home on polling day. 5 As Ferejohn and Fiorina point out, one should not automatically 
assume that people use the same decision making criteria in all fields .6 Nor should one confuse description 
and prescription. Merely because a particular decision-making process appears fatuous, it does not mean that 
it cannot describe how people act. However, the idea that the probability of an outcome has no effect faces 
severe problems as neatly encapsulated in "A. Wuffle"'s whimsical article. ' As s/he put it, the mini-max 
regret model has, "never been felt to be particularly convincing by anyone other than its propounders. 
M. J. I linich, "Voting as an act of contribution, " Public Choice, Volume 36,1981. 
2 J. A. Ferejohn and M. P. Fiorina, "The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis, " American Political Science 
Review, Volume 68,1974. This is short-hand for "minimising your maximum possible regret. " 
3 Ferejohn and Fiorina, "The Paradox of Not Voting, " p. 535. 
4 One would only not vote if the net disutility (or utility) from the actual act of voting is more than the net disutility felt if 
your preferred candidate fails to win by one vote. 
S Similarly, "They [Fcrejohn and Fiorina] would have to argue that one should never cross the street to buy a newspaper, ": N. 
Beck, "The Paradox of Minimax Regret, " American Political Science Review, Volume 69,1975, p. 9 18. Or, "There are many 
professors of political science who would gladly give their legs to elect a Democratic president, but I do not believe such 
intensity of sentiment is widely distributed in the population": S. V. Stephens, "The Paradox of Not Voting: Comment, " 
American Political Science Review, Volume, 69,1973, p. 914. I le also points out a serious technical problem: if your 
favoured candidate loses by one vote, a mini-max regretter would feel better if they abstained rather than voted: in the former 
case no costs of voting would have been incurred, but there would in the latter) 
6 J. A. Ferejohn and M. P. Fiorina, "Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing, " American Political Science Review, 
Volume 69,1973, p. 921. 
7 "A. Wuflle, " "Should You Brush'Your Teeth on November 6,1984: A Rational Choice Perspective, " PS, volume 17. 
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(Indeed, there is suspicion that at least one of its authors doesn't believe it). "' A more plausible alternative to 
utility maximisation based on cost-benefit analysis is, rather than mini-max regret, that when the costs 
involved are small, people do not (and indeed it would not be rational to) weigh up costs and benefits - the 
costs of so-doing are not warranted when the costs of acting are so small. Also, arguably deciding whether or 
not to vote is not a one-off decision, but a constantly recurring decision, for which emphasis on one-off 
balances of costs and benefits, rather than tradition and inertia may be inappropriate. 2 
Another explanation presents itself, in that voting can ben seen as a means of expressing oneself, for 
example expressing solidarity with one's class? This seems useful in explaining why candidates without any 
hope like Chartists stood. This allowed them to demonstrate solidarity, and to make their political points 
about the electoral process. But, making voting a psychic event makes the explanation so vague as to be not 
very useful, if one takes this as the sole determinant 4 
One should not go overboard in using this type of argument to explain voting. Even in Bradford 
about 20% of electors did not vote (see Appendix 4), though in the decade after 1832 there were four general 
elections and a by-election, all keenly contested; its first successful newspaper was begun; a succession of 
political societies were formed; fierce controversies raged over the New Poor Law; and a local dissenter 
campaign waged against the compulsory payment of church rates, and even a contest for the constable of 
Horton resulted in carriages being used to transport voters .3 What 
is needed is a mixture, taking into account 
that there are some factors, such as costs of voting, which influence turnout and changes in which can 
explain changes in turnout levels. 
O'Gorman posited three explanations for his claimed rise in turnout before 1832: improvements in 
communications, making it easier for electors to get to the poll; more sophisticated organisational techniques; 
and a more keenly contested electoral system with more political excitement and enthusiasm. According to 
him turnout was higher in places where party development was most advanced and appears to have been 
lower where electorates were particularly large 6 
As all these trends continued after 1832, it is problematic that, rather than continuing to rise, turnout 
fell after 1832. Indeed, not only did these trends continue, but the legislation of 1832 contained factors 
favourable to higher turnout. Curbs on out-voting and increases in polling places made voting easier, though 
there were also curbs on polling hours. The registration system may have increased turnout. That is, by 
1 Wuf le, "Should You Brush Your Teeth, " p. 578. 
2 One could attempt to model people's behaviour using multi-round models, like those for the Prisoner's Dilemma: S. 
Sutherland, Irrationality: The Enemy Within, Constable, London, 1992, p. 17-19. 
3 This is similar to the conclusions of some work on British Parliamentary election turnout for 1966-74 by Crewe, Fox and 
Alt and for 1987 by Swaddle and Ileath. Both found the main determinant to be strength of party identif ication, and that 
abstainers were relatively isolated from social networks: Denver and I lands, Electoral Behaviour, p. 18-40. 
4 In Leeds municipal elections at least, it was the local challenge of the Chartists and local internecine Liberal disputes that 
went with more people voting; see, for example, R. Pearson, "Knowing One's Place: Perceptions Of Community In The 
Industrial Suburbs Of Leeds, 1790-1890, " Journal of Social History, Volume 27 Number 2.1993, p. 232. I lowever, this 
conflict was also be seen as having made the possible gains from voting higher. 
Elliott, "Municipal government in Bradford in the mid-nineteenth century, " p. 114. 
6 O'Gorman, Voters. Patrons and Parties, p. 188-91.1 le does not believe, though, that turnout was higher in general elections 
that were particularly partisan. 
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putting an extra obstacle in the way of joining the electorate it excluded from the electorate those people who 
were least likely to vote. That turnout actually fell after 1832 suggests that other factors, in particular the 
more general motivations of feelings of civic duty, democratic enthusiasm etc., were important. 
3.5.2 Correlation of turnout and closeness 
My emphasis on the importance of keen contests in inducing vitality suggests a possibly interesting 
statistical correlation, namely between turnout and the closeness of a result. If closeness is taken as a proxy 
for how close electors expected the result to be when deciding whether or not to vote, then one would expect 
that a close result would go with higher turnout. Such a correlation could reveal much regarding the 
importance of narrow cost-benefit analysis in determining turnout. 
However, I have not made any such calculations as there are serious problems with doing so. First, 
an expected close result may produce more organisational activity, such as arranging more lifts to polls or 
greater canvassing to identify more supporters, and this drives up turnout. 1 Second, as Cox shows, the 
obvious measure of correlation between expected closeness and turnout is defective. 2 If the actual majority is 
used as a proxy for how close a result electors expected, and it is measured as a percentage of total votes cast, 
one is then correlating turnout (total votes cast over electorate) with closeness (size of majority over total 
votes cast). As both terms are, inter alia, dependent on the total number of votes cast it is unsurprising if one 
finds correlations! Cox's preferred solution - using the gross majority size, rather than calculating it as a 
percentage - is not helpful for nineteenth-century England, with its widely divergent constituency sizes. 
Third, Glazer and Grofman have shown that there are yet further problems. They demonstrate several 
possible models of voting which produce correlations between the expected closeness of a result and turnout, 
despite the model not making individuals' decisions on whether to vote depend upon the expected closeness 
of a poll. For a simple example, consider two different polls. The first is expected to be close, but electors 
agree that there is little to choose between the candidates. The second is expected to be a landslide, and 
almost all electors think the likely winner is much better than the other candidate. In the rational voter model 
the chance of voting depends both on the chance of your voting altering the outcome, but also on the 
difference to you of the different possible outcomes. Therefore, the latter poll may have a higher turnout, the 
greater value attached to one candidate winning rather than the other out-weighing the impact of the 
expected large margin of victory. 3 
Thus, the contribution of political science theory is mixed. Recent work has suggested that statistical 
manipulation of majorities and turnout figures is of limited use. However, it has also suggested that the ad- 
hoc arguments used elsewhere in this Chapter regarding turnout being depressed by impediments to voting 
and increased by organisational activity are warranted. 
"The seminal work was V. O. Key, Southern Politics In State And Nation, Caravelle edition, Vintage Books, New York, 
1963 (original edition 1949). 
2 G. W. Cox, "Closeness and Turnout: a Methodological Note, " Journal of Politics, Volume 50 Number 3,1988. 
3 A. Glazer and B. Grofman, "A positive correlation between turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model, " 
Quality & Quantity, Volume 26,1992. 
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3.6 Yorkshire's evidence 
3.6.1 The overall picture 
The crude Yorkshire turnout figures support Craig's claim that turnout steadily declined (Graph 
3.9). 1 Indeed, comparing Craig's figures with these crude Yorkshire figures it would appear that Craig's 
erratic approach to the size of electoral registers is not that important; whilst it does make some of his 
individual figures misleading, the overall picture is little distorted. 
The decline in turnout was, though, far from uniform, as illustrated by the correlations in Table 3.5. 
The majority of these correlations are negative: the later the year, the lower the turnout was in that 
constituency. Yet there are exceptions. A different perspective is to examine how individual polls diverged 
from the mean in that election (Table 3.6). Some of the lowly turnouts are accentuated by the presence of 
multiple entries depressing the crude turnout figures. However, even if this is adjusted for, large 
constituencies like Leeds and Sheffield still frequently have turnouts significantly below average. 
Beverley -0.87 Pontefract 0.07 
Bradford -0.14 Ripon -1.00 
Halifax -0.28 Scarborough 0.12 
Huddersfield 0.60 Sheffield -0.54 
Hull -0.46 Wakefield 0.03 
Knaresborough -0.34 Whitby 
Leeds -0.69 West Riding -0.93 
Northallerton 1.00 York -0.77 
North Riding -1.00 
Table 3.5: Correlations between turnout and year 1832-S02 
1 Data saved as post32to. mtp. 
2 There are no figures for Richmond and Whitby as each only one poll each during this period. Northallerton and Ripon 
had only two polls each during this period. From here on, polls marked P in Appendix 4 are excluded from calculations. 
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Graph 3.9 
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Year 
-r- Mean national turnout (Craig) -r- Mean Yorkshire turnout 
Difference 
from mea 
Constituency and poll 
n 
+15% Pontefract 1847 
+13% Knaresborough 1847, Pontefract 1835 
+12% Beverley 1835, Halifax 1847 
+11% Beverley 1837, Huddersfield 1847, Ripon 1835, Scarborough 1841 
+10% Halifax 1835, Pontefract 1847 
+9% Ripon 1832, Northallerton 1841 
+8% Beverley 1832, Knaresborough 1835, Knaresborough 1841 
+6% Bradford 1847, Knaresborough 1832, Knaresborough 1837, York 1837, York 1841, 
East Riding 1837 
+5% Wakefield 1847, York 1835, North Riding 1835 
+4% Halifax 1832, Pontefract 1837, Scarborough 1832, York 1832 
+3% West Riding 1841 
+2% Bradford 1841, Wakefield 1837, North Riding 1832 
+1% Halifax 1837, Scarborough 1837 
0% Beverley 1841, Bradford 1835, Sheffield 1835, West Riding 1837 
-1% Beverley 1847, Halifax 1841, Sheffield 1832 
-2% Bradford 1837, Huddersfield 1837, Hull 1832, Wakefield 1835 
-3% Leeds 1832 
-4% Bradford 1832, Wakefield 1841, Whitby 1832 
-5% Hull 1841 
-7% Leeds 1835 
-8% Hull 1847, Knaresborough 1847, Northallerton 1832 
-10% Hull 1835, Hull 1837 
-14% Leeds 1837, Leeds 1841, Sheffield 1837 
-18% Scarborough 1835 
-20% Huddersfield 1832 
-24% Sheffield 1841 
-31% Huddersfield 1835 
-49% Sheffield 1847 
The figures given here are for the difference between crude turnout in Yorkshire constituencies at general 
elections 1832-50 and the mean turnout in all Yorkshire constituencies that polled at that general election. 
Table 3.6: Differences between turnout and the mean 1832-50 
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In places like Leeds, Sheffield and the much smaller Huddersfield, political conflict was often fluid, 
with conflicts within parties (such as over the state's role in education in Leeds during the 1840s) and 
coalitions across the political spectrum (as with the radical-Tory coalitions behind Michael Sadler' and 
Richard Oastler in Huddersfield). 2 This meant established political machines did not evolve, or at least often 
fractured. Thus, come an election, efforts to identify and mobilise supporters were restricted, resulting in 
lower turnout. 
The impact political organisation could have on turnout is also reflected in the placings of county 
polls roughly in the middle of the table. Counties possessed attributes that depressed turnout - the further 
distances electors had to travel to vote, and the organisational challenges of the vastly greater number of 
electors. However, due to their high cost, county polls normally only occurred when all sides were ready and 
willing to fight an intense battle. This produced middling turnout levels of counties, with the extra obstacles 
being balanced by the extra campaigning. It is also interesting to note Beverley's high turnouts. For all the 
possible drawbacks of bribery, the ready availability of money to electors in Beverley appears to have 
motivated them to participate in the electoral system. This is a theme revisited in Chapter 5. In general, these 
turnout figures are another example of how it took political organisations to compensate for apathy and 
produce vitality. 3 
3.6.2 An administrative mirage? 
In explaining declining turnout one must beware of an administrative mirage. Beguiling though 
crude turnout figures are, particularly given their relative ease of calculation, they are only crude measures. 
At the same time that turnout was dropping it also happens that general elections were tending to occur later 
and later after the date on which the electoral registers used in them came into force. Whilst being registered 
was necessary to vote, it was not sufficient. For example, being alive was usually required. Similarly, moving 
or selling property could, like death, result in a person who had an entry on the electoral register no longer 
being legally qualified to vote. The more such deadwood entries there were, the lower crude turnout would 
be. 4 However, this would not necessarily mean that, amongst those alive and able to vote, there was any less 
inclination to vote. Further, the greater the period of time elapsed since the creation of the electoral register, 
the greater the number of deadwood entries would be. Thus, an apparent decline in turnout could be 
generated if one compares elections which used electoral registers of different ages .5 Evidence is available 
t Leeds also saw, for example, the radical Patriot paper back the Tory Michael Sadler in 1832, because of his support for 
factory reform. 
2 Though when Oastler stood in 1837 local Radicals and Tories independently decided to invite him to stand, when the 
two deputations arrived at this house on the same day they quickly agreed to make a joint invitation: C. Driver, Tory 
Radical: The Life Of Richard Oastler, Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, p. 344-5. 
3 Organisational activities did not always increase turnout. Most famously the Anti-Corn Law League in the 1841 
Walsall by-election made great efforts to stop opponents voting. Further, organisational activity which involved 
mobilising "electors" may have done so in dubious ways, as with polling the dead. 
4I am ignoring the trivially small number of occasions when, for example, a vote was cast on behalf of an electoral 
register entry for a dead man. 
s An example of such factors can produce an illusory turnout decline are the British general elections of 1945-1987: D. 
Butler, British General Elections since 1945, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, p. 55-7 and D. Denver and O. I lands (eds), Issues 
and Controversies in British Electoral Behaviour, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1992, p. 15-7. 
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from poll books and other sources from which the number of dead, or otherwise unable to vote, can be 
estimated. This potentially allows turnout figures to be adjusted to take into account these factors. 
Multiple entries are a foam of pseudo-deadwood: like deadwood in that no matter how may entries 
person might have had, he could only vote once (so a proliferation of multiple entries would depress crude 
turnout) but unlike deadwood in that their number was fixed when the electoral register was compiled, and 
could not change during the course of its one-year life. However if, for example, there were more multiple 
entries on the registers used in 1847 than those used in 1841, this would depress crude turnout. An increase 
in multiple entries could explain the decline in crude turnout that did occur in 1832-47. Prima facie, such an 
increase may well have occurred. being entered on the register more than once was, partly, a form of 
insurance, by making it more likely that one would be able to vote. Given the increasing emphasis placed in 
the 1830s on registration by political activists there may have been an increase in such insurance. However, 
against this must be held the gradual decline in ancient right voters who were a ready source of potential 
multiple entrants. 
Chapter 2 (Table 2.1) showed that the proportion of the electoral registers in counties taken up by 
multiple entries was static between 1846 and 1853 at 2%. This is consistent with the evidence of the North 
and East Ridings (Table 3.7). (The West Riding evidence is too patchy and surrounded by too many special 
factors to be meaningful). In boroughs the proportion of multiple entries was stagnant, at 5% in 1839 and 
1842 and twitching downwards to 4% in 1846 (Table 2.1). The more detailed, and more reliable, evidence 
from Yorkshire (Table 3.7) indicates no clear secular trend. Correlating the proportion of register entries 
taken up by multiple entries and the year, as given in Table 2.7, produces a correlation of merely 0.036. Even 
if the calculations are refined, no signification correlation appears. Thus, for example, allowances can be 
made for some constituencies having ancient right voters (thereby making multiple entries more likely) and 
some being large, urban places where one might find more people owning more than one qualifying piece of 
property (thereby making multiple entries more likely). However, regression analysis still only provides a 
poor fit' Thus, changes in the proportion of register entries taken up by multiple entries had no effect on 
trends in turnout over time. 
With a dummy variable taking the value I for constituencies which existed before 1832 and 0 otherwise, the regression 
equation is: % multiple entries - -148 + 0.085 Year - 3.11 Dummy variable (R2 - 6.7%, 
N- 71). If another dummy 
variable is added, taking the value I for constituencies with a population of over 10,000 in 1831 and 0 otherwise, the 
regression equation is: % multiple entries - -134 + 0.076 Year - 0.95 Dummyl + 2.93 Dummy2 (Rzm 9.7%, N- 
71). 




1834 2.3 1835 3.7 
1836 3.6 1836 1.9 
1839 3.9 1837 1.7 
1840 3.9 1839 1.5 
1842 5.8 1842 1.4 
1846 4.7 1846 6.2 
1847 4.8 1847 3.9 
Half ax Scarborough 
1832 0.9 1835 5.1 
1835 1.1 1836 5.1 
1836 2.8 1837 4.1 
1839 4.1 1839 3.5 
1840 4.2 1842 2.7 
1842 3.5 1846 1.8 
1846 1.3 1847 1.9 
1847 1.4 
Hudelers eId Sheffield 
1832-50 0 1832 5.7 
Hull Wake geld 
1834 11.9 1839 8.9 
1835 6.9 1847 14.7 
1839 6.4 Whitby 
1842 8.5 1835 7.9 
1846 11.1 1839 7.4 
1847 10.0 1842 6.2 
Leeds York 
1834 12.0 1846 4.8 
1836 18.3 North Riding 
1837 18.6 1835 0.6 
1838 19.7 1839 0.3 
1839 19.6 1840 0.2 
1840 21.0 1841 0.3 
1842 19.3 1842 0.3 
1847 17.5 1846 0.6 
Northalerton East Riding 
1832 9.7 1839 0.6 
1836 3.8 1842 0.2 
1837 3.6 1846 0.5 
1839 5.4 West Riding 
1842 5.0 1839 15.0 





Table 3.7: Proportion of Yorkshire registers taken up by multiple entries' 
1 Data saved as me. mtp. 
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3.6.3 Counting the deadwood 
Some sources give information on how many register entries at the time of a poll were for people 
who had died, lost their qualification, etc. ' Where there are no figures given in a poll book, it is reasonable to 
assume that this does not reflect there not being any, but simply reflects what the poll book producer decided 
to include and what not to include, or even did not know. The following regression equation is based on the 
Yorkshire dead figures that are known and a further sample of forty other non-Yorkshire constituencies, 
which I have added to the data-set as the Yorkshire evidence alone provides only twenty data-points. 
t People marked as "lost qualification" and "removed" (or "removals") in poll books are counted as no longer possessing 
the qualification for which they were registered. "Disqualified" are not, as I assume this refers to people who still 
possessed their qualifications, but either due to having a job like excise officer, or falling foul of some other electoral 
law, could not vote. They have not been counted as deadwood as there is no reason to suppose that the numbers would 
increase noticeably during the life-span of one electoral register. For example, in January of a year a register might 
contain two excise officers and in August of that year it is likely to still contain two. It is possible they were not the same 
two, but for there to be a change in the total number the size of the excise officers establishment would have had to have 
risen. At no time does it appear to have grown at a sufficient rate to matter here. A few poll books list those disqualified 
due to being excisemen etc., and the numbers in such poll books are consistently small. 
2 These extra forty polls are all the 1832-50 elections for which poll books or newspaper cuttings revealing the number 
of dead are available in the Institute for Historical Research. The data has been supplemented by Dod, Electoral Facts, 
F. H. McCalmont, The Parliamentary Poll Book ofAll Elections 1832-1918,8th edition with introduction and additional 
material by J. Vincent and M. Stenton, Harvester, Brighton, 1971 and Smith, Parliaments of England. The elections are: 
Aylesbury 1848, Banbury 1837 and 1841, Barnstaple 1847, Bath 1837 and 1841, Bedford 1841, Blackburn 1847, Bolton 
1837 and 1849, Bridgwater 1837, Brighton 1837, Buckingham 1832, Bury St Edmonds 1832,1837 and 1847, 
Canterbury 1837 and 1841, Carlisle 1847 and 1848, Cirencester 1848, Colchester 1837, Coventry 1837, Derby 1832, 
Durham City 1843, Grimsby 1832, Hastings 1847, Ipswich 1842, Isle of Wight 1835, Kidderminster 1849, Lewes 1835, 
Maidstone 1838 (two elections), Maldon 1847, Newark 1840, Newport (Isle of Wight) 1847, Northampton 1835 and 
1837, Poole 1835,1841,1850, Reading 1841,1847 and 1849, Rochester 1847, Shrewsbury 1837, Sudbury 1841, 
Warwick 1837, Whitehaven 1832, Wigan 1845, Winchester 1841 and Worcester 1841. Data saved as dead mip. 
My Shrewsbury 1837 calculation is based on poll book evidence that the Parliamentary electorate, at 1473, was 
substantially higher than that which might be inferred from J. A. Phillips and C. Wetherell, "Parliamentary Parties and 
Municipal Politics, " p. 48-85 in J. A. Phillips (ed), Computing Parliamentary History: George Ill To Victoria, Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh, 1994. Their figures are, however, somewhat confused. 
In Table I (p. 62) they give Shrewsbury's Parliamentary electorate to be 1,158 in 1835 and 1,231 in 1837/8 (sic). But, 
Table 2 (p. 64) states there were, in Shrewsbury in 1835,1,102 electors who were in the Parliamentary electorate, but not 
the municipal electorate (though their breakdown in that table only totals 1,052), and 728 who were in both. This 
suggests a Shrewsbury electorate in 1835 of 1,830, rather than the 1,158 claimed two pages earlier. I lowever, the same 
page has yet another figure! In a footnote we are told the Parliamentary electorate in 1835 was 1,248; the same sentence 
says the municipal electorate was 1,265 (which is the same as the number in Table 1, but not the same as the number 
implied by Table 2). 
As if three different numbers in three pages is not confusing enough, the footnote's explanation offered for the 
difference between the footnote's 1,248 and Table I's 1,158 is even more confusing. The 1,265 municipal electorate 
figures mutates into "the parliamentary [sic] registration total. " Further, we are told the difference between this 
parliamentary registration total and "the parliamentary franchise total of 1,158 in Table I stems from the failure of 107 
(1,265 - 1,158) qualified electors to vote. " 
The reference to "failure ... to vote" suggests that 1,265 
is meant to be the electorate and 1,158 the number of voters. 
This interpretation does face the problem that the 1,158 figure has just been described in the footnote as "the 
parliamentary franchise total" and that the 1,265 figure was originally meant to be for the municipal electorate. however, 
Phillips and Wetherell are clearly all at sea on this occasion, and this is the neatest way of rescuing some semblance of 
believability from their figures. Moreover, 1,158 figure is very close to (and only a typographical error away from) the 
figure of 1,155 voting in 1835 given in Phillips and Wetherell, "Probability and Political Behaviour: A Case Study of the 
Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, " History and Computing, Volume 5 Number 3,1993, p. 140. 
This, though, produces further problems as the 1,158 figure was described, in Table 1, as being for the electorate. If 
this figure is really for the number who voted, what about the rest of Table 1: are its other figures also labelled wrongly? 
The figures for Beverley are clearly for the electorate rather than for the number who voted (though see p. 258 below). 
On the other hand, the 1837/8 Shrewsbury Parliamentary electorate figure - 1,231 - only differs by a typographical error 
from that given in the 1837 Shrewsbury poll book for the number of people voting - 1,312. Indeed, the 1,231 figure, that 
(continued) 
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In the regression "age" refers to the age of the electoral register, in days, on the day of polling and is 
measured from 31 July, which was the main qualifying date for being registered. ' Electoral registers came 
into force on 1 November, until Graham's 1843 Act changed this to 1 December. 2 The regression equation 
produced is: proportion of register entries representing dead people = 0.000063 age, which gives a 
reasonable fit 3 The age of a register was, then, an important determinant as to how many entries were for 
dead people, though there were other important factors in determining this, such as the socio-economic 
make-up of different constituencies. 
Ideally, having produced one regression equation, I would now produce a similar equation for the 
number of removed upon a register. However, the evidence for them is too thin to permit any meaningful 
regression equations. But, where there is evidence for both dead and removed the number of removed was 
typically three to four times greater than the number dead (Appendix 4). By comparison, Phillips found that, 
for pre-1832 English boroughs, the death rate was half the rate at which people moved out of constituencies 4 
As moving within a constituency could deprive electors of their right to vote, having a removal rate that is 
three to four times the death rate, rather than only double it, is not unreasonable. I prefer the lower end of this 
range - that is, three times rather than four times - as the evidence from Appendix 4 is heavily weighted 
towards industrial and urban areas, and boroughs rather than counties. In both cases such a weighting would 
probably boost the apparent removal rate. Therefore, I estimate the proportion of an electoral register's 
entries which were deadwood to be 0.000252 times the age of the register (in days); this is the death rate with 
the death rate multiplied by three (for removals etc. ) added. 
(.. continued) 
in Table I claims to be for the electorate, appears again, in Table 3, this time claiming to be the number of voters, as it 
also does in Table 2 of the History and Computing article. 
The situation is clearly confused, and it should be clear why I prefer my numbers to theirs. It also demonstrates why I 
feel it is important to distinguish clearly between electors and electorate on one hand and voters on the other. 
t There were some other, occasionally important, requirements, such as the need to have paid all taxes, which revolved 
around other dates. No allowance has been made for leap years and all Februarys are assumed to have twenty-eight days. 
2 6&7 Vict. c18. 
3 N=60. With a zero coefficient made mandatory there is no R2 figure (or rather, its interpretation is very murky). As this 
is a linear regression I am ignoring seasonal variations in the death rate. One minor source of error is that the regression 
has attempted to fit a linear line to a non-linear situation. The number of people still alive, I., when a register is tp days 
old, is: 1. - (initial register size) x [(1- death rate)" t]. The linear equation gives: Ie - (initial register size) " [death rate x 
to]. I lowever, this makes only a small difference. For a register with 100 entries, that was 412 days old (the largest t 
value I have), one respectively gets 97.43 and 97.40 people left alive. 
The regression implies an annual mortality rate of 23/1,000 in the electorate. This compares to Phillip's estimate, for 
the late eighteenth century, of 29.9/1,000 for an electorate amongst an "average" urban population: Phillips, Electoral 
Behaviour, p. 90-I n21. (In both cases the mortality rate amongst the population as a whole would have been higher, due 
to the higher mortality rate of children). It also compares reasonably to English county mortality rates, 1841-50, of 19- 
26/1,000: Returns of the Rates of Mortality in the Several Counties of England and Wales, in the Two Decennial Periods 
1841-50, and 1851-60; also in the Years 1855 and 1865,1867 (445) LVI and 25/1,000 in 1842 amongst 114 English 
districts (biased towards urban areas): "Miscellaneous, " Journal Of The Statistical Society OjLondon, Volume 6,1843, 
p. 271-2. 
4 Phillips, Electoral Behaviour, p. 92. 
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3.7 The overall picture and the impact of 1832 
My figures for turnout before and after 1832 produce a striking picture. Before 1832 it was typically at 
levels found in the mid- to late-twentieth century, but after 1832 rose to historically high levels (Table 3.8). 
This, though, was followed by decline, with the 1840s seeing turnout return to pre-1832 levels. ' 
The blip in the decline - the election of 1837 - reinforces the idea of the key role of electoral conflict. 
The 1837 election saw the peak of electoral ferocity in the series of elections in which the Conservatives 
moved from humbled remnant to majority party. 1837 was, for example, an election that had fewer 
uncontested seats in Britain than 1835 or 1841 and 1847.2 It was also reflected in other electoral statistics 
(Table 3.9). This intensity of conflict came through in the turnout levels. 
The 1837 election was the first general election after 1835; that is, after the opportunity granted by the 
monarch to the Tories had given them (briefly) power, and had spurred a groundswell of organisational 
enthusiasm to exploit (or close) this opening. This was reflected in the spread of Reform Associations and 
Conservative Operatives and Tradesmen's societies in the West Riding in 1835-6 and in the founding of both 
the East Riding Reform Association and the Bradford Reform Society in 1835. It was also reflected in the 
greater interest taken by publications like The Times and The Spectator in registration in 1835-7 compared 
with 1833-4. The 1837 election was also organ isationally easier as party lines were clearer. There was less of 
the blurring that had occurred in 1835 with the friction between Whigs and radicals and coalitions between 
Tories and radicals. 
Table 3.8 shows how the post-1832 system was different in not only having a much larger electorate 
and having the constituency map greatly redrawn, but also in having, at least initially, higher turnout levels. 
After 1832 many of the physical impediments to voting were reduced, with the splitting of counties into 
more than one constituency, the increase in the number of polling places, the curtailing of out-voting and the 
introduction of electoral registers, which made it easier for political organisations to locate, and hence 
mobilise electors. 
1 One might object that declining turnout can simply be explained by an increase in the number and frequency of 
opportunities to vote, e. g. see B. Grofman, "Models of voter turnout: a brief idiosyncratic review -A comment, " Public 
Choice, Volume 41,1983, p. 56. However, in 1832-50 the gap between successive general elections was increasing, and 
though local government reform in the mid-1830s may have produced more contests, there is no reason to believe their 
numbers continued increasing into the late 1830s and the 1840s. 
2 There are many different figures for uncontested (unpolled in my terminology) seats. For England, including 
Monmouthshire but excluding the Universities, there were about 172 polled constituencies in 1802,170 (1806), 174 (1807), 
188 (1812), 152 (1818), 172 (1820), 157 (1826), 162 (1830) and 170 (1831): Cannon, Parliamentary Reform, p. 278-89. In 
England an average of 27% of constituencies were polled at elections in 1812-30 and 59% in 1832-65 with a trough of 
47% in 1847: G. W. Cox and J. W. Ingram, "Suffrage Expansion and Legislative Behaviour in Nineteenth-Century Britain, " 
Social Science History, Volume 16,1992, p. 541 and p. 557. For all of Parliament about 189 MPs (29%) were elected 
without a poll from 124 constituencies (31%) in 1832,275 (42%) from 174 (43%) in 1835,236 (36%) from 150 (37%) 
in 1837,337 (51%) from 213 (53%) in 1841 and 367 (56%) from 236 (59%) in 1847: W. O. Aydelotte, "A Data Archive 
for Modern British History, " p. 333-60 in V. R. Lowin and J. M. Price (eds), The Dimensions Of The Past: Materials, 
Problems, and Opportunities for Quantitative Work in History, Yale University Press, London, 1972, p. 339, Craig, 
Electoral Facts, p. 160 and Vincent and Stenton's figures in McCalmont, Poll Book, p. xix. For English MPs it was 24% 
elected without a poll in 1832,38% in 1835,30% in 1837,45% in 1841 and 52% in 1847: Craig, Electoral Facts, p. 1-S. 
There was a similar decline in the contestation of by-elections, from 60% in 1832-5 to 27% in 1841.7, though the figures 
subsequently rose: Craig, Chronology of British Parliamentary By-Elections 1833-1987, Parliamentary Research Services, 
Chichester, 1987, p. 313-4. 
I For example, in Manchester, Coventry and I luddersfield. The latter was an exception in having a similar coalition in 
1837. Whig-Radical friction was evident in Bradford in 1835, where this let in I lardy. But, in 1837 the idea of Tories 












1832 88% +7 95% +14 
1835 85% .3 92% -3 
1837 84% -1 96% +4 
1841 81% -3 92% -4 
1847 77% -4 88% -4 




In a poll 
Liberal candidates 





in a pol13 
1832 197 408 189 352 
1835 202 281 154 288 
1837 269 293 177 325 
1841 227 217 139 256 
1847 173 214 121 223 
Table 3.9: English candidates and contests 1832-47° 
However, vitality is not simply a matter of turnout. How many people took part also matters. In this, 
the number of contested elections was crucial. After all, if a constituency had no poll there could be no 
turnout. As Table 3.10 shows 1832 again marks a sharp jolt to the system. The 1832 general election had one 
and a half times more voters in England than all the three previous general elections added together! The 
differences between the second and third columns of Table 3.10 show the importance of considering the 
number of polled constituencies in different years. It was changes in this which produced a large part of the 
change in the total number of people voting. And it was conflicts between electoral elites that drove the 
number of polls and political organisation (and hence affected turnout), which in turn had a major impact on 
how many people voted at an election. 
1 The 1831 figure is my calculation for turnout at a typical general election before 1832, rather than my 78% number, 
which is a figure for turnout in a typical constituency before 1832. The numbers for 1832-47 are the adjusted Craig 
figures. 
2 The table contains estimated turnout levels for all of England. The adjustment for deadwood is based on the equation 
derived above, with a typical register age entered for each election (135 days for 1832,162 days for 1833,362 days for 
1837,335 days for 1841 and 367 days for 1847). The adjustment for multiple entries is based on there being 4% in 
boroughs and 2% in counties, with boroughs tending to poll twice as often as counties. Given that there were 191 
English borough constituencies (including Universities) and 68 counties after 1832, this implies an overall multiple entry 
rate of 3.7%. 
3 The maximum figure was 465 MPs. 
4 Calculated from McCalmont, Poll Book. 
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General election Number voted Number of electors in 
polled constituencies 
1826 106,000 130,000 
1830 88,000 109,000 
1831 73,000 90,000 
1832 396,000 475,000 
1835 286,000 366,000 
1837 398,000 507,000 
1841 287,000 384,000 
1847 233,000 339,000 
Table 3.10: More English electoral statistics 1826-471 
3.8 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 showed that the electorate was large before 1832, grew greatly after 1832 and that 
electoral conflicts drove much of the growth. The same picture, but for turnout, has appeared in this Chapter. 
Before 1832 turnout in constituencies was typically a little under 80%, before shooting up in 1832. However 
just as in the absence of much enthusiasm for self-registration it was often left to political organisations to 
register people, so it was often left to political organisations to get people out to vote. When organisations 
faltered, either due to systemic obstacles like geography and overwhelming numbers or due to frequent 
realignments of factions, so too did turnout. Indeed, with turnout we can extend the argument further. 
Despite all the political effort, turnout dropped after 1832, at a time when political organisations were 
continuing to develop; whilst 1832 opened up many new possibilities for public participation, the public 
turned out to be somewhat reluctant to utilise them. To some extent, political organisations were victims of 
their own success, being better at getting people registered than at subsequently getting them out to vote. 
However, that this problem could exist was in itself a reflection of wider disinterest and apathy. 
1 The numbers are derived from D. Beales, "The Electorate before and after 1832: the Right to Vote, and the 
Opportunity, " Parliamentary History, Volume 11 Part 1,1992, Craig, Election Results 1832-1885, Smith, Parliaments 
of England and my figures in Tables 2.1 and 3.8. Due to the errors involved, all the numbers have been given to only 
three significant figures. Note that the number of English Parliamentary constituencies increased in 1832 by 13 (5%). 




Chapters 2 and 3 showed how manifestations of, and opportunities for, public participation in the 
electoral system suggest a system possessing much vitality, albeit with many opportunities not being taken or 
taken only at the instigation of political organisations. Arguably this picture is misleading, in that other 
factors restrained the opportunities to formulate and express electoral preferences. Regarding deference, one 
can argue, 
The result of any county election in England may be calculated beforehand by calculating the number of 
great landed proprietors ranged on each side and the weight and influence which each and all of them 
individually and collectively possess. ' 
If this were true, for example, then a large county electorate would have meant little. Therefore, Chapters 4 
and 5 examine two possible restraints on vitality: deference and corruption. 
The debate over deference (this Chapter's focus), even merely in the political arena, has a long and 
complex historiography. 2 This is unsurprising given the difficulties of divining people's motivations and the 
diversity of the population, which drove a visitor to comment, 
I took great pains to discover the moral and intellectual condition of the British for we are used to 
hearing the most contradictory assertions on this subject. After careful study I found these assertions 
were all correct' 
The stereotypical, and somewhat old-fashioned, view of electoral deference is exemplified by the story 
regarding the Duke of Leeds' death during the 1841 West Riding election. His demise produced confusion as 
to how, or whether, his influence would be exerted. Allegedly, after some delay, a farmer arrived at a market 
town and announced, "Well, we have got our orders at last, we are all to be yellows this time: '4 Similarly, an 
1830 election squib by William Heath has a borough patron receiving £5,000 from a would-be MP and 
saying, "Here they are all good votes - ready to vote for my coach horse if I order them - Give me the money 
and I'll secure you the seat"! 
t Lord Stanley: J. K. Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament 1833-68, University of London PhD, 1949, Volume 1, 
p. 3. 
2 This debate has generated a substantial literature. D. C. Moore's seminal works have had two strands: a theoretical 
contribution in the form of deference communities and an analysis of electoral behaviour that claims to spot them in 
action. liis most relevant are "Concession or Cure, " Historical Journal, Volume 9,1966 and Politics of Deference. 
Criticisms of him are present in almost all subsequent work. Most useful as an introduction are E. P. I Iennock, "The 
Sociological Premises of the First Reform Act, " Moore "The Sociological Premises of the First Reform Act: A Reply, " 
and R. W. Davis, "The Politics of the Confessional State, 1760-1832, " Parliamentary History, Volume 9 Part 1,1990. 
Useful for theoretical perspectives are R. W. Davis, "Deference and Aristocracy in the Time of the Great Reform Act, " 
American Historical Review, Volume 81,1976,1I. A. Ellis, "Aristocratical Influence and Electoral Independence, " 
O'Gorman, "Electoral Deference in 'Unreformed' England" and D. Spring, "Walter l3agehot and Deference, " American 
Historical Review, Volume 81 Number 3,1976. 
3 Gustave d'Eichthal to Auguste Comte, 17 October 1828: 13. M. Ratcliffe and W. I I. Chaloner (eds), A French Sociologist 
Looks At Britain: Gustave d'Eichthal and British society in 1828, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1977, p. 8. 
4 Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 182-3 n4. 
The squib is reproduced in H. T. Dickinson, Caricatures and the Constitution, 1760-1832, Chadwyck-i Iealey, 
Cambridge, 1986, p. 301. 
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Section 4.2 challenges such anecdotes, by examining Yorkshire examples of how patrons and 
electors interacted. This includes looking at limitations on patrons' powers and the influences patrons had 
exercised on themselves. The picture is of electoral deference having to be worked for and earned by patrons, 
and even then being limited as an electoral tool. It was sometimes even neglected in preference to non- 
electoral considerations. 
Sections 4.3,4.4. and 4.5 examine three areas in which Moore claimed to find deference in action: 
in canvassing, in poll books and in the drafting of certain clauses of the 1832 legislation. With canvassing 
and the publication of poll books, however, I find factors other than deference to be important, with signs of 
electoral vitality and limits to the control that deference could exercise on elections. In the drafting of the 
1832 legislation I find conflicts between different motivations, and limitations to the ability of legislators to 
understand what they were doing, or to pursue clear and consistent courses of action. Again, the importance 
of deference was limited by the presence of other factors and the unwillingness (and inability) of participants 
to place deference above all else. 
4.2 Interactions of patrons and electors 
There is much scattered evidence that deference by electors towards patrons was not guaranteed, but 
rather that patrons frequently had to earn deference by kindly words, good deeds and close attention. Thus, 
when Lord John Russell described relations between aristocrats and the public, it was not a picture of 
unlimited and automatic influence: 
Wherever the aristocracy reside, receiving large incomes, performing important duties, relieving the 
poor by charity, and evincing private worth and public virtue, it is not in human nature that they should 
not possess a great influence upon public opinion, and have an equal weight in selecting persons to serve 
their country in Parliament. ' 
Similarly, Palmerston defended aristocratic electoral influence, so long as it was, 
An influence arising from good conduct and propriety of demeanour on the one side, and respect and 
deference on the other. 2 
A manifestation of the limits on patron power was the popular belief that electors with two votes were 
expected to cast only one as their patron wished, and could cast the other as they wished. As Althorp said, 
Every gentleman who had been engaged in county elections knew that there were always private and 
personal considerations which induced electors to give their second vote in a different manner to that in 
which they had given their first 3 
Another manifestation was the efforts patrons made to secure the "right" electoral outcome. An example is 
Windsor, where before 1832 one (but significantly only one) seat was safely in the Crown's interest. Yet, the 
King's secretary (Sir Herbert Taylor) wrote to Grey in 1831 that, "Having been member for Windsor, I may 
Hansard, 3rd series, Volume 2, c. 1086-7,1 March 1831. 
2 Hansard, 3rd series, Volume 2, c. 1326,3 March 1831. 
3 Hansard, 3rd series, Volume 5, c. 1371,13 August 1831. For further examples see O'Gorman, "Electoral Deference in 
'Unreformed' England, " p. 402 n30. There is some evidence that this was not always the case. Marmaduke Lawson said 
of his contest for Boroughbridge in 1818 that, "They [his opponents] would tell you that to give both your votes to your 
landlord is integrity, and a just sense of gratitude for being allowed to pay for a house or field": Smith, "Fitzwilliam and 
Malton, " p. 51 n2. 
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state that the expenses of election will amount to about £ 1,000 and the annual subscriptions, charities, etc., to 
something less than £100". 1 Similarly, in Penryn in 1826 the candidates had arranged for the town crier to go 
around before the election announcing that voters would no longer be made "comfortable" - i. e. given money 
- and as a result few voted on the first two days. The decision was then reversed and the flow of voters 
increased sharply. 2 However, the exchange of such anecdotes is not particularly fruitful; a more systematic 
approach is needed. For this I enter the lion's den, taking a sample of constituencies in which deference 
could be expected to be atypically strong - all the Yorkshire boroughs in which a small number of people had 
great electoral influence. 
Consider first Aldborough and Boroughbridge, two constituencies within the same parish, separated 
by the River Ure, sixteen miles north-west of York. The Dukes of Newcastle had a predominant interest, but 
in the eighteenth century the Wilkinsons were also influential and normally had one of the four seats. 
Aldborough was quiescent between 1800 and abolition in 1832, with one exception: 1820, which saw a poll, 
and an (unsuccessful) petition. The substantial margin of victory apparently demonstrates the Newcastles' 
power. Though victory was due to a number of votes being rejected, these came from people outside the 
borough, and hence were both not valid, and people over whom there had been no reason for the Newcastles 
to exercise power. But, 1820 also demonstrates the ends to which the Newcastles had to go in order to retain 
control. The Returning Officer was a Newcastle tenant, there was only limited publicity given to the 
existence of the election and there were allegations of bribery. These activities should not be over-stressed: 
one Newcastle candidate was able to absent himself from the constituency so much that the petition 
questioned whether he really existed! Yet, winning elections was not an effortless process. 
In Boroughbridge, a market town on the main road to Edinburgh, the Newcastles' hold came under 
greater strain. Although there were no polls in 1715-1818, there were contests in 1818,1820,1826 and 1830 
before abolition in 1832.3 The Lawsons, having inherited the Wilkinson electoral interest, stood a candidate 
in 1818, feeling that the Newcastles had failed to recognise their importance. 
4 Marmaduke Lawson (junior) 
won, aided by success in winning over some Newcastle tenants with kindness and attention and the fact that 
neither of the incumbents were re-standing. Seeing himself as a Parliamentary failure, Lawson resigned in 
1819 amidst rumours of a pay-off from Newcastle. However, his ambitious mother persuaded him to fight 
the resulting by-election, which he won! The victory did not last, as a resulting petition unseated him in 
1820. Newcastle lost again in 1830 when Lawson's brother, Andrew, successfully stood with a colleague 
against two Newcastle nominees. Newcastle's hold on Boroughbridge, then, was far from secure. 
It is tempting to conclude that the contrast between Aldborough and Boroughbridge illustrates how 
the number of polls was evidence of the strength, or otherwise, of the patron's hold. I iowever, and this is a 
point reinforced by the other Yorkshire constituencies, whilst the number of challenges did act as a good 
1 II. Grey (ed), The Reform Act, 1832: The Correspondence Of The Late Earl Grey With IN Majesty King William IV 
And With Sir Herbert Taylor From November 1830 To June 1832, John Murray, London, 1867, Volume 1, p. 21. 
2 Annual Register, 1827, History of Europe, p. 179. 
3 For more details see T. Lawson-Tancred, Records OfA Yorkshire Manor, Edward Arnold, London, 1937, p. 313.334. 
4 The Wilkinsons had, in the eighteenth century, managed the local Newcastle property. The male line died out in 1805 
with James Wilkinson and the property passed to Barbara Isabella, wife of Marmaduke Lawson. Both he and James 
Wilkinson were barred from being MPs by virtue of being clergyman. This may well have encouraged Newcastle's 
attitude that he could now have all 4 MPs. 
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proxy, the relationship between challenges and contests or polls was variable. Sensing a challenge a patron 
could take emergency measures, which resulted in a contest and poll being headed-off. That they did not 
happen would not be a good reflection on the strength of the patron's hold, rather the extent of the 
emergency measures required would be a better reflection. Thus, the lack of contests and polls in some 
constituencies should not automatically be assumed to mean that patrons had strong holds therein. 
The next constituency is Knaresborough, eighteen miles west of York on the river Nidd, with a 
spacious market and a gradually declining linen industry. Though of moderate size, with an 1801 population 
of 3,388, it had a small electorate - under ninety in 1800-32. In the mid-eighteenth century the fourth Duke 
of Devonshire acquired ownership of the vast majority of the burgages. This left his son, the fifth Duke and 
usually a Whig, with control of both the seats. Sometimes he was a patron with a light-touch. When during 
the Revolutionary Wars he backed the government on one occasion, both the constituency's (Whig) MPs 
offered their resignations. He replied, "I never interfere with your vote -I don't see why you should interfere 
with mine. "' 
In 1784 and 1804-5 his control was attacked by self-proclaimed "independent" interests, who 
attempted to extend the franchise to resident householders. Further, between 1784 and 1805 elections cost 
Devonshire increasing sums, resulting in criticism of James Collins, his agent. The costs rose from £160 13s 
Id in 1790 to nearly £500 in 1802 and £564 in April 1804 2 The 1804 July by-election was disrupted by 
riots, which were sufficiently virulent to prevent a return being made. They were organised by a small 
number of people hostile to the Duke's influence (who were successfully prosecuted). However, this was not 
simply a case of agent provocateurs inciting innocents. Rather, the Duke's new agent - John Carr - had 
curtailed the types of expenditure Collins had indulged in, and been criticised for, claiming the money had 
been spent more to make Collins popular than to win elections. The response was a wave of unpopularity 
that the riot ringleaders successfully tapped. 
The contrast between 1804-5 and later elections illustrates the prevalence of a major theme from 
Chapters 2 and 3. There was much continued hostility to the Devonshires. For example, in the 1806 by- 
election only an opportune speech from Lord John Townshend (a candidate) stopped the crowd going further 
than stoning him; at the general election of 1806 both 300 miners and then the Scots Greys had trouble 
restoring public order; and expenses were continually above £500. However, just as political organisation 
was important to raise turnout and increase the electorate, so in Knaresborough in the absence of a willing 
champion of the anti-Devonshire cause, who could organise and lead it, those hostile to Devonshire achieved 
little beyond upsetting law and order. 
Unrest returned in 1830 when demonstrations against the Devonshire candidate made the Duke 
proclaim he would not interfere again. The expansion of the electorate (to a much greater, though still not 
large, 278 entries on the electoral register in 1832), and the supplementing of the burgage franchise with the 
1 D. M. Stuart, Dearest Bess: The Life and Times of Lady Elizabeth Foster, of erwards Duchess Of Devonshire, from Her 
Unpublished Journals and Correspondence, Methuen and Co., London, 1953, p. 94. 
2 E. A. Smith, "The Election Agent in English Politics, 1734-1832, " English Historical Review, Volume 84,1969, p. 28 
and Thorne, History of Parliament, Volume 2, p. 451. 
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L 10 franchise that allowed a wider range of property to qualify people for votes, meant his possible influence 
was greatly curtailed after 1832 anyway. 
Northallerton, a North Riding burgage borough thirty-two miles north-west of York, had such quiet 
politics that the History of Parliament volume for 1790-1820 only manages one paragraph regarding it. ' It 
was largely agricultural in character, with a market specialising in general trade like linens and tanning. 
Though the pre-1832 electorate was larger than many others - around 200 in 1800-32 - the burgages were 
split between only two interests: the Pierse and Lascelles families. Nevertheless, the 1812 election cost about 
£5002 With 1832 the constituency expanded, adding a weaving district and losing one of its MPs. The 
Pierses and Harewoods (as the Lascelles interest had become when a Lascelles became Earl I larewood in 
1812) could no longer split the representation. Whilst the Harewood interest did not take up the f ight, the 
Pierse interest was exercised in favour of Charlotte Pierse's son-in-law William Battie Wrightson. That he, 
unlike the rest of the family, was a Whig did not matter. In contrast to Lawrence in Ripon, she exercised 
influence for her family rather than her party. Nevertheless, he lost to an outsider, the distinguished sailor 
John Boss, a man of similar (though more reformist) politics. The only other poll before 1850 was in 1841 
when the Harewoods tried to regain "their" MP, but Wrightson (ensconced as MP since 1835) held on. 
Richmond, another burgage borough, lay on the edge of the Pennines. It was a market town, lacking 
indigenous industry. Nevertheless, the population of the parish grew steadily in the early nineteenth century, 
reaching 3,900 by 1831. Between the late eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries it had the superficial 
appearance of a Whig pocket borough, controlled by the Dundas family, with thirty-nine years of the 
nineteenth century passing before a poll occurred, which was then the first poll since 1727. In 1773 Dundas 
owned 160 of the 273 burgages, and this proportion stayed much the same through until Parliamentary 
reform. 
Yet control was not guaranteed. In 1798 Lord Dundas wanted to bring in Arthur Shakespeare, and 
persuaded an incumbent, Charles Beauclerk, to make way. But, in late November Lord Dundas had to 
contemplate travelling down from Glasgow and engaging in electoral manipulations. Though his presence 
was eventually not required, and indeed Shakespeare too was absent from the constituency, Dundas had 
written of his concern that, 
our worthy Chief Magistrate ... with some of 
his co-adgitors [sic] would have attempted to make 
disturbance in the Borough, in such an event it would have been advisable that my Hand and Seal should 
have been within call 3 
Later, in 1805, when Dundas was looking for a seat for Henry Grattan he wrote, 
I am afraid that my attempting to elect a new Member for Richmond at this particular moment will be 
attended with danger. You know the discontent the late Enclosure Act has created ... Unfortunately I 
have no burgage conveyances made out ... and it 
is quite impossible to get them done soon, for the 
1 Thorne, History of Parliament, Volume 2, p. 454. 
2 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 148. 
Fieldhouse, "Parliamentary Representation In The Borough Of Richmond, " p. 21 1. Though Fieldhouse says Dundas got 
Beauclerk to resign as Dundas wanted the seat for Shakespeare, it was also reported that Bcauclcrk sold the scat to 
Shakespeare for £2,000: Thorne, History of Parliament, Volume 2, p. 458. 
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descriptions are long, and must be very particular. Under these circumstances, the independent burgage 
holders might carry an election against me ... although they are in general friends of mine. 
' 
The burgage conveyances mentioned were potentially tricky pieces of paperwork. Even if someone owned 
more than one burgage they were only able to vote once (or not at all if they were female). However, by 
temporarily transferring the burgage properties to friends, tenants, servants and other malleable people, an 
owner of several burgages could control many more votes than just the one. This was how Elizabeth 
Lawrence controlled Ripon, where she would temporarily give her tenants from elsewhere burgages at 
election time. Similarly, the Duke of Devonshire used tenants from his estates at Chatsworth (Derbyshire), 
Whafedale (near Skipton) and Market Weighton (near Beverley) to be the temporary holders of burgages in 
Knaresborough. 
The technical aspects of conveyances could be difficult. In addition to the task of finding 
appropriate people to be burgage holders2 (and ensuring they did actually vote) there was the need to 
produce, whilst following the requisite legal niceties, large numbers of watertight conveyances. While 
neither was impossible, time, money and effort were frequently required. It is arguable that such 
manipulation of conveyances slips over the boundary into corruption; it certainly shows how "deference" 
had to be worked for, and that could mean more than just being paternalistic. 
After 1832 independent forces still periodically surfaced, though in a different guise. Now it was 
local Liberals who sometimes wished to look for MPs beyond the Dundas family or its nominees. In March 
1840 a local shopkeeper was evicted by Dundas for having proposed an opposition candidate, and in 1841 - 
when the independent Liberals made a greater effort to get an MP - there were various invitations to, and 
discussion of, possible candidates, though in the end the idea of fighting the Dundas interest was sufficient to 
put off possible candidates. ' 
Ripon, located in the West Riding twenty-one miles north-west of York, was a market town, trading 
particularly in woollens and spurs, and became a city in 1836 when an Episcopal see was erected. Lying at 
the northern tip of the network of waterways that led to the Ilumber, coal and produce from the Dales often 
passed through. There were also many hotels, inns and taverns: it was a miscellaneous mix of shopkeepers 
and craftsmen. It was another closed burgage borough. The prevalence of burgage boroughs in this sample is 
indicative of both their small (and hence more controllable for one individual) electorates, and also the 
importance of direct ownership by patrons of franchises in exercising control. 
Until 1808 the borough was split between two women, the heiresses of William Aislabie. Allanson 
was his eldest daughter, and had the majority of the estate. Her sister, Lawrence had the rest, and inherited 
Allanson's share on her death in 1808. Lawrence, probably Britain's richest woman, remained dominant in 
the constituency until her death in 1845. Her estates, which included Fountain's Abbey and Studly Park, 
gave her great electoral influence. 
1 Lord Dundas to his son, March 1805: Thome, History of Parliament, Volume 2, p. 458. From the above regarding 1798 
it is clear that Thorne is wrong to state that this event was "the only whisper of opposition. " 
2 Who might also require payment, as with Knaresborough in 1775: box 33, parcel 242, Vyncr MSS, Leeds Archives. 
3 For more details, see Fieldhouse, "Parliamentary Representation In The Borough Of Richmond, " p. 213-4. 
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The 1832 legislation temporarily weakened Lawrence's control, with polls subsequently in 1832 
and 1835. As with Knaresborough the addition of £l0ers made tight control of electors more difficult. 
Indeed, in 1832 and 1835 Lawrence's tenants were only, respectively, 86 out of 341 electors and 110 out of 
383. Furthermore, the opposition Liberal interest was sufficiently organised to have a solicitor working for 
them. After the 1832 election Lawrence gave all her tenants notice to quit, including non-electors. She finally 
forced only about nine to leave, all of whom had voted against her. Forcing even this limited number to quit 
took time. The notices to quit were not served until eight and a half months after the poll: her tenants were on 
annual tenancies for which notice had to be given in September to quit at Lady-day. In 1835 all of 
Lawrence's tenants voted her way, including various new electors created by the building of cow-houses 
(which temporarily became Britain's most famous cow-houses when a Parliamentary committee's 
investigations into elections touched on them). Nevertheless, only about fifteen cow houses were built, and 
the clear majority of the electorate were still not her tenants. Her nominees did, though, win this time, helped 
not just by this tinkering at the margins with vote creation, ' but also by Lawrence's generosity towards local 
charities and local people, backed up by exclusive dealing. 
Finally, there was Thirsk, a borough on the York-Darlington road where it took two Reform Acts to 
induce its first poll (1868). It was firmly controlled by the Frankland family, who owned nearly all of the 
burgages. It was a perfect picture of a pocket borough - no polls, no contest, little effort needed by the 
patron. 
However, as can be seen by comparison with the other Yorkshire constituencies considered, this 
was the exception. Though patrons like the Devonshires, Fitzwilliams and Newcastles exercised great control 
over certain constituencies, it was not unbridled. It was control that had to be worked at, paid for and earned. 
Edward Bulwer-Lytton's aphorism is pertinent: "Yield to a man's tastes and he will yield to your interests. " 
A reflection of this was that most patrons lived in or near the constituency they had influence in (or if, like 
the Fitzwilliams, they had landholdings in widely scattered parts of the country, they employed powerful 
local agents to, inter alia, mind their political interests). This was a reflection of electoral and non-electoral 
factors. For landowners their electoral influence usually resided where their landholdings were located. 
Having a home where a landholding was often made sense for non-electoral reasons, such as ease of estate 
management. However, the additional need for patron proximity to ensure electoral influence was most 
clearly illustrated by those who had estates in more places than they could live. Difficult elections frequently 
brought personal visits (e. g. p. 114), and conversely absences caused problems. Even where patrons kept on 
winning, it does not mean that winning was easy. 
1 Throwing opponents out of their homes had not been greatly effective either: the Liberal interest easily rehoused people 
where necessary after their 1832 victory. 
2 Much of this paragraph comes from the evidence of James Glynn, Report from the Select Committee on Bribery at 
Elections, 1835 (547) VIII, p. 190-9 and p. 220. Being a Liberal he had an obvious incentive to exaggerate Lawrence's 
wicked ways, so the relatively limited picture of them he drew is all the more striking. 
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Patrons had similarly to work for support in larger, more open boroughs. ' Consider Halifax and 
York. In Halifax Anne Lister, of Shibden Hall controlled about fifty electors in 1791-1840, and was a 
prominent Tory. 2 Her 1832 diary records an example of her exercising influence: 
Sent for him [John Bottomley] to get his vote for Mr Wortley. Ile had signed, he said, for Lord Grey and 
Milton, but I told him the latter would not come forward, that he, Bottomley, was therefore at liberty and 
must give me his vote which he therefore did .3 
Several months later they conversed again, and he once more promised his vote for Wortley: 
They had all been at him and some said they would not employ him again if he would not vote their 
way, but he told them how I wanted him to vote, and seeming to care nothing about it, but that he 
thought he ought to oblige me. It is quite useless to leave such men as he uninfluenced. He knows 
nothing and cares nothing about it, and is literally best satisfied with the idea of pleasing someone he 
knoWS. 4 
This need for frequent contact, the limits to patrons' powers and the importance of public promises were all 
also reflected in Lister's influencing of a Mr. Snowden in 1835. He explained he would have followed her 
wishes, had he not been canvassed first by the Liberals and promised not to vote. She persuaded him to 
change, commenting, 
Very well, said I, then I will think no more of what has passed - meaning he can keep his farm. Said I 
would not take a new tenant who would not give me his vote but I had not meant to send away an old 
one. However I must now consider Snowden as a new tenant and ask his vote. Ile promised to give it 
me. I said dinner was waiting, ordered him beer, and came away. s 
York, like Richmond, saw a combination of a political magnate6 and independent activists of the 
same party label during the existence of the city's Whig Club, principally 1818-30. In 1818 when Whigs 
were plotting to gain the city's second seat from the Tories it was the Whig Club, rather than the Whig 
Corporation or Fitzwilliam's agents, which took the initiative. However, when in 1820 the Whigs won both 
seats, the new MP - Marmaduke Wyvill - though proposed by the independents' choice for candidate at the 
previous election (Cooke), had most of his expenses met by Fitzwilliam 7 There was an open coalition, 
including joint canvassing, between Wyvill and Lawrence Dundas, the Fitzwilliam candidate. 
1 lt was also evident outside Yorkshire, as with, at various times, Sir William Drake and Amcrsham, North and Banbury, 
3rd Marquis of Hertford and Bodmin (where he took over Lord Dunstanvillc's interest when the latter became tired of the 
incessant demands on him), the Marquis of Aylesbury and Marlborough, the Marquis of Stafford and Newcastle-under- 
Lyme (where both seats were lost in 1812 after rents were raised), the 5th Duke of Marlborough and New Woodstock 
(where one scat was lost in 1820 when the Marlborough tradition of employing about 100 locals as servants at Blenheim 
was stopped), Fitzwilliam and Peterborough and the Duke of Portland and Wigan (where he disbursed many customary 
payments, favours and services). 
2 Though her 1835 support for the then Tory JamcsArchibald Stuart Wortley was as much motivated by duty to her aunt 
Lady Stuart as by political considerations. 
3 Diary for 30 July 1832, reproduced in M. M. Green (ed), Miss Lister ofShibden 1/all: Selected Letters 1800-1840, Book 
Guild, Lewes, 1992, p. 174. 
4 Diary for 11 December 1832, reproduced in Green, Miss Lister, p. 174. 
s Green, Miss Lister, p. 174-5. 
6 Fitzwilliam inherited the York Whig interest in the 1780s. From then until deep into the nineteenth century, apart from 
the period when the Yorkshire Association was at its peak (1783-7), at least one York MP was a Fitzwilliam, a 
Fitzwilliam nominee or met with their approval. 
7 P. Brett, The Rise and Fall of the York Whig Club, University of York, York, 1989, p. 15. 
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As with Richmond one suspects part of the reason for this freedom of activity for local activists was 
that patrons had interests elsewhere. There were differences of political opinion between locals and patrons, 
in particular over Parliamentary reform in York, which Fitzwilliam, unlike his son, opposed. Such behaviour 
allowed these tensions to be resolved without expensive and unpleasant in-fighting that might also, 
particularly in York, have given success to the common Tory enemy. Further, it was not worth their while to 
try and control every dot and comma, or rather requisition and bill, ' of political activity. A more relaxed 
attitude was less costly and more plausible. 
In counties patron involvement was normal, and farmers' well-being was frequently closely linked 
to that of landlords, who were the obvious channel for the airing of grievances. Thus, for example, numerous 
East Riding families, like the Stricklands, Bethells, Clifford-Constables, Ilothams, Thompsons, Sykes and 
Duncombes were politically involved and all produced one MP for an East Riding constituency in the 
nineteenth century. Yet, as in boroughs, so in counties. Patrons' influences were often limited. For example, 
the minute book of the Bradford committee for one of the occasions the Wortleys contested the West Riding 
survives. It contains much detailed information on the progress of the campaign. There are some comments 
like, "Mr Thompson's tenants in Baildon will vote as he wishes, " but they are rare? Farmers and landlords, if 
of differing political views, could avoid each other; entering into an agreement frequently meant accepting 
different political views, just like the terms of the tenancy or an obligation to farm an area to usual standards. 
Further, agreement on the handling of political views was often a quid pro quo for other treatment, like low 
rents. According to one agricultural historian, 
The relationship also succeeded, however, because it was rarely put to too much strain. Sensible 
proprietors refrained from putting excessive pressure on farmers for their votes' 
The limitations to patron influence were reflected in canvassing: though it was normal to ask a 
landlord's permission to canvass their tenants, refusal did not necessarily mean that canvassing did not 
occur., Landlord-tenant relations involved a complex mix of mutual interest and obligation, encompassing 
more than the mere electoral field, and it is wrong to assume that electoral considerations necessarily 
predominated, especially if tenants had few political interests or views coinciding with their landlord. 
Landlords could use threats and evictions to impose their electoral wishes. But, they were constrained by the 
danger of tenant resentment. Good tenants were not in abundance; why risk income from them over an 
election? Similarly, there is a psychological cost involved in being ruthless. It is not obvious that all 
landlords were so inclined, nor what price they were prepared to pay in return for receiving deferential 
behaviour. Limitations could be self-imposed. As Grantley Berkley put it, he decided not to canvass on one 
occasion because, inter alia, "my family, owning such an acreage in the county, a request from me might be 
regarded by some as dictation. "' Likewise, in 1832 one Knaresborough tenant promised to vote for 
Cavendish, but, 
t Three York elections in 1818-20 cost Fitzwilliam £25,000: Brett, York Whig Club, p. 7. 
2 Bradford Parliamentary election papers, MM 53/11/1, Bradford Archives. 
3 G. E. Mingay, Rural Life in Victorian England, Heinemann, London, 1977, p. S2-3. 
4 Evidence of Joseph Parkes, 1835 (547) VIII, p. 101. 
s G. F. Berkley, My Life And Recollections, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1865-6, Volume 1, p. 347. Self-imposed limitations 
were also reflected in the reluctance of some families to hold too many seats. Thus Ralph Lambton stood down from Durham (continued) 
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with regard to my Tenants, I cannot interfere, as I would wish them to exercise their own judgement and 
inclination, unbiased by myself. ' 
Tempting though it is, one should not be obsessed by elections. Political participation involved 
trouble and bother. 2 There was a widespread dislike of electoral disruption, and a heavy-handed wielding of 
electoral influence could exacerbate this. 3 Thus, when James Collins (the Devonshire's Knaresborough 
agent) was criticised by the chief steward John Heaton for his election activities, it was not merely rising 
costs which earned him his rebuke, but also his failure to keep order. 
Not only was politics not everything, but also electoral and non-electoral considerations often 
conflicted, particularly over landholding decisions. Though the splitting of landholdings to create votes was a 
favourite radical target (or Tory target when the radicals or Anti-Corn Law Leaguers were doing it) it made 
little agricultural sense, and this restricted its occurrence. Another target of electoral suspicion was the 
position of tenants-at-will, enfranchised in 1832. Though there was a rise in their numbers, this could be 
accounted for by the fact that price fluctuations, changes in land values arising from enclosure and general 
instability were incentives to avoid the long-term setting of rent values, particularly where profit margins 
were low. Further, many parts of Yorkshire had a tradition of requiring six months notice to end annual 
tenancies and tenancies-at-will, which made tenants more secure than might at first appear. Moreover, 
evictions were not always easy to execute; there were legal and social limitations and evictions could easily 
result in legal and financial entanglements, entailing disruption, money and a loss of face: force was a show 
of failure. Evictions were further constrained by the rise in de facto (and, given the basis of English law, de 
facto could become de jure) tenant's rights, such as landlords compensating their tenants for any 
unexhausted improvements at the end of their tenure. It was relatively rare for landlords to move beyond 
verbal urgings and warnings into intimidation or eviction of tenants who voted the "wrong" way. This is 
evinced by the fuss generated by Newcastle's use of evictions following the 1829 Newark election. 
Newcastle's justification was, "Is it presumed that I am not to do what I will with my own? "s That he was 
prepared to make such a public comment, albeit a much criticised one, shows the limits of the view that 
intimidation was a flagrant breach of generally accepted norms: that did not stop some people. I lowever, the 
singularity of his behaviour is demonstrated in three ways: the popularity of this simple quotation with 
historians, the occurrence of a debate in Parliament and the burning of his castle by a crowd in 1831. Whilst 
(.. continued) 
City in 1813 after his nephew was elected for County Durham: S. J. Reid, Life And Letters Of The First Earl Durham 1792- 
1840, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1906, Volume 1, p. 68. 
1 Shawe to Bead, 7 October 1832, Miscellaneous Documents, MD 1859/3, Sheffield Record Office. 
2 Charles Greville wrote that the new Queen (in 1830), "is by no means delighted at her elevation. She liked quiet and 
retirement and Bushy (of which the King has made her Ranger), and does not want to be a Queen": E. A. Smith, Reform 
or Revolution? A Diary of Reform in England, 1830-2, Alan Sutton, Stroud, 1992, p. 3. 
This dislike of politics was also reflected in election addresses, which frequently contained apologies for disturbing the 
"peace" of a constituency. There is also some evidence that very political newspapers were not popular, as with the 
financial failings of the Hull and East Riding Times compared to the ! lull Packet. Similarly, editors, even when 
indulging in political squabbles, frequently apologised for them. 
4 Note that technically more entrenched tenants were not necessarily safer from eviction: the number of conditions which 
came with leases frequently made it difficult to (remember to) keep them all: London and Westminster Review, Volume 3 
and 25 Number 2,1836, p. 502. 
s A. I Ieesom, "'Legitimate' versus 'Illegitimate' Influences: Aristocratic Electioneering in Mid-Victorian Britain, " 
Parliamentary History, Volume 7 Part 2,1988, p. 283. Newcastle's use of evictions was not only notorious, but also 
often insufficient to retain electoral control, as with his difficulties in Boroughbridge: p. 112-112. 
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intimidation was not beyond the pale, neither was it the order of the day. More subtlety was usual. For 
example, in 1868 someone commented on Cheshire politics that, 
I do not believe that a Conservative landlord dares to brave public opinion and turn off his tenants, but 
he allows his agent to go to the tenant, and he allows him to say how much it would please the landlord, 
if the tenant voted in a certain way, and gives hints that if the tenant does not vote as his landlord wishes, 
all sorts of petty indulgences, in the shape of small repairs, additional gates, and perhaps a little time to 
pay his rent, will be withdrawn. ' 
The very notoriety of some intimidation cases suggests their rarity. So, for example, in the four northern 
counties there was only one eviction in 1760-1832 2 Similarly, Stoker found, "There is not a single example 
of a Lowther eviction in the period [1760-1832] by the interest that was probably the most ruthless and 
determined in the country". 3 Likewise, the Duke of Bedford in 1897 could not find any evictions having 
happened on the Thorney estate since the fens had been drained. 4 
In Yorkshire too evictions for political reasons were uncommon. The two most famous eviction 
cases in Yorkshire were in Ripon (p. 116) and Malton. 3 At Malton in 1807 a combination of poor canvassing, 
neglect of the constituency and distraction by the colossal Yorkshire county contest led to the Fitzwilliam 
interest losing one of the two seats to an independent challenge. Isaac Leatham, one of the independent 
candidates, had a good record of local service, including providing barley to lower market prices. The 
Rockingham interest, inherited by Fitzwilliam, was not merely that which could be passed on in a will, but 
was also rooted in astutely cultivated goodwill and popularity. For example, when Burke had stood a 
personal letter and a visit occurred. Fitzwilliam, though continuing some practices like rent cuts in hard times 
and charity donations, ended the traditional election ball, rarely visited, charged for his soup kitchen in 1799- 
1801 and had, in William Hastings, an unpopular steward. 6 Nevertheless, of the 500 electors in 1807,250 
were direct tenants of Fitzwilliam, 48 undertenants on his property, and 140 held land or houses of his 
tenants. In other words, 438 electors were connected to Fitzwilliam directly or indirectly. ' Of the 213 who 
were tenants or undertenants on Fitzwilliam property, with neither freeholds nor tenancies from other 
landlords, only 101 voted for both the Fitzwilliam candidates, with 84 splitting, 13 not voting and 15 casting 
both votes for the non-Fitzwilliam interest. A similar picture exists for freeholders who also held tenancies 
from Fitzwilliam or from his tenants. ° 
After defeat evictions were only one prong of a four-pronged strategy, the other prongs being a 
petition, property purchases, and punitive measures, like increasing Derwent barge tolls for some and 
1 Report from the Select Committee on Parliamentary and Municipal Elections, 1868-9 (352) VIII, q. 6419. Although the 
evidence was given after the passing of the 1867 legislation, it is clear that the witness's comments are as applicable to 
the period before 1867: no comment is made about 1867 having changed matters. 
2 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 238. 
3 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 405 n39. 
41lanham, Elections and Party Management, p. 13. 
s See also Smith, "Yorkshire Elections of 1806 And 1807, " p. 62-3. 
6 William Bartindale to Fitzwilliam, 26 October 1807, Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments, WWM F 76/118, Sheffield 
Archives. Edward Leefe -a key mover in the opposition to Fitzwilliam - was motivated by a personal dislike of I Iastings, 
who had interfered in his professional affairs. 
7 Smith, "Fitzwilliam and Malton, " p. 54. 
1 Smith, "Fitzwilliam and Malton, " p. 60-1. 
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selective trading. One local tanner said to Cooke, Fitzwilliam's defeated candidate in 1807 but victor in 
1808, 
Many repented sincerely and he was sure that what had lately passed would never in his time take place 
again; that many were led astray by loud talking people ... [others] were induced by the consideration of 
the deference they ought to pay to the disposition of neighbouring gentlemen, to some of whom they 
were under obligations in their business, to others, in the part they took as magistrates. ' 
After the second election in 1808, caused by Fitzwilliam's successful petition, those who voted for Cooke 
largely had their eviction notices withdrawn, and river tolls returned to their old level, though a 25% rent 
increase remained. In addition, customary treats and gifts, suspended in 1807, were reinstated. Traders who 
suffered from exclusive dealing from Fitzwilliam's opponents had their plight sympathetically considered. 
Thus Malton reinforces the picture of the difficulties patrons had, even in closed constituencies, of 
ensuring that electors behaved as they wished. Malton was normally so quiescent that the next poll after 1808 
was not until 1874, and in 1834 the Returning Office reported having received no requests for copies of the 
electoral register. 2 Yet, in 1807 Fitzwilliam lost. Force was useful but not all-powerful. In Northamptonshire 
Fitzwilliam tenants were more malleable than those of other Whig landlords, due to the Fitzwilliam 
reputation for discipline. But, generosity, usually financial, from patrons normally sufficed to retain control. 
There were some exceptions. Not all patrons or MPs played by these rules. William Windham wrote to a 
Norwich constituent in 1802, 
I have received your letter, and, in return for the offer which you so handsomely make of serving me 
upon condition that I will serve you, by procuring, as I understand it, for Mr. Foster the appointment 
which he has been soliciting under the Charterhouse, I take the first opportunity of informing you that, 
having actually obtained that provision for Mr. Foster, and waiting only till the appointment should be 
made out, I have, in consequence of this letter of yours, actually written to recall my application, and to 
desire Mr. Pitt to bestow the appointment upon somebody else, not being willing that what I had 
obtained from motives of sheer good will and compassion, having been ignorant at that time whether 
Mr. Forster was even a voter for Norwich, should be wrung from me a matter of bargain and sale. You 
will, therefore, dispose of your votes as you think fit, as I, certainly, shall not seek to gain them by a 
promise of service which I no longer mean to perform. 
Yet, for those inundated with requests for patronage it was "natural" to give preference on the basis of 
returning favours. The need for patrons to earn deference was extended in the need for candidates to cause 
satisfaction, as with the need to purchase freedoms in many corporation boroughs, the need to be generous to 
charities, churches, and schools, and the need in places like Iiedon to be generous to the Iveson family with 
their influence over the corporation and Parliamentary elections. 
Both electors and patrons faced conflicting pressures, with different people favouring different 
candidates and with electoral and non-electoral considerations conflicting. This interleaving and indirectness 
of different pressures was complicated by electors also exercising influence over patrons. 4 Similarities 
' Smith, "Fitzwilliam and Malton, " p. 62. 
2 1834 (591) IX. 
36 June 1802: The Windham Papers: The Life and Correspondence Of The Rt. Ilon. William Windham, 1750-1810,, 4 
Member Of Pitt's First Cabinet And The Ministry Of 'All Talents . Including Hitherto Unpublished Letters... With An 
Introduction By The Rt. Hon. The Earl Of Rosebery KG., KT., Herbert Jenkins, London, 1913, Volume 2, p. 192-3. 
4 The occasional appeals to women also indicate the indirectness of some electoral influence. For example, a Tory 
address in Norwich c. 1831 called on women to exert their "persuasive influence on the minds of a father, brother, 
husband or lover; tell them not to seek filial duty, congenial regard, matrimonial comfort, nor tender compliance, till they 
(continued) 
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between the electoral attitudes of landlords and tenants were not necessarily the result of influence and 
pressure flowing from landlord to tenant. Influence could be indirect, and could flow the other way. Thus, for 
example, good and profitable tenants had leverage over their landlords. Similarly, Croker, when campaigning 
in Bodmin in 1820, recorded that, 
Their [the corporators'] patron is rather their agent than their master, he has no other hold over them 
than good offices and good will; they jealously elect their own fellow-corporators who must be 
residents, so that the patron can never get his own private friends into the corporation. Sir John 
Morshead, a former Lord Warden, was their patron, and on his death or resignation, they placed 
themselves under the Pitts, Lord Camelford, who had some property in the borough. On Lord 
Camelford's death, Lord Greville wished to be patron, but some kind of demur took place, and Mr. C. 
Rashleigh, who was an attorney and a chief manager in the borough, advised them to invite Lord de 
Dunstanville, which they did. ' 
As in Bodmin, so in Buckinghamshire. The Marquis of Chandos was a boroughmonger who supported 
moderate Parliamentary reform in 1831-2, and owned 300 slaves yet became an opponent of slavery. Ile, 
knew when to bend. This was part of the secret of his success. He also had a good nose for a popular 
issues, as he demonstrated in his opposition to [Catholic] emancipation and his support of the Corn 
Laws. These qualities ... were probably more important to his success than his broad acres and his army 
of tenants. 
Even coercion could work both ways; to quote Gash, "If any class was coerced in 1831, it was the landlords; 
and some of them equally certainly in 1846". 3 The sight of voters driving patrons and candidates to change 
position is more common after the 1832 changes, with their opening up of the electoral system. For example, 
in 1847 a letter was written regarding the recent election in Bradford that, "This triumph is what many of us 
little expected a few weeks ago ... Fortunately 
however Mr Busfeild gave a little way to the wishes of some 
of his supporters. "4 The appearance of third man candidates was also a form of reverse coercion, electors 
forcing patrons to appease them. The influence of non-electors is returned to on p. 152. 
If electoral deference had been a one-way and guaranteed process there would have been little need 
for campaigning in uncontested elections. Yet, even then campaigning often occurred, as with the 
distribution of an election address from Milton, an 1818 Yorkshire candidate. This behaviour was expected. 
Similarly, in North Riding certain acts were expected: 
At a former election, some years ago, I know that every voter received Ss. for a dinner, and he was 
conveyed in addition; and at the last election, many of those voters who had had previous experience, 
asked, "Shall we have our 5s.? " and when they heard that they were not to be allowed it, they were 
unwilling to go, and they did not go in many cases. 
(.. continued) 
have saved your country from perdition! ": G. J. I lolyoake, Sixty Years OjAn Agitator's L(je, 3rd edition, T. Fisher 
Unwin, London, 1906, p. 29. 
t L. J. Jennings (ed), The Croker Papers: The Correspondence And Diaries Of The Late Right Honourable John Wilson 
Croker, LL. D., FRS., Secretary To The Admiralty From 1809 To 1830, John Murray, London, 1884. Volume 1, p. 165. 
2 2W. Davis, Political Change And Continuity 1760-1885: A Buckinghamshire Study, David and Charles, Newton 
Abbot, 1972, p. 98. 
3 Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p. 178. 
4 Edward Kenion to Mr. W. J. Nichols, 2 August 1847, Nichols correspondence, 67D78, Bradford Archives. Busfeild was 
a victorious candidate. 
5 1860 (455) XII, q. 987. 
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It was similar requirements to make at least a minimum of effort that governed the appearance of candidates 
in Newcastle's interest at Aldborough and Boroughbridge elections. Often they did not appear, as with Henry 
and William Clinton, but when in 1818 there was some opposition to the Newcastle interest, an express 
coach was despatched to bring the candidates along. ' 
Even when campaigns were of dubious legality - as frequently so in Beverley - it is not clear who 
was influencing whom. In Beverley there were accepted sums to be paid to voters, and both sides paid these 
sums. Therefore there was no incentive to switch sides as a result of a bribe. Contestants were not so much 
bribing to gain votes, but in order to avoid losing them (see p. 149). Generosity occurred despite the make-up 
of Beverley which, at first glance, made it perfect for a borough version of Moore's deference communities. 
It was small, with a population rising from 5,401 in 1801 to 10,058 by 1851 2 After 1832 it had a majority of 
workers in the electorate, 3 and was one of only eight boroughs where artisans were a majority of the 
population. 4 Being an administrative and social centre various rich families lived in the vicinity. The 
electorate in the first half of the nineteenth century was about 1000-1500, and party organisation was weak 
compared to other places, with it being hard to pin party labels even on some candidates. This combination 
of smallness (making personal contact easier), the number of workers dependent on employers and 
customers, yet only limited industrialisation and the presence of aristocracy should have provided fertile 
ground for deference communities. Still, there was the need to distribute money. 
The levelling feature of elections, with importance given to electors regardless of social rank, was 
reflected in references to the trust and privilege that accompanied the franchise. Three examples are an 
address from a freeholder for the 1826 Yorkshire election, describing voting as, "one of the most valuable 
privileges inherent in British subjects"; 5 Buckingham's comment in 1835 to voters that, "You are assembled 
today to discharge an important duty ..: '6; and Wilberforce 
(junior)'s speech at Bradford in 1841: "You hold 
at this moment the high and responsible office of electors who are about to chose their representative .. "ý . 
Likewise, the language of election addresses is that of a candidate being in the hands of the 
electorate! John Hardy's 1841 address claimed: 
Encouraged by these proofs of your favour [his election in 1832 and 1835] 1 again offered myself as a 
Candidate at the Election of 1837, unconscious of having done anything to forfeit that confidence which 
1 Lawson-Tancred, A Yorkshire Manor, p. 320. 
2 The growth is slightly inflated by the change of boundaries in 1832. The population of the three parishes comprising 
the borough - St Martins, St Marys and St Nicholas - was 7432 in 1831; in 1832 part of St John Parish was added, 
bringing the population up to 8263: J. 1 I. Philbin, Parliamentary Representation, 1832: England and Wales, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1965, p. 228. 
3 Markham, Nineteenth-Century Parliamentary Elections, p. I 1. 
4 Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 89. 
s Bradford and Shipley election and political papers, DB13 cl, Bradford Archives. 
6 Speech at Sheffield nomination meeting 1835, Sheffield 1835 poll book, p. 8. 
7 Guardian's report of Wilberforce speech 23 August 1841, Bradford and Shipley election and political papers, DB13 
c13, Bradford Archives. 
1 There are of course some exceptions to this deference, for example Acland's comment, "Burgesses - think. (if you have 
recovered from the stupor of electoral drunkenness)... " (I lull poll book for 1832 and 1835, p. 82). One is tempted to say, 
though, that if Acland was doing it it was not normal! The poll book also describes certain voters as "timid traitors, " 
"fools, " "worse than fools, " "traitors" and "arrant traitors. " This was unusual. 
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a Majority of the Constituency had twice reposed in me ... [On losing] it determined me not to obtrude 
myself again on the attention of the Electors of Bradford. 
On the 28th of December, 1839, a Deputation did me the honour to wait upon me with a Requisition by 
as large and respectable a number of the Constituency, that with a view to a then expected Dissolution, I 
could not refuse the offers of support, which for the reasons I have given I should not have presumed to 
solicit... the number and respectability of those who had invited me would not permit me to refuse. ' 
In the same vein, Wilberforce (senior)'s letter to the York Herald in 1806 apologised that, "I must 
unavoidably become an Egoist"; J. S. Wortley's 1835 West Riding address said, "I venture to address you as 
a Candidate for the Honour of your Representative, having thought it my duty to comply with a strong desire 
to that effect, expressed by a large body of the Electors of this Great District'; ' and Henry Wickham's 1847 
address started, "Having had this Day the honour of being presented with a Requisition most numerously 
signed ..:. 
4 Though not all addresses were obsequious, even those which showed rather more initiative on 
the part of the candidate were clothed in similar language. So, E. L. Lister wrote in 1837, "I beg leave once 
more to offer myself as a Candidate for your Representative, "s in 1837 Milton claimed he felt, "it an 
imperative duty no less than a natural impulse, to offer you the continuance of my services, till you are 
pleased to dispense with them, "6 and Richard Bethell's 1826 Yorkshire address said that, 
Encouraged by the many spontaneous assurances of support which I have received, I now, venture to 
offer myself to the Freeholders of this great County ... Activated 
by no views of private interest, deeply 
sensible of the importance of that trust to which I aspire, and anxious to discharge its duties with 
diligence and fidelity. 7 
The same style and vocabulary was invoked even where it was patent that the (potential) candidate was 
taking the initiative. As Charles Duncombe wrote in the York tferald, 
The flattering manner in which many of my friends have called upon me to know what may be my 
intentions, under the present situation of the County, demands from me a public avowal of them. I beg, 
therefore, to assure you that I have no intention to disturb, nor do I feel the necessity of the peace of the 
County being as present disturbed, but should circumstances occur, which at this moment it is not 
possible to foresee, I should not hesitate to presume to make an offer of my services ... 
The 1832 reforms do not appear to have brought about any change in this language, which is not surprising 
as the greater openness of the electoral system meant that candidates were more anxious for support, 
balancing out any shift in the other direction from a less deferential, more partisan style of politics. 
In a sense, it does not matter if candidates meant what they said when using the type of vocabulary 
illustrated above. Rather, that they felt it was necessary to use it in itself illustrates how candidates were 
constrained by the need to meet expected norms of behaviour, and that these norms included limits to 
influence over electors. 
1 Bradford and Shipley election and political papers, DBI3 c1, Bradford Archives. 
2 York Herald, 1 November 1806. 
3 1835 West Riding poll book (Stanfield), p. 6. 
Bradford and Shipley election and political papers, DB 13 c1, Bradford Archives. 
s Letter to "The Independent Electors, " Busfeild Ferrand MSS, S1 D7912, Bradford Archives. 
6 Letter to "The Electors, " Busfeild Ferrand MSS, 31 D79/2, Bradford Archives. 
7 Bradford and Shipley election and political papers, DB13 cl, Bradford Archives. 
1 York Herald, 25 October 1806. 
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These factors - limitations on patrons' powers, their need to earn electoral loyalty, the influences 
exercised on patrons themselves and the importance of non-electoral considerations - resulted in a 
complicated four-way relationship between electors, non-electors, candidates and patrons, in which subtle 
and intricate patterns of constraints and inhibitions surrounded the simple idea of "deference. " 
4.3 Publication of poll books 
The reasons for, and circumstances of, the publication of poll books in the nineteenth century have 
received little attention from historians. Yet, Moore hung part of his arguments around their publication, 
claiming that, 
Clearly, poll books could not have been published if, in significant fashion, the information they contain 
as to how the voters did vote offended against the predominant contemporary assumptions as to how the 
voters should vote. ' 
This argument has a significant problem. If it is correct, then poll books were published when electors voted 
as they should have. Given Moore's belief in clear deference communities in determining how electors voted 
this means that poll books were published when they revealed nothing more than that which a little 
contemporary knowledge could have supplied. Given the effort and cost involved in producing poll books, 
why then were they published at all? Tracing landownership and landlord-tenant relationships through local 
knowledge and contacts would often have been easier than trying to translate poll book information, 
frequently patchy and inaccurate and inconveniently arranged for the task, into a map of deference 
communities. 
However, poll books were published. Moreover, they were normally commercial ventures, and so 
had to contain information people wanted and were prepared to pay for. My explanation for this is two-fold. 
First, Moore is wrong. Voters behaving in contravention of contemporary norms did not result in poll books 
not being published. Rather, given the utility of poll books as electoral tools, the more unusual voters' 
behaviour was, the greater the campaigning need for poll books. Upsets to traditional landed control like the 
Malton 1807 election did result in poll books being published. Second, poll books had a wider, local heritage 
function. They did not simply record votes, they recorded local history. 
The use of poll books as electoral weapons explains the increasing popularity of poll books in an 
earlier period. In the early seventeenth century the Commons disapproved of records of voters' names, 
believing it would facilitate undue pressure. Thus, in 1628 the keeping of a Yorkshire poll list was severely 
criticised by the Commons. ' But the Last Determinations Act (1696) required the Clerk to keep, and make 
available, records. 4 The increasing popularity of poll books should be viewed, 
1 Moore, Politics of Deference, p. 2. 
2 Another difficulty with Moore's view is that it does not explain why secret voting took place in other elections many 
years before it was introduced for Parliamentary elections (Section 5.7). If, as Moore argues. it was deference 
communities becoming unacceptable that led to the secret ballot being introduced, why did they become unacceptable in 
other elections so many years before they did so for Parliamentary elections? Indeed, the ballot could be seen as 
supporting deference, by protecting the legitimate interest of electors against the illegitimate interests of non-electors. 
3 S. W. Baskerville, P. Adman and K. F. Beedham, "Manuscript Poll Books And English County Elections In The First 
Age Of Party: A Reconsideration Of The Provenance And Purpose, " Archives, Volume 19 Number 86,1991. p. 399. 
4 7&8 Will. III c. 25, clause 6. 
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In the context of the renewed drive to mobilise for partisan advantage all the electoral resources which 
deference and `interest' could command. ' 
Poll books were an essential electoral tool, providing information with which future elections could be 
fought more effectively. Electoral utility meant some poll books included extra information like the names of 
people who voted other than as they had pledged, or who had been otherwise disreputable. 2 Likewise, an 
Acland poll book stated, 
The Tories being so far maddened as to threaten a scrutiny, may go mad outright and carry their threats 
to execution; - wherefore, any information of votes recorded in the names of the absent or the dead, 
should be communicated WITHOUT DELAY. In order to provide against the insane threats alluded to, 
the publisher will endeavour to secure the issue of one of these parts daily, until the Poll Book shall have 
been completed ... I... earnestly claim the assistance of my reformist 
brethren in making my 
Commentary on this Poll-Book as complete an expose of the tricks of the Hull Tory Corruptlonists as 
may be practicable. 3 
But, in addition to narrow electoral information, many also included information like lists of constituencies' 
previous MPs and details of victory processions. These had decidedly limited uses for fighting future 
elections. Rather, they were part of local history, and poll books, being repositories of local history, recorded 
such details. 
As Table 4.1 shows poll books' own explanations of their existence mixed electoral utility and local 
heritage. Likewise, the Lincolnshire 1818 poll book included a proposal to reprint the poll book of 1723. Poll 
books like those of Ipswich (1831), Kings Lynn (1826) and Sussex East (1832) included records of non- 
voters and records of people demanding that their failed attempts to vote (e. g. due to being late) were 
recorded. 4 The desire for accuracy, an important part of being an account of record, was reflected in the pre- 
emptive apology for any errors in poll books like Northamptonshire (1806) and Suffolk (1830). 
In conclusion, poll book publication was driven by local printers seeing a financially remunerative 
market; and the information readers were prepared to pay for was both psephological and antiquarian. Their 
publication was a reflection of the limitations to controls on electors' behaviour (and hence the need for 
detailed information about their behaviour) and the setting of elections in a wider social and traditional 
context (hence the local history aspect of many poll books). 
1 Baskerville, Adman and Beedham, "Manuscript Poll Books, " p. 400. 
2 E. g. Chester Sheriff 1818, Leicestershire (Cockshaw) 1830. 
311u11 poll book for 1832 and 1835 (Acland), p. 2, p. 79. 
4 Another use of "matter of record" motivations was the Bristol 1837 poll book published by the Bristol Liberal 
Association for use with an election petition. 
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Poll Book Reason given in poll book for publication 
Banbury 1835 "That every farmer may know with whom he ought or ought not to deal. " 
Buckingham 1832 "That the real Independent and Free electors may have a right view of the 
opposition they had to contend with, - and that they may plainly see, the 
Tenantry of the Grenville Family, - and those immediately dependent 
upon that family, - cannot bind the shackles of despotic nomination on 
them, without their assistance. " 
Chester 1837 "A considerable degree of doubt having been expressed respecting the 
votes given. " 
Derbyshire South 1832 "The following pages contain information which will probably be 
(Shore) referred to by your children in many years to come. " 
Essex 1830 "A wish was generally expressed that the Poll be published. " 
Huddersfield 1834 "That these SHARKS of society [Whigs] may be known, in order to be 
avoided as much as possible ... [and] so that every PATRIOT may distinguish his FRIEND from his enemy. " 
Huddersfield 1837 "Behold your opponents in their true colours. " 
Huntingdonshire 1830 "Been requested by several Gentlemen, FREEHOLDERS of the 
COUNTY OF HUNTINGDON. " 
Kent East 1832 "The Publication of the Poll at a contested Election is generally a matter 
of so much interest, that seldom or ever is it dispensed with ... [1832] introduced a new, as well as a numerous class of Electors hitherto 
unknown, and who, without the present publication, would probably have 
continued so. " 
Liverpool 1812 "Four Hundred and Seventy-Six errors have been detected in the Poll 
(Wright & Cruckshank) Book already [published]. " 
Norfolk 1806 (Bacon) "A POLL being considered merely a book of reference by which the 
freeholders' party-opinion may be easily traced, and in the event of a 
succeeding contest, his abode discovered, the arrangement of this edition 
has been studiously adapted to these objects. " 
Norfolk 1806 (Stevenson "It may be interesting to the local antiquary, and amusing to the village 
& Matchett) policeman, to trace the change of residents, and mark the development of 
political predilections, which these humble yet faithful records exhibit ... 
the curious in election matters may learn from thence how their friends or 
fathers exercised their franchise. 
Westmoreland 1818 "The Friends of Mr. Brougham [a defeated candidate] are most earnestly 
desired to examine the Poll Book, and make enquiries into the validity of 
every doubtful vote. " 
Whitehaven 1832 "Being one of the enfranchised Boroughs under the Reform Act, the 
election of a Representative was entirely a new feature in our local 
matters, and will, it is natural to conclude, occupy a prominent situation 
in the history of the place. " 
Worcester 1841 "The late Election ... presented so many novel, singular, and unexpected 
occurrences, both in its progress and result, as to render necessary the 
publication of a Poll Book ... [it makes clear] the political, and perhaps, 
in many instances, even the religious opinions, which influenced each 
elector. " 
Table 4.1: Publication of poll books' 
1 These are all the 1800-50 poll books in the Institute of I listorical Research with a substantive reason for publication. 
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4.4 Canvassing 
Canvassing was probably the most important single task of election committees, requiring 
organisation of people, construction and distribution of instructions, writing and distribution of letters of 
solicitation, production of routes and some sort of central control. Personal meetings and letters were 
potential substitutes for canvassing, though the latter did not provide the recipients' voting intentions. 
Canvassing was meant to identify and mobilise support (possibly leading to a decision of whether or not to 
stand), to make the ritual public bow of subservience to the public and to publicise candidates and issues. 
Though the relatively small size of most electorates, even after 1832, made total canvassing possible, the 
existence of out-voters before 1832 made matters harder. Matters became easier after 1832 with the existence 
of nearly definitive registers. ' Before 1832 voters had to be traced, a task which could be substantially eased 
by a poll book for a previous election. Furthermore, the efforts to ensure that a person not only had the 
requisite qualifications, but could prove them if needed, and the efforts to provide objections to supporters of 
the other side, were part of registration campaigns after 1832 but were part of election campaigns before 
1832. 
Though "respectable" people, such as peers and magistrates, were often preferred as canvassers to 
"mere attorneys, " this does not mean canvassing was always a stuffy and "proper" occasion; flags, colours 
and festivities - like meals and breakfast parties - were common. "Respectable" electors (and wielders of 
influence) were normally canvassed first. Women sometimes also participated, most famously in canvassing 
for Fox in the 1784 Westminster election. Lady Milton canvassed in Yorkshire in 1807, and Mrs. Jane 
Osbaldeston made a name as a keen campaigner in Yorkshire. It was an exercise in social rituals, a way of 
flattering voters and allowing direct and personal contact; hence the hostility to paid canvassers, who were 
often seen as a source of corruption, a cloak for bribery, a profession of trouble-makers and a source of 
intimidation? There were some who encouraged these criticisms with their behaviour, such as the agents in 
Yorkshire who happily acted for both sides simultaneously. The dislike and suspicion of canvassing, often 
seen as involving undue influence and treating, and the feeling that canvassing involved unreasonably trying 
to persuade people to vote against their initial inclinations, motivated some supporters of the secret ballot, 
who believed it would curtail canvassing. 
A pre-emptive strike with canvassing was often liked, for reasons including desiring to get 
promises, or half-promises, from voters first, making it harder for them to switch ,$ and the possibility of 
scaring off other potential candidates. Public promises of votes were valued (e. g. p. 181). 1 lowever, electors 
might like to hedge and wait, possibly in a desire to maximise the value of their vote, and early canvasses 
could be accused of causing unnecessary disturbance. 
1 There are only a few isolated examples in Yorkshire in 1832-50 of people not on registers voting: see Appendix 9. 
2 E. g. Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act (1854) &c., 1860 (329) X, q. 58, q. 414- 
6,968 and 1654-6. 
3 Smith, "The Election Agent, " p. 29. 
4 E. g. evidence of Joseph Parkes and of another witness, 1835 (547) VIII, p. 105, p. 130. 
sl lence the Beverley election address of 1830 which commented on rumours about who would stand and said, "Be 
cautious in your movements - your enemies are on the alert - suspend your promises, and a few days will put the matter 
beyond doubt": Beverley Election 1830: A Collection ofAll the Placards, Squibs, &c. Issued During The Above Election, 0. 
Scaum, Beverley, [1830? ], p. 3. 
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Canvassing is thus relevant to my thesis in two ways: as a reflection of vitality in the electoral 
system and its implication for the weakness of deference communities and similar limitations on electors' 
behaviour. Even where canvassing was more a matter of ritual than electoral efficacy it illustrates how 
electoral influence could not be taken for granted; there were still hoops to jump through. The importance of 
canvassing and organisation and, by implication, the weakness of Moore's deference communities, is 
illustrated by Cobden's 1847 election for the West Riding. An unopposed election was expected, with the 
opposing parties agreeing to split the return between Morpeth and Denison. I lowever, the Tories struck their 
deal with Fitzwilliam, not the Anti-Corn Law League. The League wrecked the deal by putting up Cobden, 
on the day of nomination and without any previous warning. This left no time for an election campaign to be 
organised, so Denison stood down after losing the show of hands. Some saw this as a mournful triumph for 
electoral bureaucrats, others saw it as a triumph over a "dishonourable coalition. "' 
Though canvassing could be accurate, this should not be taken as support for Moore. If clear 
deference communities existed a few well placed queries would have more effectively and economically 
provided the requisite information, and there would have been no need for the time-consuming and costly 
exercise of canvassing. That canvassing could be accurate can be deduced from the reliance some potential 
candidates placed on it when deciding whether or not to stand. For example, it was alleged that canvass 
books were used in the metropolis to decide elections: agents, particularly on different wings of the same 
party, would meet and agree who would withdraw to avoid the costs of a contest and to stop other candidates 
winning. Edwin Lascelles' career as a Yorkshire MP began and ended with canvass returns. In 1761 he was 
elected without a poll, after his opponent withdrew partly because of poor canvass returns. In 1780 Lascelles 
in turn withdrew, again partly because of poor canvass results. In 18061lenry Lascelles withdrew before 
polling, with canvassing returns again playing a significant part. A different twist occurred in 1812 when 
Wortley, worried by the resources of Milton and Lascelles, but desiring election for Yorkshire, tried to 
frighten Lascelles off with a canvass. 4 Canvass returns also resulted in the withdrawal of William Duncombe 
in 1831. This behaviour was not restricted to counties as, for example, with Charles Langdale in 1841 giving 
up his bid for re-election in Knaresborough after adverse canvassing. 
Nevertheless, evidence as to the accuracy of canvassing is far from conclusive. It is easy to find 
evidence pointing the other way, as with Lister's comment on the 1835 Liberal I Ialifax victory that it, "burst 
upon us like a thunderbolt "s Likewise Parkes, commenting on his 16 years experience, wrote to Russell that 
English borough results, "generally much baffle previous calculations of both parties. 
" Anecdotal evidence 
of electors' flexibility over how they voted, for reasons other than changes in the preferences of the heads of 
1 Clark MSS, DDCL/1/4, Doncaster Archives. See also the evidence of Robert Dudley Baxter, 1860 (433) X11, q. 1558 
(though he confuses 1847 and 1848). 
2 1860 (455) XII, q. 3179-82. 
3 Though Lascelles did suffer from a poorly organised campaign, it was not this in itself that made him withdraw. Rather, 
he withdrew because of the message from canvass returns - which strongly suggested that, if he stood, either he or 
Wilberforce would lose - and these reflected his poor organisation.. 
In the end it was Wortley who was frightened off, after Lascelles' friends raised over £50,000 within hours of the 
nomination meeting: R. W. Smith, "Political Organisation and Canvassing: Yorkshire Elections before the Reform Bill, " 
American Historical Review, Volume 74 Number S, 1969, p. 1556. 
s Green, Miss Lister, p. 179. 
6 Close, The General Elections of 1835 and 1837, p. 229. See also p. 504. 
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their putative deference communities is readily available. Thus it was that the Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (1857) of the West Riding United Reform Registration Association, reported that the Liberal 
majority on the register would only exist, 
in any contest fairly turning on some question appealing to their cherished principles, and calling forth 
earnest and zealous action in their assertion and maintenance. Apart, however, from such an occasion, it 
would be unsafe to rely upon the numerical majority of Liberals, in a contest for the Riding - so many 
considerations, quite apart from such as are purely political, social, or economical, governing the votes 
of a large proportion of the constituency. ' 
Moore claimed that a rise in "contested" elections ("polled" in my terminology) reflected "the growing 
inability of election managers to predict the outcome of a prospective contest "2 If the accuracy of canvassing 
were a reflection of the importance of deference, and a fall in accuracy occurred, then it would follow that 
traditional blocs were breaking down. Such breakdown would produce more polls, as in the absence of firm 
predictions going to the poll would be the only way to know whether or not one had a chance of winning. 
But, this argument does not follow. It is possible to accurately predict a result by canvassing heavily and 
well, whether or not deference communities exist. Canvassing's accuracy depends on a variety of factors, 
including its extent and the quality of the canvassers. 
Moreover, the fluidity of the connection between influence and voting patterns was reflected in 
expressions of surprise and electoral fluidity found in contemporary comments3 and in Cox and Grady's 
election manuals. ' They stressed the importance of canvassers not noting as definites those who were 
actually undecided. That this was sufficiently common to be worthy of note implies that undecided electors 
and poor canvassers were not rare. Though their 1868 manual also said that (p. lxxxii) effective registration 
activities would often prevent a contest, "by enabling both parties to calculate their chances with a near 
approach to accuracy, " it is notable that the accuracy was meant to flow from efficient registration activities, 
not deference communities. Moore did not overlook undecided electors. But he claimed, 
Obviously, the "doubtful" were not the "don't knows" who figure so largely in studies of present-day 
electoral behaviour. Rather, they were the men whose effective social identities had yet to be 
discovered! 
This can mean two things. Either Moore is arguing that electors were aware of their "effective social 
identities, " but canvassers were not. Or, that the electors themselves were not aware of their own "effective 
social identities". If he meant the former, Cox and Grady disagree. They said of undecided electors, 
It is necessary that you should know how he voted before, or, if he is a new man, what are his political 
opinions, that you may be enabled fitly to deal with him. 
In other words, they did not urge the collection of information that would reveal his "effective social 
identity". Further, numerous other election guides stressed the importance of accurate canvassing. That this 
1 Warde Aldam MSS, DDWA Slip 736-7, Doncaster Archives. 
2 D. C. Moore, "The Matter of the Missing Contests: Towards a Theory of the Mid-19th Century British Political 
System, " Albion, Volume 6,1974, p. 97. 
E. g. Kenion to Nichols, 2 August 1847, Nicholls Correspondence, 67D78, Bradford Archives. 
4 The most frequently quoted is Cox and Grady, The New Law And Practice Of Registration And Elections, 1868. In this 
context the 1847 edition is much the same. 
5 Moore, "Missing Contests, " p. 109. 
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point needed stressing, and canvassers instructed so, suggests that the doubtful were indeed "don't knows" or 
at least "undecided. " If the second interpretation of Moore's comment is taken, then we are left with a rather 
curious form of deference community, whose members do not even know their own location within it. 
In reality, then, Moore's arguments regarding canvassing and deference communities do not hinder 
the general argument regarding the limitations to influence and prevalence of vitality and, as I have shown, 
his interpretation of Cox and Grady on canvassing as giving support for his deference communities is not the 
only plausible interpretation. 
4.5 Urban penetration and county boroughs 
4.5.1 Urban penetration 
Before 1832 40/- freeholds located anywhere in a county - even within a borough - could grant 
county votes. There were, moreover, no impediments to a borough elector also being a county elector 
(except in county boroughs - see below); given the appropriate borough franchise he could even qualify for 
both in respect of the same piece of property. The county electorate can be envisaged as comprising rural and 
urban sections, the latter being 40/- freeholders from urban areas which were usually also boroughs. ' They 
were not always within boroughs as some urban areas lay elsewhere, and some others had grown beyond 
borough boundaries. 2 The presence of this urban electorate in county constituencies was known as urban 
penetration. 
Its main significance derived from the belief, and reality, that urban county electors behaved 
differently from rural electors. The situation was normally pictured as urban penetration allowing industrial 
interests to encroach on rural landed interests. In Yorkshire there were certainly differences between 
Whigs/Liberals in the (industrial) West Riding and the other Ridings. Those from Leeds and other industrial 
West Riding towns were keen on having MPs to cultivate their interests; hence, the candidatures of John 
Marshall in 18263 and Brougham in 18304 for Yorkshire. Indeed, of his election in 1830 for Yorkshire 
Brougham said he, 
never thought of canvassing the squires though he had taken great care to canvass the towns ... if you 
could make sure of two or three large towns, you had an extremely good chance! 
' Whilst not all borough constituencies covered urban areas it would be inconveniently verbose to talk of 'borough 
constituencies (which covered urban areas)'. Similarly, "borough" is taken to mean "a borough Parliamentary 
constituency, " though there were some boroughs that were not constituencies. 
2 The notion of a borough constituency "boundary" is somewhat nebulous before 1832. For example, in a freeman 
borough such as York whereabouts freeman lived did not effect their ability to vote, and therefore the idea of a 
constituency boundary was irrelevant. I Iowever, for some constituencies boundaries did matter - for example if scot and 
lot payers could vote. 
3 John Marshall (1765-1845) was a Yorkshire MP 1826-30. A spinning flax manufacturer, owning several big mills in 
Leeds and Shrewsbury, he was one of the first to mechanically spin flax. 
4 The circumstances under which West Riding Liberals foisted Brougham upon reluctant North and East Riding Whigs 
are described in N. Gash, Pillars of Government and Other Fssays on State and Society c. 1 770-c. 1880, Edward Arnold, 
London, 1986, p. 77-93. 
s Moore, Politics of Deference, p. 142. Even where urban areas could not grant victory, they could show markedly 
different voting patterns. For example, the 1837 East Riding poll book shows that in total 3022 split Bcthell-lroadley 
and 2363 plumped for Thompson. But, for electors who qualified in I lull the figures were 109 and 201 respectively. 
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It was such attitudes that led Brougham to be labelled, "The member for Yorkshire, or rather one should say 
the member for Leeds, Huddersfield, and Sheffield"' Differences between the West Riding industrial areas 
and Yorkshire's wider rural acres meant Yorkshire political discourse frequently contained an acceptance of 
the idea that industrial and rural areas were different, had different interests and even different politicians. 
This discourse was even reflected in the statute book, with the awarding of Grampound's Parliamentary seats 
to Yorkshire. Whilst technically the seats did not go to the West Riding industrial towns (e. g. a Leeds 
Parliamentary constituency was not created), in practice they did, as it was widely accepted and expected that 
the West Riding would have a share of Yorkshire's now four MPs. 
After 1774 Birmingham had similar influence over one of the Warwickshire county seats. In 1829 
Blackwoods Magazine opposed the proposed transfer of a seat to Birmingham as, Inter alia, 
the town of Birmingham possesses aF repondering, if not overwhelming influence in the election of 
members for the county of Warwick. 
Urban penetration was important and also increasing as new urban areas arose and old ones 
expanded. Urban penetration outside of borough constituencies increased, as urban areas pushed beyond old 
boundaries and with the tendency in many large towns like hull for the better-off (i. e. those most likely to 
have 40/- freeholds) to migrate from town centres to the edge. 3 
4.5.2 County boroughs before 1832 
The situation is complicated by the existence of some cities and boroughs that were "counties of 
themselves"4 This status was an historical relic, often being a ceremonial honour, but also having some 
administrative impact. 5 There were, in terms of the Parliamentary franchise, three types of county boroughs. 
All of them elected two MPs. In some, 40/- freeholds located in the borough could grant votes for the county 
borough, but could not grant votes for the surrounding county; I term these borough-voting-county- 
boroughs. In others 40/- freeholds could grant votes for the surrounding county, but not for the county 
borough; I call these county-voting-county-boroughs. Finally, in yet others, 40/- freeholds could not grant 
votes for either the county borough or the surrounding county; these are non-voting-county-boroughs. 6 
4.5.3 The 1832 legislation 
There has been controversy over those parts of the 1832 legislation dealing with urban penetration 
and county boroughs. Moore argued that the intention behind the 1832 reform legislation was to effect a cure 
1 R. Stewart, Henry Brougham 1778-1868: 11is Public Career, Bodley I lead, London, 1986, p. 245. 
2 Blackwood's Magazine, Volume 25, May 1829, p. 669. It estimated that, assuming the distribution of frecholds was 
proportional to that of inhabited houses, Birmingham had at least one third of the freeholders entitled to vote for the 
county. Similarly, in the 1770s in Surrey Southwark businessmen got the radical Sir Joseph Mawbey elected, thus 
irritating many county gentlemen, and in Middlesex industry won one seat in 1820. 
3 K. J. Allison, 'Hull Gent. Seeks Country Residence'] 750-1850, East Yorkshire Local I listory Society, Beverley, 1981, 
p. 7-8. 
4 For convenience "county boroughs" is used to describe them, though it is technically inaccurate as some were cities 
rather than boroughs. This distinction had no effect on the electoral system. Many contemporary sources talk of "cities 
and boroughs that are counties of themselves. " I call them all county boroughs. 
s For example I lull, being a county borough, was exempt from the Yorkshire county rate. Another example is that of the 
adminisration of trials, as with 38 Geo. III c. 52 (1798) and 51 Gco. III c. 100 (1811). 
6 For a list of the county boroughs see Appendix 5. 
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in the sense that, inter alia, having a constituency representing only one interest would thereby isolate 
interests and legitimise local elites by identifying them with the interests present in that constituency. This 
required ending urban penetration, which mixed landed and industrial interests within county constituencies, 
and produced the steady undermining of landed interests as urban penetration increased. Thus, he argued, the 
existence of clauses to curb urban penetration are evidence of the importance of the desire to secure a "cure" 
However, I will draw a rather different picture from the question of urban penetration, a picture of legislators 
limited in their abilities and comprehension, and beset by differing pressures, under which urban penetration 
was only rarely accorded priority. 
Moore agrees the top priority of the Government was to abolish nomination boroughs, ' but also 
claims that a desire to remove urban influence from county constituencies was, "an obvious, important and 
hitherto neglected symbol of the sort of political world they hoped to create. "2 
The following discussion of various clauses3 is complicated by the renumbering, shuffling and 
amendments during the 1831-2 process. Table 4.2 summarises how the relevant clauses changed as the 
legislation passed through Parliament. The county freeholder clause dealt with which freeholds could grant a 
right to vote in county elections. The county borough absorption clause, in consort with the Schedule 
indicated, dealt with where freeholds located in county boroughs could grant a right to vote. The borough 
freeholder clause dealt with what property located within a borough could not grant a right to vote in the 
surrounding county. 
1 Moore, Politics of Deference, p. 143. This was also reflected in the curious resurrection of Old Sarum. Abolished in 
Schedule A, it "reappeared" after a new borough had its boundaries drawn so as to include all of the ex-Old Sarum 
constituency. Yet, the Government preferred abolishing Old Sarum to redrawing its boundaries. 
2 Moore, Politics of Deference, p. 143-4. 
3 These are clauses of what became 2 Will. IV, c. 45 ("the Great Reform Act") which applied to England and Wales; 
hence, the following text is applicable to both England and Wales. The names of the clauses, with the exception of the 
borough freeholder clause, are of my own devising. "Borough freeholder" is somewhat of a misnomer as it includes 
property other than freeholds, but is used in most of the literature. 
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Clause Original bill 1" bills 2d bill (June Amended by 3rd bill Final act` 
(March 1831)' 1831)3 committee (December 
(Sept. 1831)4 1831) s 
County freeholder p. 3 1.11-28 Clause 9 Clause 16 Clauses 16 Clause 18 Clause 18 
franchise and A 
County borough p. 3 1.29-36 Clause 10 Clause 15 Clause 15 Clause 17 Clause 17 
absorption clause 
Borough p. 31.7-10 Clause 11 Clause 18 Clause 18 Clauses 24 Clauses 24 and 25 
freeholder clause and 25 
County borough G G 11 11 G 0 
Schedule 
Contents of All county All county All count' As for the 2nd Non-voting County-voting 
Schedule boroughs, except boroughs boroughs bill county county-boroughs 
London, Lincoln boroughs and non-voting- 
and Welsh ones county-boroughs 
Table 4.2: Urban penetration and county borough clauses 
The county borough absorption clause, and accompanying county borough schedule, initially 
allowed 40/- freeholds situated within non-voting-county-boroughs and borough-voting-county-boroughs - 
except for those omitted from the Schedule - to grant a vote in the surrounding county. (Additionally, it 
confirmed the right of 40/- freeholders in county-voting-county-boroughs to vote in the surrounding county). 
This not merely enfranchised 40/- freeholders in non-voting-county-boroughs, but did so by allowing them 
to qualify for the county, rather than the county borough. Further, 40/- freeholders in borough-voting- 
county-boroughs, instead of being able to qualify for the borough, were now able to qualify for the county 
instead. In other words, not only were some qualifications transferred from boroughs to counties, but some 
new ones located in boroughs were able to grant a county vote. The omission of London, Lincoln and the 
Welsh county boroughs (all non-voting or county-voting) from the Schedule was quickly rectified. 
Thus, in fifteen (and a bit) county boroughs urban penetration was increased. Is this a large number? 
Cannon thinks so, describing it as "no less than sixteen [sic]"! Though only some electors, in only some 
A Bill To amend the Representation of the People In England and Wales, [14 March 18311,1830-1(247)11. 
2f orm OjParliament: The Bill as proposed to be amended in the Committee by Lord John Russell, 1830-1(0.37)11. 
3A Bill to amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales, [25 June 18311,1831(22) Ill. 
4A Bill (In Committee) To amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales, [August 18311,1831(0.29) 
111, A Bill (As Amended By The Committee) To amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales, [7 
September 1831], 1831 (232) III and A Bill (As Amended On The Report) To amend the Representation of the People In 
England and Wales, [ 15 September 1831], 1831 (244) III. 
sA Bill To amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales, [ 12th December 18311,1831-2, (11) III, A 
Bill (As Amended By The Committee) to amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales, [ 10 March 
1832], 1831-2, (265) III and A Bill (As Amended On Further Consideration Of The Report) to amend the Representation 
of the People in England and Wales, [14 March 1832], 1831-2, (277) Ill. 
62 Will. IV, c. 45, incorporating Reform of Parliament (England) Bill: Amendments Made by the Lords To the Bill, 
lntitled, An Act to amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales, 1831-2, (507) Ill. 
7 Except Bristol; however it was included in the county borough absorption clause. The effect was no different than if it 
had been included in the clause. 
1 However, that they were omitted in the first place strongly suggests this was not an issue of great importance to the 
Government nor had it been given much thought. 
9 Cannon, Parliamentary Reform, p. 249. His reference to sixteen Is based on his erroneous classification of county 
boroughs. 
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constituencies out of the total Commons, is not much, it was the case that, as Cannon pointed out, county 
boroughs almost by definition were significant urban areas. 
The matter is complicated by the borough freeholder clause. ' Not only are its changing occupancy 
requirements important, but the crucial interaction between it and the county freeholder clause has been 
overlooked by historians. Initially, it stated that a person could not qualify for a county vote in respect of a 
"house" which, "by reason of the occupation of which ... 
he or any other person shall be entitled to vote ... 
for any city or town. "2 In other words, for properties with clear annual values of at least £ 10,3 their ability to 
grant county votes was restricted. There were no such restrictions on freehold of a clear annual value of 
between 40/- and £ 10. 
The impact was two-fold. First, for non-county boroughs, and for county-voting-county-boroughs, 
it cut urban penetration from its pre-1832 level (and Schedules C and D meant there would now be more 
urban areas contained within non-county boroughs). Second, it reduced the above-mentioned increase in 
urban penetration resulting from giving county votes to freeholds in non-voting- and borough-voting county- 
boroughs. As non-county boroughs were easily the bulk of boroughs, it is clear, even without detailed 
numbers, that the overall impact was to cut urban penetration from its pre-1832 level .4 Note, though, that 
abolishing some boroughs meant urban penetration was increased compared to what it would have been after 
1832 had they not been abolished: if they had continued to exist, the workings of the borough freeholder 
clause would have taken some urban freeholders out of the county electorate. But it had no effect on the level 
of urban penetration compared to what it was before 1832. This increase is unlikely to have been large; after 
all, the professed motivation for selecting boroughs to be abolished was, inter alia, small populations and 
small tax bases. 
In summary, urban penetration was cut, though not as much as it could have been, and as one 
contemporary commented, these cuts meant, "The agricultural interest ... has received another boon by 
clause xxiv. "s Urban penetration was not cut as much as it could have been as this would have caused other 
problems, though the reasons for this are not straightforward. 
t An example of the confusing nature of the exact workings of the borough freeholder clause is the graffiti in the margin 
of one copy of Moore, "Concession or Cure, " where one person has written "Devastating" and another, underneath, "If 
you can understand it! " 
2 There were some minor changes between the original bill and the first bill. One was a minor drafting clarification, 
adding county boroughs to "city or town. " More substantively, warehouses, counting houses etc. were added to "house. " 
Their initial omission was presumably a mistake (none of the reasons given for having this clause would explain a 
differentiation between houses and warehouses etc. ). That the mistake was made suggests that this was a topic the 
Government was not familiar with, nor had considered in great detail. 
3 This is not quite accurate, as it could be argued that a non-rated £10 property could not grant a borough vote, and could 
therefore grant a county vote. I lowever, these are relatively minor and esoteric diversions from the main argument. 
" This is not to say, though, that urban penetration would not be higher in 1833 than in 1831. Gash pointed out - Politics 
in the Age of Peel, p. 91 - that Clause 22 of the final act removed the need for property to be assessed for the land tax, and 
so - in theory at least - allowed a flood of urban freeholders to join the county electorate. This could have had a 
substantial impact. For example, Brock, Reform Act, p. 30 highlighted the fact that because many Manchester freeholders 
were not assessed to land tax in late 1820s they were not able to vote in county elections. 
s J. G. Lemaistre, flow Will It Work? Or, Conjectures As To The Probable Effects Of 'An Act of Parliament to amend the 
Representation of the People'. (2d. W. 4. chap. 43) Passed June 7,1832, G. A. Williams, Cheltenham, 1832, p. 12-13. 
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Giving votes to freeholders in non-voting-county-boroughs increased the electorate. I lowever, had 
they been able to vote for the borough, rather than the surrounding county, an electorate increase would still 
have been achieved but without increasing urban penetration. Further, this would have increased the borough 
electorate, thereby alleviating problems of undue influence, faggot votes' and small electorates. I lowever, 
arguably this alleviation would have been minimal as freeholders may have been more open to landlord 
influence than £IOers, and landlords could manipulate the definition of freeholds. Moreover, such faggot 
votes would have been worse in boroughs than in counties, which had larger electorates with which to 
swamp them (see p. 138) 2 So, though giving freeholders in non-voting-county-boroughs county votes 
increased urban penetration, there were good reasons for so doing, especially as this increase was moderated 
by the borough freeholder clause. 3 It also preserved uniformity of treatment for county boroughs. It was a 
convenient means of achieving uniformity given that 40/- freeholders who resided in non-county boroughs 
would - within the limitations of the borough freeholder clause - be able to qualify for county votes. In 
effect, then, all boroughs would be of one form: county-voting-(county-)boroughs. 
Arguably this desire for uniformity reflected an abstract desire to tackle problems like faggot votes 
and electoral misdeeds: simple rules leave fewer nooks and crannies to be exploited. The validity of this 
argument is questionable: in fact, such behaviour could be restrained only by having numerous rules to seal 
off all these nooks and crannies from abuse. 
The abolition of some boroughs meant that urban penetration would, after 1832, be higher in their 
counties than it would otherwise have been. However, as even Moore agrees that abolishing nomination 
boroughs was the Government's top priority, this reveals little about the importance attached to curbing 
urban penetration. Similarly, that urban penetration continued unaffected in counties containing urban areas 
that were not Parliamentary boroughs reveals little. What could the Government have attempted to do to curb 
urban penetration in such areas. Created even more boroughs? Disfranchised householders simply because 
the housing density in their vicinity was too high? That the Government did not try to curb urban penetration 
in such a situation merely reveals that it possessed common sense. 
There is a problem in finessing too detailed and intricate a chain of reasoning from the evidence. It 
is unclear how many people understood what was happening. For example, when Grey wrote to the King's 
secretary, regarding a meeting with Wharncliffe, Grey seems to have misunderstood one aspect of the issue. 
He described Whamcliffe as greatly desiring the "exclusion of the freeholders in towns from the right of 
voting in counties. " Grey said he found, "the proposition inadmissible. " But his stated reason for so doing 
was erroneous: he only mentioned the impact on non-resident freeholders in towns, arguing that there 
t Votes based on manipulation of property specifically for the purpose of granting a vote, as, for example, in the creation 
of freeholds. 
2 This faggot vote argument explains why the borough freeholder clause left frecholds between 40/. and £ 10 with the 
ability to qualify for a county vote. I find unconvincing O'Neill and Martin's claim that leaving these freeholders in the 
county is an example of "the poor standard of legislative draftsmanship": M. O'Neill and G. Martin, "A Backbencher on 
Parliamentary Reform 1831-1832, " Historical Journal, Volume 23,1980, p. 560-1 n78. There was a good reason for the bill 
to be drafted as it was, and despite much detailed scrutiny of these clauses during the debates, the Government stuck by 
this provision. (Also see Grey's exchange with Wharncliffe, p. 136). 
3 It is important to stress that the county borough absorption and borough freeholder clauses were separate entities. 
Unfortunately, on one occasion Moore implied that it was one clause which covered both areas: "The Sociological 
Premises of the First Reform Act, " p. 330-1 where he covers both topics but simply talks of "the clause. " 
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numbers were trivial, and so such an exclusion would have little electoral impact whilst it would break the 
principle of not taking away rights without compensation or provision or equivalent rights. Ile did not 
mention the fate of freeholders for between 40/- and £10, who would have also been affected by such an 
exclusion and who were not trivial in number. That he could make such an omission in a letter informing the 
monarch of an important meeting (it being an attempt to broker a deal to break a legislative deadlock) 
strongly suggests he did not understand the issue himself. ' (Nor was he consistent on the issue. When talking 
to Wharncliffe on 16 November 1831 he said he would reconsider whether, as the bill then stated, borough 
freeholders should be able to get a county vote if they could not qualify for a borough vote. However, after a 
Cabinet meeting he told Whamcliffe than any change, "would be quite inconsistent with the principle 
adopted in the late Bill of continuing persons now in the enjoyment of existing rights ")2 
The Government's uncertainty on the issue was reflected in its about-turn in February-March 1831. 
The King had written to Grey in February approving of the proposed franchise changes, 
it being also understood that no person shall in future acquire a right of voting for a county by virtue of 
any property situated in any borough sending Members to Parliament 3 
Yet the bill that was introduced in March would have allowed just that. Rather than having a clear aim or 
course of action, the Government regularly altered its intentions regarding urban penetration as greater 
acquaintance with the issues revealed more difficulties. 
There were several difficult issues, and the inter-working of several clauses made satisfactory 
drafting difficult. The issues of urban penetration were but one ingredient in a complicated assortment of 
issues, confusions, prejudices, errors and pragmatism. Althorp described the borough freeholder clause as, 
"one of the most difficult in the whole Bill to draw up satisfactorily. "4 Even the Government's own initial 
bill, let alone the much-amended later versions, was a hasty compromise concocted from competing plans 
drawn up by semi-amateurs (for example, the £10 franchise was only agreed on a fortnight before the bill 
was put and Wakefield was left out of the first draft by mistake). It was only in the last week of February that 
William Adam (a Parliamentary lawyer) and Mr. Stephenson (a Chancery barrister) were summoned to 
correct the draft bills The desire for secrecy restricted consultations over, and refining of, the wording. Thus, 
for example, there was the fact that leases frequently required rent to be paid quarterly, whilst the legislation 
assumed half-yearly payments and, as Althorp wrote to his father, "We none of use were aware that the 
difference was material. "6 
1 Grey to Taylor, 30 November 1831: Grey, The Reform Act, Volume 1, p. 452. 
2 A. D. Kriegel (ed), The Holland House Diaries 1831-40: The diary of henry Richard Vassall Fox, third Lord Ilollan4 with 
extracts from the diary of Dr. John Allen, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977, p. 445 n362. 
34 February 1831: Grey, The Reform Act, Volume 1, p. 102. l lowever, in November 1831 Grey stated that the original 
intention had been that no county votes could be had in respect of any property within boroughs (p. 467). 
4 Hansard, 3rd series, Volume 9, c. 1104,1 February 1832. 
s D. Le Marchant, Memoir OfJohn Charles, Viscount Althorp, Third Earl Spencer, Richard Bentley and Son, London, 1876, 
p. 295-6. 
6 30 August 1831, Le Marchant, Memoir OfJohn Charles, Viscount Althorp, p. 325. 
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Details of the clauses can be explained simply by insufficient understanding, or cross-purposes, 
amongst members of the Government and legislative drafters. ' Many MPs were confused, bewildered and 
even bored by the intricacies. One thrust of Ministerial ambition was a simplification of the borough system, 
albeit tempered by a distrust of uniformity for the sake of it. This logically led to attempting to roll the three 
types of county boroughs into one. From this it follows that uniformity was prized more highly than curbing 
urban penetration. Further, given that the choice was between these two, we cannot see the choice made as 
simply a pragmatic one intended to woo support to get the legislation through Parliament. The key swing 
votes rested with Tories, and hostility to uniformity was a regular part of the Tory critique. An earlier 
example is to be found in the Quarterly Review. Speaking of the disparity between Gatton and Manchester or 
Liverpool, it said that this, 
may be very offensive to the taste of the lovers of symmetry ... [but unless reform] would secure to the 
country a more perfect system of legislation, it will be admitted, we presume, to be in the highest degree 
unphilosophical, for the mere object of correcting an anomaly, to hazard a violent and perilous 
innovation. 2 
The second bill included the same clauses as those described above, with one important change. In 
the borough freeholder clause "shall be entitled" was changed to "may be entitled. " The previous wording 
meant that someone must have got a borough vote in respect of a borough freehold for it to not be able to 
grant a county vote. Now, however, it was only necessary for it to be possible for someone to get a borough 
vote in respect of it; if, for example, they did not have one due to not having paid the requisite taxes this did 
not then permit them a county vote. 3 
On 17 August 1831 Colonel Davies moved that the county borough clause be rejected, claiming that 
freeholders should vote for the boroughs within which they were located. Althorp argued there would arise a 
problem of fictitious vote creation in boroughs 4 It was defeated by 164-124, though its supporters included 
some normal ministerialists. Similarly, in February 1832, when the third bill was being debated, a version of 
the borough voting option was debated and voted on in the Commons. The Tory Praed argued that, 
A new class of voters would be introduced, whose inclinations would lend them to use every exertion to 
prevent the return of Members for the counties connected with the agriculture ... The Knights of the 
Shire were those who were supposed to represent the agriculturalists, and therefore their return ought not 
to be influenced by those who had no direct connection with that interest; on the other hand, the cities 
and towns ought to return individuals to represent the manufacturing and commercial interests. This 
doctrine was clearly recognised by Blackstone! 
t An example of the difficulties is a serious drafting problem with the first bill. Clause 11. outlining the borough 
franchise, said that nothing "herein contained" could take away the right of certain people to vote in counties. If "herein" 
is taken as referring to the whole act, rather than simply to that clause (and there is no clear legal definition of "herein" to 
clarify matters), then this largely nullified the borough freeholder clause. This was probably a result of poor drafting 
rather than a Machiavellian plot. Nevertheless, it suggests that, at the least, historians should be wary at reading too 
much into the particular wording or impact of a detail of a clause. It also suggests this was not a topic with which the 
Government was either used to or paying detailed attention to, hence the error. The problem resolved itself with the 
amendment of the second bill in committee, as the rewriting of the county franchise meant that the meaning of the phrase 
was retained without those problematic words. There were other reasons for rewriting rather than removing them. so the 
motivation is unclear. 
2 Quarterly Review, Volume 44, February 1831, p. 563-4. 
3 See Hansard, 3rd series, Volume 6, c. 339,20 August 1831. 
41! ansard, 3rd series, Volume 6, c. 162-72 and 182-3,17 August 1831. 
' lfansard, 3rd series, Volume 9, c. 1130,1 February 1832. Ile appears to have been one of the few MPs to have a good 
grasp of the topic. Ile argued on 13 August 1831 for a form of limited voting (i. e. each voter has fewer votes than the 
(continued) 
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Therefore, he proposed a borough franchise including 40% freeholders, but with no boroughs property 
conferring county votes. He was prepared to meddle with the borough franchise to limit urban penetration; 
indeed, to do so he was prepared to substantially widen the borough franchise. However, he was not in a 
majority. Russell and the Government opposed this, on the grounds that the agricultural interest would then 
not only have the counties, but also boroughs "ruralised" by the Boundary Commissioners. Russell claimed 
he did not believe that there was a sharp county/borough, agriculture/manufacturing division, and that such a 
proposal would tend, 
to create division and a feeling of jealousy between the agricultural and manufacturing interests, the 
union and combination of which should be the object of the Legislature. ' 
Such a franchise would provide a very sharp divide in interests that would not only be potentially divisive 
but was unlikely to find favour with radicals who wanted something to restrain the old landed interest in 
counties. (An additional problem would have been the enfranchisement thereby of non-residents for borough 
elections). Initially, the Government had played with the idea of such divisiveness, in order to court Ultra 
support, but once it was no longer required switched to worrying about rather than praising it. 2 Milton too 
opposed the Tory amendment. Hansard reported him saying, 
The amendment would tend to the disfranchisement of certain voters which he would wish to find 
increased rather than diminished. He said disfranchisement, because it was often considered that a vote 
for the county was more valuable than a vote for the town or borough 
The amendment was lost 90-181 4 Paradoxically though, this lack of enthusiasm for curbing urban 
penetration shows the Government's desire to preserve traditional rights, and thereby appeal to conservatives 
- where possible. One can thus take the Government's stance as evidence either for or against importance 
being attached to aristocratic concerns. The best that can be concluded is that this demonstrates how 
dangerous divining a particular set of motives from legislative detail is. 
Though the initial, first and second bills were essentially identical over urban penetration, $ starting 
with the committee stage of the second bill important changes were made. First, the county franchise was 
altered. The number of borough freeholders able to vote in counties was not simply a function of the county 
borough absorption and borough freeholder clauses, but also of the county franchise. Thus, alterations in the 
(.. continued) 
number of candidates to be elected) to allow a minority to stop itself being swamped by the majority. Similarly, he 
argued during the Committee Stage that a two thirds majority should be required for any changes to the constitution. 
Neither proposal got much support. 
t flansard, 3rd series, Volume 9, c. 1135,1 February 1832. 
2 For example, I Iennock, "The Sociological Premises of the First Reform Act, " p. 326. Indeed, much of their efforts went 
into balancing rural and urban interests: for examples of balancing changes in the Schedules; see Cannon, Parliamentary 
Reform, p. 246. Moore himself, in "The Other Face of Reform, " argued that, though the England and Wales reform bill 
was initially drafted to appeal to the Ultras, once they had rejected reform in 1831 the Government changed tactics to 
garner support elsewhere. 
lfansard, 3rd series, Volume 9, c. 1142-3,1 February 1832. 
4 One should be cautious of assuming that all of the minority were following Moore in placing great emphasis on curbing 
urban penetration, since voting for the amendment was also voting for altering the borough franchise and hence 
wrecking a central part of the reform legislation. 
fl Iowever, following the defeat of the first bill in the Lords Russell had suggested moving all town freeholders from the 
county into the borough. This stringent curb on urban penetration was opposed by Althorp and rejected as it would not 
gain many, if any, net votes for the bill. It would also produce faggot vote problems in boroughs. 
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countyfranchise had a knock-on effect on urban penetration; this connection has been overlooked by 
historians. 
The initial county franchise proposals essentially were for 40/- freeholds at present enjoyed by 
someone, or which might later accrue to someone by any means, to be able to grant county votes. 1 fowever, 
matters changed in the second bill's committee stage. For freeholds of at least £ 10 nothing changed. But for 
freeholds worth between 40/- and £10, the freehold had to be presently enjoyed by that person or accrue to 
someone via inheritance (by fee simply or fee tail). Hence, over time, the number of freeholds worth less 
than £ 10, in respect of which county votes could be had, would decline, as not all would be passed on to 
others via inheritance. As this decline would include freeholds in boroughs it meant that urban penetration 
would, in absolute terms, decline. However, though the number of urban freeholders would fall, so would the 
number of rural freeholders. The possible impact on what proportion of the county electorate that would be 
urban is unclear. The explanation for this action, then, cannot be unequivocally be put down to curbing urban 
penetration. Rather, the restrictions on freeholds of under £ 10 were driven by a desire to curb faggot votes. 
Additionally the borough freeholder clause was split. It initially covered all property, but now 
freeholds were treated separately. For copyholders, leasees, tenants and occupiers other than freeholders the 
previous wording still applied. That is, a person could not qualify for a county vote in respect of such 
property if, were it occupied, it could grant him or someone else a borough vote. Such property of between 
40/- and £10 could not grant a county vote and as, for such property over £10, this clause applied, so the curb 
on urban penetration resulting from urban copyholders, leasees, tenants and occupiers other than freeholders 
was nearly watertight. 
However, for freeholders conditions were relaxed. A borough freehold was now disqualified from 
granting a county vote to someone only if it was worth at least £10 and if it was occupied by him: the "or 
someone else" condition was dropped so non-occupying freeholders were no longer included. This 
(probably) reduced the decrease in urban penetration, compared to what it would have been with the 
previous wording. "Probably" because the situation of non-occupying freeholders is unclear. Some of them 
may have been, for example, farmers with urban property they did not occupy, who were now able to have a 
county vote in respect of their urban property. Does this really count as urban penetration: the property was 
urban but the voter was not? On the other hand, for other non-occupying freeholders it was a clear case of 
urban penetration. 
The reason for the change was the problem of non-occupying freeholders, most notably landlords 
with occupying tenants. Under the original wording, though such people could have had county votes before 
1832, they would have now lost them. Yet it could be asked, "What have they done wrong to deserve having 
their county votes removed? " This was dealt with by the change - their votes were not to be removed. 
Individual property rights took precedence over curbing urban penetration. 
Additionally the county borough absorption clause was amended. Borough-voting-county-boroughs 
were now to remain so: 40/- freeholders were no longer to have their votes transferred to the county. This 
reduced the increase in urban penetration, though at the expense of breaking uniformity, as not all county 
boroughs would now have the same franchise. 
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These changes were the result of a compromise between different imperfect solutions. Lord Holland 
wrote, 
We then discussed in Cabinet the knotty point of giving proprietors in towns (who had no votes for the 
borough) votes for the County in the character of freeholders, copyholders, and leaseholders on the same 
qualification as would, if their property did not lay within the borough entitle them by the bill to vote for 
the county. To this Lansdowne, Palmerston, and Richmond, who was absent, had strong objections 
founded on the apprehension of town voters overwhelming the land. After much tedious discussion, a 
middle course recommended by Althorp was adopted, viz to give or rather leave freeholders so situated 
a right to vote, but not to extend that right of voting for the County to Copyholders or leaseholders for 
land or possessions in a town ... the reason 
for so altering our former determination was a persuasion that 
we should hardly be able to carry a provision so injurious to the rights of persons connected with town 
population. ' 
By this stage in the proceedings the Government, faced with the complications and inter-relationships of 
reality, had given up attempting to produce a simple, consistent and logical bill (quite rightly, given that was 
impossible). Z It therefore would be a mistake to attempt to find such clear logic in it, particularly as 
participants did not have detailed statistical evidence available to illustrate what the result of different 
changes would be. What is clear is that urban penetration was to be curbed, though in some cases the curbs 
were relaxed in the face of other problems. In particular, curbing urban penetration lost out to letting those 
who previously were able to vote continue to have a right to vote. 
There is one important caveat to this picture of curbs on urban penetration being relaxed as 
problems arose. From the start, the Government wished to give freeholds in non-voting and borough-voting 
county boroughs county votes, thereby increasing urban penetration. Thus, from the start, some other 
considerations took precedence over curbing urban penetration. In this case the subsequent changes (to the 
treatment of borough-voting-county-boroughs) acted to increase the curbs on urban penetration, though even 
then not everything that could have been done was done: freeholds in non-voting-county-boroughs were still 
to grant county rather than borough votes. Curbing urban penetration lost out to curbing the possibilities for 
faggot votes. 
One other explanation for the Government's willingness to let some freeholders vote in counties 
was that it was a counter to the Chandos clause, which gave the vote to £50 tenants-at-will. Arguably, these 
extra freeholders would balance out the danger of illegitimate agricultural influence being wielded over 
tenants-at-will .3 This 
is a difficult argument to sustain. First, it meant the Government abandoning the idea of 
keeping different interests apart. Second, the Government voluntarily Increased the impact of the Chandos 
clause after it had been passed, by extending its remit from simply £50 tenant-at-will farmers to include 
' Kriegel, The Holland /louse Diaries, p. 29-30. See also J. Milton-Smith, "Earl Grey's Cabinet and the Objects of 
Parliamentary Reform, " Historical Journal, Volume 15 Number 1,1972, p. 68.1lolland Is Ignoring county boroughs in 
this comment; as already explained far from simply leaving freeholders with such a right to vote, it extended the right to 
other county boroughs. I lolland's record makes it clear that it was not Ultra support the government was looking to; had 
they been, the judgement would surely have been that curbing urban penetration as tightly as possible would be the least 
injurious course to take. Note that while the attitude of Landsdowne, Palmerston and Richmond might appear to be that 
of people greatly concerned with urban penetration and separating landed and manufacturing Interests, they did not 
consistently take this attitude. For example, on another occasion Landsdowne argued for the enlargement of smaller 
boroughs, so "infusing landed interest into town elections": Kriegel, The Holland House Diaries, p. 99. 
2 The overall mess was reflected in election law guides, which spent much time explaining the system and sometimes 
even got it wrong; e. g. a handwritten guide in the Warde Aldam papers (DDWA, Slip 233, Doncaster Archives) stated 
that in, "the towns which are Counties of themselves, freeholders may vote, as they have been accustomed. " 
3 Moore, "Concession or Cure, " p. 53-4. 
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houses and gardens. Third, the Government supported this freeholder amendment before the Chandos clause 
was. But the Government's hand was forced when this amendment was proposed by a non-Government MP 
before Chandos came up: it would have courted the worst of both worlds to oppose it and then to oppose 
Chandos, with the risk of ending up with latter and without the former. This assumes the Government 
thought it was likely to lose the Chandos vote. However, Brock argued' that the Government was going to do 
it anyway regardless of Chandos being passed; it simply wanted to avoid making an announcement which 
would antagonise the landed interest before the Chandos vote. Similarly, Wasson argued that the Cabinet 
decided to change the borough freeholder clause, for other reasons (undue influence, independent electorate 
and the renting out of property should not result in a vote being lost) before Chandos. 2 Also, as Ilennock 
stressed, Althorp defended the change in public on the grounds of equity, rather than by reference to 
Chandos. 3 Why should property owners lose their right to a county vote because their tenants could vote in 
the borough? 
The final changes were made in the House of Lords, to the third bill. The county franchise was 
significantly extended. 4 Previously, for freeholds worth between 40% and £ l0 to grant a persona vote, he 
had to hold it at present, or acquire it by inheritance. However, the Lords also allowed acquisition by 
marriage, marriage settlement, devise, promotion to any benefice or office, or simply for the person to be in 
bona fide occupation. This increased the county electorate, without significantly increasing the risks of 
faggot votes or undue influence. Thus, it can be seen as strengthening the county interest, but it also 
increased urban penetration (or rather, reduced the decrease) as more urban freeholders would now be able 
to qualify for a county vote. This indication of a messy situation is reinforced by the previous history of the 
clause: the initial version of the third bill had dropped inheritance, and then the Commons committee stage 
had added promotion to benefice, as ways of acquiring freeholds that would still grant a vote. 
4.5.4 Further Problems 
One problem with giving the urban penetration clauses of the 1832 legislation a significant 
emphasis is that contemporary descriptions of the conditions that brought about and shaped Parliamentary 
reform concentrated heavily on concessionary or transfer of power explanations, rather than a Moore-like 
aristocratic cure. 5 In addition, contemporary descriptions of the bill and suggested alternatives to its contents 
are greatly lacking in reference to urban penetration. 
Whilst it would be impractical forme to have looked at all the pamphlets produced (searching the 
British Library catalogue simply for books published in English in 1831 with "Reform" in the title produces 
over 400 responses) I sampled a wide range, as can be seen from the bibliography, and these provide 
t Brock, Reform Act, p. 226-7. 
2 Wasson, Whig Renaissance, p. 224-S. 
3 1lennock, "The Sociological Premises of the First Reform Act, " p. 324-6. 
In addition, the borough freeholder clauses were tightened up by the addition of "or any other building" to them. 
s For example, Walsh, The Practical Results Of The Reform Act Of 1832, John Murray, London, 1860, p. 149; Earl Grey, 
Parliamentary Government Considered With Reference To Reform: A New Edition, Containing Suggestions For The 
Improvement Of Our Representation System, And An Examination Of The Reform Bills Of 1859 And 1861, John Murray, 
London, 1864 (at best only p. 96 has a vague Moore-esque reference, yet even Chapter VII, with suggestions for a reform 
bill, makes no mention of urban penetration). Similarly, Moore-esque references are not to be found in the 
correspondence in Grey, The Reform Act, particularly Volume 1, p. 375-6n, where Grey lists the key features. 
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evidence for the point. ' Even Lord John Russell's explanatory pamphlet= when listing the leading questions, 
p. 9-10, and when discussing the franchise, p. 20-1, does not mention urban penetration. The only exception is 
p. 22, which quotes from a Lords' protest (signed by amongst others Wellington) that talked of, "an influence 
so great as must leave in many instances, the representation of counties, and division of counties in the power 
of voters from the towns. " In addition, Cannon has pointed out that he has not seen one letter in 
correspondence between Cabinet ministers referring to urban penetration, despite these often mentioning the 
fundamental principles of the bill. 3 Urban penetration is conspicuously absent from the arguments in other 
commentaries. 4 
Even Walsh's pamphlets, which lists "aristocratic" features of the bill (p. 41-53) and specifically 
addressed the question of whether the Ministerial plan would "guard the existing ascendancy of the upper 
orders, " does not mention urban penetration. That he did not believe the ascendancy would be guarded is not 
surprising, given that he was a Tory, but his reasoning is instructive. It was based on the abolition of some 
boroughs, the use of single-member boroughs (which precluded different classes from splitting the 
representation between them) and the, as he saw it, low franchise. These outweighed for him the legislation's 
aristocratic features: the extra county seats, the abolition of some boroughs where the aristocratic hold was 
weak and the escape of some small aristocratic boroughs. Urban penetration did not come into it. 
These omissions were also a feature of contemporary prints. 
' Even Blackwood's Alagazine, which 
contained some comments on the desirability of curbing urban penetration, 
' made no mention of urban 
penetration in its summary of the first bill's contents or of the first and second reading debates. 
' Similarly, 
Princess Lieven wrote in March 1832 of the first reform bill for England and Wales, 
Its leading features have scared me completely: ... [including] the total number of members reduced by 
sixty or more, & septennial Parliaments maintained - the two last being the only good features of the 
bill. 9 
Likewise, a suggested alternative to the bill, which desired to trim its radicalness, made no mention of urban 
penetration. Indeed, by arguing for a higher borough franchise it would have increased urban penetration (by 
reducing the number of urban freeholders whom the urban penetration clauses would have precluded from 
' For example, No Party Man, Pros And Cons Of Lord John Russell's Bill, James Ridgway, London, 1831, p. 3. 
2 Letter To The Electors Of Stroud, On The Principles Of The Reform Act, 2nd edition, James Ridgway, London, 1839. 
3 Cannon, Parliamentary Reform, p. 247. 
4 E. g. A Statement Of The Arguments Against Reform, Brought Forward In The Late Debates; With 774 Answers That Were 
Given To Them By The Speakers Themselves; By The Speakers On The Other Side; Or By Other Speakers On The Same 
Side, James Ridgway, London, 1831 and from the entry for 22 October 1830 in F. Bamford and Duke of Wellington (eds), 
The Journal Of Mrs. Arbuthnot, Macmillan, London, 1950, p. 407. Reform: Not A New Constitution, James Fraser, London, 
1831 and A Member of Lincoln's Inn, A Cursory View Of Errors On The Subject Of Representation, And The Principles And 
Means by Which A Just And Safe Representation Of The People Can Be Effected, Roake and Varty, London, 1831 likewise 
do not mention the topic.. 
s J. Walsh, Observations On The Ministerial Plan Of Reform, James Ridgway, London, 1831. 
6 See, for example, Dickinson, Caricatures and the Constitution, p. 317 and p. 325. 
7 E. g. February 1831, Volume 29, p. 243-4 and July 1831, Volume 30, p. 33. 
April 1831, Volume 29, p. 656-9 and May 1831, Volume 29, p. 659-66 and p. 736-40 respectively. 
Princes Lieven to her brother, 2 March 1832: Smith, Reform or Revolution?, p. 52. She was wife of the Russian 
ambassador in London, and a friend of many leading politicians. 
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having a county vote). ' Another alternative reform plan, despite including measures to strengthen county 
representation at the expense of towns, had no mention of urban penetration? The five defences of the 
reform legislation in a contemporary collection of arguments3 did not mention Moore-like arguments or 
urban penetration. Media reports of the contents of the Reform Bill similarly lacked references to urban 
penetration. 4 
Another alternative suggestion was the plan produced by Francis Ilext. 
s hext, a rector in Cornwall, 
was a member of the very minor gentry and played little part in politics until in 1831. Then, he started 
writing columns (as "YZ") in the Royal Cornwall Gazette, and later produced a reform plan. Jaggard 
describes the plan as "desperate and unprincipled, it was a last ditch bid so blatant in its motivation that with 
one exception all of Cornwall's principal Tories shied away. "6 However, its main components were that no 
existing boroughs should be abolished, that the borough franchise should vary from one place to another 
(remember, though, that in practice the flat-rate £10 franchise varied with varying property prices across the 
country), counties should not be split and Parliamentary candidates should not make pledges on any specific 
policies (remember Burke's idea of Parliamentary representatives). The plan failed to gain any serious 
support. The problem was a mirror-image of the usual reformers' problems: any specific plan ran into 
difficulties, as different anti-reformers had different views on different details. In addition, simple and out- 
right opposition to all reform had both a unifying appeal (though this belief turned out to have been 
Wellington's undoing) and emotional satisfaction. At a moment of high drama and emotion it is perhaps not 
surprising that few were willing to muddle through the middle. Still, if urban penetration was a key part of 
any aristocratic cure, and if such a cure was a key part of anti-liberal support for Parliamentary reform, it is 
odd that urban penetration did not feature in this plan (and, like one of the above mentioned plans, by 
increasing the borough franchise it too would have increased urban penetration). 
Further, other aspects of the Parliamentary Reform legislation indicates that urban penetration 
concerns did not predominate; in particular, the creation of some big boroughs, with the addition of large 
rural tracks to make up the number of electors. The various clauses discussed above meant that many 
freeholders in rural areas thereby had borough rather than county votes. But, as they were rural, rather than 
urban, freeholders this meant that the balance between rural and urban electors in counties was shifted 
towards urban freeholders. Had the Government been determined to curb urban penetration matters could 
have been different, such as with the abolition of such boroughs or the provision of different constituency 
1 Rational And Efficient Reform In The Representation Of 17w Commons House Of Parliament. Consisting Of Plans, By 
Which That Great Desideration May Be Accomplished With Safety To The Existing Institutions Of 7 he State, And To Te 
Full Enjoyment Of Political Right By Every AIan in The Country Who Pays Taxes, Charles I Ienry Cook. Newcastle-upon- 
Tyne, 1831. 
2 11. Twiss, Conservative Reform, Being Outlines of a Counterplan, Enclosed In A Letter To Lord Lyndhurst, S. Sweet, 
London, 1832. 
3 S. E. Brydges, F. rposillons on the Parliamentary Reform Bill: April 1831, Genoa, 1831. 
4 E. g. The Spectator, 5 March 1831. 
F. J. I Text, Letters On Reform In Parliament, Addressed To Sir R. R. Vyvyan, Bart. M. P. And To 77he Magistracy And Gentry 
Of Cornwall, Dates from March 11th to April 12th 1831. And Originally Published In The Royal Cornwall Gazette, With 
The Signature Y. Z Together With Views of a Modification of the Reform Bill, abstracted from the Letter to that Gentleman, 
and reduced to the form of Resolutions, as for submission to a County Meeting, 
T. R. Gillet Jr.. Truro, 1831. See Also E. 
Jaggard, "Cornwall Politics 1826-1832: Another Face of Reform?, " Journal of British Studies, Volume 22,1983, p. 94-6. 
6 Jaggard, "Cornwall Politics 1826-1832, " p. 95. 
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boundaries. Some rural areas were added to boroughs which, with some imagination, could have been 
avoided. For the borough of Halifax it made sense to have, in addition to the Halifax township, parts of 
North Owram and South Owram, as the town of Halifax extended into these townships. As, however, it only 
extended into parts of them - and the rests of these townships were rural -a tightly drawn boundary would 
have produced a sensible borough constituency, whilst at the same time limiting the inclusion of rural areas. 
However, this was not done. Instead, a wider, though simpler, boundary was used. Likewise, the boundary 
for the north-west of York resulted in a chunk of rural land being included. In a low-lying area with high 
hedges the Boundary Commissioners decided simply to draw a straight-line between some tall landmarks. As 
with Halifax this made a certain sense, but with more effort (planting stone markers? ) a more imaginative 
boundary could have been drawn that would have resulted in rural areas being excluded. ' 
Similarly indicative is the absence of urban penetration from rumours as to what the first Reform 
bill would contain. For example, in February 1831 the Quarterly Review speculated that it would give MPs to 
a few manufacturing towns, disfranchise some of the least populous boroughs, extend the borough franchise 
to copyholders and householders and possibly shorten Parliaments? In addition, though the ballot was being 
much discussed, it believed that radicals were willing to waive it temporarily, believing a reformed 
Parliament would soon pass it. 3 It is not the content, but the general topics, of these rumours that are 
illuminating. They demonstrated which issues political elites were discussing - lopping off some decayed 
constituencies, enfranchising some new industrial areas, enlarging the franchise and tinkering with the 
method and frequency of voting. Urban penetration was not a part of this debate. This omission was not 
simply on the part of those on the periphery of events. For example, when Brougham wrote to Graham in 
November 1830, asking him to find out how the Palmerston grouping stood on various Parliamentary reform 
issues, urban penetration was not one of them .4 The memorandum 
from the Cabinet's drafting committee on 
the bill did not mention urban penetration either! 
A later event reinforces this point. In 1831 a Parliamentary return of resident freeholders in English 
and Welsh county boroughs was made. 6 However, it was not printed until 9 August 1831, which hardly 
suggests this was a major or urgent issue. Further, there were no returns for Canterbury, Carmarthen, Exeter 
or York. That they should fail to respond, and that no further return to remedy this was demanded, again 
strongly suggests this was not an issue of much importance. 
4.5.5 Conclusion 
Moore was right to highlight urban penetration as being important and neglected, but the 
conclusions that can be drawn are not straight-forward. Urban penetration frequently took second place to a 
1 The major and much under-used source on the activities of the Boundary Commission are the papers in the Public 
Record Office, PRO T/72. 
2 Likewise see Croker's letter of II January 1831: Jennings, The Croker Papers, Volume 1, p. 97. 
3 It also mentioned some Scottish things. Quarterly Review, Volume 44, February 1831, p. 37S-6. 
4 C. S. Parker, Life And Letters Of Sir James Graham, Second Baronet OjNetherby, P. C., G. CB., 1752-1861, John Murray, 
London, 1907, Volume 1, p. 96. 
s Grey, The Reform Act, Volume 1, p. 461-3. 
A Return Of the Number of Freeholders Resident in the several Cities and Towns, being Counties within themselves, in 
England and Wales, 1831 (150) XVI. 
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range of other concerns during the production of the reform legislation. Partly this was a result of the 
complex and convoluted internal logic of the electoral system throwing up surprising interactions between 
urban penetration and other things; partly it was a result of Government confusion and failure to understand 
its own legislation; but it was also partly a result of deliberate choices, as in the preference for uniformity 
over curbing urban penetration in the initial stages and the persistent preference for curbing faggot votes and 
respecting traditional rights over curbing urban penetration. 
It was all rather messy. ' Partly also it was simply due to urban penetration not being of great 
concern, as reflected in the drafting, and changing of the drafting, of the clauses, which reveal limited 
familiarity with the issues and changing views as the debates produced great knowledge. Grey himself 
articulated the three great principles of the (England and Wales) Reform Bill as being disfranchising 
nomination boroughs, enfranchising populous towns and introducing the f 10 franchise? Urban penetration 
was not one of them. 
Nevertheless, urban penetration was curbed, and several parts of the legislation can only be 
explained by a desire to so do. The overall impact of the legislation was to reduce urban penetration 
compared to what it was before 1832. ' However, on several occasions the opportunity to cut it even further 
was not taken, and other objectives took precedence. For example, one of the debates over which freeholds 
worth less than £10 should be allowed to grant county votes centred around the rights of smaller proprietors 
and the need to avoid faggot votes. Urban penetration was not part of this coterie of arguments. 
4 
The framers of the reform legislation did not see the maintenance of deference communities as 
paramount; deference was not the only issue to determine behaviour. 
Conclusion 
Deference and paternalism are difficult concepts. Indeed, the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd 
edition) has as its earliest usage example for paternalism a quote dating from as late as 1881. To some extent, 
these are theoretical constructs retro-fitted onto the early nineteenth century. 
The question of how deference influenced elections is complicated, and involved various subtle, 
counter-veiling trends. With the political arena merging with that of society and personal interactions, and 
largely the same cast being present in both, electoral deference was but part of a larger picture. It was a 
mutual process, involving prices being paid by both sides and many non-electoral factors. This helps explain 
that apparent paradox highlighted by Speck, Grey and I Iopkinson 
s Talking of the eighteenth century, though 
11. Walsh, The Practical Results Of The Reform Act, described the reformed system as a mix of public apathy and a 
deluge of proposals in Parliament. 
2 Kriegel, Holland House Diaries, p. 151. 
I lowever, other factors worked to increase urban penetration in future years, as in North Durham, where by 1864 half 
the register entries were for boroughs freeholders: Nossiter, Influence, Opinion and Political Idioms, p. 59. Still, these 
numbers were lower than they would have been without the relevant parts of the 1832 legislation. The changes to the 
treatment of land tax also had an effect (see p. 135). 
4 Ilansard, 3rd series, Volume 9, c. 1103-6,1 February 1832. 
W. A. Speck,, W. A. Gray and R. I lopkinson, "Computer Analysis of Poll Books: A Further Report, " Bulletin of the 
Institute for Historical Research, Volume 48,1975, p. 64-3. 
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it also largely applies to the early nineteenth, they pointed to the disparity between the abundance of election 
literature, with a high issue content, and the correspondence of leading politicians, which rarely mentioned 
ideas but is full of patronage details. Whilst the former suggests an open, participatory system, the latter 
suggests a deferential one. In fact the two went together; deference was a participatory process. In canvassing 
and the publication of poll books this too was reflected: they provided information with which the 
participatory process could be manipulated. The importance of wider influences is also reflected in the 
drafting of certain parts of the 1832 legislation: urban penetration could not be isolated from the rest of the 
system. 
Yet we have seen how patrons could have great control over constituencies for long periods of time. 
It was not automatic control, but control that had to be worked for and sometimes even required patrons to 
bend to the will of the nominally subservient. As a result, the uncontested return of Graham and Lord 
Headley for Ripon in 1806 still cost £789 14s 2d. 1 The failures of both Fitzwilliam and Miss Lawrence in 
individual elections for what should have been their pocket boroughs indicates the occasional fragility of 
even the most clear-cut situations of landlord influence. Not only, then, was electoral control limited, but 
non-electoral considerations often took precedence. 
Despite this, though, there was a distinct train of thought amongst many patrons that the public at 
large, and even the electorate - especially the enlarged reformed electorate - was not f it to wield power, and 
that they needed direction. Deference reflected sense of community -a sense of place and a sense of the past. 
These were most articulated in the Victorian era amongst the lower middle class. 
2 It was this that motivated 
Anne Lister to write of one of her tenants, 
It is quite useless to leave such men as he uninfluenced. Ile knows nothing and cares nothing about it, 
and is literally best satisfied with the idea of pleasing someone he knows. 
It was this intermingling of motives - political and non-political, deferential and non-deferential, that allowed 
the electoral system to have that vitality which is shown in both the pattern of poll book publications and 
canvassing. 
1 Vyner MSS 5793, Leeds Archives. 
2 Pearson, "Knowing One's Place, " p. 221. 
3 Green, Miss Lister, p. 174. 
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5. Bribery, corruption and secret voting 
5.1 Introduction 
In addition to deference, another possible impediment to electoral vitality was corruption and 
bribery. Or, in the more lurid language of a commentary from 1836, 
The Reform Bill, if it has fair play, shall grow up a Hercules to rid the political world of monsters; but 
already, as it lies in its cradle, has the envious goddess of Corruption sent two most deadly serpents, 
Bribery and Intimidation, to strangle the baby-giant ... when, for 
instance, they are for the first time 
engaged in exercising the solemn privilege of the elective trust ... The rich man is busy, bullying and 
bribing and drenching every poor wretch accessible to such inducements; and the glorious mob is 
staggering, roaring, and rioting through the streets. I 
Corruption and other ill-deeds have a prominent place in reports of nineteenth century elections, as typified 
by the comment of Mr. Rigby's agent in Coningsby, "I do not see how we can win; we have polled all our 
dead men and Millbank is seven ahead. " But, in this Chapter I argue two main points. First, much of the 
corruption and bribery that did occur was not an impediment to vitality. Second, some of it actually 
encouraged, and was symptomatic of, vitality. 
There are three major methodological problems, and one empirical curiosity, when one is dealing 
with the early nineteenth century electoral system, the bribery within it and the system's responses to that 
bribery. The problems are located in vocabulary and moral judgements, the absence of alternative 
interpretations and the presence of Whiggism. The empirical curiosity concerns the secret ballot. 
First, the usual difficulties of vocabulary and moral judgements are particularly acute. Even 
relatively banal phrases like "giving money to voters" can in different times and people evoke different 
images. Is the first thought that occurs one of bribes being disbursed or of voters having free transport to 
polling booths provided? The payment of conveyance expenses2 was a regular feature of nineteenth century 
elections and a regular target of critics' ire. But, the giving of car-lifts to voters is a well-accepted part of 
modern British elections and not seen as corrupt. The mere provision of services for electors is not 
corruption, and thus this matter needs closer examination. It is easy to slip into imposing current moral 
standards on nineteenth century elections; whether or not this is useful is partly a function of what history is 
seen to be, but equally any such description is less useful than one that also takes into account contemporary 
moral standards. The vocabulary of corruption and venality, with the assumption that politics should be 
something higher than trading votes for favours, has been the framework within which historians have 
operated. Yet, this has meant adopting the discourse of the reformers. Section 5.2 questions some of these 
traditional assumptions, and looks at some advantages of bribery. 
Second, hiding behind the bland yet vituperative label of "bribery" are a multiplicity of different 
acts and different motivations. Beyond its simple black and white, reproving tone is a vista of grey areas. For 
example, is paying money to voters bad even if the other side is paying out exactly the same sums - i. e. there 
'London and Westminster Review, Volume 3& 25 Number 2,1836, p. 488-90. 
2 That is, the costs incurred by electors in travelling to and from voting. These often included not just transport but also 
food, drink and overnight accommodation. The dividing line between reasonable provision, and provision that is so 
generous as to constitute bribery, was, and is, somewhat ethereal. 
148 
is no financial incentive for a potential voter to switch from one side to another, and, moreover, it means 
more people vote? Is complying with local tradition, as with providing a great banquet, corrupt? Section 5.3 
looks at the example of Hull, whilst Section 5.4 looks at varying standards regarding alcohol and the giving 
of money. 
Third, implicit, or even explicit, Whiggism pervades many works on the history of "corruption" 
The idea is of a steady, almost pre-ordained progress. Partly as a result, the attempts to curb certain forms of 
behaviour have not been seen in their own terms. Section 5.5 looks at investigations, and election petitions in 
particular, whilst Section 5.6 looks at legislation. 
The empirical curiosity is that of the secret ballot. Section 5.7 shows how the history of the secret 
ballot, and other forms of voting, often conceived as a counter to either deference or corruption, is varied and 
rich, and results in some interesting questions being raised. 
Given the confusions and difficulties already mentioned, and others forthcoming, it is important to 
keep a firm grip on terminology. I take a bribe to be a payment (in cash or kind), other than genuine 
conveyance expenses, primarily intended to influence the way a person (not necessarily the recipient of the 
payment) votes. Primarily because there are many actions that may incidentally effect a vote but which it is 
not useful to call corrupt. This is a nebulous area, but a useful question to bear in mind is, "Would this 
payment have been made even if there were no election in the offing? " There is a subset of bribery that I 
term negative bribery. Where, for example, both sides in an election are making the same level of payments 
for support then there is no financial incentive to vote for one side or the other, so this is not straight forward 
corruption. Likewise, payments may have been made (particularly in the form of bogus employment) simply 
as preventative measures, to stop someone else bribing the person in question or because the absence of such 
payments could result in a loss of votes. These payments were not positive attempts to garner votes, but 
negative attempts to avoid losing them. As Clay found with Hull freemen in 1841, some electors would not 
vote without their usual fee, "yet they could not be tempted by a very much larger sum to vote the other 
way. "0 
5.2 What is wrong with bribery? 
There were some - like the Duke of Bedford - who saw corrupt election expenses as something that 
"inflicts a positive injury upon the community ' .2 However, this view did not go unchallenged: if a good MP 
is one who looks after his constituents, then possibly the more bribery the better. A continual complaint of 
opponents of bribery was that too many people - both candidates and voters - were ready to indulge. Often, it 
was not seen as wrong; providing a meal for someone who had given up their time to vote was, arguably, 
more a matter of politeness than bribery. Wilberforce said of his first campaign for hull, 
After a successful canvass on the spot, he repaired to London, where about three hundred }lull freemen 
resided in the vicinity of the river: there he entertained at supper in the different public-houses of 
Wapping... By long established custom [my emphasis] the single vote of a resident elector was rewarded 
with a donation of two guineas; four were paid for a plumper; and the expenses of a freeman's journey 
1 Markham, Nineteenth-Century Parliamentary Elections, p. 15. 
2 D. Spring, "English Landed Society in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, " Economic ! listoryReview, 2nd series, 
Volume 17,1964, p. 31. 
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from London averaged 101. a piece. The letter of the law was not broken, because, the money was not 
paid until the last day on which election petitions could be presented. ' 
Even in the extreme case of open purchases of votes it should not be automatically assumed that this was 
bad. Buying votes may lead to rich candidates winning, or those with access to large financial resources (e. g. 
Wilberforce in 1807 received money from dissenters across the country to fight Yorkshire), but if the 
definition of a good MP is one who makes constituents better off, then a rich MP who can afford to be 
generous to local causes fits this category. The willingness to spend money can be taken as a proxy for 
eagerness for the job. Further, if a society dominated by inherited property is accepted as the norm, where 
property means respectability, then why should not rich property owners win? 
A more potent criticism is that the distribution of money meant electors were distracted from serious 
issues by short-term gratification. There are two responses to this. One is that people were not forced to take 
bribes; that bribery was around merely gave them an opportunity to be bribed if they wished. Whilst buying 
votes can detract from the idea that elections are about rationally evaluating competing arguments, choosing 
whether or not to be bribed can itself be a rational decision. Second, as elections were frequently seen as 
local affairs, rather than the election of a national government, there were fewer national issues to be 
distracted from than might be the case today. In many ways there was little an MP could do for his 
constituency other than distribute patronage and gifts. John Mitchell, a Bull MP, was criticised in 1818 for 
supporting slavery and making money from it. He responded: 
He was sorry this was the fact, but indeed it was not necessary to regret it much. Ile was on one account 
sorry his West Indian connections were not twice as great; for then he should have been enabled to have 
done twice as much for the prosperity of Hu112 
The susceptibility of electors to bribes also permitted otherwise unlikely candidates to win, as with dissenting 
and low Church Beverley electing Catholics in, 1832 and 1841 (Charles Langdale and John Towneley). 
Buying votes may inculcate a demeaning and insulting attitude towards the electorate, with the idea 
that politics is a competition carried on "above their heads" and discourage the idea that elections are about 
the representation of interests. However, the role of election rituals, with their participative nature, to some 
extent contradicts this. Purchasing votes can also be a pragmatic response - there is the irony that many 
reformist MPs, at least before 1832, sat for "corrupt" seats, presumably on the basis that once in Parliament 
they could do enough to out-weigh this blemish. Relying on money, whilst closing the system to the poor, 
opened it to the non-landed rich. 
Indeed, one can justify corruption as a socially unifying force, bonding otherwise discordant groups 
together. Take the example of the use of charity funds for partial purposes, as condemned by the Charity 
Commissioners' 1836 Report. By closely linking a political bloc with people's personal lives an intimate link 
is developed, that strengthens that faction. In Beverley the winter of 1840-1 saw both the Beverley 
Conservative Association and a Reform Association distribute flour and coal. The Fitzwilliams provided 
food in Malton outside election time. In a sense these were bribes, but they also aided the maintenance of 
1 V. Hannay), "Electioneering, " Quarterly Review, Volume 102,1857, p. 48. 
2 Markham, Nineteenth-Century Parliamentary Elections, p. 13. 
The purchase of seats allowed a wider range of people into Parliament: see p. 185. 
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social order. It is questionable how many of these activities were conducted with explicit electoral motives in 
mind, rather than paternalistic ones or a desire to preserve order. ' Though charitable donations and like 
behaviour could have non-electoral roots and motivations, they could also be suspended or reversed in the 
face of an electoral reverse, as happened with Fitzwilliam suspending customary treats and gifts in Malton 
following the defeat of one of his candidates in 1807. One cannot take this argument too far - the mere 
exchange of cash for services is not necessarily socially binding;; 2 however these activities were more than 
that. They relied on local traditions, often taking forms decided thus (as with the level of payments in Ilull) 
and often using local conduits, as with the Iveson brothers in Hedon. 
Corruption and the frequently concomitant rumbustiousness could encourage intolerance - in 
particular the use of violence on opponents - and stifle debate. By encouraging the idea that voting, or 
breaking a window, was all that was required this inculcated a very limited idea of political participation. 
And the rowdiness and lack of civility such actions equalled meant that, though one can argue they made 
society more stable, they also prima facie had the opposite effect? However, it would be wrong to assume 
that, by contrast, all policy pronouncements were temperate, rational and admirable. Religious disputes in 
particular frequently resulted in highly aggressive and intolerant invective. Further, bribery and policy 
pronouncements often accompanied each other. 4 
Though not all the money spent on elections went on bribery - there were Returning Officers' 
expenses for candidates to cover for a start - it was still true that bribery and treating made Beverley and Bull 
elections expensive, and could deter candidates. s In Northallerton treating took place, even if there was no 
contest. Likewise in Ripon Miss Lawrence, who owned property rented by many members of the electorate, 
gave large sums to charities, including places which were not connected with elections b In York the Minster 
campanologists were traditionally given a £5 5s gratuity by candidates! Such negative bribes quickly added 
up. Similarly, the Scarborough MP, J. V. B. Johnstone, 
was an exceedingly good member for the borough, diligently alive to its interests and laborious in 
performing the duties his position entailed upon him, irrespective of private opinion. 
His activities and generosity included giving stone from his Hiackness quarries for the building of a church 
and museum! 
1 This question of non-electoral motives was considered in Chapter 4. 
2 Consider prostitution. 
3 Rowdy behaviour, however, cannot solely be blamed on elections. Indeed, criticism of the (alleged) public behaviour of 
some parts of society was a recurring theme, as in the moves to abolish public executions. This was first moved In 
Parliament in 1841 by Ilenry Rich. Though on this occasion he received the support of just one other MP, and the 
motion was withdrawn, support quickly grew and 1868 saw the last English public hanging. There were also attempts to 
make the process more decorous by increasing the procedure's solemnity. See 11. Porter, flanging In Judgement: 
Religion and the Death Penalty in England, SCM Press, London, 1993, p. 67-70 and p. 87. 
4 E. g. as in the Yorkshire 1826 election and the Bradford and Shipley election and political papers, DB 13 and the 
Busfeild Ferrand MSS, 51D79, Bradford Archives. 
E. g. see p. 218. 
6 1833 (547) VIII, p. 190-9 and p. 220. Between 85 and 110 electors, out of about 340-390 in total, were her tenants. 
7 1837 York election ACC93/S, York City Archives. 
J. B. Baker, The History Of Scarborough, From The Earliest Date, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1882, p. 447-8. 
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Building social stability, whether deliberately or as an inadvertent by-product, could, and did, 
involve non-electors and activities other than bribery. Borderline activities like conveyance expenses meant 
electors were able to vote at a lesser cost to themselves and indeed made it easier for them to vote. Benefits 
can even be seen in an extreme example of under-hand election proceedings, that of kidnapping electors. 
George Kenman, a leading Bradford Liberal, complained of the 1847 election there that, 
The non electors have laboured as if their existence depended on the result ... The most disgraceful features connected with the contest have been the kidnapping of voters. In this business I feel that both 
parties have been guilty of considerable impropriety. 
In other words, non-electors were eager and active participants in the electoral process. Similarly, in Ilalifax 
in 1832 non-electors formed large crowds, with banners and flags. The raucousness became violence, with 
windows broken and allegations that some shop-keepers and beer-shop keepers were intimidated. 2 In both 
1832 and 1835 non-electors had a large presence at the nomination meetings, and it was claimed that in 1835 
some voters delayed voting, hoping that they would be able to avoid having to do so and so avoid the risk of 
exclusive dealing. One speaker at the hustings, Mr. Brown, said that he hoped non-electors would show that 
they had money to spend. Both years saw crowd violence. ' Such involvement of non-electors and violence 
occurred at other Halifax elections, and though it appears to have been prompted by outsiders, there was also 
a self-identification, evidenced by the presence in 1835 of a large flag with "Non-electors" on it. Public 
participation, especially at nomination meetings, could add vitality, but it could also add disorder and 
violence 4 
Huddersfield elections likewise frequently saw violent behaviour and involvement by non-electors. 
This included the reading of the Riot Act in 1832, with the cavalry summoned, and the breaking up of Whig 
meetings by large crowds in 1837 along with urges for exclusive dealing and the swearing-in of sixty special 
constables. Again though, this was also a means by which the electoral process became more inclusive - 
anyone can riot, and indeed workers whose muscles have been built up by long hours of arduous labour 
could be the best. Even the symbolism in 1837 was inclusive. When the Whig Stansfield arrived he was 
greeted with pieces of bread and cheese on long poles, a reference to a day's ration in the workhouse. 
Huddersfield is perhaps unusual in this respect as a theme of its politics in the 1830s was anti-Whig Radical- 
Tory coalitions, based on such issues as factory reform and opposition to the New Poor Law. Yet the 
importance of non-electors' influence elsewhere is demonstrated by the opposition of many Chartists to the 
introduction of the secret ballot on its own, fearing that it would reduce their electoral influence. Non- 
electors were an essential part of political power in many industrial constituencies. Thus, al luddersfield 
poem of the 1830 included the lines, 
1 A. Jowitt, "Dissenters, Voluntaryism and Liberal Unity: The 1847 Election, " p. 7-23 in J. A. Jowitt and R. K. S. Taylor 
(eds), Nineteenth Century Bradford Elections, Bradford Centre Occasional Papers No. 1, University of Leeds, 1979,87, 
p. 19. 
2 1835 (547) VIII, q. 3434-611. 
3 Evidence from William Craven, a solicitor who supported the Tories, 1835 (547) VIII, q. 199-210. 
4 This is an example of the double-edged nature of many of the rituals. Similarly, the chairing of successful candidates 
could either be a reconciling gesture and a chance for a community to have a good time, or it could result in scuffles, 
tumult and further division. 
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For none can withstand the terrible might, 
Of working men votes on a Saturday night. ' 
The importance of non-electors is not only illustrated in descriptions such as this one, but also in the breadth 
of the audience at whom electoral propaganda was aimed. Broadsheets and rhetoric appealing to the "non- 
electors" and the general population were common. 
5.3 Hull 
The tales of wealth a candidate could bring to Hull were popular. It was a borough with a reputation 
of expensive, riotous and drunken elections. The 1853 Royal Commission unearthed a weighty tome of 
evidence of systematic and continued corruption in Hull in 1841,1847 and 1852, concluding, 
We find that there is a practice in Hull of expending an exorbitant amount of money at elections for the 
purpose of satisfying the improper demands of a great body of the constituency; that such expenditure is 
corrupt, not to the extent of immediately altering the votes of the persons affected by it, [my emphasis] 
but to the extent of producing an improper desire on their part to force on a contest for the purpose of 
pecuniary advantage. 
This half-hearted conclusion regarding corruption affecting electoral outcomes is particularly striking given 
that Hull is atypical by virtue of its notoriety and its being investigated, and this conclusion followed from an 
extensive investigation which unearthed much evidence. This mix of bad reputation, close investigation but 
mild conclusion makes it instructive to look at some of their findings in more detail. 
Though payments to large numbers of voters were discovered and well documented, the earlier 
Wilberforce quotation (p. 149) illustrated how the scale of pay was customary. If both sides stayed true to 
custom and so offered electors identical sums for identical purposes, then these payments provided no 
incentive for electors to switch their votes. However, the Commission did unearth large-scale employment of 
people, with these payments being a form of bribery. Though the pay rate was traditionally set at Ss the 
willingness of different sides to employ different numbers of people permits the possibility that financial 
inducements did alter voting. Large sums certainly were spent: in 1852 the Blues spent £3637 2s 5d and the 
Oranges £5595 1Os 2d. 4 On this matter the Commission said, 
Many witnesses gave evidence that after accepting employment and receiving payment from one party, 
with a knowledge that they were thereby pledged to vote for that party, voters did, either because their 
employment was curtailed by their own side, or because they saw greater promise on the other side, 
accept employment from the other side, and vote accordingly! 
Some allegations centred around partisans paying for freemen's admissions - on the understanding that they 
would vote for the side that had paid; there were even some allegations of written contracts. ' The numbers 
t Jowitt, "Dissenters, Voluntaryism and Liberal Unity, " p. 9. 
2 E. g. J. Symons, High Street, Hull, Some Years Since, And Biographical Sketches, Interspersed With Historical Accounts 
Of The Dock Company - The Town, ancient and modern - Siege, Hospitals - Guilds, &c., J. W. Leng, I lull, 1862, p. 22-27. 
3 Report Of The Commissioners Appointed under Her Majesty's Royal Sign Manual To Inquire Into The Existence Of 
Corrupt Practices In The Borough Of Kingston-Upon-flu!!; Together With The Minutes O/Evldence, Parts I& II, 1854 
( 1703) and (17034) XXII. The quote is from 1854 ( 1703) XXII, p. xxv. 
4 1854 (1703) XXII, p. xix and p. xxiii. 
s 1854 (1703) XXII, p. xxiii. 
6 1854 {1703} XXII, p. iv-v. 
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were not insignificant: in 1839-40 440 freemen had their admissions paid for thus. ' As the 1840 register had 
about 4800 entries, 2 these creations amounted to around one-in-ten of the electorate. But, though after 1832 
some newly created freemen could qualify to register, those created by purchase could not. It was not a 
straight-forward question of money being used to illegitimately boost the electorate. Those who were 
becoming freemen with Parliamentary votes had to meet other qualifications, such as being descended from a 
freeman or having served an appropriate apprenticeship. The political parties were then paying the admission 
fees for some of them. Given this, it is questionable whether such action really was corrupt: such people met 
the conditions to be an elector themselves, bar the paying of money to the Corporation (how different is this 
to, for example, nowadays politicians canvassing with electoral registration forms to get people registered? ) 
and it had a beneficial effect (making it easier for poorer people to enter the electorate). 3 Indeed, as a 
significant part of the cost of being admitted as a freeman was the Stamp Duty, paying for the creations made 
a regressive tax more equitable! 
Thus, even in Hull, it is not clear that disbursing money was corrupt or detrimental. Much of the 
expenditure was traditional and, as it was disbursed in equal sums by each side, did not provide a motivation 
for electors to switch sides. Further, the availability of money both increased the electorate (with the paying 
of freemen's admission fees) and provided an extra incentive to vote. 
5.4 Different standards 
Hedon provides a good example of the difficulties of distinguishing bribery from generosity or 
normal behaviour. A freemen borough with a small electorate, it had a reputation for venal and personality- 
based politics. Though abolished in 1832 it lived on as an East Riding polling station, and in 1837 the Hull 
Rockingham commented, "Hedon it will be seen is Hedon still. "4 Candidates were required to purchase their 
freedoms, which put money into the local community, or at least the corporation's pockets. Between 
elections non-repayable "`loans" to freemen were common. MPs were generous to local charities, the church 
and school and in the provision of entertainment. A local attorney - William Iveson - also had limited 
electoral influence, based on a mix of property, influence with the corporation and financial generosity. 
Electoral influence was more subtle than the simple wielding of money, and was frequently cloaked in the 
form of "generosity. " 
Free food was an established part of civic celebrations, including elections; likewise other forms of 
generosity. Thus, for example, the Fitzwilliams were patrons to schools, societies, agricultural shows and 
railway companies linked with Parliamentary constituencies; they were also patrons of others (like the 
Statistical Society and the British Association for the Advancement of Science, of both of which Charles 
William Fitzwilliam was at one time President) which garnered no clear electoral benefit. 
1 1854 (1703) XXII, p. iv-v. 
2 Appendix 9. 
3 Freemen by patrimony had to pay £1 9s on being admitted, whilst freemen by apprenticeship had to pay Is to be 
registered in the indenture books and then £1 9s on admission: Report from the Select Committee on Municipal 
Corporations, With the Minutes of Evidence taken before them [and index], Municipal Corporations, Volume I, 1833 
(344) XIII, q. 6859-76. 
4 Markham, Nineteenth-Century Parliamentary Elections, p. 10. 
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The idea of electors being "transformed into just so many beer barrels"' is a firmly entrenched part 
of the electoral picture. But alcohol itself had an entrenched role in society - the provision of free drinks was 
a custom in far more than just elections; in 1836 John Dunlop catalogued 300 "drinking usages" in 98 
different trades, such as at the sharpening of ploughshares or at the laying of the first joist. 2 When the 
commencement of peace was celebrated by means including food and drink in York in 1814, a subscription 
was held to ensure that the poor could also partake. 
Alcohol was often seen as healthy, with even John Bull being fat and red. Size and alcohol were 
associated with each other and with health, resulting in teetotaller campaigners often looking for fat people to 
lead their parades. ' Additionally, the narrower range of non-alcoholic drinks available in the nineteenth 
century, along with the social role of a pub as a meeting place, should be remembered. The use of public 
houses as venues for electoral entertainment - with the concomitant (allegations of) disorder, debauchery and 
drunkenness - was forced on some candidates. Whilst generous treaters like P. B. Thompson with Escrick and 
Richard Bethell with Rise Park, had their own venues for dinners, balls and other events, other, less well 
endowed, candidates had to turn to public houses. 
There is a distinction between alcohol consumption and drunken or riotous behaviour, and indeed 
between being drunk and being riotous. The first English temperance reformers were opposed to 
drunkenness rather than alcohol per se; it was only from around 1832 that teetotalism became the main 
principle. 5 Temperance campaigners did, occasionally, achieve some success in the electoral field. In 
Bradford in 1841 they canvassed 709 electors, and got 532 of them, plus 100 influential non-electors, to 
successfully petition the candidates not to use pubs during the election campaign. 6 
Despite this proviso, alcohol did encourage (and encourages) boisterous and unruly behaviour. Thus 
it was that a Bradford election song had a chorus commencing, 
So rump and dump, dump and stump, and stump, stump 
And thump, and thump, thump, aye, thump and thump, thump... ý 
Whilst these lyrics are somewhat lacking in sophistication in the cold light of day, a touch of drunkenness 
can easily turn the song into a jolly, loud and entertaining song. One may consider much of such electoral 
behaviour distasteful, but it was also often fun for the participants and different. 
Like alcohol, the giving of money was a part of wider social behaviour, frequently motivated by 
non-electoral factors. The giving of money was also often a way of noting public service! Disbursing money 
was normal, even beyond the broad confines of negative bribery, as numerous examples in this Chapter have 
1 One Who Thinks Aloud, The Language Of The Walls: And A Voice From The Shop Windows. Or. The Mirror Of 
Commercial Roguery, William Tweedie, London, 1855, p. 17. 
2 N. Longmate, The Waterdrinkers: A History Of Temperance, l lamish Hamilton, London, 1968, p. 17-20. 
3 Peacock, York In The Age Of Reform, p. 1-2. 
4 L. L. Shiman, Crusade against Drink in Victorian England, Macmillan, London, 1988, p. 35. 
s Shiman, Crusade against Drink, p. 9-11 and p. 18. 
6 B. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, Faber and Faber, London, 1971, p. 345. 
7 Songsheet, Bradford and Shipley election and political papers, DB13 cl, Bradford Archives. 
E. g. W. D. Rubinstein, "The End of 'Old Corruption' in Britain, " Past & Present, Number 101,1983, p. 67. 
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already illustrated. Expenditures such as those on treating and conveyancing was often seen simply as 
necessary bureaucratic costs, akin to the costs of erecting hustings etc. Hence on occasions candidates of 
different sides still agreed to split such costs between them. Treating's sometime acceptable nature was also 
reflected in it not being a common-law (traditional) offence, nor being illegal before the test of the writ. 
It was hard for candidates to limit spending even if they wanted to. Generosity was expected and 
many activists were happy to run up bills, which were hard to control and difficult to disown. For example, 
James Brown stood for Hull in 1847 after being promised that it would cost a maximum of £ 1,300-£2,000. 
He was finally left with a bill for £3,000. There is a hint of hypocrisy in the behaviour of Burdett, who only 
became "incorruptible" - i. e. reluctant to spend money on elections - once he was bankrupted. One person's 
corruption was another's generosity; one person's purity was another's meanness. 
Even where payments to voters were intended primarily to sway changing their voting behaviour, 
and where they did achieve this, the levels were not infrequently set by tradition. (Tradition could also 
demand payments at non-election times). The situation in Hull has already been mentioned. Another example 
is York, where it was "notorious to election agents" that the going rate was £2 for a plumper and £1 for a 
split vote. ' Such generosity was not kept secret. It even advertised in the press. In any case, spending money 
could be seen as preferable to demagoguery. As Grey expounded, 
To give money bribes to electors is not worse or rather not nearly so bad as to court their favour by 
flattering their passions and prejudices. 
Elections were a break from the mundane, being different and exciting, whilst also a chance to glory 
in one's importance and traditional freedoms. In this context, free food and drink were a logical part of local 
heritage, a heritage that was also expressed in printed records, plaques and pottery. 3 
5.5 Curbing corruption 
It would be wrong to take a totally rosy view of bribery and corruption. William Cooke lost the 
York election of 1818 in the face of such widespread distribution of money by Sir Mark Sykes that over half 
of those who signed Cooke's requisition did not vote for him 4 Likewise, for the 1820 York election Lord 
Howden's election expenses included sums for 784 voters at 42s each and 66 at 21 s each .3 
The judgement of 
historians is epitomised by Markham's claim that, 
It is indeed a well-established fact that well into the Victorian period the administration of electoral law 
was notoriously lax. b 
As shall be seen "lax" is an unfair, inaccurate and over-simple description. There were two main methods of 
tackling "abuses". First, a scrutiny could be demanded by a candidate and, if the Returning Officers 
1 Evidence of Joseph Parkes, 1835 (547) VIII, p. 89. 
2 Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 407 M. 
3 H. J. Hanham, "Politics and Community Life in Victorian and Edwardian Britain, " Folk Life, Volume 4,1965, p. 5-6. 
4 Brett, York Whig Club, p. 5. 
s Peacock, York In The Age Of Reform, p. 80. 
6 J. Markham, The 1820 Parliamentary Election at Hedon: A study of electioneering in a Yorkshire borough before the 
passing of the Reform Act, J. Markham, Beverley, [1971), p. 29. 
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accepted, the return would be withheld until the scrutiny had been carried out. This meant scrutinising the 
votes cast to check for any irregularities. However, as the returning officer had to do this before the new 
Parliament met' there was often little time available and a scrutiny only involved questioning the validity of 
votes. 
Second, a petition could be lodged against the result of an election. Petitions covered three main 
issues: a constituency's franchise (though this was rarely an issue after 1832), allegations of bribery or 
corruption and the behaviour of the returning officer. 3 Petitioning became, by the mid-eighteenth century, the 
main means of (attempted) redress, though the rate of petitioning declined in the later eighteenth century. 
Petitions had to be lodged within fourteen days of the start of a new Parliament, so again there was some 
time pressure, and there was also the need to find large sums of money for the recognizances. 4 
There were three main possible rulings: a ruling on the franchise, a voiding of the election result or 
the replacement of an elected MP by a losing candidate. This restricted what it was practical to petition over. 
For example, it was not possible to directly petition against the behaviour of a candidate's supporter. If that 
candidate won, and if they could be held responsible for their supporter's activities, and if unseating the MP 
could be a reasonable punishment, then petitioning could be a form of redress. Otherwise it could not. At 
best, a petitioner in these circumstances could hope that the petition hearings would so reveal the moral 
turpitude of other participants that the committee might recommend that the Attorney-General prosecute 
them. This was rare. 
The petitioning system was much criticised. s Responsibility for taking up breaches of electoral law 
usually resided with victors' opponents, who, if they too had carried out activities of dubious legality, often 
had little incentive to enforce the law. This problem was amply illustrated after the 1841 election, when 
misdeeds on all sides resulted in deals being struck to "pair-off' ten petitions which were then withdrawn. 6 
Indeed, the cases were so prevalent and blatant that a Commons committee was set up to investigate, and 
legislation followed. Another example is the York situation after the 1837 poll. Atcherley, a defeated 
candidate, considered lodging a petition. However, the question of justice was by no means the only matter 
on his mind. John Holeby wrote to him, reciting various questions posed by Atcherley and responding: 
What numbers of votes remained unpolled for me at 4 o'clock after the artificial and shameful delay that 
was created: - I am not aware of any voters who had to poll ... 
1 This was because they were obliged to have made a return by then. There was no such deadline for by-elections. 
2 If someone tried to vote and was rejected, they could still ask that their desired vote be recorded even though it would 
not be counted. This was a tendered vote. Tendered votes could also be considered during scrutinies. 
3 Though misdeeds by returning officers are popular anecdotes for those wishing to disparage the electoral system only 
three English elections have been voided due to irregularities by returning officers since 1832: Tomes (1839), Rye 
(1847) and Harwich (1851). In theory a petition could cover any topic that might conceivably be a reason for over- 
turning a result, but those mentioned were the main three. The only other significant one was to claim that a victorious 
candidate was not properly qualified to be an MP. 
4 In effect these were monetary deposits to show that the petitioners were being serious and not merely vexatious. 
s E. g. The State of the Law Of Controverted Elections Examined, I lenry Renshaw, London, 1836. 
6 The deals included both those over petitions for the same constituency and those covering petitions for different 
constituencies; it was a deal of the latter sort that allowed Disraeli to keep his scat. This flurry of deal-making followed 
the passage of 4&5 Viet. c. 57 (1841), which allowed investigations to be conducted without agency first being proved. 
This act was but one in a long line of attempts to curtail the withdrawal of petitions under dubious conditions; e. g. see 53 
Geo. III c. 71 (1813). 
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Would a petition be popular or the contrary: - Your friends here think a petition would not be popular ... Barclay made himself unpopular by pursuin, the Petition after his defeat and had he offered himself a 
second time, he would have been rejected ... 
Petitioning could be slow and costly. In particular, the expense of witnesses and short-hand writers 
quickly added up and the usual hearing of several petitions in parallel meant that parties to petitions had to 
retain several barristers in the hope of having one available when needed and, as a counsel might well not 
attend the committee hearing, further costs were incurred in having to meet afterwards to discuss events. A 
fully contested petition could easily cost the parties involved hundreds of pounds each. 
Yet, in 1832-52 290 petitions were presented, of which 86 (30%) resulted in elections being ruled 
undue or voided. Of the others, 32% resulted in elections being upheld and 38% were withdrawn. The 
pattern of petitions suggests that corruption was worst in boroughs, (no English county had an election 
overturned in 1800-50) and in boroughs with large number of freemen; only three of those boroughs with a 
large number did not have at least one election over-turned in 1832-54 
The 1820 Grampound petition exemplifies how election petition committees could fail to deal with 
widespread bribery. The committee reported the day after it had been appointed, ruling that the members had 
been duly elected. Yet, it was this election that caused Sir Manasseh Lopez and some voters to be convicted 
of bribery, and precipitated the constituency's abolition! 
Holeby to Atcherley, 13 November 1837,1837 York election ACC93/7, York City Archives. The theme that a petition 
would injure Atcherley who would otherwise win at the next election is repeated in a letter of 16 November 1837 
(ACC93/8). However, in another letter (2 December 1837) Holeby wrote, "Who can blame you for taking any legitimate 
means to obtain that Seat which you ought to have had, " (ACC93/15). 
2 Report from the Select Committee on Controverted Election Fees; With the Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix, 1837-8 
(50) X and 1860 (329) X. 
3 Craig, Electoral Facts, p. 173 and Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 189-93. 
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Year of Constituencies where election Constituencies where MP(s) Comments 
election voided replaced by a defeated candidate 
1832 Hertford (2), Oxford City (1), Petersfield (1), Salisbury (1), Hertford and Warwick's 
Stafford (1? ), ' Tiverton (1), Southampton (1) writs were suspended. 
Warwick (1) 
1835 Ipswich (2) Canterbury (1), Windsor (1) 
1837 Bedford (1), Marylebone (1) Evesham (1), Hull (1), Ipswich (1), 
Norwich (1), Petersfield (1), 
Shaftesbury (1), Tynemouth (1) 
1838 Maidstone (1)* Devizes (1)* 
1839 Cambridge (1)*, Ludlow (1)*, Totnes was a double return 
Totnes (1)* 
1841 Ipswich (2), Newcastle-under- Clitheroe (1), Lewes (1), Lyme Regis Sudbury's writ was 
Lyme (1), Southampton (2), (1), Marlow (1), Thetford (1), suspended. It was 
Sudbury (2) Wakefield (1), Weymouth (2), Wigan disfranchised in 1844. 
(1) Thetford was a double 
return. 
1842 Ipswich (2), Nottingham (I)* Newcastle-under-Lyme (1)* 
1843 Durham (1)* 
1846 Bridport (1)* 
1847 Aylesbury (1), Bewdley (1), 
Carlisle (2), Cheltenham (1), 
Derby (2), Great Yarmouth (2), 
Harwich (1), Horsham (1), 
Lancaster (1), Leicester (2), 
Lincoln (1), Rye (1)* 
1848 Cheltenham (1)* Horsham (1)* 
The number after a constituency name denotes the number of MPs unseated. An asterisk indicates that it was a by- 
election. 
Table 5.1: Successful English petitions 1832-502 
Part of the problem was that petitions were considered by a committee of MPs. Though the details 
of how they were picked and how they worked changed several times in 1800-50 several problems, inherent 
in such a set-up, remained. Committees were heavily biased towards, and for much of the period legally 
constrained to, looking at matters shown to have directly affected the return. Their investigative ability could 
be thwarted by parties compromising on their differences or allegations for mutual benefit, such as lessening 
the costs .3 Even without collusion, the presentation of a petition 
did not, and could not, lead to a general 
' It was probably only R. H. Gronow's election that was voided, though some sources imply that W. F. Chetwynd's 
election was also voided. 
2In addition, some MPs stood down in the face of a petition: p. 159 n3. Also a Gloucester MP who saw off a petition in 
1838 nevertheless resigned and (successfully) fought the subsequent by-election. 
3 Not all deals were nefarious. Desires to reduce expense and minimise strife occasionally expedited justice. For 
example, the four candidates for Leeds in 1841 agreed to compile a common list of dead and removed electors, to 
compare with actual voters. If this comparison were to show that someone had been unduly elected then the "bogus" 
winner(s) would not vote in Parliament and all parties would agree before an election committee to the striking-off of 
these votes. If the committee did not agree to end proceedings then (so minimising extra costs) the "bogus" winner(s) 
were to take the Chiltern Hundreds: Warde Aldam MSS, DDWA/P/25, Doncaster Archives. 
Further, some deals included MPs standing down, as with the resignation of MPs for Bridgnorth (1838), Woodstock 
(1838), Great Yarmouth (1838), Bridport (1841), Nottingham (1842) and Weymouth and Melcombe Regis (1847). 
These are all the cases of such deals I have traced for 1832-50. Also a Sudbury MP resigned in 1837 following upon a 
(continued) 
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investigation of all possible illegalities at that election in question. Thus, for example, if a defeated candidate 
who bribed brought a petition his activities could not be investigated, unless there was a counter-petition or if 
his petition had been to get the seat rather than void the election. ' 
Even within this limited remit, committees often performed poorly. An 1836 criticism of the 
petition system claimed, 
Nothing, we admit, can be more variable than Election committees. We have not only known two of 
them dispose of the same case differently, in different sessions, but the very same case adjudicated by 
the same identical committee in two contrary ways. These were extreme cases, but .. 
2 
This was not a lone voice. The expert Mr. Manning commented, 
In looking through the decisions of committees of the House of Commons with reference to the subject 
of alms it appears very difficult to extract any definite principle of general application. This is not to be 
wondered at, when it is considered how little committees are bound by precedent or authority. 3 
The confusion of thought and decision was exacerbated by the mixing of points of fact and law, and by the 
mixing of statue and common law, and criminal and civil law. There was no court-like division between 
judge (matters of law) and jury (matters of fact). 4 As Corbett and Daniell claimed: 
This mixture of matter [of law and fact, statute and common] renders the task of the Reporter more 
difficult than it would have been if he had simply to report the proceedings of a trial at Nis! Prius, or an 
argument in Bank, in which the subject of discussion is generally reduced to a few distinct points. 3 
In May 1838 William Wilberforce (junior) was unseated as Hull's MP on petition. He published an attack on 
the election committee system, arguing it was biased, though he conceded that cases of palpable injustice 
were rare and rulings were occasionally made across partisan lines 6 The cause of problems, he wrote, 
... is not, that is to say, the fruit of incorrigible want of principle 
in those who occupy the seat of 
judgement, and it must therefore spring from some fault in the constitution of the court. The machinery 
needs readjustment, and not the judges [MPs] deprivation. 
(.. continued) 
pre-poll agreement that if two candidates of either party were elected, one would resign. On one other occasion a deal 
was made for an MP to stand down, but they were not able to resign: see p. 201 
t P. A. Pickering, Remarks On Treating And Other Matters Relating To The Election O/Members Of Parliament And On 
Some Recent Decisions Of Committees Of The House Of Commons, James Ridgway, London, 1849, p. 60. I lowever, 5&6 
Vict. c. 102 (1842) allowed committees to request powers to make wider investigations of bribery in limited 
circumstances. 
2 Controverted Elections, p. 19-20. 
3 A. J. Stephens, A Practical Treatise On The Law Of Elections; With Directions For Candidates, Electors, Agents, 
Returning Officers, Overseers, Claimants, And Objectors; And An Appendix, Containing The Statutes For England; 
Scotlan4 And Ireland With Notes; The BoundaryAct; And Forms Of Indentures, Precepts, &c. &c., first volume, Shaw 
and Sons, London, 1840, p. 382. 
4 Libel was one of the few exceptions to this, and indeed libel cases produced many complaints regarding inconsistency 
and competence. 
s U. Corbett and E. R. Daniell, Reports Of Cases Of Controverted Elections, In The Sixth Parliament Of The United 
Kingdom, J. and W. T. Clarke, London, 1821, p. iii. 
6 W. Wilberforce, The Law and Practice of Election Committees, in a Letter to the Electors offlull, James Fraser, 
London, 1839. 
7 Wilberforce, Election Committees, p. 5. 
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Committee members had to combine the role of judge and jury and often lacked experience in such matters. 
Judges could protect juries from the skills of advocates; no such protection existed for election committee 
MPs. So, Wilberforce asked, 
Who will not confess that, in the mutual counteraction of opposing forces, the latent, but constantly 
existing bias, will generally determine the direction of judgement? ' 
This point was also made in the aforementioned 1836 criticism. It is unsurprising that MPs, facing legal 
confusion, relied on partisan instincts to sort through conflicting claims regarding fact, statue law, common 
law, precedence and tradition. As the Quarterly Review pointed out in 1843, there was no-one for an election 
committee to ask direction of if it were puzzled on a matter, no scope for appeal if an error were made in 
legal interpretation, nor scope for correction of factual errors. 3 
Not only were decisions often made under difficult circumstances, but the basis on which they were 
made was often unclear. Wilberforce gave the committee Chairman's response to a request to explain the 
grounds for one particular decision: 
The chairman stated that if all the committee had taken one view of the subject, he should have been 
very glad to give an answer to the question, but as different members of the committee laid stress on 
different parts of the evidence, it would be difficult for him to state the precise grounds on which the 
decision of the committee had proceeded. ' 
Not only were election committees unlike juries in that simple majorities sufficed, but the compacting of 
several issues into one vote meant decisions could be reached without there being a majority in favour of 
anything. For example, a majority might think a voter innocent of treating, and a majority might think a voter 
innocent of being a paid agent, but if there were one vote on whether he were guilty of any misdemeanour 
there could be a majority in favour. 
Many of the problems for petitions resulted from them being judged by MPs - MPs moreover who 
frequently only did the job once in their career and who might do it reluctantly given the time consumed, and 
certainly without pay. Though inimical to efficiency these conditions are unsurprising. Given the Commons' 
history, with its struggles to determine its membership for itself, suggestions to allow outsiders to rule on 
petitions were not popular. Having a limited pool of MPs to judge petitions might have allowed a body of 
expertise to accumulate, but random selection avoided bias in the selection process whilst also preventing 
controversy over the circumstances of the selection of a particular committee. In addition to the lack of 
expertise, the lack of continuity meant an absence of identity between individual MPs and the quality of 
committees' decisions, resulting in little incentive for MPs to ensure their committee produced a high quality 
result. Discontinuity also bred inconsistency. As one commentator put it, defects in laws were greatly 
aggravated by, inter alia, "the extreme uncertainty which prevails in the interpretation of them"s 
' Wilberforce, Election Committees, p. 12. 
2 Controverted Elections, p. 20-1. 
3 Quarterly Review, March 1843, Volume 71, p. 480-4. 
4 Wilberforce, Election Committees, p. 25. 
5Pickering, Remarks On Treating, p. 2. 
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There were various fudges tried to circumvent these problems; for example, Buller's bill proposed 
having legally informed assessors appointed by the Speaker. ' An alternative tack was that taken in Peel's 
bill, to have the Speaker appoint a general committee of six MPs who would then play a major, but not sole, 
role in the petition process. Similarly Wilberforce in his attack mentioned the possibility of cutting the size of 
committees so that its members would be more clearly responsible for its decisions. Yet, at heart, Peel's 1842 
dictum was not challenged, namely that, 
We must take care that we do not throw upon the public the charge of investigating matters of personal 
rather than public concern. There will be a prevalent desire to shift the whole burden of mere [my 
emphasis] election trials to the public purse. 
Some reforms occurred. At the time of Wilberforce's complaint, parties had to exchange some 
information as to what allegations they would be making. But, it was only necessary to exchange the names 
of voters and the broad category of allegation. Categories as broad as "bribed" were acceptable, and the lists 
had to be swapped only five or ten days before consideration of the petition. This made it hard to prepare 
apposite counter-evidence in time, as with the case of John Savage and the fiull petition. Wilberforce had got 
advance notice that he would be accused of accepting a bribe, but there was no advance warning that he was 
going to incriminate himself and no adjournment was allowed to summon the alleged briber as a witness. 
The problems of preparing evidence were exacerbated by the volume of objections: 836 of the 1514 votes 
cast for Wilberforce were objected to, but just 23 of them had only one objection lodged against them - 22 
had 2,559 had 3,108 had 4,114 had 5 and 10 had 6. All this also worsened the problems of the cost of 
having witnesses come to London, and possibly have to wait around for several days. Even worse, 
procedural pedantry often accompanied this procedural inefficiency and incompetence. So, for example, 
Wilberforce's list of objections was rejected as the Christian name of a party to the petition was recorded 
wrongly. 
Despite these problems though, as Table 5.2 shows, petitioning did result in many investigations. 
Whilst the process was rather hit-and-miss, and did require large sums of money to operate, it did work after 
a fashion. The national and Yorkshire pictures suggest that petitions tended to come from constituencies that 
predated 1832 and had a small electorate and/or a large proportion of ancient-righters on their registers. 
1 Though this post was sometimes an object of party attention; indeed votes on the appointment of the Speaker are a 
favourite choice for those wishing to analyse partisanship in Commons voting records. 
2 W. B. Gwyn, Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain, Athlone Press, London, 1962, p. 87. 
3 It was ten days for English and Welsh counties, and for all of Scotland. This was partly laid down by 53 Geo. 11I c. 71 
(1813), which had tightened matters up for England and Wales. 
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Constituency Year of Comments 
election 
Aldborough 1820 Failed challenge to the franchise and claiming corruption and 
misbehaviour by Returning Officer. 
Beverley 1807 Failed allegations of corruption. 
Beverley 1819 Failed allegations of Returning Officer misbehaviour and 
candidate lacking appropriate qualifications. 
Beverley 1826 Alleged candidate not properly qualified. Discharged when 
recognizances not entered into. 
Beverley 1837 Alleged corruption. Discharged when recognizances not 
entered into. 
Boroughbridge 1820 Two petitions alleging Returning Officer impersonated and 
wrong return made. Also touched on form of franchise. Two 
MPs replaced by two defeated candidates. 
Boroughbridge 1821 Two petitions regarding franchise ruling made above. New 
franchise ruling made. 
Boroughbridge 1830 Failed allegations of Returning Officer misbehaviour and 
improper interference of a peer. 
Halifax 1835 Failed allegations that some votes wrongly rejected and 
others wrongly accepted. 
Halifax 1835 Failed claim that election should be voided because of 
rioting at the election. As with previous petition failed 
because of failure of petitioners to turn up at the right time. 
Hedon 1820 
Huddersfield 1837 Two failed petitions for inquiry into presence of soldiers at 
election in contravention of the Commons resolution of 22 
December 1741. 
Hull 1802 Three failed petitions alleging corruption. Failed as 
recognizances not entered into. 
Hull 1819 Alleged Returning Officer misbehaviour and corruption. 
Failed as recognizances not entered into. 
Hull 1826 Alleged corruption. Failed as recognizances not entered into. 
Hull 1835 Failed claim that some votes wrongly accepted. 
Hull 1835 Failed petition alleging corruption and personation. }lad it 
not been for the costs involved it probably would have been 
pursued to a successful conclusion. 
Hull 1837 Successfully unseated Wilberforce by alleging that some 
votes improperly rejected and others improperly accepted. 
Also claimed corruption and that Wilberforce was not 
qualified to be an MP. 
Table 5.2: Yorkshire petitions 1800-50 
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Hull 1838 Failed petition from several voters opposing the striking-off 
of their votes following the above petition. 
Knaresborough 1804 Called for Attorney-General to prosecute 7 people. Six were 
tried in August 1805 for rioting and preventing the conduct 
of an election; three were convicted and three cleared. 
Knaresborough 1830 Committee appointed 21 April 1831 but Parliament 
dissolved before report. 
Knaresborough 1832 Petition withdrawn. 
Malton 1807 Petition allowed to lapse. 
Malton 1807 Petition allowed to lapse. 
Malton 1808 Successfully voided election. 
Pontefract 1813 Failed allegations of Returning Officer misbehaviour and 
corruption. 
Pontefract 1826 Failed allegations that some votes wrongly rejected, 
corruption and a candidate not qualified to be an MP. 
Pontefract 1830 Failed allegations of corruption. 
Pontefract 1837 Alleged corruption. Failed as recognizances not entered into. 
Pontefract 1838 Failed call for investigation into practice of paying head 
money. 
Ripon 1833 Failed call for election to be voided because of disorder and 
error in register. 
Wakefield 1841 Two petitions. MP unseated for also being Returning Officer. 
Also alleged that some votes unduly accepted. 
York 1834 Alleged candidate not qualified to be an MP. Failed as 
recognizances not entered into. 
York 1835 Two petitions. Failed allegations of drunkenness and 
corruption. 
Table 5.2: Yorkshire petitions 1800-50 
5.6 Electoral legislation 
There was a large amount of legislation passed by Parliament in 1800-50 regarding elections. There 
was also a large amount that did not pass. ' While many of the measures are not of great interest or 
importance - for example, the formal renewal of legislation or the location of elections in Glamorgan - there 
is a constant stream of legislation tackling the major contemporary questions of cost, undue influence and 
how investigations should be carried out. 
There was more legislation on controverted elections after 1832 than before. While it is tempting to 
see this as evidence of the 1832 legislation's failure to achieve its stated aims, there is another explanation. 
An 1839 Act2 had an expiry date on it, and required regular renewal. Only in 1848 were expiry dates 
abandoned. These renewals rarely included significant changes to the legislation. More significant was the 3 
1 Appendix 8 lists all the electoral legislation which reached that statue book in 1801-67. 
2 2&3 Vict c. 38 
31 1&12 Victc. 98 
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increasing tendency for legislation to subsume most, if not all, previous legislation on that topic. This, in a 
somewhat haphazard and limited way, produced some codification of the law (or rather, of statutes; common 
law and precedents were another matter). Some of the legislation also became clearer, due to measures such 
as increasingly useful (and more accurate! ) marginal notes, the introduction of clause numbers in bold and 
more professional drafting. The simplification was, though, limited even by the end of the century: 
The changes made by these acts [1832,1867 and 1884] have been very great, but the law as a whole has 
never been codified or restated; one has still to consider the law as it stood before these acts and to see 
exactly in what respects it has been modified by them, also to see how the earlier acts have been patched 
and tinkered by the later. ' 
Electoral contests were largely conceptualised as private affairs. The state might lay the 
groundwork, but it was up to candidates, agents or voters to take further action. For example, the Returning 
Officer might be sued for damages by an aggrieved party. A major problem was that partisan political 
motives, rather than a desire to ascertain the truth or enforce the law, dominated. Petitioning was restricted 
by fears of raking-up one's own dubious activities and political calculations as to whether a petition, even a 
successful one, would be politically advantageous. And, as a further disincentive, petitioning involved heavy 
costs. These problems were reflected in gradual, haphazard moves to restrict the ability to withdraw a 
petition as part of an inter-party deal, to make petitioning more effective by allowing corruption to be 
investigated without agency first being proved, 2 to widen the grounds on which a petition could be made3 
and to allow for the setting up of election commissioners. 
The stream of legislation contained serious attempts to tackle the problems perceived by legislators. 
The system was not inflexible. Even in the early nineteenth century there was tinkering aplenty. The main 
obstacle to change was often the House of Lords - particularly when it came to suggestions to disfranchise 
somewhere. There was, though, a certain lack of imagination by Parliament. As Section 5.7 shows there was 
a great diversity of "secret" voting systems used in non-Parliamentary elections, in contrast to their absence 
from Parliamentary elections. Without conceding the full-blown secret ballot, there were other steps that 
could have been taken. Similarly, the problem of treating could have been limited by curbing out-voting by 
permitting proxy voting, as was allowed in a variety of other elections 
4 
Despite the numerous complaints regarding the registration procedures (or the problems of proving 
a qualification pre-1832) there was little legislation, or attempted legislation, regarding it. Partly this was 
because much of the problem lay not with the law in theory, but the law in practice. For example, the 1865 
amendment to the registration system required Overseers to be reminded every year as to what they were 
F. W. Maitland, The Constitutional History Of England, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1908, p. 352. 
2 4&5 Vict. c. 57 (1841) allowed evidence regarding bribery to be taken without it first being necessary to prove that the 
alleged briber was acting as agent for a candidate. Allowing this evidence to be taken made it easier to subsequently 
prove agency. 
Principally due to 5&6 Vict. c. 102 (1842), which allowed petitions alleging general bribery. The act also allowed 
election committees to examine the cause of the abandonment of petition allegations, and to recommend an inquiry if a 
corrupt compromise was believed to have taken place. This mechanism was, though, only used twice in 1842-62. 
4 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act and the 1848 Public I iealth Act. 
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meant to be doing. ' This was part of a long struggle with overseers; thirty years earlier an act had even had to 
be passed to permit registration to go ahead, despite their errors. 2 
The volume of legislation fluctuated greatly. This was only between zero and six acts a year, yet it 
is notable that the surges of legislation in 1801-3 and the 1840s both followed major constitutional 
upheavals, the Act of Union and Parliamentary Reform respectively. In both cases there were many loose 
ends to tidy up. This is unsurprising given the electoral system's complexity. For example, the standard late 
eighteenth-century reference works on county and borough elections respectively indexed 323 and 365 legal 
cases, along with 26 and 36 statutes 3A flavour of the technical difficulties, let alone political difficulties, 
involved in reforming this system was illustrated by the problems with urban penetration (p. 132-142). 
There were persistent attempts to improve the system. Within the frame of reference used by 
legislators bills were often well thought out and possessed a reasonable chance of success. There were, 
though, many problems to overcome. For example, 6&7 Vict. c. 18 (1843) was a collection of technical 
problems with the 1832 system, such as whether the 7 mile residence limit encapsulated in the 1832 
legislation should be measured as the crow flies or the highway-man walks .4 Faced with eager political 
activists even the most diligent and expert legal draftsman had little hope of covering every possible 
ambiguity and loophole .5 
There was an increasing tendency to centralisation. It came in two forms - increasingly detailed 
instructions to local officials to ensure they did their jobs properly, and a move towards Government concern 
for the electoral system rather than aggrieved individuals. Changes were dominated by attempts to make the 
system work as it "should" - e. g. remove undue influence, or get on to the register those who should be there 
- rather than to change it fundamentally. 
5.7 Use of the secret ballot and similar voting systems 
The secret ballot question in the nineteenth century is somewhat odd. For several years in the 1830s 
it was a major issue, with there being a significant chance in the eyes of contemporaries that a change in the 
law would soon occur. Given that it was a matter of real debate, and there were minds to be swayed on it, 
128&29 Vict c. 36 
2 6&7 Will. 4 c. 101 
3 S. Heywood, A Digest Of The Law Respecting County Elections. Containing The Duty And Authority Of the High Sheriff 
From The Receipt Of The Writ To The Return Thereof- And The Mode Of Proceeding At County Elections, 11%ether 
Determined By The View, The Poll, Or The Scrutiny. Together With. The Qualifications, And Personal And Other 
Disqualifications, Of The Voters, Joseph Johnson, London, 1790, and S. I leywood, A Digest of so much of the Law 
respecting Borough Elections, As Concerns Cities and Boroughs In General, Their Representation, And Returning Officers; 
The Carriage and Delivery of the Writ; The History, From, Conveyance, and Delivery of the Precept; The Duty of the 
Returning Officer, previous to the Election; The Form and Effect of Decisions and Last Determinations; The Right of 
Electors for Boroughs in general, And of Burgage Tenants, Freeholders, Leaseholders, and Copyholders in particular, J. 
Johnson, London, 1797. 
4 This was settled in favour of crows by 6&7 Vict. c. 18 (1843). 
'Another example of the importnat yet obscure technicalities is that of house numbers. In Bartlett versus Gibbs (1843) it 
was ruled that if a street had house numbers, then house numbers had to be included in electoral register entries (else the 
description of properties was legally not adequate). I lowever, whilst a revising barrister could usually amend a register 
entry in order to add a house number, he could not do so if an objection had been lodged against that entry. This was 
reversed in 1846 (Lucknett versus Knowles), which allowed revising barristers to alter entries even if they were objected 
to. 
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one might reasonably assume that the arguments used in the Commons were ones people thought would be 
persuasive. These arguments often revealingly touched on aspects of ritual, as with claims that openly 
declaring a vote was part of being a fine, upstanding, free Englishman. However, many other arguments, 
such as that the ballot was un-English and impractical, were argued as if the secret ballot was not already 
being used in England for other elections. However, the secret ballot was in fact being widely used for 
elections well before 1830. 
The systems considered here were not all straight forward secret ballots. Some were variations on 
the theme, using different techniques to achieve one (or more) of the claims that the secret ballot made and 
ranging from genuinely to partially or occasionally secret. Although Vernon has noted the existence of some 
of these, and claimed they were significant, he goes little further. ' As he implies, it is highly misleading to 
concentrate only on the secret ballot for Parliamentary elections. There was a far richer and wider debate 
over electoral systems, with secrecy being only one part. This is not surprising if one remembers that secrecy 
for secrecy's sake was hardly ever employed as an argument. Rather, secrecy was seen as a (possibly 
unpleasant) cure for other problems, such as undue influence, and other cures to these problems were also 
discussed. 
Secret ballots were used in clubs and indeed the phrase "black balled" comes from the use of black 
balls in such ballots. Book clubs also used ballots for selecting new members and new works. 2 More 
significantly, some English towns started using the ballot in the fourteenth century. In Lancaster it was 
normal by 1362, in Norwich by 1415, in London in the sixteenth century and in 1637 Charles I forbade 
corporations to use it after the Merchant Adventurers had thereby elected men he disapproved of. Not 
everyone obeyed this ban. 3 James Harrington's Common-Wealth of Oceana described a mythical state which 
used a secret ballot and three months after his death in 1677 Lymington borough decided to use a version of 
his system. However, this only lasted seven weeks, possibly because of monarchical disapproval 4 Other 
advocates at the time included the first Earl of Shaftesbury. 
The Eighteenth Century Short Title Catalogue contains few items with "ballot" in their title, and 
many refer to American elections .5 However, two of these are 
insightful. The first, from 1701, uses "ballot" 
(without the word "secret") on the first page, without explaining the term. This suggests that as early as 1701 
the use of the secret ballot, or at least arguments over its use, were common enough to make "ballot" in itself 
a clear and meaningful phrase. 6 (It is clear that "ballot" does mean "secret ballot" from other comments, such 
as the criticism of the idea that the "vote of every Elector [be] known to all the World, " and the comment that 
1 Vernon, Politics And The People, p. 276-302. 
2 1835 (547) VIII, p. 189-90. 
3 B. Keith-Lucas, The English Local Government Franchise: A Short History, Blackwell, Oxford, 1952, p. 140-2. 
4 S. Hyland, Curiosities from Parliament, Allan Wingate, London, 1955, p. 159-62. 
s Though as American was a colony for the bulk of the eighteenth century, the presence of"ballot" in political discourse 
regarding American governance is still significant for British purposes. 
6 Enquiry Into The Inconveniences of Public, And the Advantages of Private Elections, With the Method of a Ballot, A 
Baldwin, London, 1701. It supports the secret ballot for Parliamentary elections, and also for (London's) Common Council, 
arguing the latter should take a lead in spreading use of the ballot. 
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a voter is, "expos'd to the Influence of a great many Passions, which cou'd not move him, if his Vote was 
known to none, but himself. ")t 
The other, from 1705, also uses "ballot" without using "secret" and without explaining the term? 
Other parts of the work, again, make it clear that "secret ballot" is what is meant. It also highlighted some 
who had used the ballot in England: the Lords, and companies and other financial organisations (notably the 
East India Company). Somewhat plaintively it then states, 
We cannot suppose the People can value a little Drink more than their Birthrights, or that they are 
ignorant that they have often paid dear enough for a drunken Bout or two with their Votes, that they 
should be so fond of an old Custom, as not to let it go for the greatest Advantage. 
Whilst it goes on to describe "the Method of the Ballot" at some length this does not invalidate my key 
argument. That the method needed describing certainly suggests that "ballot" was not that commonly 
understood. However, that "ballot" rather than "secret ballot" sufficed as the descriptive label for this method 
of voting also strongly suggests that "ballot, " in contexts such as these, can be taken to mean "secret ballot. " 
If this were not the case, then why did the work only use "ballot"? This is particularly so as the work also 
refers to the use of "the Lot" (p. 8,10). Had "ballot" been ambiguous this would have made matters most 
confusing. Thus where we find "ballot" on its own it can, in contexts like these, be taken, with some 
confidence, to mean "secret ballot. " 
Even the Commons occasionally used secret voting. The Journal for 12 April 1694 notes that the 
Commons selected seven people to be Commissioners on a matter after voting by "lists given in by the 
Members of the House"° A similar procedure was used on 20 April 1711, when the Journal uses "ballot" to 
describe this procedures The same procedure was used the following day when, "The Clerk, and Clerk 
Assistant, went on each Side of the House with Glasses, to receive from the Members the Lists. "6 On 29 
March 1742 a tie resulted from such a procedure, which the Speaker had to resolve. The Journal records, 
"Mr. Speaker said, That ... having ever disliked the Method of Ballot, except 
in Cases of Necessity; the 
Openness of acting here, being, in his Opinion, one of the great Pillars of Security to the People. "7 
The Commons also briefly used the ballot to settle election petitions. On 18 February 1707 a 
resolution was passed that, "all Questions at the Trial of Elections shall, if any Member insist upon it, by 
determined by Ballot "8 A report four days later on the method to be used, involving balls and a box, makes 
'Enquiry Into The Inconveniences of Public, And the Advantages of Private Elections, p. 4. The book's full title, and p. 16, 
are also highly suggestive. 
2 The Patriot's Proposal To The People of England Concerning The Ballot, The best way of choosing their Representatives 
in Parliament, London, 1705. Given the nineteenth-century denunciations of the secret ballot as being un-English, it is 
interesting to note the stress on patriotism and making England a better place in this pro-bal lot work. 
3 Patriot's Proposal, p. 7. 
4 Volume 11, p. 158. 
s Volume 16, p. 606. 
6 Volume 16, p. 609. 
7 Volume 24, p. 154. 
'Journal, Volume 15, p. 551. 
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it clear that "ballot" here meant secret voting. ' The possible use of the ballot was abandoned on 22 
November 1708 2 
Though in the case of my above examples, the context and/or corroborating detail makes it clear 
that "ballot" was being used as in "secret ballot, " this is not always the case. If "ballot" was used on its own, 
it arguably should interpreted as meaning "by lot" rather than "secret ballot. " For example, Parliament did 
use lots on occasion, as with the selection of Grenville election committees. The word "ballot" has a 
somewhat opaque history. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary, 3 gives inter alia the following 
definitions: 
1. A small ball used for secret voting; hence, by extension, a ticket, paper, etc. so used (first use 
1549). 
2. The method or system of secret voting, originally by means of small balls placed in an urn or 
box (first use 1549). 
3. A method or drawing lots by taking out small balls, etc., from a box; hence general lot-drawing 
(first use 1680). 
Similarly, the verb "ballot" is given as both meaning secret voting and drawing of lots, and a "ballot-box" is 
"a box in which voting ballots are deposited, or from which, in drawing lots, small balls are taken out. " 
Picking names by lot was a well established method, dating from at least Athenian times when lots were used 
to fill many offices. Some of the money distributed under Queen Anne's Bounty was allocated by lot. The 
names were "drawn in the same manner as the State Lottery. "4 Ballot as lottery first appeared on the statute 
book in eighteenth century legislation regarding the militia, for which men were to be chosen "by Ballot out 
of the List returned. "s 
It is possible that where "ballot" is used, in conjunction with who could vote, that an election 
process existed whereby names were put in a box, and then one, or more, names were drawn to indicate the 
person(s) chosen. Similarly, ballot or voting papers could be used without votes being secret, though the 
details of electoral administration may have produced de facto secrecy. (Likewise, though, almost any voting 
procedure could be put into practice in a manner so as to produce de facto secrecy). 
For example, the Birmingham Poor Law Guardians were elected by votes marked on "tickets" 
(ballot papers) which also contained the voter's name. Tickets were handed in and counted. Depending on the 
attitude of officials and access to the submitted tickets, this could, but did not necessarily, mean that voting 
was secret. 6 This uncertainty was not unique to Birmingham. As the Poor Law Commissioners' report put it, 
"the votes shall be given or taken in writing, collected and returned in such manner as the said 
Commissioners shall direct. " Their directions were, "that voting papers ... shall be left by parochial officers 
1 Journal, Volume 15, p. 559. An example of the actual use of this system was the Ashburton election petition, 26 
February 1707: p. 577. 
2Journal, Volume 16, p. 7. 
3 CD-Rom version, 2nd edition, 1992. 
4 A. Savidge, The Foundation And Early Years Of Queen Anne's Bounty, S. P. C. K., London, 1955, p. 56 and p. 60-1. 
s Though "lottery" had appeared in other legislation, such as 30 Geo. IH c. 5 (1757) which setup a national lottery, this 
legislation did not use the word "ballot. " 
6 1835 (547) VIII, p. 103 and p. 248-9. 
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at the house of each rate-payer. "' The exact means of collection determined the degree of secrecy, but they 
were not specified. 
Before that, the corporation of Pontefract's charter stipulated the use of the secret ballot to elect the 
Mayor; the charter was adhered to, and burgesses wrote (or caused to be written) a name on a piece of paper 
(which was not to have the voter's name on it) which was then placed in a bag or box with the ballot papers 
being burnt after the count 2 Ripon's corporation was also elected by ballot, though without any requirement 
3 in its Charters. The Municipal Corporations commissioners reported that, 
The Lights [i. e. those nominated] are presented to the assistants, a majority of whom choose one of the 
Lights for mayor. This and all other elections are by ballot. 4 
The phrase "a majority of whom" strongly suggests that election by lots was not what was happening. 
Soham, Cambridgeshire, elected its parish officials and surgeon by secret ballot, and, intriguingly, 
on at least one occasion use of the ballot was only decided upon at the last moment, upon the suggestion of a 
friend of a candidate .5 The Corporation of London only stopped using a secret 
ballot in its Common Council 
shortly before 1835. Both Portsmouth and Wisbech corporations used the ballot. 6 For Portsmouth, the 
Municipal Corporation Commissioners recorded a method of nominating candidates for mayor and electing 
justices that involved some secrecy and also the use of a secret ballot method with balls for actually electing 
the Mayor. ' Of Wisbech, the Municipal Corporations Commissioners reported, "The votes remain unknown, 
and the secrecy appears to give general satisfaction. "' But, a historian of Wisbech described the method of 
election as, "rather singular and unusual, and indeed has been called whimsical. " Each elector went to the 
hustings to vote and was, "entitled to make one mark against any name on the poll list "9 All these marks 
accumulated on one list. It is unclear from this whether voting was secret, and if they were then at least the 
second voter would know how the first had voted! The Commissioners also found the ballot being used in 
Boston, Deal, Lincoln, King's Lynn, Rochester, Romney, Southampton1° and Swansea. 
First Annual Report Of The Poor Law Commissioners For England And Wales, W. Clowes and Son, London, 1835, p. 25- 
2 The Charter was 4 James 1. Appendix to the First Report of the Commissioners Parts 1-IV, 1835 (116) XXV-XXVII, 
Part 3, p. 1674. 
3 1835 (547) VIII, p. 199 and Ripon Charters 2 James 1 and 2 James 2. 
4 1835 (116) XXV, Part 3, p. 1708. 
s 1835 (547) VIII, p. 16-17. The witness did not give a date, but from the context it would appear that it was a recent, if 
not a continuing, practice. 
6 1835 (547) VIII, p. 106-7. 
7 1835 (116) XXV, Part III, p. 803-5. The secret ballot was used from at least 1680, if not earlier. The actual use of it is 
confirmed by the instruction for conducting elections in CE 3/52, Portsmouth City Records Office. 
11835 (116) XXV, Part IV, p. 2552. 
9 W. Watson, An Historical Account Of The Ancient Town And Port Of Wisbech, In The Isle Of Ely, In The County Of 
Cambridge, And Of The Circumjacent Towns And Villages, The Drainage Of The Great Level Of The Fens, The Origin Of 
The Royal Franchise Of The Isle Of Ely &c., 11. and J. Leach, Wisbech, 1827, p. 228-31. 
10 Under the local act 13 Geo. III c. 50 (1773) regarding the Guardians of the Poor. 
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The Whitehaven harbour trustees were elected by ballot, ' and St Mart ins-in-the-Fields, for the 
election of Poor Law guardians, distributed ballot papers to electors. This is a good example of the problem 
of defming "secret'- the ballots had to have the voter's name on the back, but they could be sealed and if 
they were counted face up would then remain secret. Essentially, the behaviour of officials determined its 
secrecy. 2 St Matthew, Bethnal Green, used the ballot, without any apparent statutory requirement. 3 The 
situation was the same for St Luke, Chelsea. 4 
Hobhouse's Select Vestry Act, 5 with its provision for the secret ballot was amongst others taken up 
by Marylebone, St Pancras and St George, Hanover Square. In the latter two, coloured ballot papers were 
prepared by each side. 6 For St Mary, Newington (Surrey), the statutory position was permissive. The local 
act of 1814 stated that vestry elections were to be conducted, "by Poll or Ballot, or in such Way of Election 
as shall be deemed most proper and convenient "7 There is some difficulty over language here, as it is 
arguable exactly what "ballot" meant. No details of the electoral mechanics were given, but clause 75 
described using a ballot, under some circumstances, to decide which creditors the parish should pay. The 
description here makes it clear that, at least for the purposes of this clause, "ballot" meant drawing by lot. 
Certainly the lack of mechanical detail suggests that the meaning of "ballot" was well understood and indeed 
that its operation was not a rarity. The real problem is deciding whether "ballot" meant "by lot". Although 
clause 3 states who "shall be entitled to a vote, or have Voice at or in any Vestry" this does not make it clear 
what "ballot" meant, as a pedant with missionary zeal could argue that the number of votes a person had was 
the number of bits of paper they could put into the lottery. 
The situation for Paddington is clearer. Here, the local act of 1824 was explicit, stating that 
vestrymen were to be elected, 
by Ballot, by putting the Names of the Persons to be voted for by each Elector into a Balloting Glass or 
Box, to be afterwards drawn out, and the Number of Votes for each Person determined by Scrutineers ... 
and each Inhabitant and Occupier, ..., qualified as 
hereinafter mentioned, shall be entitled, on such 
The local act 22 Vict. c. 14 (1859), clause 19 stated that, "any Five Voters may then and there ... demand a Poll, which 
shall be taken by Ballot. " Although clause 22 provides for deciding (by lots) an election which results in a tic, this is not 
conclusive evidence that "Ballot" here does not refer to election by lots as this may simply have been a provision that 
covered the possibility of a tie resulting from a poll which was not by ballot. 
2 Information on methods used from 1835 (547) VIII, p. 427.31. 
3 The local act 53 Geo. III c. 113 (1813) required 3 Geo. 11I c. 4l and 13 Geo. III c. 53 [need to check) regarding the filling 
of vacancies amongst governors and directors of the poor. Also, clause 37 required the use of picking by lots to select 
which creditors to pay off, under some circumstances, and although the lottery method is clear from the description of 
the mechanics to be used, the whole process is labelled as a'ballot'. The local act 4 Geo.! V c. 21 (1823) repeals the parts 
of previous legislation dealing with the re-appointment of governors, directors of the poor and vestrymen. The 
replacement system included clause 9, which stated, "Elections for Vestrymen and all other Questions shall be 
determined by a Shew of Ilands, but whenever a Shew of I lands is not satisfactory, a Ballot may be demanded, and acted 
upon accordingly. " 
The local act 1-2 Geo. IV c. 67 makes no mention of whether lots, ballots, shows of hands or anything else should be 
used, although clauses do cover the selection of vestry committee-men (especially clause 2) and auditors (especially 
clause 43). 
s 1&2 Will. IV c. 60 (1831). 
6 E. g. 1835 (547) VIII, p. 497. 
7 The local act 54 Geo. III c. 113 (1814), clause 3. 
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Ballot, and on all other Ballots for the Election of Vestrymen as herein-after provided, to the same 
Number of Votes as are authorised under [58 Geo. III c. 69]. ' 
Though this is not a description of election by lot, clause 129 talks of using the ballot to decide which 
borrowed monies should be paid off, which suggests in this context selection by lot. It appears likely that 
"ballot" was used with a variety of different meanings, but that contemporaries knew which was to apply in 
certain circumstances. 
By the 1830s many were using "ballot" to mean "secret ballot, " and not, for example, drawing by 
lots. Indeed "the ballot question" was one of the most common, if not the most common, ways of referring to 
arguments over whether or not secret ballots should be used in Parliamentary elections. 2 This suggests that 
simply using "ballot" was considered to be sufficient to make one's meaning clear. This cannot have been 
because there was only one use of the word that was current - we have seen the lottery use in clauses dealing 
with paying-off creditors - but only because in any given context there was only one current meaning. 
If ballot did not mean lot, then this means the ballot, as conventionally defined, appeared on the 
statue book long before Hobhouse's Act. Further, the lack of definitions of ballot suggests that it was 
sufficiently widespread in use - though not necessarily for Parliamentary or local elections - for this to be 
unnecessary. However, against this must be balanced the very detailed questioning over the mechanics of the 
ballot in other countries in many Commons committees of the 1830s and latter. Nevertheless, such a 
widespread use of the ballot would help explain why Hobhouse's Act, and in particular its clause permitting 
the ballot to be demanded, slipped through with little debate. 
3 The passage of this secret ballot legislation is 
puzzling. It is not strange that Hobhouse, a radical, should have proposed the ballot, but it is strange that 
comment on, and opposition to, the proposal was almost completely absent. Yet the bill was not a trivial 
affair, the question of select vestries was long-running and frequently controversial, and debates over using 
the secret ballot for Parliamentary elections were frequently lively and prominent. The bill, which was 
originally introduced before the 1830 general election, did not pass until after the 1831 general election. It 
did not slip through quickly. Nor did it slip through without any attention. Wellington was recorded as, in 
one of its debates, referring to, "the excitement which at present existed on this subject "4 I lowever, the 
legislation apparently passed largely unnoticed. When Ifobhouse presented the report of the Vestry 
Committee (1 April 1830), it was at 2: 30am and with only one other MP presents The following February he 
recorded that, "I dined in Berkeley Square, and was too late at the I louse of Commons to bring on my Vestry 
1 The local act 5 Geo. IV c. 126, clause 3. Clause 19 states that annual elections were to use this procedure, and clause 13 
that it was to be used for the election of auditors. 
2 Another example is the letter from Henry Warburton to George Grote (an active Parliamentary supporter of the secret 
ballot) of 18 January 1831: 11. Grote, The Personal Ltfe Of George Grote, 2nd edition, John Murray, London, 1873, 
p. 76-7. Warburton uses the phrase "ballot" without "secret, " though from the context it is clear that he meant "secret 
ballot. " There are other letters making the same point throughout the book, including one from Mrs. Grote to Mrs. 
Gaskell, 24 December 1836, p. 109. It also refers to the "Ballot Union" and "hearty ballotecrs" (note the absence of 
"secret"). 
3 Hansard appears not to have any mention of the secret ballot clause. For example, see the committee stage of 30 
September 1831: Hansard, 3rd series, Volume 7, c. 879-89 I. 
4 The Times, 12 October 1831. 
Lord Broughton [J. C. Hobhouse], Recollections OJA Long Life: With Additional Extracts From /!! s Private Diaries, edited 
by his daughter Lady Dorchester, John Murray, London, 1910, Volume 4, p. 14-1 S. 
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Bill, the only time I was ever too late in my life. A sad business! "' But it was not only his eating habits that 
the bill's timetable conflicted with. It also conflicted with the passage of the Parliamentary reform legislation. 
For example, Hobhouse's diary recorded passage of the committee stage at the same time as the Reform Bill 
was facing defeat in the Lords, and subsequently the rest of the vestry bill's passage through the Commons 
being overshadowed by the Lords again debating the Reform Bill .2 
The normal explanation is that Parliamentarians were distracted by the Parliamentary reform 
debates. However, given that the possibility of the ballot was a factor in many of the rumours, and that the 
controversy led to a heightened interest in electoral reform, this argument is a little odd. A partial explanation 
may be that little attention was paid simply because using the ballot in local elections was already common. 
Ballots continued to be part of local government. The Whigs' Municipal Corporation Reform 
permitted councillors, auditors and assessors to be elected by a method that required ballot papers to be cast. 
Such papers had to include voters' names and the location of their qualifying property. ' Thus this was not a 
secret ballot in the straight forward sense, especially as Clause 34 of the act permitted a voter to be asked, 
"Are you the Person whose Name is signed as A. B. to the Voting Paper now delivered in by you? " I Iowever, 
the degree of secrecy could approach that of a secret ballot, simply depending on the technicalities of how an 
election was conducted (e. g. what happened to the ballot papers, and who was allowed to see them). 
All this makes somewhat odd the claims that the ballot was un-English, cowardly, sneaky or 
unmanly. It also makes somewhat baffling the extreme rarity of references to its use (except in English clubs) 
in Britain during debates over the introduction of the secret ballot for Parliamentary elections. 4 There is a 
particularly striking contrast with the arguments over universal suffrage, where radicals and others were 
extremely ready, even eager, to delve into Anglo-Saxon history to provide historical roots for their 
contentions. Partly for this reason, Vernon is wrong to attach much significance to the ballot as a precedent, 
even in his rather skimpy description of early use of the ballot. If it was of significance why did 
contemporaries not mention it? And if one wishes to find a link between the early limited use of the secret 
ballot and its introduction for Parliamentary elections in 1872, it is necessary to explain why the seventeenth 
century dalliances with it did not produce such a result much earlier. Vernon does not explain. 
Nevertheless, the existence of the ballot in so many forms and places illustrates the diverse nature of 
the electoral system, and the apparent ignorance of many MPs. 
5.8 Who was to blame for bribery? 
The question of where the blame should be allocated for bribery and corruption needs to be 
considered. Given the costs of elections, especially if contested, and particularly if they went to a poll, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the enthusiasm for spending money often came from members of the electorate 
1 Broughton, Recollections, Volume 4, p. 85-6. 
2 30 September 1831 and 3-6 October 1831: Broughton, Recollections, Volume 4, p. 133.5. The report stage occurred at 
nearly 2: 00am. 
3 5&6 Will. IV, c. 76 clauses 32 and 37. 
4 For example, the Commons debate on Grote's 1835 motion does not - as reported in Hansard - have any such 
references: Hansard, 3rd series, 2 June 1835, c. 369-472. 
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rather than the disbursers of it. Indeed, on occasion candidates co-operated in order to reduce the levels of 
food and drink and sundry paraphernalia surrounding an election. Thus, for example, a letter on the 1847 
Bradford election said, 
We have avoided the opening of inns & beerhouses, and the excessive intemperance which would have 
been the natural result. 
Just as candidates could pressure electors to vote one way or another, so electors could pressure candidates to 
indulge in financial generosity. Thisleton, who was involved in Clay's 18521full campaign testified that, 
Very few got paid before voting: only those who could be depended upon. The person would say, "You 
know I am going to vote for your party, but you must put me down as a runner. "2 
Likewise, it was said of the payments to out-voters in Hull and payments to them, 
There was evidence of the custom, and that the voters would not vote without the customary payment. 3 
In Knaresborough, similarly, Devonshire's agent James Collins was criticised in 1804 for the rising costs of 
election - the implication being that the public rather than the agent was the driving force. The 1790 election 
had cost £160 13s Id, but this rose to £500 in 1804, including £400 for innkeepers. This is despite 
Devonshire owning all the burgage property. s In Malton William I lastings, Fitzwilliam's steward, wrote in 
1805 regarding the by-election, 
We found it necessary in order to keep all things quiet and in order to promote Lord Milton's popularity 
to increase the allowance to a guinea a man which with twenty or twenty five guineas given to the young 
' men of the town and some other small extras kept all in good humour. 
Corruption, particularly in an age of lower material living standards, shorter holidays and longer working 
hours, could produce admiration, amusement and enjoyment as much as, if not more than, condemnation. 
Elections were often like a cross between an England football match and Prime Minister's Question Time. 
The somewhat bizarre brew of serious political acts, communal festivities and raucous behaviour is reflected 
in the Illustrated London News' illustration of 7 August 1847, showing a placard-wielding crowd at a 
hustings. The placards read, "Who Stole His Grandmother's Pocketbook, " "Where's Your Wife" and "Liberty 
And No Stale Potatoes. "'As Cox and Grady put it, 
The license of an election is eagerly seized by the non-electors for the indulgence of an English taste of 
noise and fun .9 
Uproarious behaviour does not necessarily require censure. 10 Just as Rubinstein has argued more generally 
than simply for the electoral system, the use of money and kind in the electoral process was essential to its 
1 Kenian to Nicholls, 2 August 1847, Nicholls Correspondence 67D78, Bradford Archives. 
2 1854 ( 1703) XXII, p. vi. 
1854 ( 1703) XXII, p. vi. 
4Smith, "The Election Agent, " p. 28. 
5 Seymour, Electoral Reform, p. 92. 
6 Smith, "Fitzwilliam and Malton, " p. 57. 
1 The Anti-Bribery Society, founded sometime in the 1830s or 1840s, was a short-lived obscure organisation, which 
issued leaflets and encouraged investigations. Its failure is also an example of this moral ambivalence. 
8 The illustration graces the cover of Markham, Nineteenth-Century Parliamentary Elections. 
9 Cox and Grady, The New Law and Practice Of Registration And Elections, p. cliii. 
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operation, and there was often little pressure from public opinion (be this either widely or narrowly defined) 
to change: the system worked, and people accepted it. ' The Westminster Review said in 1862 that a man, 
known to have bribed, nay, actually convicted of bribery, is not the whit less respected by the majority 
of the House. 2 
As another commentator put it, 
Society deals with political seduction much as it deals with seduction in private life. It ostracises the 
victim, and pardons the seducer. It smiles on the briber, and denounces the bribed. 3 
Or, as Grenville put it (with Liverpool constituency in mind), 
Here comes the difficulty of Reform, for how is it possible to reform the Electors? 4 
Behaviour and the political climate were shaped by more than incomplete statutes, and with "corruption" 
often viewed as standing by your friends and justly thanking your supporters. Traditional modes of 
behaviour overcame legal niceties. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Much of the historical analysis of anti-corruption legislation has been somewhat Whiggish in 
outlook, or at least implicitly Whiggish, as in seeing the early nineteenth century as a period on the way to a 
modem, free system. Further, surveys that deal with post-1850 events have tended to treat pre-1850 events as 
only preliminary staging posts on the way. 5 As a result, much of this analysis is more interested in how the 
law changed, rather than how it worked. Further, little consideration has normally been given to the 
impediments to effective legislation. 
Money was not all powerful, as was demonstrated in 1812, with Brown's failure to build up a semi- 
permanent election machine for the Fitzwilliam interest in Yorkshire by offering general retainers. Too many 
people refused, as there might be circumstances under which they would not wish to act for Fitzwilliam. 
Vitality, moreover, went wider than this. Not even before 1832 was electoral corruption some untouched 
monster; rather, there was an on-going struggle to banish, or at least tame, it that frequently resulted in 
something reaching the statute book. 
For a variety of reasons electoral laws were often far from effective, but understandably so. English 
law, and much else, was based not on codified written documents, but an accumulation of precedents. This 
meant the law was often open to a wide variety of interpretations. Election committees suffered from this 
(.. continued) 
10 This ambivalence is also demonstrated in the often tolerant and good humoured description of electoral behaviour in 
English fiction; see II. G. Nicholas, To The flustings: Election Scenes From English Fiction, Cassell, London. 1956, 
Introduction, 
1 Rubinstein, "The End of 'Old Corruption, '" p. 72, p. 75 and p. 77. 
2 Gwyn, Democracy and the Cost of Politics, p. 72. 
3 S. I I. Walpole, The Electorate and the Legislature, 2nd edition, Macmillan and Co., London, 1892, p. 81. 
42 December 1830: Strachey and Fulford, The Grenville Memoirs, Volume 2, p. 77. 
s Two useful studies are Gwyn, Democracy and the Cost of Politics and C. O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt 
Practices in British Elections 1868-1911, Oxford, 1962. They both suffer from these problems, particularly " as its title 
suggests - O'Leary's work. 
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too, with the further problem that, for quite understandable historical and constitutional reasons, petitions 
were often tried in a highly partisan and lax manner. Elections, and the policing of their purity, were largely 
seen as a matter for individuals, and it was up to candidates and supporters to decide whether to (attempt to) 
enforce laws and take up legal cudgels. Yet, the costs involved and an unwillingness to rake up everyone's 
misdeeds often acted as restraints. Hence, the frequent lack of successful legal action against abuses should 
not be seen as a failure of only the electoral mechanics. It was also a reflection of the problems of 
conceptualising elections as private affairs. Thus in 1842 Peel opposed the idea of state-paid election 
commissioners, arguing it would be wrong to "throw upon the public purse the charge of investigating 
matters of personal rather than public concern. "' Petitioning was one reflection of how deeper legal and 
traditional dilemmas inhibited curbing corruption; another was the ability of witnesses to refuse to answer 
questions on the grounds of possible self-incrimination. 
As Erskine May estimated in 1850 for Britain, 
The statue book contains at least 241 statutes relating to the election and return, and to the sitting and 
voting of members of the House of Commons, which have not been expressly repealed by any later 
2 acts? 
This voluminous and fragmented statute book was supplemented by precedents, traditions and case law, and 
this was reflected in the full titles of contemporary election manuals (see Bibliography). The legal corpus 
dealt with many topics many times, often without reference to the other treatments of the same topic. This 
frequently vague and inconsistent corpus' often had to be employed at short notice, and by people who were 
not masters of its intricacies and had partisan axes to grind. 
The idea of starting again from scratch and drawing up a codified, clear and consistent set of laws 
went against the normal English constitutional tradition. Even the 1832 legislation deliberately avoided 
introducing uniformity or removing all local traditions. A typical comment illustrative of this was made by 
George Johnstone, in a debate on Curwen's bill on 19 May 1807.1le was reported as saying, 
The constitution, under which we enjoy so many blessing, is not the work of human wisdom alone, but, 
has been produced by a happy combination of circumstances, during the lapse of ages; and to hazard the 
safety of such a fabric by measures of dangerous reform, whose consequences the house cannot 
calculate, seems to be the heights of folly and presumption 
Vitality was manifest not merely in the stream of legislation, but also in the infrequency of corrupt returning 
officers, the diverse motivations for "bribery, " the inclusive nature of much electoral activity and the spread 
of a variety of voting methods. 
Professional drafting of laws dates from the mid- to late-nineteenth century. Until then drafting was 
often amateurish, and it shows. Yet, even with professional drafting drawing on many years of expertise 
present-day electoral law is still easy to circumvent. Moreover, even a codified set of laws, clear and 
consistent, would have left grey areas. It was, and is, problematic distinguishing bribery and corruption from 
1 A. J. I leidenheimer, Political Corruption: Readings In Comparative Analysis, II It, Rinehart and Winston, New York. 
1970, p. 363. 
2 T. Erskine May, On The Consolidation Of The Election Laws, Butterworth, London, 1850, p. 4. 
3 Erskine May, On The Consolidation Of The Election Laws, p. 8-20. 
4 This quote is from the debate as reported in Cobbeit's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 14,19 May 1809, c. 649-667. 
176 
generosity and normality, particularly when "bribery" and "corruption" are not timeless, value-free phrases. 
Bribery and corruption were not simply aberrations derived from lax morals and a malfunctioning system. 
Rather, they were often a way of coping with the system's existing state (and so were pragmatically 
justified), or even claimed innate rights. ' For example, if giving a dinner was acceptable, as it normally was, 
what about distributing free food? Or free food tokens? No law can cover all possible ingenious possibilities, 
but rather has to depend on vague statements like "undue influence" or "corruption. " The problems of 
constructing watertight legislation was partly acknowledged in 1831-2. In the words of the proverb, "A 
coach and four may be driven through any Act of Parliament. " The favoured solution of 1831-2 was largely 
to swamp problems by numbers. Thus, for example, to define strictly the residence qualifications for 
claiming a right to vote was not possible, but the hope was that any problems with the definition would be so 
few in number, compared to the registered total, that even if laws were bent for partisan ends the bending 
would achieve little. 
The impact of 1832 was mixed. Whilst larger electorates, more polling places and some technical 
changes in franchise qualifications acted as a restraint on corruption, there were few direct attempts in the 
legislation to tackle corruption and a system of more contests and more electors provided more opportunity, 
and more productive occasions, on which corruption could be exercised. 
One should not let staid moralising prevent an appreciation of elections as entertainment, with the 
concomitant activities such as eating and drinking. Stories about freemen travelling from London to 
Newcastle to vote being diverted to Ostend, or freemen travelling to Berwick being deflected to Norway, 2 
certainly reflect the unscrupulous nature of elections, but they are also amusing anecdotes which reflect the 
importance of elections in local heritage and their entertainment value. When elections are conceptualised as 
community entertainment, the merry disbursement of food, drink and money becomes a traditional, inclusive 
activity, and an obvious corollary rather than a heinous crime .3 
1 For an example regarding treating see Pickering, Remarks On Treating, p. 29: "Those who call it an offence, dccm it the 
most venal in the world. Those who call it hospitality, deem the refusal of it an offence of the graver character. " 
2 J. Grego, A History Of Parliamentary Elections And Electioneering From The Stuarts To Queen Victoria, new edition, 
Chatto and Windus, London, 1892, p. 328-9. Likewise, Sidney Smith recalled of 2 voters in the 1841 Walsall by-election, 
"One was asked his name and on giving it a man exclaimed, 'Why that man is In America! ' When the second gave his 
another cried, 'I buried that man on the third of last monthl'": N. McCord, The Anil-Corn Law League 1838-1846, George 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1958, p. 157. 
Cf Peel's defence of treating in Tamworth: Rowe, "The i lcrtford Borough Bill, " p. 98. 
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6. MPs and candidates 
6.1 Introduction 
Studying MPs and candidates has a two-fold purpose. ' First, they, their behaviour and their 
backgrounds are important parts in themselves of the electoral system. Second, they are reflective of other 
aspects of the system. Whilst much work has been done on biographies of successful candidates (i. e. those 
who were MPs), and on utilising Parliamentary voting records to trace party cohesion over time, there has 
been less work on who candidates were and what their backgrounds and their motivations. 2 For example, 
little is known about why people wished to become MPs or stopped being MPs. Even in pre-1832 Yorkshire, 
where there were many relatively closed boroughs and few contests, there was a steady turnover of MPs. 
Electoral defeat was by no means the only way for MPs to go. Yet, as Namier wrote, 
We have written about Parliamentary leaders and great administrators, and more or less ignored those 
whom they led and with or through whom they had to do their work, the individual members of 
Parliament, the Civil Servants etc.... we want to know about the life of crowds, to hear symphonies and 
not arias ... how much do we know about the real political life of the country, even about that body 
which before the eyes of the nations has for centuries shaped its joint existence? 3 
Appealing though this vision is, it contains, as shall be seen, some misleading implications, especially the 
implication that MPs were part of the "real political life of the country. " Whilst de Eure this is true, in practice 
many contributed by doing almost nothing, rarely speaking or voting in Parliament. Rather, a wider 
conception of "real political life" is needed to understand why they stood for election. 
Section 6.2 looks at the necessary qualifications to be an MP, and the variability of their 
enforcement. Section 6.3 looks at the make-up and fate of MPs, particularly those in Yorkshire. Section 6.4 
examines the motivation of candidates. The applicability to Yorkshire MPs of Cox's argument that speaking 
and other activities were driven by electoral pressure is studied. Section 6.5 considers MP's majorities, and 
how they changed over time. Section 6.6 looks at searches for candidates, and what this reveals of people's 
expectations of MPs; a theme continued in Section 6.7 which looks at what definitions of "local links" were 
seen as acceptable. 
6.2 Qualifications 
The main requirements for MPs were relatively simply, being based on age and property. The age 
requirement was twenty-ones Some MPs were elected when younger: with Parliaments nominally of seven 
' The major sources of information on Yorkshire MPs and candidates, which underpin this chapter, are Bean, Parliamentary 
Representation, L. Stephen and S. Lee (cds), The Dictionary of National Biography: From the Earliest Times to 1900, 
Oxford University Press edition, Oxford University Press, London. 1921-2, M. Stcnton (ed), 117to's 1$7ro of British Members 
of Parliament Volume 11832-1885: A Biographical Dictionary of the ! louse of Commons, I larvester Press, l lassocks, 1976, 
and Thorne, History of Parliament. 
2 The four main exceptions are S. F. Woolley, "The Personnel of the Parliament of 1833, " English Historical Review, Volume 
53,1938, p. 240-62, G. P. Judd, Members of Parliament 1734-1832, reprint of 1955 edition, Archon Books, I lamden 
Connecticut, 1972, G. W. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian 
England, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, Chapter 7 and O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 117.126. 
3 L. Namier, Crossroads of Power: Essays On Eighteenth-Century England, l lamish I lamilton, London, 1962, p. 2-4. 
4 There had been a residency requirement for MPs, but this went long before 1800. The question of women being MPs does 
not appear to have arisen, and was probably, in this period, sufficiently unthinkable to the political elite for no explicit rules 
to be required. 
178 
years, and the difficulties involved in having a stop-gap MP until a person reached twenty-one, it was tacitly 
accepted that someone just under twenty-one could be elected, though traditionally they did not vote. Charles 
James Fox, Lord John Russell and William Charles Wentworth Fitzwilliam (elected for Malton in 1832) 
were all elected when under-age. Transgressions of this rule were neither widespread nor rare: in the general 
elections of 1802-31 there were thirteen occasions when someone under twenty-one was elected. ' Though 
youthful MPs existed, and their presence was often praised as an example of the electoral system's openness 
to talent, some candidates were attacked for their youth. In the Yorkshire election of 1807 Milton, who had 
just turned 21, was nicknamed "the Boy, " and at the nomination meeting was presented with a box of toys, to 
shouts of "let the Boy have his playthings"2 
The property qualification was possession of a freehold or copyhold worth at least £600 p. a. for 
county MPs, or £300 p. a. for borough MPs. 3 Neither University MPs nor the eldest son or heir of any peer, 
lord or anybody meeting the qualification to be a county MP had to themselves meet this property 
qualification. This caveat emphasises the intention, which was to ensure that only "respectable" people could 
be MPs. Indeed, the Tory 1710 act was entitled, "An act for securing the freedom of parliaments .. ". Its 
intent had been to keep out (Whig) non-landed rich, who did not have a "proper" stake in the country. 4 In 
1837, when Molesworth tried (and failed) to abolish these property qualifications, the arguments were much 
the same: without such qualifications people without property could legislate over property, and such an 
abolition would make justifying property qualifications for voting harder. 
The qualifications were somewhat relaxed with Warburton's 1838 act, but were only abolished in 
1858,3 following the rather unfortunate case of Edward Glover. Elected for Beverley in 1857, he was 
unseated on petition for not possessing the requisite property qualifications and then jailed for three months 
for having (falsely) made a declaration that he had the requisite qualifications. This was the only prosecution 
for making a false declaration in the history of these statutes. 
Previous to its abolition, then, the property qualification was of little practical substance. It was full 
of - used - holes. The Swiss cheese nature of the property qualification was demonstrated in debates over the 
Scottish Reform Act of 1832, when it was proposed to introduce a property qualification for Scottish MPs, 
since none was in existence at the time. Several MPs pointed out that the English qualification was not 
enforced, and so of little point. Althorp responded, "The object was not that they should actually possess the 
(.. continued) 
S 7&8 Will. III c. 25, clause 8 (1695). 
1 Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 82. 
2 Duchess of Devonshire's recollections in Stuart, Dearest Bess, p. 157. Pitt had likewise been both praised and satirised for 
his youth, as in the couplet, "A sight to make surrounding nations stare, A state entrusted to a schoolboy's care. " 
3 This resulted in the curious situation whereby a copyholdcr could be an MP. but could not vote In Parliamentary elections 
in counties before 1832. These qualifications had been introduced in 1710, and modified In 1760 (9 Anne c. 5 and 33 Geo. 1I 
c. 20). The latter required all MPs to take an oath before sitting or voting that they met the requirements of 9 Anne c. 5. The 
not uncommon breaking of this oath contrasts strangely with the later enthusiasm among some for more oaths to curtail 
bribery and corruption at elections. 
4 See the quote from Swift in Porritts, House Of Commons, Volume 1, p. 170. 
1&2 Vict. c. 48 and 21&22 Vict c. 26. 
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qualification required, but that they should be of a sufficient degree of respectability. "' Even when property 
qualifications were scrutinised the result was not necessarily more honesty. John Arthur Roebuck had his 
fingers burnt after nearly being unseated in 1832 when his property qualification was questioned. his father- 
in-law had nominally given him a Joshua Reynolds painting, which he in turn nominally gave to Joseph 
Hume, who in return nominally gave him an Irish estate. Afterwards he was, according to a friend, 
particular in affairs of that kind, that he insisted on having all legal forms observed, and he actually 
brought me bank-notes of the requisite value, which had been lent him by our friend George Grote, and 
which I, of course, immediately returned to Grote. 2 
Burke, Pitt, Fox and Sheridan were all often used examples of MPs who only met the property qualifications 
by bogus means. ' Like the age limit, this qualification was occasionally, though rarely, enforced. Indeed, it 
was unusual for any of the qualification requirements to result in MPs being unseated. This happened only 
five times in 1832-50.4 In 1837 a Marylebone MP was unseated for lacking the property qualification. Joseph 
Holdsworth was unseated after winning Wakefield (1841) for having been the Returning Officer at the time. 
Although he had delegated these duties, he still had not been eligible. J. Harris, elected for Newcastle-under- 
Lyme in 1842, was unseated for acts of bribery by his agent at a previous election. In 1847 an Edinburgh MP 
was disqualified for being a government contractor, and won the subsequent by-election. In 1849 a Limerick 
MP was disqualified for having been convicted of high treason. 
As the property qualification was enshrined in law, it was available for employment when there was 
a desire, induced by other reasons, to exclude a person from Parliament, as happened with Feargus O'Connor 
in 1835. As with much of electoral law, qualifications were not regularly enforced, but were available to be 
used by sore losers. s The practical lack of impact of the property qualification is demonstrated by the 
similarity of Scottish and University MPs to other MPs, despite their not requiring a property qualification. 
1 LI. E. Witmer, The Property Qualifications of Members of Parliament, Columbia University Press, New York. 1943, p. 153. 
A further example of the lack of enforcement is the debate over Warburton's aforementioned bill. A major part of his 
argument was that a more sensible law would also be an enforced law. 
2 Witmer, Property Qualifications of Members of Parliament, p. 126-7. This money was presumably used for a fictitious 
property purchase. 
3 Witmer, Property Qualifications of Members of Parliament, p. 142. For other evidence of fictitious qualifications sec the 
letter from Robert Southey to I lany Southey, 20 July 1826: C. C. Southey (ed), The We & Correspondence of 11w late 
Robert Southey, Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, London, 1849-50, Volume 3, p. 264. 
4 As O'Gorman states that only ten MPs were excluded for having a bogus qualif ication in 1710-1858, this implies the figure 
was five for 1710-1832: Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 118. 
My f igures are somewhat less than Witmer's, but I am using a narrower definition. Witmer claims that after the 1832 
general election three MPs were unseated as a result of petitions that included complaints over the validity of qualifications 
(two of these were in Ireland); after 1835 the figure was again three (with two of them from Ireland) and after 1837 it was 
five (of which one was from Ireland): Property Qualifications of Members of Parliament, p. 131 n42, p. 134-S and p. 151.2. A 
petition could, for example, include complaints about qualifications and treating, and, as the result of the latter (though not 
the former) being proved, cause an MP to be unseated. Such a petition would count in Witmer's figurs, but not in mine. 
sA more bizarre example is that of Southey, elected in 1826, in absentia, for Downton. To avoid having to serve Southey 
wrote to the Speaker pointing out that he was not properly qualified. A new writ was moved. See Southey, Robert Southey, 
Volume 5, p. 271-9 and below, p. 220. For other evidence of the weakness of the law sec Polritts, house Of Commons, 
Volume 1, p. 174-5. 
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There were other requirements, which excluded clergy, ' judges, 2 peers, aliens ,3 
lunatics, sheriffs and 
mayors4 and bankrupts .3 Further, commencing with 4&5 Anne c. 20 (1705) various Acts prevented holders 
of some offices of profit and those linked with Government contracts being MPs 6 
The requirement for newly elected MPs to take Parliamentary oaths acted as a de facto restriction on 
their religious beliefs. These restrictions were relaxed during the nineteenth century. In 1829, Catholic 
emancipation led to a new oath, compatible with non-Anglican forms of Christianity. The election of a 
Quaker in 1833, who refused to take an oath but instead made an affirmation, resulted in the Commons 
deciding to allow affirmations. ' In 1858 it became possible for Jews to vote and sit in the I louse, following 
the controversy generated by the election of Baron Nathon de Rothschild for London in 1847. ' In 1885 
Charles Bradlaugh, a self-proclaimed atheist, was finally admitted to the Commons, taking the oath and 
being accepted, despite his lack of religious belief. The legal situation with Bradlaugh is confused as the 
refusal of the Commons to seat him had (probably) been in breach of the 1866 Parliamentary Oaths Act, but 
the courts backed off from a showdown. 
In practice the restrictions were nebulous: variable in their interpretation, variable in their 
enforcement and liable to change under pressure. Pressure usually derived from, or at least was crystallised 
by, an individual case. Whilst, for example, before 1885 self-proclaimed atheists (probably) did not have the 
right to be MPs, neither had they challenged the rules through successful election. And when an atheist did, 
the result, albeit after plenty of drama and strife, was that he was able to become an MP. In other words, once 
changes in society had occurred that generated challenges to such rules, the rules were changed. Only when 
the challenges ran ahead of social change, as with Horne Tooke, did they fail. 
Another important de facto qualification arose from MPs receiving no pay. ' Pretending to non- 
existent wealth could circumvent the qualification rules, but it could not pay the bills. The costs of elections, 
1 This became statutory with 41 Geo. Ill c. 64 (1801), following the dispute over whether or not I tome Tooke, an ex-pricst, 
could be an MP. Ile was personally excluded from the operation of this act as, according to folklore, his patron threatened 
that he would otherwise elect a black man in Tooke's place. 
2 By common law in England, although in Scotland there was legislation from the eighteenth century and in Ireland they 
were banned following an act in 1821. 
3 Aliens were excluded by common law, whilst naturalised aliens were excluded by a variety of statutes commencing 
with 12&13 Will. I11 c. 2 (1700). 
4 Sheriffs and mayors could not be MPs for constituencies for which they held these posts. 
s The exact fate of a bankrupt MP was covered by 52 Geo. 111 c. 144 (1812): he had twelve months aller the Issue of a 
commission of bankrupcy, during which time he could not sit or vote, before a new writ was moved for his scat. This 
provided extra time for him to become solvent once more. 
6 Also some ministerial offices of profit required new holders to stand for re-election upon acquiring them. Ministers were, 
until the later nineteenth century, treated no different from MPs. For example, it was only in the 1890s that the Law Officers 
stopped being able to practise law privately. 
1 Under 7&8 Will. Ill c. 24 (1695) Quakers were allowed to make affirmations rather than take oaths, but it was only in 
1833 that the Commons interpreted this act as also covering MPs' oaths, over-turning their 1698 ruling. 22 Geo. ll c. 30 
(1748) extended the provisions of this act to Moravians. 
121&22 Viet. c. 48 and a subsequential Sessional Order. The latter became a standing order in 1860, and then a new oath 
was introduced in 1866. 
'Also, it is also often overlooked that on taking his seat a by-election victor had to pay fees of t8 l Os: A Return of the 
Amount ojthe several Fees demanded from a Member on taking his Seat in this Mouse, at a General Election, and when 
returned upon a New Writ upon a vacancy; by what Authority charged and to what purposes applied, 1837 (48) XXXIX. 
There were no such fees for general election victors. 
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the pressures of a "respectable" social life and the large amounts of time being an MP could absorb (which 
was not then available for earning money) were not conducive to financial heath. By 1800 the practice of 
constituencies paying MPs wages was long gone. For someone who did not live in London, and yet wished 
to attend Parliament regularly, a town house - with its expenses - was necessary. I lowever, it should be noted 
that some MPs, like the eldest sons of peers, would have been living an expensive lifestyle anyway. Though 
some offices and places could provide an income, tenure was often uncertain and there were only enough for 
a minority of MPs. Radical abuse could make such income less than a complete blessing. Also, the 
economical reforms of the late eighteenth century had cut back on the number of places available. 
The three most famous examples of financial need were Macaulay - who, having already sold his 
gold medals from Cambridge, then left the Commons for five years to replenish his finances with a well paid 
Indian post; Cobden - who needed a £75,000 subscription and a public petition to keep him in politics after 
the Corn Laws were repealed; and Disraeli - whose motives for marrying a rich widow were often 
questioned. Though there are several examples of MPs from Yorkshire going bankrupt as a result of their 
Parliamentary careers, it is hard to judge whether this was primarily due to the cost of the lifestyle or the cost 
of elections. Thus, there were regular financial crises during the career of John Wharton, Beverley MP in 
1790-6 and 1802-26. In 1806 rumours of his financial problems circulated; in 1818 he owed money to his 
son-in-law Thomas Lennard and there were problems over receiving payment for sale of an estate in 1808; 
when he lost in 1826 deep pecuniary problems quickly emerged. However, Beverley elections were 
themselves expensive. 
The lack of pay, in combination with the property qualification, reflected the traditional veneration 
of the "independent politician, " a combination of probity and intellectual independence. The reality, though, 
could be different. 
6.3 Background of candidates and MPs 
6.3.1 Introduction 
In 1816 the Quarterly Review provided a summary of where MPs came from: 
A laudable and useful ambition leads into parliament the opulent merchant and manufacturer; the lawyer 
high in his profession; the man who has returned with affluence from the East or West Indies, and 
is 
conversant with the customs, wants, and interests of our conquests and colonies; the military and naval 
officer, who in the course of their services have acquired a competent knowledge of affairs upon which 
the legislature must often be employed. It is for the advantage of the republic also that from a like 
ambition, men liberally educated, but more richly endowed with the gifts of nature than of fortune, 
should sometimes prefer the service of the state to that of the army or navy, or of the three professions, 
as an honourable path to distinction. ' 
Candidates tended to come from one of four broad categories. First there were close relatives - especially 
sons - of aristocrats, particularly if there were land holdings near, or 
in, that constituency. In the early 
nineteenth century about 20% of MPs were aristocratic? Second MPs, especially in counties, came from 
local gentry families, like the Bethells of the East Riding. Third, there were those from professions like the 
' Quarterly Review, October 1816, Volume 16, p. 258. 
2 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 119 n25. 
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law and military. By the early nineteenth century they made up about a third of MPs. ' Fourth, there were 
those from industry and commerce, particularly in boroughs, who comprised about 20% of MPs in the early 
nineteenth century. 2 Candidates came from much the same spectrum as MPs, though they tended to the 
poorer and lower end. 
6.3.2 Age and length of service 
In 1734-1831 18% of MPs were, when first elected, sons of peers or peeresses? The precedence 
given to elder sons is demonstrated by the mean age of eldest sons of English peers on first being elected - 
23.7 years - compared to that of their other sons - 27.3 years. But, as these eldest sons normally ended up in 
the Lords, they served fewer years on average as MPs than their younger brothers - 10.7 compared to 15.8. 
MPs with an ancestor in the male blood line who had been an MP first entered Parliament aged 31.0 
on average, compared to 39.8 years for those without such ancestors. In addition to entering earlier, they 
served longer - 14.6 years on average compared to 11.8 years. Similarly, those who were initially outsiders 
by virtue of their nationality or education took longer to enter Parliament (Table 6.1). Not being English and 
not being a member of that social stratum that sent its sons to public schools resulted in a higher average age 
on first election. It was not merely closed constituencies that allowed young people to enter Parliament, it 
was also their family and social ties. As a result, MPs elected for the first time at one of the general elections 
in 1832-68 were younger in counties than closed boroughs .4 
Nationalitys Average age Education Average age 
English 34.5 Public school6 30.2 
Scottish 35.6 Did not attend public school 37.3 
Irish 37.3 
North American 40.7 
Table 6.1: Average age of MPs on first election 1734-1831 
There were many young MPs. In 1790-1820 about 15% of MPs were under 30 
7 and in 
1734-1832 (but excluding the 1832 intake) about a quarter of the MPs were under 25 when first entering the 
1 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 120. 
2 O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 120. 
3 The figures in this, the subsequent paragraph and the Table 6.1 derive from Judd, Members of Parliament 1734-1832, p. 79. 
4 Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament, Volume 1, p. 113. 
s There were only two MPs whose nationality does not fall into one of these four categories. 
6 Charterhouse, Eton, I farrow, Rugby, Shrewsbury, Westminster and Winchester. (Merchant Taylors and St Pauls are not 
included). 
O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 117 n22. 
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House. ' This youthfulness accompanied a large number of relatively brief periods of service: about a quarter 
of MPs in the same period served for no more than six years. 2 
Though the average age of MPs elected at general elections rose somewhat, this small rise is easily 
explained by the rise in life expectancy. The average age rose around one and a half years in 1734-1831,3 
and then altered little. The upheavals of 1833 and 1847 benefited older MPs, but the average age of MPs 
elected for the first time varied little, being 42 in 1832,38 in 1835,1837 and 1841, and rising to 40 for 
1847. 
Overall, with an average length of service of over a decade, and with 35% having gone to a public 
school, there was a combined familiarity and frame of reference for most MPs. ' This was abetted by the 
traditions of Parliament and the sense of history they deliberately invoked. It was reflected in common, 
classical standards of oratory. Many MPs knew each other. The web of friendships and relatives may have 
been the reason for ending up in the Commons in the first place. As Melbourne said, "Damn the Whigs, they 
are all cousins. " Certainly much of Yorkshire Whig politics can be traced on the family trees of the Dundas 
and Fitzwilliam families, who were even related to each other. For example, the 4th Earl Fitzwilliam's sister, 
Lady Charlotte Wentworth, was the mother of Lawrence Dundas, whose sister in turn married Robert 
Chaloner, another noted politician, and the 5th Earl married Mary Dundas. More distantly the Fitzwilliams 
were also related to the Howards, of Castle lloward. 6 The Commons often resembled a club. As the 
Quarterly Review wrote in 1830, 
There is something in the very atmosphere of the House unfavourable to bold and uncompromising 
conduct. It is, de facto, a sort of overgrown club. This is the worst part of the business. Things are every 
day admitted in private among the members, which are studiously denied or concealed in the speeches 
reported from the gallery. 7 
Further, "There is, and always has been, a very real feeling of fraternity within the walls of the } louse. "' 
Commenting on his impressions a visitor in 1782 said that, 
The members have nothing particular in their dress ... It is not at all uncommon to see a member lying 
stretched out on one of the benches while others are debating; some crack nuts, others eat oranges, or 
whatever else is in season. 9 
t Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 23. 
2 Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 27. 
3 Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 82. 
4 Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament, Volume 2, Table 1. These figures are based on statistics for the number of new 
members that are significantly at odds with some other historians. This Is probably because he excludes retreads, that is 
people who had been MPs previously but were not MPs immediately previous to the election in question. 
s All statistics, unless stated otherwise, in this paragraph are from Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 79. See J. Cannon. 
Aristocratic Century: The peerage of eighteenth century England, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984 p. 34-5 
regarding a similar common frame of reference for the eighteenth century aristocracy, derived from a common educational 
background. 
6 The 5th Earl Howard - Frederick - married Caroline Leveson-Gower, of the Wentworths of Stainborough and 
Wentworth Castle branch of the Wentworths. The Fitzwilliams were of the Wentworth-Woodhouse branch. 
7 Quarterly Review, January 1830, Volume 42, p. 271-2. 
1 E. M. Mowbray (ed), Seventy Years At Westminster, With Other Letters And Notes Of The Late Right 11onble. Sir John 
Mowbray, Bart., M. P., William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh, 1900, p. 106. 
0 Jennings, An Anecdotal History, p. 53. 
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In this "best and pleasantest Clubs1 it was not uncommon to see even sleeping MPs. 2 This informality 
included seating arrangements, as with O'Connell's last speech being from the despatch box, and Ilume 
crossing the floor and sitting next to Peel to tell him of Louis Phillipe's abdication. 
The clubbish atmosphere was reflected in Parliament's rules. Though procedural rules offered 
opportunities for delay and obstruction - particularly by repeatedly moving, "That this Ilouse do now 
adjourn, " 4 by presenting numerous motions, by forcing many divisions and talking at length - these were 
rarely employed. Only with the Irish nationalists in the later nineteenth century was the full paraphernalia of 
possibilities exploited. Previously, for example, an informal Speaker's guillotine (exercised by calling the 
leading MP from each side) had sufficed. Clubbishness had predominated over procedural purity. 
6.3.3 Social background 
The 1834 Black Book estimated there were 73 MPs who were sons of peers, 78 other relatives of 
peers and 49 merchants, manufacturers or traders! These figures are similar to other contemporary estimates. 
The Black Books' own figures suggest a fall in the number of relatives of peers, as for 1830 it was estimated 
that 256 MPs were relatives of peers. 6 A comparison with other sources also suggests a decline: the 1834 
estimate of 11% of MPs (73) being the sons of peers contrasts with Judd's of 20-23% for 1802-31 7 Not all 
of this fall can be put down to the impact of the 1832 legislation as 1831 had already seen the proportion fall 
to its lowest level since the Act of Union (though only fractionally below the post-1812 general election 
level). ' 
Though traditionally 1832 is seen as marking the political arrival of manufacturers and merchants, 
they had found seats before 1832. Their wealth provided the resources to purchase land, influence and/or 
votes. Thus, Thomas Houldsworth, cotton spinner, was MP for both Pontefract and Newton before 1832. Of 
the 111 MPs whose seats were abolished in 1832,22 were merchants or bankers -a higher proportion than 
that of the Commons as a whole, and evidence of the use of small constituencies by such people to get into 
Parliament before 1832.9 
t Hope Vere: Jennings, An Anecdotal History, p. 157. 
2 One Of No Party V. Grant], Random Recollections Of The House Of Commons, From The Year 1830 To The Close Of 
1835, Including Personal Sketches Of The Leading Members O/All Parties, Smith, Elder and Co. Cornhill, London. 1836, 
p. 80. 
Jennings, An Anecdotal History, p. 259 and p. 251. 
4P. Fraser, "The Growth of Ministerial Control in the Nineteenth-Century I louse of Commons, " English Historical Review, 
Volume 75,1960, p. 448 has some examples of repeated moves for adjournment. 
Woolley, "The Personnel of the Parliament of 1833, " p. 246. 
s J. Wade, The Black Book: An Exposition OfAbuses In Church And State, Courts Of Law, Municipal Corporations, And 
Public Companies; With A Precis Of The House O/Commons, new edition, Effingham Wilson, London, 1835, p. 626. 
7 Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 84. 
Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 79. 
9A similar point was made by the Tory Quarterly Review, Volume 45,1831, p. 322. It calculated that the Reform bill would 
unseat fifteen of thirty-nine merchants sitting for boroughs (in England? ); four of the ten MPs connected to the West Indies, 
as proprietors or merchants would go; ten out of twenty MPs who were directors of the Gabt India Company, or had 
connections from long residence or commerce with Britain's Asiatic empire would go; fourteen out of the thirty-one city and 
country bankers or members of the monied interest would go; two out of three shipowners would go; and two out of three 
manufacturers would). Indeed, William Knibb, an opponent of slavery, on hearing on arrival in England that the reform had 
(continued) 
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As a result 1832 had a mixed impact, opening some constituencies, but also making it harder for the 
newly rich to buy their way in. The 1834 Black Book estimate of 8% of MPs (49) being merchants, 
manufacturers or traders compares to 18% of MPs being involved in commerce in 1734-1832. This apparent, 
and somewhat surprising, fall, should however be treated with caution. The 18% figure falls to about 13% if 
bankers are excluded (as they appear to be from the Black Book total), and to 6% if"West Indies interest" 
(but not "West Indies merchants") are excluded. There was no dramatic change around 1832, and the small 
increase that probably occurred did not bring the number of merchants, manufacturers and traders to a new 
high. ' Even after 1832 landowners averaged around 60% of the new intake at general elections .2 
What did change was that manufacturers and merchants increasingly tended to represent 
constituencies near their residence. With less opportunity to simply buy a seat (which might be located 
anywhere), there was an increased tendency to be elected for a seat with which they had a link, such as by 
living or owning land there. Thus James Stuart Wortley was elected for Bossiney in 1831 but for I lalifax in 
1835 and then the West Riding in 1841. County MPs were different. Even before 1832 it was rare for a 
county MP to not live in the constituency. In Yorkshire Brougham was the notable exception in 1830, and 
indeed was attacked by Tories for not owning any Yorkshire land. 
6.3.4 Continuity 
Many families provided more than one MP; indeed, the majority of MPs had relatives who had been 
MPs before them. In 1802-31 the number of MPs with an MP or ex-MP blood relative in the male line varied 
between a high of 414 (1830) and a low of 355 (1802); that is, between about a half and two-thirds of the 
total number of MPs at any one time. 3 There was an infusion of new blood in 1832 (Graph 6.1). 4 The 
relatively low 1831 figure is noteworthy. Although this election resulted in a substantially increased number 
of MPs supporting the government, this mini-landslide was not accompanied by a new breed of people 
entering into Parliamentary politics. Such an influx had to await 1832, and even then was largely a Scottish 
and Irish event. After the 1826 elections 94% of the new MPs came from England and Wales, but in 1832 
this fell to 73%, though there were nevertheless 37% more new English and Welsh members after the 1832 
election than after 1826.5 Furthermore, much of the new blood did not last: there were fifty-three Liberal 
MPs who were first elected in 1831 or 1832 and then were defeated in 1835 and never returned 
(.. continued) 
been passed said, "Thank God. Now I'll have slavery down, ": J. 11.1 Einton, Memoir Of William Mibb, Missionary in 
Jamaica, Houlston and Stoneman, London, 1847, p. 139.1 am grateful to Jim Walvin for this reference. 
1 Woolley, "The Personnel of the Parliament of 1833, " p. 246-7 and Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 80. 
2 Derived from Glynn, The Private Member O/Parliament, Volume 2, Table 10. 
3 Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 85. 
4 Cannon, Parliamentary Reform, p. 197, Close, The General Elections of 1835 and 1837, p. 4, p. 223.5, p. 483, Glynn, The 
Private Member Of Parliament, Volume 2, Table 1, G. 11. Jennings, An Anecdotal History Of The British Parliament, From 
The Earliest Periods to the Present Time. With Notices O/Eminent Parliamentary Men, And Examples Of Their Oratory, 
Horace Cox, London, 1880, p. 61, Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 28 n4 and Woolley, "The Personnel of the Parliament of 
1833, " p. 242. Data saved as newmps. mtp. Some years have more than one point, due to Inconsistencies in the sources. Some 
can be explained by different attitudes to void elections etc. and perhaps the more serious ones result from some including as 
"new" those who had previously been MPs, but were not MPs immediately prior to the election in question (these are known 
as retreads). 
s Of the 144 new members in 1826,133 were for England or Wales, and 184 of 252 In 1830: Woolley, "The Personnel of the 
Parliament of 1833, " p. 242 and Judd, Members of Parliament, p. 28 n4. 
6 Close, The General Elections of 1835 and 1837, p. 224-5. 
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Graph 6.1 
Number of new MPs elected at general elections 1802-47 
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A more detailed look at what happened in Yorkshire reveals some of the nuances behind these 
global changes (Tables 6.2 and 6.3). Even after 1832, with a great increase in the number of polls, being 
defeated in a poll was a rare way for an MP to go; indeed, in 1831 not one MP was defeated in Yorkshire 
who re-stood in their old constituency. Moving elsewhere, either because the patron of a constituency so 
desired it or to attempt a more prestigious constituency' or for other reasons, was more common. This pattern 
continued after 1832, though it became less common for MPs to be replaced by their patron or move on to a 
new constituency. The relatively high incumbency rates suggested that many MPs desired to continue. 
However, there was a large increase in the proportion of elections that were contested. 
Though drawing meaningful conclusions from a small sample is difficult, it is noticeable that for 
Yorkshire in 1800-32 over one in five contests did not result in a Poll .2 These figures suggest that there was a 
significant fringe of electoral activity that can be lost if the distinction between a contest and a poll is not 
made. As was frequently seen in the Yorkshire county constituency- notably in 1806 -a contest between 
candidates could be resolved before any polling has occurred. The mere absence of a poll does not mean 
there was not campaigning, heavy expenditure, free food and drink or a chance for electors to express their 
preferences (in this case via canvass returns rather than also having the polling booth). The prevalence of 
non-polled contests indicates the importance of campaigns in forming and revealing electoral preferences. 
1 It was possible for someone to hedge their bets by standing for both a prestigious constituency and for another one, 
particularly given the spreading of elections over days, if not weeks. Ilowever, it was not common for an MP to be 
elected twice. This happened six times in 1832-50: Viscount Lowther (1832, West Cumberland and Westmoreland), C. 
Thompson (1832, Dover and Manchester), Daniel O'Connell (1841, County Meath and County Cork), Richard Cobden 
(1847, Stockport and the West Riding), J. O'Connell (1847, Kilkenny and Limerick boroughs) and C. P. Villiers (1847, 
South Lancashire and Wolverhampton). In each case the latter constituency was the one the person chose to represent. 
This behaviour also occurred before 1832, as with James Wortley being elected for I3ossiney and Yorkshire in 1818. 
Likewise, some, but not many, MPs resigned from one seat to fight another. In 1832-50 there were ten: Viscount 
Milton (1833, resigned from Malton to fight North Northamptonshire), F. Goodricke (1837, Stafford and South 
Staffordshire), J. T. Leader (1837, Bridgwater and Westminster), Viscount Cantelupe (1840,1Iclston and Lewes), Sir J. 
Walsh (1840, Sudbury and Radnorshire), W. Thompson (1841, Sunderland and Westmoreland), T. 1 I. S. Sotheron (1844, 
Devizes and North Wiltshire), Sir I I. Seymour (1846, Midhurst and Antrim), Lord Robert Grovesnor (1847, Chester and 
Middlesex) and Sir J. Duke (1849, Boston and London). As with the twice-elected MPs, it can be seen that, generally, 
counties and large urban areas were seen as more prestigious than other constituencies. 
2 This compares with O'Gorman's estimate that the number of contests resulting in a poll in the general elections of 1806 
and 1807 was about 30%: Voters, Patrons and Parties, p. 112. 
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Uncontested Contested (poll) Contested (no poll) 
1800-32 135(71%) 43 (23%) 11(6%) 
1832-50 61(44%) 76 (54%) 3 (2%) 
Total 195 (60%) 118(36%) 14(4%) 
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6.4 Motivations of candidates and MPs 
6.4.1 Introduction 
A central problem in explaining MPs' motivations is the mismatch between the effort involved in 
them being (and staying) elected and their subsequent activity. An excellent example of this mismatch was 
the second reading of the first Reform Bill, in March 1831. It was probably the greatest Parliamentary event 
in the lives of anyone then living. A mammoth seven-day debate had occurred on the first reading - 
elephantine even by the loquacious standards of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; there was large 
scale unrest and disturbance in the country; twenty-three counties met within seven days to petition for the 
Bill; intense political intrigue circulated; a close result was widely expected, with a majority probably 
expecting a slim defeat for the government; urgent whips were issued by ministers and much effort made to 
mobilise supporters. ' And yet, when the vote came it was only 302-301, i. e. a total of just 603 MPs, out of a 
complement of 658. True, this was then the fullest House for a division at Westminster in history, but it is 
hard to imagine circumstances more propitious to MPs voting. Some adjustments need to make this figure 
useful (Table 6.4), but even then about 18 MPs were absent (though four of them 'may also have been paired 









Definitely ill 7 
Absent 18 
Total 658 
Table 6.4: MPs and the Reform Bill's second reading 
There had been talk of MPs intending to abstain, wishing to see the Bill defeated but mindful of 
their own future prospects, and who would only vote if their votes were necessary to ensure its defeat. Given 
the general widespread expectation of a wafer-thin result that any of them would have abstained in the end is 
doubtful. 2 
'For example, Grey asked the King (Grey, The Reform Act. Volume I, p. 167-8) to release two MPs who had been due to 
attend him: Lord Belfast (George Hamilton Chichester) and Colonel H. Cavendish. Both voted. 
2 This, though, was not the expectation somewhat earlier or amongst everyone. For example, Grey wrote to I lcrbcrt Taylor 
on 19 March 1831, "I still feel assured that there will be a considerable majority on Monday in favour of reform, " though he 
had some doubts over the committee stage, sufficient to ask advice on the King's feelings regarding a dissolution: Grey, Te 
Reform Act, Volume 1, p. 154; similar sentiments are expressed elsewhere: Volume 1, p. 156, p. 161 and p. 162. But references 
like these to expectations of a large majority, need to be put in the context of many other expectations of a small majority 
and a fluidity in expected numbers on both sides. Thus whilst Rickman wrote to Southey on 6 March expecting a 
majority for the bill of over 46, on 12 March he was expecting it to be lost: 0. Williams, Lamb's Friend the Census- 
(continued) 
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Military service abroad is an explanation not contained in Table 6.4, but then none of the sources 
consulted mention it, which suggests that it was not the cause of any absences. 1 Also missing, however, is 
the apparent lack of contemporary criticism from opponents of the bill at the failure of some MPs to turn up - 
even in extrem is Parliamentary activity was not an assumed necessity of being an MP. 2 
Two MPs from Yorkshire were absent, neither being listed as ill. They were Frankland and Smith. 
Sir Robert Frankland, born in 1784 and a moderate reformer, was MP for Thirsk 1815-34. It was a family 
borough, with Franklands owning the major burgages. He was heavily involved in public service, being not 
just an MP but a Yorkshire deputy lieutenant and Yorkshire I{igh Sheriff 1838-9. Ile was absent from all 
divisions on the Reform Bills. The Thirsk electorate before 1832 was relatively small at about 50; both the 
expectation and result was a fairly large increase - to 254 entries on the 1832 register, 
3 and Thirsk lost one 
seat, though the Frankland's grip on the constituency was barely effected. Sir Culling Eardley Smith, born in 
1805, was MP for Pontefract 1830-1, and a candidate there in 1837; he also stood in Edinburgh in 1846 and 
the in West Riding in 1848. He was a religious philanthropist and became known for supporting Protestant 
principles, being active in the Evangelical Alliance and other Protestant organisations. Pontefract was not 
due to lose any seats, but its electorate did increase from about 650 before to 956 register entries after the 
reform legislation 4 
Both were active people, standing for political office and taking an active role in society. Yet, this 
was accompanied by missing such an important vote. Perhaps the explanation partly lies with the relatively 
moderate direct effect of the 1832 legislation on Pontefract, and there is no evidence that people in 1831 
thought its impact would be significantly greater than it was. The case of Thirsk is somewhat stranger as, 
though the influence of the Frankland family on Thirsk elections was not seriously reduced, Thirsk did lose 
one MP. However, this should be balanced against the desire for a Whig MP to support the Whigs. Possibly 
Frankland deliberately abstained in order to reconcile these conflicting interests. A similar argument could 
also be made for Smith - torn between loyalty to the Duke of Wellington and a desire to support reform after 
(.. continued) 
Taker: Life And Letters OfJohn Rickman, Constable, London, 1920, p. 275-6. Rickman, being a Clerk at the Table was no 
peripheral gossip, but rather well placed to make a learned guess. 
Though The Spectator expected the second reading to pass with a considerable majority, this was in the context of 
believing that, "there are precisely the same number against the measure as for it, but there are eighty members whose 
sentiments are yet unknown or at least unexpressed, ": 12 March 1831. 
1 Explaining the absence of an MP by his being on military service would be incomplete anyway. The Implication Is that a 
person who knew he might be absent for this reason still thought it reasonable to stand, and electors still thought it reasonable 
to vote for him. Further, the number of MPs who might also have been absent on military service should not be 
overestimated. In 1832 thirty army officers were in the I louse of Commons: Return of the Number of Ofcers of each Rank 
on the Effective Strength of the Army, who are Members of The Commons ! louse of Parliament, 1831.2 (676) XVII. In 
addition, such people - if they knew they would be absent for a long time - could stand down, as a Richmond MP did in 
1812. 
2 E. g. the Gloucester Journal, 26 March 1831, commented on the high level of MP turnout, rather than the large number 
who were absent. Similarly, The Advantages Of Reform, As Proposed By The Present Ministers, 9th edition. Roake and 
Varty, London, 1831, which (despite its title) attacked the bill, blamed the passage of the second reading on Calcralt, Francis 
Jeffrey and Sir Charles Morgan. They all voted in favour but, respectively, switched sides at the last moment, was allegedly 
not qualified to sit in Parliament and was too frightened to vote otherwise. Absent MPs were not, however, normally 
bemoaned. Even when The Spectator (12 March 1831) commented that, "there are always good excuses for absence when a 
member seeks them, " it too was not censorious of absent MPs. 
3 Figures from Appendix 9. 
4 Figures from Appendix 9. 
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the experience of Catholic emancipation being passed by an unreformed Parliament, and against the popular 
will. But, even to abstain when such a close result was expected, and escape mention in contemporary 
literature, is still intriguing. 
6.4.2 More inactivity 
This lack of activity, despite the costs of becoming and remaining an MP, was common, before and 
after 1832, and amongst both backbenchers and ministers. ' Lord John Townshend was a Lord of the 
Admiralty (1782 and 1783), a Joint Paymaster General of the Army and a Lord of Trade and Plantations 
(1806-7). Yet he was a poor attender of Parliament and one of the main reasons for Devonshire replacing 
him as an MP for Knaresborough in 1818 was a desire for a more active MP. Likewise, Althorp was first 
elected in 1804, became a county MP in 1806 (for Northamptonshire) and was a Lord of the Treasury for 
thirteen months in 1806-7. He did not make his maiden speech until March 1807, and according to a 
biographer, "The first instance that I can find of Lord Althorp's showing an interest in politics, was ... 
1809.94 For some MPs even minimal political activity did not appeal, yet they went through the electoral 
hoops. Squire Osbaldeston said of being elected for East Retford, 
[I] was returned, but not without paying dearly for the distinguished honour, as it is deemed. I did not 
consider it an honour at all; I thought it a great bore. 3 
He left few traces: 
One of the few proofs remaining that he was ever a Member of Parliament is the inscription beneath a 
gay young figure with a bat which is preserved in the pavilion at Lord's ... The Squire was evidently 
trying to do his duty though his heart was elsewhere ... Though 
he was actually a Member for about five 
years, until the dissolution, he could not stand the House of Commons for more than a few sittings, and 
it was only his mother's ambition that he should take up a family seat which made him try. 4 
Similarly Mytton, another sporting eccentric, was elected in 1819, yet, "That he visited the l louse of 
Commons but once and then only briefly did not occur to him as doing less than his duty. "0 Neither did it 
stop him standing again (unsuccessfully) in 1831. One of the more eccentric examples is that of Christopher 
Atkinson. He was MP for Hedon 1780-3 and 1796-1806, yet only spoke once during all that time, and on 
that occasion only spoke because he (wrongly) thought that someone else was referring to his conviction for 
perjury, and anyway he was ruled "completely out of order" by the Speaker. 
MPs varied greatly in their regularity of attendance, speaking and voting. Long service was no 
guarantee that they would either speak or vote. MPs were easily distracted from attending and voting. One 
contemporary wrote that, 
1 Nor was it new to the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century "attendance was erratic even on major political 
issues, ": P. D. G. Thomas, The House Of Commons In The Eighteenth Century, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, p. 122. Also 
see J. Iiatsell, Precedents Of Proceedings In The House Of Commons, Under Separate rides. Ritte Observations, 3rd edition 
(Volumes 1& 2), 2nd edition (Volume 3) and Ist edition (Volume 4), T. Payne, London, 1796, Volume 2. p. 94-3. 
22 Marchant, Memoir Offohn Charles, Viscount Althorp, p. 92. 
3 E. D. Curving (cd), Squire Osbaldeston: His Autobiography, The Bodlcy I lead, London, 1926. p. 26. I [is agent was T. I I. B. 
Oldfield, the radical author. 
4 Cuming, Osbaldeston, p. viii. His mother, Jane Osbaldeston, was a keen electioneer, famously canvassing for the 
Fitzwilliam interest in the elections of 1806 and 1807. 
5 D. Sutherland, The Mad Hatters: Great Sporting Eccentrics of the Nineteenth Century, Robert I tale, London, 1987, p. 58. 
Another sporting enthusiast, Astley, was persuaded by his friends to stand, and on losing at the subsequent elections said, "so 
at last I was free, not to say kicked out": p. 91. 
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There were many other members, who made a point of "looking in to see what's doing" almost every 
evening; but they soon left the house again. ' 
Another recorded that a fellow MP, "informs me he shall not go to town at the meeting of Parliament unless 
something very urgent occurs. "2 
The number voting in divisions on the Catholic question in 1805-27 averaged 437, with a high of 
549 and a low of 229.3 Whilst this shows the relative importance of the Catholic question to MPs, it also 
shows that even on such an issue a high number consistently did not participate. Yet these participation rates 
were historically high: when in June 1807 505 MPs assembled for the King's speech the Annual Register 
commented this number was, "the greatest, it was supposed, that have ever been assembled on any 
occasion"° In 1816 Parliament voted to abolish income tax, an important and emotional issue (it was also 
decided to destroy all income tax records) and one which went against the Government. I lowever, only 444 
MPs voted. For a set of four votes in 1821 the Annual Register gave a list of voters and pairs. On Tavistock's 
motion regarding Queen Caroline 502 voted and 23 (sic) were paired; on Plunkett's motion for a committee 
on law effecting Roman Catholics 448 voted and 50 were paired; the second reading of a bill to abolish the 
Malt Tax had 386 voting with 30 paired; and Hume's motion for army cuts saw 137 voting, with 12 paired 
In the 1821-2 session 89 MPs did not vote at all .6 The second reading of the 
first Reform Bill (for England 
and Wales), which has already been considered, was not the only important vote to take place during the 
reform debates, yet all those other votes (including the ones that precipitated dissolutions and Prime 
Ministerial resignations) had lower turnouts. 
Matters were similar after 1832. Tavistock's 1833 motion to repeal the Septennial Act had only 213 
votes cast against, with 164 in favour. The election of the Speaker in February 1835, seen as a trial of party 
strength, saw 622 vote, and the amendment to the address 7 days later saw even fewer - 611 - vote. In 1836 
there was a vote on amending the Tithe Commutation bill, which Russell had told Ilobhouse would, if 
passed, cause him to abandon the bill, but the vote was merely 78-70.7 The May 1839 Speaker election - 
another party trial - saw 616 vote. Two no-confidence motions in 1840 (January and June) saw 595 and 623 
vote respectively, and on the latter the Government was defeated by one. The crucial vote on the repeal of 
the Corn Laws on 15 May 1846 saw 600 vote. As a final example, the third reading of the Corn Importation 
' Grant, Random Recollections, p. 6. 
2 Henry Broadley's Diary, 8 January 1840: J. Markham (ed), The Diary O/An Honourable Member: The Journal oj! lenry 
Broadley MP 1 January 1840 to 17 March 1842 - The everyday working life of an East Riding AIP, I lumbcrside Leisure 
Services, Hull, 1987, p. 19. 
3 Derived from Blackwood's Magazine, July 1828, Volume 24, p. 93-4. These figures, like all the voting figures in this and 
the following paragraph, are simple voting totals, not even adjusted for tellers and the Speaker. 
4 Annual Register, 1807, p. 236. 
s Annual Register, 1820 (sic), p. 600-13. Interestingly, "pairing" is explained here, suggesting the practice was not 
widespread. 
6 RE. Zegger, John Cam Hobhouse: A Political Life, 1819-1852, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1973, p. 105. 
7 Brent, Liberal Anglican Politics, p. 10-11. As the Tory leadership stayed out of the controversy what Is surprising is the 
paucity of the number of government supporters, rather than the total number voting. This lack of Interest and activity, 
though, was not confined to backbenchers alone. When the English Tithe Commutation bill was discussed by Ministers on I 
February 1836 it had neither been read nor given thought beforehand: A. Aspinall, "The Cabinet Council, " Proceedings of 
the British Academy, Volume 38,1952, p. 188. 
194 
bill was passed in May 1846 by 327-229. When tellers, the Speaker and forty paired MPs' are added this 
makes a total of 601 MPs, out of a house of 656 2 
Important issues could bring large numbers of MPs out to vote, but even on such issues there was a 
consistent and noticeable degree of non-participation? It was not yet the case that a no-confidence motion 
would, as a matter of routine, result in a near 100% turnout 4 Being an MP and voting did not necessarily go 
together. This is reinforced by the work of Ginter on division lists for 1761.1820. Just over 1 I% of MPs are 
not recorded in any of the division lists (or documented as being paired, abstaining, ill, caught in the wrong 
lobby, shut out or absent either abroad or at home), and one in four are listed or documented no more than 
twice. 5 
The bulk of my evidence so far is regarding voting. Speaking and attending are other matters. 
Indeed, an MP could be a good attender, but, as with Henry Broadley (East Riding 1837-51), only rarely 
speak. Speaking is dealt with below (p. 203-213). Records of attendance do not exist, but the evidence that 
does survive suggests a picture similar to that which is implied by the levels of voting and speaking. 
Generalised complaints about poor Parliamentary attendance were frequent, though not common, and even 
election committees could suffer from low attendance, causing the consideration of petitions to be delayed. ` 
Nevertheless, it was uncommon for Parliament to be adjourned at 4pm due to inquoracy (quorum being 
forty); the number of times this happened each session only varied between zero and ten in 1831.50.7 
6.4.3 Pairing 
It was not all disinterest and inactivity. There was an eagerness among some to get into the 
Commons, as evinced by the number of carpet-baggers and opportunistic stabs at seats that took place. An 
W. O. Aydelotte, "The Country Gentlemen and the Repeal of the Corn Laws, " English Historical Review, Volume 82, 
1967, p. 53 nI. 
2 Sudbury, a two-member borough, had been disfranchised in 1844, and had not had any MPs sitting for It since a successful 
petition shortly after the 1841 general election. 
3 The history of the publication of division lists also reflects the mixed attitudes to voting's importance. Though the 
publication of official lists was commenced in response to complaints about the inaccuracy of privately printed lists 
(which suggests MPs' voting records were a matter of concern), this did not happen until as late as 1834. 
4 Low numbers of MPs voting also resulted in some legislation slipping through. The Combinations Acts's repeal (1824) 
followed Place persuading colleagues to not speak in debates, to avoid provoking opponents of repeal Into action; "The result 
was that the bill passed almost unnoticed, ": D. Miles, Francis Place 1771-1854: The L(Ie O/A Remarkable Radical, 
Harvester Press, Brighton, 1988, p. 2. In 1853 the advertisement duty was repealed. A motion to abolish it had been dcfcatod 
116-106, but later that night an amendment was moved to alter its rate from 6d to Od! This passed 77-68: I lolyoake, Sixty 
Years OjAn Agitator's Life, Part One, p. 283-4. Similarly, in 1857 Palmerston pushed the Divorce Reform Bill through, 
"although it meant keeping Parliament in session for an unprecedented time into the summer, forcing members to endure the 
burden of debating from noon to two in the morning every day in the broiling heat of one of the hottest summers in living 
memory, and ignoring the daily attrition of members drifting back to the cool and peace of their county scats ... It was said 
that by the end seven-eighths of the MPs had already left, and that government was getting its way thanks to the presence of 
a solid block of a hundred placemen in the I louse of Commons whom it was forcing to stay in London until the bill was 
passed": L. Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 378-82. 
s D. E. Ginter, "Unofficial Division Lists of the British I louse of Commons 1761-1830: A New Database and its 
Implications, " in J. A. Phillips (ed), Computing Parliamentary History: George 11! To Victoria, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 1994. 
6 For example, see Cobbett's Parliamentary History, Volume 35,18 March 1801, C. 12034. 
'Return of the Number of Days on which The House Sal in each Month of each Session from 1831-2 to 1881, inclusive, 
slating the Number of Hours Occupied and the Number of Hours after Midnight; also. Table of Quinquennial Periods 
showing, - (1), The Average Number of Hours of Sitting Annually; (2), The Average Number of Hours of Sitting after 
Midnight Annually; and (3), The Average Length of Daily Sittings during such Quinquennial Periods, 1881 (445) LXXIV 
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extreme example is Beverley in 1806. At the election one of the MPs elected was Richard Vyse. About three 
weeks later reports of the death of a freeman called "Old Vyse" led to several candidates hurrying off to 
Beverley, including John Prinsep and William Smith. Smith later told Lady Holland what happened: 
Old Vyse, who still lives to be a general entered the town in very good health, and in very great wrath 
with the poor alderman [Prinsep] for thus daring to trespass on his manor, on the presumption only of 
his being defunct; and if the alderman had not made a rapid retrograde movement there is no knowing 
whether the old warrior's fury might [have] sent him on a very unexpected journey in a quite different 
direction. ' 
The second reading of the Reform Bill illustrates how factors such as being ill or paired, or the 
vacancy of some seats can artificially inflate the number of apparently absent-without-good-reason MPs 
(Appendix 6). This, and other technical explanations, help explain the low levels of activity. 
A paired MP was both absent but also participating in votes. Pairing was an agreement between 
MPs on opposite sides of a vote that neither would vote, thereby allowing them both to be absent without 
affecting the result 2 It originated in the eighteenth century, and in 1743 a resolution was even passed to ban 
it (it was defeated 171-139). By 1844 Erskine May commented that pairing, "has for many years been 
resorted to. "3 As pairing was initially fairly informal, and always remained unofficial, the evidence as to its 
extent in this period is thin. There are, though, some indications. Henry Broadley's diary has several entries 
on pairing, suggesting it was not a rare event: 
Wrote to Bethell to ask whether he wished his pair to be extended. 
I had paired for dinner. 
[Wrote to five newspapers] stating I had paired with Mr. Slaney on the 27th Feb. 
Paired with Towneley. 
Wrote to Bethell to tell him he was paired last night with old Byng and desiring him to write to Byng to 
renew the pair for tomorrow or the end of the debate. 
Note from Bethell to get a pair tomorrow. 
I had paired off to get something to eat. 
Paired for the night and then to Strand Theatre. 4 
These suggest that pairing was organised in a relatively relaxed, but not comprehensive or mercenary, 
manner. His reference to writing to the papers is reassuring, in that it suggests that newspapers are, at least on 
major votes, reasonably good sources for pairing levels. 
A series of detailed vote records in the Black Book suggest similarly prevalent but not widespread 
levels of pairing in 1833-4: 26 were paired on the ballot (315 voted), 4 and 5 (sic) were paired on West 
Indian slaves (241 and 183 voted), 17 (sic) were paired on the Corn Laws (471 voted), 15 (sic) were paired 
on repealing the Septennial Act (420 voted), 5 were paired for Ingilby's malt duty motion (170 voted for), 2 
were paired for Cobbett's malt duty motion (201 voted), 8 were paired for Ripon's motion on bishops in the 
Lords (187 voted) and I was paired against on the 3rd Reading of the new Poor Law (52 voted against). 
5 
' Thorne, History of Parliament, Volume 5, p. 438. 
2 Except in some procedurally esoteric cases where quorum featured. 
3 T. Erskine May, A Treatise On The Lax, Privileges, Proceedings And Usage O/Parliament, Ist edition, Charles Knight, 
London, 1844, p. 221. 
4 Henry Broadley's diary, 5 February, 14 February, 3 March, 26 March, 7 April, 5 May 1840,18 March. 14 May 1841: 
Markham, Diary OfAn Honourable Member. 
The slavery vote had only one teller on each side, and in the Septennial Act vote two MPs were shut out, as was one 
MP on Cobbett's motion as one on Ripon's motion: J. Wade, Appendix To The Black Boot* An Exposition Of The 
(continued) 
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6.4.4 Other explanations 
There were some technical aspects of Parliament, and voting, that may have put off MPs. It was 
sometimes difficult for MPs to vote. Absence caused by military service has already been noted (p. 192). 
Contemporary accounts have a smattering of references to MPs being shut out and unable to vote, for 
example on the 1830 Civil List vote that brought Wellington's ministry down. ' 
Poor ventilation, over-crowding and a polluted Thames could make the Commons chamber 
unsavoury. 2 This both deterred MPs from attending Parliament, and meant that even if they did they were 
more likely to not be in the chamber, and so run the risk of missing a vote, especially in an age without 
division bells to warn of an impending vote. Professor John Playfair wrote to Lord John Russell in 1813 that 
the Commons, "is certainly most trying to the health. "3 Similarly, Russell wrote the following year that, "My 
health is hardly good enough yet to attend zealously to the H. of Commons"" Conditions were exacerbated 
by the problems of over-crowding in the Chamber, including resultant disputes over whether or not seats 
could be reserved, which explain the "many and very serious debates" on a topic which otherwise "must 
appear ridiculous". 5 Poor conditions and protracted sittings could tire MPs. As one put it, "I divided once or 
"6 twice but was so worn out that I came away to Club. 
Yet, to some extent the lack of space was deliberate. It is indicative that the capacity of the 
Commons chamber, even after it was rebuilt following the 1834 fire, was significantly less than the number 
of MPs. 7 Indeed, when the Hume committee looked at the question in 1833 it only asked for accommodation 
for 600 MPs, whilst the 1835 committee setting specifications for the new chamber only wanted sitting space 
(.. continued) 
Principles And Practices Of The Reform Ministry And Parliament: The Church And The Dissenters. Catastrophe Of 77u 
House Of Lords; And Prospects Of Tory Misrule: With Tables Of Ecclesiastical And Election Statistics, And Corrections Of 
Former Editions Of The Black Book, 6th edition, Effingham Wilson, London, 1835, p. 94-111. 
Some of these pairing figures are dubious - it is hard to believe that where a figure is given for the total number paired on 
a vote it can be an odd number. This would have required, for example, two MPs on one side to agree to pair off with one 
MP on the other. However, there is no reason to believe that, even if occasional MPs are Icf out (hence the odd numbers), 
the overall picture is significantly distorted. 
1 L. Strachey and R. Fulford (eds), The Grenville Memoirs, Macmillan, London, 1938, Volume 2. p. 59-60. Sec also the 
previous footnote. 
2 E. g. Grant, Random Recollections, p. 2 and 7n and S. C. I Lall, Retrospect O/A Long L(fe: From 1815 To 1889, Richard 
Bentley & Son, London, 1883, Volume 1, p. 20. 
3 Playfair to Russell, 4 December 1813: R. Russell (ed), Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell 1805-40, T. Fisher 
Unwin, London, 1913, Volume 1, p. 176. Similarly, the London and Westminster Review, No. 2 Volume 3& 25.1836, 
p. 414, commented that, "The mortality among the members of the I louse of Commons Is already greater than among any 
similar number of men belonging to the same rank in life, " and talked of the "anxieties, fatigue and later hours. " Further, 
regular attendance at Parliament required living in London, or near by, for at least part of the year. When the Grotes 
considered moving from Dulwich to London so Grote could more easily regularly attended Parliament, his wife was 
reluctant - "I knew that London would prove injurious to my health": Grote, George Grote, p. 107. 
4 Russell to Homer, 28 October 1814, in Russell, Lord John Russell, Volume 1, p. 180. 
s Hatsell, Precedents Of Proceedings, Volume 2, p. 87n. 
'Henry Broadley's diary, 3 July 1840: Markham, Diary OfAn Honourable Afember. 
7 On the old chamber see Grant, Random Recollections, p. 2 and I lall, Retrospect, Volume 1, p. 20. The modern chamber's 
shortage of capacity can be seen on TV on budget day, despite there now being seven fewer MPs and three more deputy 
Speakers. It was claimed that the new chamber encouraged vice as MPs, unable to find a scat, made their way to the smoking 
room or sat in the Library instead: R. Quinault, "Westminster And The Victorian Constitution, " Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 6th series, Volume 2,1992, p. 94-5. 
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for 420-460 MPs in the body of the House. The poor ventilation, and lack of space when full, led some to 
call it a second black hole of Calcutta. 2 This was somewhat of an exaggeration; conditions were much 
superior to those many of the population had to work in, attendance was, at most, a part-time job3 and 
attending a debate was not necessary to vote in it. 
It was not simply nature that made the Commons unpleasant to sit in; the behaviour of many MPs 
worsened the situation. Thus Peel complained that, 
it really was not worth a man's while to be there for so many hours every night. The sacrifice was too 
great. He said the Radicals had brought the House into such a state that no man could do business but 
themselves. ` 
The degree of decorum fluctuated over time, both with the ability of the Speaker to control MPs, with the 
number of unruly members and with the intensity of political conflict. The real change came with 
appointment of Lefevre as Speaker (1839-57). Previously, 
the discipline of the House was relaxed, and there was a great want of decorum. Cock-crowing and other 
disorderly interruptions had been not uncommon. Lefevre changed all that. s 
Despite the problems of conditions in the chamber the (often late) hours of sitting and voting did not 
necessarily depress activity. This is despite the fact that carriages were normally not available for hire after 
midnight, which then made returning home from Parliament difficult for many. 6 The evidence from seven 
sessions in the 1840s is, however, strong 7 For these sessions votes on public bills had a mean turnout of 163 
(and median of 140) if conducted before midnight, against a mean of 215 and median of 186 for votes after 
midnight. 8 As the main reason for voting late was to permit a longer debate (i. e. it was an important matter) 
this is not a comparison of like with like, but it is clear that late sittings were not necessarily a significant 
M. H. Port (ed), The Houses Of Parliament, Yale University Press, London, 1976, p. 13 and 312. 
2 Quinault, "Westminster And The Victorian Constitution, " p. 79. I Iowever, I fume failed to persuade the I louse in 1833 that 
a new chamber was needed to ease congestion: W. J. Rorabaugh, "Politics And The Architectural Competition For The 
Houses Of Parliament, 1834-47, " Victorian Studies, Volume 18 Number 2,1973, p. 159-60. 
3 In 1831-50 the length of the Parliamentary session varied between 93 and 176 days: 1881 (445) LXXIV. 
416 June 1830: Lord Colchester (ed), A Political Diary 1828-30 By Edward Law, Lord EAenborough, Richard Bentley and 
Son, London, 1881, Volume 2, p. 270-1. His feeling doubtless were later exacerbated by the behaviour of the Opposition 
during his 100 days Ministry, when there were frequent attempts to filibuster and drown him out with foot stamping, 
groaning and beating of sticks on the floor: N. Gash, Sir Robert Peel. The Life ojSir Robert Peel after 1830, new edition 
with revisions, Longman, London, 1986, p. I 11-2. 
5 Mowbray, Seventy Years At Westminster, p. 116. 
6 Grote, George Grote, p. 140. 
'Abstract Return of the Number of Divisions of the House Of Commons in the last Session: stating Subject of Division, Date, 
Numbers divided &c., 1843 (55) XLiV,... Return of the Number of Divisions in the Session of 1844 Stating the Subject of 
the Division, and the Number of Members in the Majority and Minority, Tellers included; also, the Aggregate Number In the 
House on each Division; Distinguishing also, the Divisions on Public Bills from Private; and also, te Number of Divisions 
before and after Midnight... [and other statistics], 1844 (628) XXXVIII,... Return of the Number of Divisions in the Session 
of 1845 ... , 1845 (659) XXVI,... Return of the Number of Divisions in the 
Session of 1846, Return of the Number of 
[private] Bills introduced and of[private]Acts passed , since the 
Year 1838..., 1846 (723-11) XXXIII, 
... Return of the Number of Divisions in the Session of 1847... , 1847 (746) XLVI,... 
Return of the Number of Divisions in the Session of 
1847-8..., 1847-8 (740) LI, ... Return of the Number of 
Divisions in the Session of 1849 ... , 1849 (616) XLV. I lowevcr, the 
number of votes for which voting numbers are given is not always the same as claimed total number of votes; though the 
number missing is never significant here. Data saved as sessions. mtp. 
" Private bills have been excluded as there was only one vote on one of them after midnight. Figures do not include tcllers, 
Speaker, pairs etc. 
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hindrance. Nor were they common: with the exception of 1831-2 and 1833, no Parliamentary session in 
1831-81 had more than 12% of its hours occur after midnight. ' 
Parliamentary timetabling was relatively flexible, and advance warning of business often erratic. An 
occasional attender in the Chamber could easily be caught by surprise. So could more assiduous MPs as 
Henry Broadley found in 1840: "The House met at one to carry up the address. I did not know of it. " Later 
that year he recorded that there had been a, "morning sitting of... which I had forgotten until late and it being 
very rainy I did not go. "2 Yet, it is hardly surprising that MPs regularly went off for dinner, or were 
otherwise engaged given that, at least for the overwhelming majority being an MP, or even a politician, was 
not a full-time job - and even they had to eat 3 However, Berkeley claimed that, "When a man is in 
Parliament the business of the House is always an excellent excuse for not being at home. "4 We have also 
already seen (p. 184) the clubbish nature of Parliament. 
Holyoake, later in the nineteenth century, was an MP's secretary, and in his memoirs recorded a 
slight twist to the problem of advance knowledge about timetabling. s His concern was that a surprisingly 
early end to a day's sitting resulted in many MPs who had left to dine wasting time in a fruitless journey 
back to Parliament, only to find that the day's business had ended. This situation was eased by, on his 
suggestion, a limelight being placed at the top of Big Ben to indicate whether or not a sitting had ended .6 
Many votes were, in themselves, of little importance. For example, granting leave to introduce a bill 
was only the first stage, in only one of the two Houses of Parliament, on the road to the statute book. Indeed, 
many such items of business were frequently agreed to without a vote. Occasionally such votes acquired 
symbolic importance, as with the votes on the secret ballot in the 1830s, which were seen by both sides as a 
trial of strength. When in latter years these votes were vested with less importance, fewer voted. Indeed, on 
one occasion the pro-balloters won, yet still nothing materialised on the statute book. Further, a Government 
defeat had less import that it does now; whilst nowadays a Government defeat on any whipped vote is of 
note, the defeat of the line taken by Cabinet in the nineteenth century was only of note if the Issue itself was 
of importance. Anyway, whipping - to which space permits only little reference' - was, even by 1850, fairly 
undeveloped. Indeed, the Tories had a Commons Whip in William Holmes who was not even an MP during 
' 1881 (445) LXIV. 
2 Henry Broadley's diary, 20 January and 21 July 1840: Markham, Diary OfAn Honourable Member, p. 19. Likewise, on 
the Reform Bill's third reading (19 September 1831) many MPs, including l3urdctt, Peel and Wetherell, missed voting due to 
its timing being a surprise. It appears that the relative ease of fitting all business into Parliamentary time allowed a greater 
flexibility in timetabling, and so more votes without several days notice, than later in the nineteenth century. 
3 Lord Worcester missed voting in the Civil List vote that brought Wellington's ministry down because he left the dinner he 
was at too late to get to the Commons in time: Le Marchant, Memoir OfJohn Charles. Viscount Altliorp, p. 257n. Until the 
1850s Bellamy's Kitchen was the only eating place within the Palace of Westminster. 
4 Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament 1833-68, Volume 1, p. 180. Against this should be held Robert Southey's 
reasons for not wishing to be an MP which included, inter al/a, the separation from his family for several months that living 
in London would entail: Southey to Robert Inglis, no date, in Southey, Robert Southey, Volume S, p. 277. 
s Holyoalce, Sixty Years OfAn Agitator's Life, Part Two, p. 146-8. 
6 This was useful: initially only the west face of the clock was illuminated, but complaints from South Dank MPs led to all 
the faces being illuminated in 1893: Quinault, "Westminster And The Victorian Constitution, " p. 95-6. 
7 For more information, see A. Aspinall, "English Party Organization In The Early Nineteenth Century, " English Historical 
Review, Volume 41,1926, p. 396-400 and N. Gash, "The Organization of the Conservative Party, 1832-1846: Part 1: The 
Parliamentary Organization, " Parliamentary History, Volume 1,1982, p. 145-156. 
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all of his tenure. Whilst by the mid-1830s pre-session party meetings had become common, attendance at 
them was variable and meetings to encourage turnout on specific issues were still rare. 
Against the incidental reasons for not voting should be held a similar one for voting. Voting in 
Parliament was initially done by one side leaving the chamber whilst the other remained seated. ' Thus, 
inertia, apathy, illness, sleep or a desire to keep one's seat could all result in a vote being cast. 2 Further, 
abstaining could be difficult: this method of voting plus the locking of the doors meant that an MP, if then 
present, could only avoid voting by hiding. 3 
There were some Parliamentary mechanisms for raising attendance (namely the ability to send out 
the Sergeant at Arms to summon MPs, and the ability to pass a motion that the I louse "be called over"). 
They were of limited efficacy. A call might raise awareness but, despite various fierce-sounding sixteenth 
and seventeenth century resolutions it was, by 1800, in practise never enforced. Similarly, though a mid- 
eighteenth century committee had looked at raising attendances, its suggestions were soon abandoned. The 
overall bias of systemic factors was towards reducing participation. 
6.4.5 Motivational explanations 
Despite my emphasis on inactive MPs, it should not be imagined all were idle. There were some 
claims that being an MP - an unpaid occupation - was time consuming. In 1820 the Commons debated 
regulating the Irish Chancery, and an amendment was adopted that no Master in the Chancery of Ireland 
could be elected an MP, as the duties of Master and MP were incompatible due to their calls on time. ' The 
London and Westminster Review commented on the inconvenience of Parliament's location for those who 
had business to transact at the law courts. 6 John Hardy had to resign as Recorder of Leeds In 1834 to have 
time to deal with Parliamentary business, and John Marshall gave as a reason for not re-standing in 
Yorkshire in 1830 that, 
The time and attendance which the Representative of a large County ought, in my opinion, to devote to 
his Parliamentary duties, and which is has been my determination to give as long as I filled that 
honourable station, are such as I cannot, at my time of life, pledge myself to the continuance of. ' 
In 1830 the Quarterly Review commented, 
The duty of members of parliament has, indeed, become so severe, that no man who is actively 
embarked in a profession, and few men of property who choose to attend to their own affairs, will 
voluntarily undertake it. The number and length of the sittings of committees is beyond all example; and 
1 There were some exceptions to the use of this mechanism, as when the Commons was in a Committee of the Whole (when 
the ayes moved to one side of the chamber, and the noes to the other). Division lobbies were introduced after the 1834 fire. 
2 "The right to seats is also lost on a division (except by the Tellers) which makes it material. in questions otherwise 
indifferent, which side are to go out": Hatsell, Precedents OjProceedings, Volume 2, p. 88. 
3 Abstaining was, though, possible and did occur. E. g. see Henry Broadley's diary, 8 February and 20 September 1841: 
Markham, Diary OfAn Honourable Member. For some examples of hiding places used by MPs see I latsell, Precedents Of 
Proceedings, Volume 2, p. 186-9 and Thomas, The House OjCommons in The Eighteenth Century, p. 245-6. 
4 Hatsell, Precedents Of Proceedings, Volume 2, p. 90-3 and House of Commons Journal, 4 December 1761, Volume 29, 
p. 63. 
s Annual Register, 1820, History of Europe section p. 43. 
6 No. 2 Volume 3& 25,1836, p. 414-5. The Annual Register, 1826,1listory of Europe, p. 106 argued that Parliament had to 
meet in London as, Inter a/ia, the Attorney- and Solicitor-Generals (and Brougham! ) needed to be able to appear in cowl. 
Hull Advertiser, 9 July 1830. 
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they collect, print, and circulate masses of matter, in the shape of reports, which set all possibility of 
perusal and comprehension at defiance. ' 
Being an MP could be an onerous duty to be fulfilled. Indeed, it was this conception of being an MP that lay 
behind the inability of MPs to resign. As the still valid Commons resolution of 2 March 1623 put it, "a man, 
after he is duly chosen, cannot relinquish. " MPs being human, though, meant various contrivances were 
created to allow MPs to resign, as with the office of the Chiltern Hundreds. It being an office of profit under 
the Crown, the holder of which could not be an MP, an MP who wished to resign simply had to be appointed 
to it. By the nineteenth century being appointed to the Chiltern Hundreds, or a similar office, was almost 
always a formality. 2 
Being a conscientious MP by these standards was more than some Members were prepared to 
undertake, and the above technical explanations only go so far. Some people stood for reasons other than 
desiring to be involved in the Parliamentary political process, for Parliament was more than merely a 
political arena. It was also a gateway to status, career enhancement, interest protection, approval, honours, 
profit, and - only if one really wanted - politics. It was the best club in the land and being an MP had an 
appeal, snaring the vain and the voracious. For barristers, for example, it was seen as a potentially major 
step towards becoming a judge or attaining other judicial posts 4 For aspiring politicians, membership of 
Parliament (though not necessarily of the Commons) was necessary to be a Cabinet minister. ' Being an MP 
also gave access to social circles of "important" people. As Admiral Rodney, a former MP, wrote in 1780, 
"To be out of Parliament is to be out of the world. "6 And as a "Young English Peer" wrote, the Commons of 
the 1840s was, 
The best club in England ... whatever a young man's rank and position, 
it was strengthened by the 
addition of M. P. to his name. To other men not favoured by fortune ... it was the golden key to open the 
doors of the most exclusive clubs. ' 
1 Quarterly Review, January 1830, Volume 42, p. 270. 
2 However, in 1842 the office was refused to one MP who admitted to wanting to resign as part of a deal to settle an 
election petition: see B. Kemp, "The Stewardship Of The Chiltem I lundreds, " in R. Pares and A. J. P. Taylor, Essays 
presented to Sir Lewis Namier, Macmillan, London, 1956, p. 213. 
3 Macaulay's comment is apposite: "The curse of England is the obstinate determination of the middle class to make their 
sons what they call gentlemen": J. M. Boume, Patronage and Society in Nineteenth-Century England, Edward Arnold, 
London, 1986, p. 85. Likewise, Russell, on introducing the Reform Bill was reported as saying that at present there were 
some MPs, "who entered parliament for the mere name, or the fashion of being members of the house - (cries of oh, and 
cheers), - who spent their time in foreign countries, and who never, or scarcely ever, attended the house, ": The Standard, 2 
March 1831. The Spectator reported Russell slightly differently: "when Parliament is reformed, so many members will not 
enter Parliament, merely for the sake of the name, and as a matter of style and fashion. (Alurmurs. ) Some members spend 
their money in foreign countries and never attend the House at all, ": 5 March 1831. These two quotes also illustrate the 
dangers of taking the exact words of Parliamentary reports too seriously. 
4 About 12% of MPs were barristers or solicitors in 1832-47, the majority of whom, "were 'status seekers' and 'legal 
careerists'": D. Duman, The English and Colonial Bars in the Nineteenth Century, Croom I leim, London. 1983, p. 193. See 
also Duman, The Judicial Bench In England 1727-1875: The Reshaping of a Professional Elite, Royal i listorical Society, 
London, 1982, p. 75-8 and p. 93-6 on politics being a way for ambitious barristers to gain appointment to legal offices. As 
p. 78 points out 59% ofjudges appointed in 1790-1820 and 52% of those in 1820-5 were MPs or ex-MPs. 
s However, William Fitzgerald became President of the Board of Trade in 1828 and did not enter Parliament until March 
1829. 
6 Namier, Structure Of Politics, p. 1. 
7 Fortnightly Review, Number 216 Volume 36 (new series), 1884, p. 797. 
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Its social status was the reason for Christopher Atkinson seeking election in 1796 for Iledon. I laving been 
expelled as MP for Hedon in 1783 and then convicted in 1784 for perjury in the handling of corn supplies, 
re-election would be rehabilitation! Occasionally, candidates like William Bell in Hull (1802), stood not to 
win but so that they could lodge a petition against the return. The possibility of Parliamentary immunity 2 also 
resulted in occasional candidates such as Robert Christie Burton, who was in Fleet debtors' gaol when he 
stood for Beverley (1818), and there is strong suspicion that the hope of immunity was his only reason for 
seeking election. Similarly, when Devonshire rescued Lord Ossulton from debt in 1806, part of this involved 
getting him elected for Knaresborough. 
The attraction of having an MP's status was also reflected in the lure of those constituencies that 
came with a high reputation. For example, in 1826 J. Marshall had wanted to enter Parliament, and 
negotiated election for Petersfield for 5,000 guineas. But when the opportunity came to be a Yorkshire 
county MP he passed Petersfield to his son and went for the glory, but much more work, of being an MP for 
the grandest county constituency in the land. 
Standing could simply be a way of making a point, as with the Chartists in the West Riding in 1848 
when Samuel Kidd considered standing: 
He was not going to poll, as he would not have stood the slightest chance of being returned, but intended 
to use the occasion for bringing his principles before the public. 
For some it was a matter of family honour and status. If large land holdings existed within a 
constituency it was usual for that family to participate in its representation. James Maitland was elected for 
Camelford in 1806 mainly because his father wanted a son in the Commons, and Lord Robert Manners 
served for over thirty years in the Commons, for Scarborough, Leicestershire and North Leicestershire, all of 
which contained family interests, despite preferring field sports to attending Parliament. Similarly, the 
Dundas family regularly had members in Parliament who said or did little. As Grey revealingly wrote to 
Holland in 1807, 
We shall have the satisfaction of making what are called "good divisions, " when the more important 
business of Fox-hunting, etc., does not prevent. 
4 
Being an MP could be seen as a great honour to have bestowed on someone. Althorp talked of, 
The most honourable situation an Englishman can enjoy - that of being the representative of a 
large and 
independentcounty. s 
But, James Scarlett, on contesting Lewes in 1812, described his ambivalence over being an MP: 
I know not whether a seat in Parliament be really an object to me. But I think 
it can do me no harm and 
my vanity perhaps has not been proof aýainst the temptation of coming in independently of all party and 
upon the strength of my own character. 
1 He took the name Saville in 1798. He was convicted in 1784, but exonerated in 1790. 
2 Though a bankrupt could not be an MP, an MP could not be arrested for debt: Walpole, The Electorate and the 
Legislature, p. 97-9. 
3 [B. Wilson], The Struggles OfAn Old Chartist; What he knows, and the part he has taken in various movements, lohn 
Nicholson, Halifax, 1887, p. 14. 
4 Trevelyan, Lord Grey Of The Reform Bill, p. 162. 
5 Althrop to Georgina Spencer, 17 February 1793: E. A. Wasson, Whig Renaissance: Lord Althop and the {talg Party 1782- 
1845, Garland Publishing Inc., London, 1987, p. 32. 
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During his career he refused several offers of a Commons seat from both Whigs and Tories, who wanted him 
for his potential debating talent. As with Cobden and T. P. Thompson, there were some candidates whom 
people wished to see in Parliament because of their political skills and views. I lowever, as Scarlett's 
comment shows, recipients of such approbation were sometimes equivocal as to its value, though also 
responsive to flattery. In the. 1840s Cobden felt that being asked to represent the West Riding was such an 
honour that he had to accept, though he would have preferred to represent a smaller constituency. ' 
For some the Commons was a training ground for the Lords. The eldest sons of major aristocratic 
families were expected to, eventually, take their seats in the Lords and at least occasionally vote or speak. 
Early election to the Commons provided them with training. Mahon, speaking in 1832, was reported as 
saying, 
I do think it of the highest importance, if we are to have aI louse of Lords at all, that those who are to 
compose it should be trained in the habits of business ... Of all the many eminent statesman who are to be found in the House of Lords at present, I only remember one - Lord I lolland - who has not received 
his political education here. 2 
All these motivations, not directly linked to being an active Parliamentarian, help explain why people 
became MPs, but not active. 
6.4.6 Political science explanations 
One can attempt to construct a more rigorous model to explain MPs' behaviour. The major work in 
this area is that of G. W. Cox .3 The essence of 
his argument regarding MPs' behaviour is as follows. First, the 
number of MPs listed in the Hansard sessional index - that is those who had on at least one occasion spoken, 
moved a motion, or otherwise addressed the chair, and been recorded as so doing in Ilansard " rose steadily 
between the sessions of 1820 of 1852.3 (Table 6.5). Similarly, participation in voting increased (Table 6.6). 
continued) 
Thorne, History of Parliament, Volume 5, p. 104. 
1 Kitson-Clark has emphasised the importance of habit and a desire to "do the right thing" in explaining why people 
became MPs: Kitson Clark, The Making of Victorian England, p. 213. 
2 Judd. Members of Parliament, p. 31-2. 
3I lis major work is Cox, The Efficient Secret. Cox is one of the leading members of what can be termed, for want of a better 
name, the "new new" political history. Its practitioners, mainly American, use rational-choice models which, though 
sophisticated compared to what historians have used in the past, are relatively crude compared to the work of economists like 
Graham Loonies on rational-choice. Statistics and institutionalist approaches are widely used. 
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MPs listed as % of all 
MPs 
1820 201 7 30.5 
1822 235 6 35.7 
1825 241 5 36.6 
1828 241 6 36.6 
1833 395 7 60.0 
1835 378 6 57.4 
1852-3 385 6 58.5 
Table 6.5: Number of MPs in Hansard 1820-531 
Year Total number % of divisions Number of divisions 
of divisions participated In by participated In by 
average MP average MP 
1836 187 22.8 43 
1850 329 26.8 88 
Table 6.6: MPs' participation in voting 1836 & 18502 
However, not only is this average participation rate low, even if one looks only at divisions on 
major issues there were still low rates of participation (p. 194). Though Cox does not address why speaking 
and voting rates were so low, he does suggest several explanations for his figures. 
' Expansion of the press 
may have motivated MPs to be seen to do things. It did become increasingly common for MPs to give the 
press written versions of important speeches to encourage their reporting. The role of the press was 
symbolised by the new building opened after the 1834 fire, which introduced a gallery specially for 
reporters. However, behind these explanations lies the idea that, "only if constituents reacted to the behaviour 
of their MPs in Parliament and MPs cared about re-election would increased press coverage have stimulated 
legislative prolixity. "4 
According to Erskine May, obtaining pledges from candidates first became sufficiently widespread 
to get public notice in 1774.3 Yet these were by no means normal, and anyway giving a pledge on a 
particular issues could often be honoured by only a couple of votes. But Cox has other evidence. MPs who 
Cox, The Efficient Secret, p. 53. 
2 Cox, The Efficient Secret, p. 54. These figures are derived from A. L. Lowell, "The Influence of Party Upon Legislation In 
England And America, " Annual Report Of The American Ilistorical Association, Volume 1,1901, who used the printed 
division lists for these years. They do not include tellers or paired MPs (p. 322 n. b); further, unanimous votes are excluded 
(p. 322) " but such a vote would almost certainly not have resulted in a division being called in the first place. Indeed, 
Lowell's main reason for excluding unanimous votes derives from his American statistics. (p. 322.3). 
3 Cox, The Efficient Secret, p. 54-6I I. 
4 Cox, The Efficient Secret, p. 55. 
3 T. Erskine May, The Constitutional History of England Since The Accession 0/George The Th1r4 1760-1860. With A New 
Supplementary Chapter, 1861-71,9th edition, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1889, Volume 2, p. 70-1. 
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sat for constituencies created in 1832 were more than twice as likely to take part in debate than had been 
MPs sitting for constituencies that had lost one or both members in 1832. MPs from small constituencies 
were less likely to participate - partly because larger constituencies generated more casework, and partly 
because, Cox argues, the larger the constituency the more important the politics of opinion were (and the less 
important influence, bribery and patronage were) and so the more important Parliamentary activity was. 
Larger electorates went with more active MPs. Thus, between 19 February and 19 March 1835 23.5% of MP 
from boroughs with an electorate' of not more than 2,000 spoke, whilst 51.5% spoke from those with 
electorates of more than 2,000. Similarly, in counties 16.4% of MPs from constituencies with electorates not 
more than 5,000 spoke and 28.6% spoke from those with electorates of more than 5,000.2 However, Cox is 
assuming that the causality runs from big electorates, via more Parliamentary participation being required to 
win re-election, to more talking. Certainly one nineteenth century commentator agreed with Cox: 
The populous modern constituency has a natural desire to exert its own weight in the House of 
Commons. It can only do this through its representative; and it consequently regards with favour the 
representative who takes an active part in parliamentary proceedings ... Thus some members speak not 
for the purpose of producing any effect on the House, but the purpose of creating a favourable 
impression on the constituency which they represent 3 
It is possible that a different causality was at work. For example, radical MPs ipso facto talked a lot - they 
were keen on doing things - and also tended to come from large constituencies (where they could get 
elected). If there is a correlation between A and B, it may not be that one causes the other, but that a third 
factor -C- causes both A and B. If this is indeed the case, then Cox's figures may simply be a reflection of 
another factor connecting large electorates and talkativeness. Further, it is not necessarily the case that 
because a constituency had a larger electorate, it was less safe. 
The evidence from Yorkshire suggests this was the case. I have compared the number of speeches 
that Yorkshire MPs gave to the size of their majority at the preceeding election. For 1800-31 1 have collected 
the data for every session. For 1832-50 I have the data for 11 sessions. Graphs 6.2 and 6.3 show the raw data. 
Where an MP was elected in an unpolled contest their majority is plotted as being 100; it is plotted as being 
110 where they were elected without any contest. The number of speeches made is measured as the number 
of entries in Hansard's index for speeches by that MP over approximately the number of days that 
Parliament sat in that session (the number of days is measured as the number of days between the first and 
last sittings of the session, with deductions for breaks, as over Christmas, but without any deductions for 
Saturdays, Sundays etc. ). 
As can be seen, there is no clear relationship between size of majority and number of speeches 
made. Indeed, the graphs make it clear why any such relationship is unlikely - there are too many MPs who 
were elected without a contest or did not speak for there to be any consistent relationship between size of 
majority and speaking rate. However, even if we ignore those MPs who were elected without any contest, 
1 Cox does not make this clear, but presumably all these figures are unadjusted for multiple entries etc. 
2 Cox, The Efficient Secret, p. 58. MPs from larger constituencies also introduced more bills and asked more questions: G. W. 
Cox and J. W. Ingram, "Suffrage Expansion and Legislative Behaviour in Nineteenth-Century Britain, " Social Science 
History, Volume 16,1992, p. 552-3. 
3 Walpole, The Electorate and the Legislature, p. 132-3. l le traced the development to 1832, but with 1867 and 1884 further 
extending matters. 
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there is still no clear relationship: a regression of speeches/day on majority size for these only gives R- 
squared values of 8.4 (1800-31) and 2.7 (1832-50). 
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Graph 6.2 
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Simple causal models do not explain MPs' behaviour. The search for purpose, rationality and logic needs to 
be supplemented by one for apathy, laziness and inertia. The great variety in frequency of speaking and 
voting has also been shown by Glynn and Aydelotte (Tables 6.7 and 6.8). 
Session Never spoke Spoke once a Spoke between once Spoke more than live 
year and five times a year times 
a year 
1833-4 35% 17% 19% 29% 
1835-7 34% 20% 22% 24% 
Table 6.7: Frequency of speaking amongst all MPs' 
Year Total number of 
divisions 
% of MPs who voted 
in under 100 
100-199 200-299 300 or more 
1836 187 36.9 43.3 11.8 8.0 
1846 106 41.5 32.1 17.0 9.4 
Table 6.8: Frequency of voting amongst all MPs2 
Instead of an electoral factor, an explanation needs to be found elsewhere for the increase that did 
occur in MPs' activity. The most likely explanation - and this is backed up by the pattern of private 
members' bills - is that Parliament could do, and was expected to do, more. As a result, it carried out more 
business, which resulted in more speeches and votes. Or to put it more precisely, had the electoral situation 
been identical, say, in 1844 to that in 1824 the number of votes and speeches would not have been the same. 
In addition, a more detailed look at the figures used for the above regression analysis shows that, irrespective 
of size of majority, MPs from seats such as West Riding, Leeds and Sheffield spoke more than other MPs. 
1832 had increased the number of such seats activist MPs - usually though not always radicals - were both 
attracted to and were more likely to get elected in. 
Though Cox accepts that industrialisation and the creation of new problems resulted in an increased 
demand for Parliamentary activity, he plays down its possible impact, arguing that if it had been a factor then 
one would have expected Parliamentary business to have ebbed and flowed with Britain's economy. As he 
points out 1832 (and also 1867, though that is not a concern of this thesis) mark the changes, not economic 
cycles. However, it is hard to see why, for example, one should expect the call on legislative time caused by 
increasing central government and Parliamentary involvement in public health to have varied with the 
economic cycle. Cholera did not necessarily come with depression, for example, and to expect politicians to 
react immediately - or react with a consistent timelag - to health problems caused by economic problems is 
unwarranted. Similarly, he does not make it clear what he thinks the link would have been - economic good 
times resulting in more social legislation as funds were available, or bad times resulting in more as the need 
1 Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament 1833-68, Volume 1, p. 207. 
2 Aydelotte, "Data Archive, " p. 345. 
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became more pressing? And, if one takes the latter view, this could have been balanced by other measures - 
such as railway bills - which were more popular during economic good times. 
The figures regarding the number and type of private members' bills are very confused, varying 
significantly from one source to another. ' Despite the great variety in the evidence, some common trends can 
be discerned. In particular, there are few clear secular rises or falls, with the striking exception of the number 
of private members' bills regarding railways, which took off in the mid-I 840s (and, as a result, procedures 
for dealing with them were changed in 1844,11 years before the procedures for all others were changed). 
There was no great change brought about by 1832, as Cox also concluded on another occasion. 2 The growth 
in railway bills was associated with factors other than electoral ones. That is, had the electoral situation been 
identical in 1844 to that in 1824 the number of private member bills for railways would have been the same 
in this hypothetical 1844 (without electoral reform in 1832) as the number in the real 1844 (with 1832). 
Cox is not the only person to have made arguments that this Chapter contradicts. Schonhardt-Bailey 
has argued for the importance of economic factors in influencing constituents, and for constituents to have 
influenced MPs' behaviour. 3 However, although she has constructed intricate statistical models they include 
basic assumptions that she does little to justify. 
She assumes that the electoral system acted as an efficient and effective transmission mechanism for 
turning economic desires into Parliamentary action. Given the widespread re-election of MPs without polls, 
or even contests, there is a clear prima facie case for arguing that many MPs much of the time were insulated 
to the electoral consequences of economic desires. As Aydelotte put it, regarding 1841-7, the lack of polls 
and the behaviour of MPs elected in polls makes it "difficult to argue that contests were an important element 
in the exercise of control by constituencies. "4 This judgement is reinforced by my figures in Tables 6.2 and 
6.3. Although she addressed the issue of the prevalance of polls, her argument is unconvincing. She claims 
that, "Gash has argued that the proportion of contested versus uncontested elections was `large by 
comparison with elections before 1830. "'s There are two problems with this use of Gash. 
First, strictly speaking what she claims Gash is saying is not relevant. That the proportion of 
elections which went to a poll is higher after 1830 than before tells us little about the actual level after 1830. 
For her statistical construct to be valid it requires that there were sufficent contests for the electoral system to 
act as an efficient and effective transmission mechanism for economic desires. Knowing that the proportion 
was higher after 1830 does not tell us if it was high enough. 
' Cf, for example, F. Clifford, A History Of Private Bill Legislation, original edition 1883-7, Frank Cass and Co., London, 
1968, Volume 1, Appendix A with G. Crosby, Crosby's Parliamentary Record Of Elections in Great Britain And Ireland. " 
With Select Bibliographical Notices And Speeches Of Distinguished Statesmen, &c., George Crosby, Leeds, 1849, Volume 2, 
p. 556 and 1846 (723-II) XXXIII. 
2 Cox and Ingram, "Suffrage Expansion, " p. 542-4. 
3 C. M. Schonhardt, A model of trade policy liberalization: Looking Inside the British `Hegemon' of the nineteenth century, 
University of California at Los Angeles PhD, 1991, C. Schonhardt-Bailey, "Specific Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio 
Diversification, and Free Trade: Domestic Determinants of the Repeal of the Corn Laws, " World Politics, Volume 43 
Number 4,1991 and C. Schonhardt-Bailcy, "Linking Constituency Interests to Legislative Voting Behaviour. The Role of 
District Economic and Electoral Composition in the Repeal of the Corn Laws, " in J. A. Phillips (ed), Computing 
Parliamentary History: George III To Victoria, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1994. 
4 W. O. Aydelotte (ed), The History of Parliamentary Behaviour, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977, p. 240. 
5 Schonhardt-Bailey, "Linking Constituency Interests to Legislative Voting Behaviour, " p. 91. 
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Second, her use of Gash is a highly misleading distortion of what he actually said. She has ignored 
the first three sentences of Gash's preceeding paragraph, which stated that, 
It may be observed as a generalization that the composition of the House of Commons in the age of Peel 
was decided almost as much by the elections that were not contested as by those that were. After the 
Reform Act there were 401 constituencies that returned members to Parliament. In the five general 
elections that took place between 1832 and 1847 the average number of those that were contested was 
only just over half. 
Further, her quotation of Gash is cut short. After the comment about comparisons with before 1830 he 
continued, 
Nevertheless it is a singular reflection that at the general election of 1841, which installed in office one 
of the most memorable ministries of the century, the electors were only called upon to record a vote in 
about 190 constituencies. 2 
She attempts to bolster her argument by pointing out that, "even where there were no contests, there 
were `electoral verdicts' (i. e., compromises between the two parties to split the representation). " This meant 
that, "Even where no voting occurred, an electoral process can be said to have existed which was akin to the 
contemporary notions of contestability. "3 There are two problems with this. First, she does not state what she 
thinks "contemporary notions of contestability" were. Second, she again distorts Gash, whom she again 
refers to as the authority for her claims. She makes no explicit claim as to how often she thinks contests 
occurred without their being a poll, but the implication of her saying, "Even where no voting occurred... " 
rather than, "Sometimes where no voting occurred... " or, "Often where no voting occured ... 
" is that if a 
constituency did not have a poll then it almost always had a non-polled contest. But, this is not what Gash 
claimed. He stated that the occurance was "often" (p. 240) but also "not infrequently" (p. 240). Faced with 
these two vague qualitative statements, one cannot reasonably leap to assuming they occurred almost always. 
Again, then, we are left with a blind assumption, devoid of supporting evidence, that there were sufficient 
contests (be it in the form of polls or non-polled contests) for the electoral system to act as an efficient and 
effective transmission mechanism for economic desires. 
She also relies on "the initial assumption is that MPs pursued, as a predominant (albeit not singular) 
goal, their reelection"4 Yet, the evidence of this Chapter points strongly towards this being an unwarranted 
assumption and that MPs' behaviour was motivated by a far wider range of desires. 
Finally, whilst she shows a correlation between how MPs voted and portfolio diversification by 
their constituents, this correlation suffers from the same problem as Cox's. She does not tackle the possibility 
that the causality ran other than from constituents' economic interests, via electoral pressure, to changing 
MPs' behaviour. 
Still, there was some link between Parliamentary activity and constituency pressure. Greville wrote 
of a Parliamentary speech by T. S. Duncombe, 
1 Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p. 239. Like Schonhardt-Bailey he uses "contested" where I would use "polled. " 
2 Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p. 239. 
3 Schonhardt-Bailey, "Linking Constituency Interests to Legislative Voting Behaviour, " p. 91. 
4 Schonhardt, A model of trade policy liberalization, p. 47 
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Tommy came to Henry de Ros and told him that his constituents at Hertford were very anxious he 
should make a speech, but that he did not know what to say, and begged Henry to supply him with the 
necessary materials. ' 
The admittedly conservative Blackwoods Magazine commented in 1833 that there had been a, 
vast multiplication of popular constituencies by the Reform Bill, which has augmented two-fold that 
class of orators who spend their breath and not their money in securing their places, and whose seat is 
2 held by the most precarious of all tenures, that of pleasing a giddy and inconstant multitude? 
William Aldam (Leeds MP 1841-7) was warned in 1847 that some of his supporters were querying why, 
"they never find your name in the Newspapers as taking an active part in the procedures of Parliament "3 
Another contemporary commented that after 1832 governments required a body of over 400 MPs to be sure 
of a majority at all times, as the presence of MPs was, "now so rigidly enjoined and expected by their 
constituents' .4 However, this incentive derived from constituents' desires came into conflict with MPs being 
intimidated by the idea of speaking in the Commons. This was an age when Parliamentary speeches were 
taken seriously and were a large part of the political process. For example, "J. D., " a retiring MP, wrote in 
1826, 
I was mortified by perceiving that my language never did justice to my thoughts, nor conveyed them 
fully and fairly to others; and my dread of failure in public, rendered highly probable by my experience 
in private, has sealed my lips in the senate [Parliament] for almost half a century. 5 
Another MP sent his speeches to Blackwood's Magazine, saying, 
I feel, at present, an inconquerable reluctance to open my mouth. Three several times, on the first night 
of the Session, I was half out of my seat, and once stood up, remaining on my legs full a quarter of a 
minute; but "Mr Speaker" fell from my lips in such a dying murmur, that the chair (to speak technically) 
did not catch my voice, and I did not catch his eyes. Since that time, I have made eleven more attempts, 
and "Mr Speaker, " in a whisper, was all that my tongue could utter, in four out of the eleven; while the 
6 other seven were confined to that curvature of the back which boys make when playing at leap frog. 
Parliamentary oratory was taken seriously, and indeed was a standard for others to be compared to. Thus it 
was that when a Wiltshire MP complemented a Leeds meeting on the Corn Laws for its quality of speeches 
he said that several of them, "would not have disgraced the best speakers in the House of Commons. "7 
However, whilst such oratorical limitations and high expectations might explain why MPs did not 
speak more, it does not explain why such people became, and remained MPs. In 1830 one MP estimated that 
only about 400 MPs were "talkers" - and this was in the context of lamenting that too many talked, and so 
slowing business down! 8 He does not appear to have found it odd that around one in three MPs were not 
"talkers. " Of Henry William Paget, MP for Caernarvon 1790-6 and Milborne Port 1796-1804 and 1806- 
1810, it was said, 
' He did. Greville writing on 25 February 1828: Jennings, Anecdotal History, p. 207. 
2 Blackwood's Magazine, November 1833, Volume 34, p. 780-1. 
3 Baylden to Aldam, 10 June 1847, Warde Aldam MMS, DDWA/P/5, Doncaster Archives. 
4 Publicus Severus [J. Dillon], Horae Icenae; Being The Lubrications OfA Winter Evening, On The Result Of The General 
Election, 1835, Part One, [1835], p. 2-3. 
s Blackwood's Magazine, August 1826, Volume 20, p. 352. 
6 Blackwood's Magazine, April 1830, Volume 27, p. 608. 
7 Turbeville and Beckwith, "Leeds and Parliamentary Reform, " p. 21. 
Blackwood's Magazine, July 1830, Volume 28. p. 59. 
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It does not appear that he ever made a speech in the Commons in all the years of his membership of it, 
though his letters to his parents and brothers show that he had decided views on some of the great 
questions of the day. ' 
He explained his behaviour, saying, "I have no facility of expressing myself - the thing does not come 
naturally to me. "2 He did vote. More bemusing are the examples of ministers who, even in times of need, did 
not speak. Mrs Arbuthnot wrote in 1830, when the Tories were ruling, "We must try and make Calcraft and 
Croker speak. Both are eminently capable ... none of the Cabinet will utter except Peel. "3 Peel himself in 
1830 was "disgusted" at the failure of three Cabinet Ministers to speak in reply to Brougham in a debate 
(Peel himself had already spoken): "If the three mutes will not speak, it is clear they will not remain in very 
long. s4 Though there was pressure, in various guises to speak, it was greatly limited in its efficacy. 
6.4.7 Problems with Hansard 
Much of the above evidence - both my own and that of other historians - assumes Hansard is a 
complete record. If an MP is not mentioned in Hansard, then he did not speak. But, taking a random day -3 
February 1806 - suggests this is not always warranted. The House of Commons Journal lists twenty-one 
items of business for that day. But, only nine of these are mentioned in Hansard. Further, of these nine there 
are two which are recorded in Hansard without any MP being mentioned in connection with them. There are 
a further five for which an MP is mentioned, but without this mention indexed in either the Sessional or 
cumulative 1803-30 index. It is only the other two items of business that Hansard reports, there are only two 
for which MPs are mentioned in Hansard, speeches reported and entries made in the indexes. 
Further, there are the twelve items of business that are mentioned in the Journal, but not in 
Hansard. These fall into two categories. First, those which it can be imagined did not involve any MPs (the 
Speaker excepted)' speaking: the second reading of a bill (three items) and a miscellaneous resolution. 
Regarding the other eight items, it is hard to envisage no MPs (the Speaker excepted) speaking. Two 
petitions were presented which resulted in leave being granted to introduce a bill, another two petitions were 
presented and referred to a committee, the House thrice went into committee and, finally, there was one 
occasion of papers being presented to the House, the Journal naming the MP who presented them. How, for 
example, could a petition be presented and referred to a committee, whose membership moreover is recorded 
in the Journal, without anybody saying anything? 
Thus, there are two problems. First, those items of business which are not recorded in Hansard, but 
nevertheless some of which almost certainly involved MPs speaking. Second, those items of business 
mentioned in Hansard which also almost certainly involved MPs speaking, but do not leave any traces in 
Hansard's indexes. Hansard apparently indexed only its reports of speeches, and moreover these were not all 
the speeches made. Those speeches that were not reported or indexed may often have been fairly brief, but 
they were speeches nonetheless. 
'Marquess of Anglesey, One-Leg: The Life and Letters ofI1enry William Paget, First Marquess ofAnglesey KG. (1768- 
1854), Jonathan Cape, London, 1961, p. 38. 
2 Thome, History of Parliament, Volume 4, p. 709. 
34 November 1830: Bamford and Duke of Wellington, Journal OjMrs. Arbuthnot, p. 398. 
43 November 1830: Colchester, Political Diary 1828-30: Volume 2, p. 413-4. 
fie presumably spoke frequently, if only to make procedural announcements. 
213 
However, it is reasonable to assume that Hansard was good at recording substantive speeches. ' This 
assumption rests on the evidence taken before, and reports of, a Parliamentary committee which investigated 
the reporting of Parliament. Though it dealt at length with how individual speeches were reported - both by 
Hansard and newspapers - and whether they were verbatim accounts or not, the question of whether or not 
someone was reported at all was not raised. 2 Therefore, though these figures do have some problems, 3 they 
do appear to be reasonable as a record of who made substantive speeches, and so can be used to make broad 
points about activity levels. 
6.5 MPs' majorities 
Although the majority an MP had at one election is only a rough guide to how safe a seat was (in 
particular changing political alignments within constituencies could alter safeness greatly, and the more 
volatile the electorate the less safe any level of majority is), the impact of 1832 on MPs' majorities is of 
interest 4 
The measure I prefer is the difference between a victorious candidate's number of votes, and the 
number of votes gained by the highest placed loser, as a percentage of the number of people who voted! In 
all Yorkshire constituencies, the mean majority at polls 1800-32 was 24.1% (median 20.0%, N=73) falling to 
15.0% (median 11.0%, N=128) for 1832-50. New borough constituencies were little different, with mean 
majorities of 15.9% after 1832 (median 11.0%, N=53). 
This clear drop in mean majorities suggests a system that was opening up. However, as variations in 
majorities did little to alter MPs' Parliamentary behaviour (p. 205-209), this drop was limited in its impact on 
vitality. Yet, put alongside the increase in the electorate, it is a salutary warning that not all was decay and 
decline. 
1 That is, recording that they occurred. The question of how close Hansard came to being a verbatim account for those 
speeches it did report is another matter. For example, see Namier, Structure Of Politics, p. 74 n I. 
2 Report From The Joint Select Committee Of The House Of Lords And The House Of Commons, On The Cost And Method 
Of The Publication Of The Debates And Proceedings In Parliament; Together With The Proceedings Of The Committee, 
Minutes Of Evidence And Appendix, 1888 (284) X. A major reason for this investigation was, however, disquiet at the 
deterioration in the quality of reporting of the contents of speeches. 
3 Indeed, according to Glynn, "I Iansard records no debate in the I louse on about half of all the private members' Bills passed 
during this period [1833-68]": Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament 1833-68, Volume 1, p. 232. 
4 Data saved as majority. mtp. 
sI prefer using the number of people who voted to using the number of votes cast. I Iowever, both involve complicated 
assumptions regarding levels of plumping, what type of contests were expected at the next election, how varying the number 
of candidates affects the likelihood of each of them being elected and so on. Thus it would be silly to claim that my preferred 
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6.6 Finding candidates 
The mixed reasons for becoming an MP, as reflected in voting and speaking records, are also 
apparent in the efforts made to find candidates. The mix of ambition and duty was reflected in the language 
of many electors when asking particular people to be candidates. Such requisitions, and responses, were 
usually couched in language implying that it was a great honour to be asked. Though this requisition/ 
honoured acceptance formula was sometimes simply a ritual to be enacted, it often represented a real 
procedure. Typical was the following request from York in 1837: 
We the undersigned Freemen and Electors entitled to vote in the Election of Members to serve in 
Parliament for the City of York consider at this momentous crisis that all Constituencies who adhere to 
the principles of the British Constitution are solemnly called upon to use their united and energetic 
exertions that such Members only shall be returned to Parliament as will maintain the true principles of 
the Constitution - promote the welfare of the Community - defend the legitimate Prerogatives of the 
Crown and the two Houses of Parliament - and resist any measure which has a tendency in its immediate 
or ultimate effects, to weaken the efficiency, or impair the usefulness, of the Protestant Established 
Church. 
That in the opinion of your Requisitioners, the principles of true Conservatism actuate a large majority 
of the electors of this ancient City and therefore it is their duty to return to Parliament two 
Representatives, in whom they can confide the defence of the sacred Institutions of our Land. 
That having a high estimation of your talent and patriotic zeal and feeling assured that your principles 
are in accordance with ours, we do therefore respectfully request that you will allow yourself to be put in 
nomination as a Candidate for the Representation of our ancient city at the next Election and we do 
pledge ourselves to give you our Voters and Interest. ' 
Though the public request and reply may have been pre-arranged, that is not to say the whole procedure was 
bogus. One of the subtleties is revealed by Peel's comments in 1830, 
I have had a letter today from Mr. Porter of Liverpool stating that there had been a meeting, and that a 
requisition was preparing calling me to stand as a candidate for Liverpool. As my resolution is fixed not 
to stand in any event, and as there would be great awkwardness in their encouraging an offer to be made 
to me which I meant to decline, I have written to them stating that I have no leisure to perform the duties 
of member for Liverpool and therefore at once notifying my intention to decline the honour. 2 
Though such protestations may sound insincere, the large fmancial and physical strain that could be involved 
in a contest suggest otherwise. Thus, some such exchanges were a matter of a potential candidate needing to 
be assured that they had a real chance of wining. ' 
The return of MPs at no expense to themselves, such as Macaulay in Leeds and two Whigs in 
Edinburgh in 1832, suggests both genuine reluctance on the part of candidates to stand, and genuine 
enthusiasm on the part of electors to have that person as MP. Macaulay, for example, had local supporters 
from his opposition to slavery and the friendship between his father and Wilberforce. A different example of 
how candidates may genuinely have been dragooned into standing against their inclinations is that of 
William Joseph Denison. After being a Camelford MP (1796-1802) he stood in Hull in 1802, at Fitzwilliam's 
instigation and with little personal effort, though not at little cost. He was defeated, and refused an invitation 
from Fitzwilliam to stand again in 1805, but stood and won in 1806. This was after being nominated without 
1 1837 York election, ACC 93/2 a-d, York City Archives. 
2 G. Peel (ed), The Private Letters of Sir Robert Peel, John Murray, London, 1920, p. 125. 
3 E. g. the exchange between T. P. Thompson and a local committee regarding him contesting Bradford in 1847: T. P. 
Thompson MSS, DTII 3, Brynmor Jones Library, hull University. 
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his consent by Fitzwilliam's agents. He had to pay £5000 in costs, and resigned in 1807. He was nominated 
for Liverpool in 1807, and disavowed the nomination. The reluctance of some candidates was also reflected 
in the vocabulary, with the frequent use of "offering, " as in a candidate offering himself for a constituency, 
which sounds rather more self-effacing than "standing". 
It was common for a deputation to be despatched to London to invite, interview or simply enquire 
after a candidate. Latterly, the Carlton (founded 1832) and the Reform (founded 1836) were used as clearing 
houses for candidates. Good candidates were often difficult to find. The strain that a constituency could exert 
is demonstrated by Beverley. It polled all but five times at elections in 1722-1831, and was fought at every 
election between the first and second Reform Acts. At no two elections in the nineteenth century were the 
same pair of MPs elected. The Whig John Wharton, who returned in 1818 just in time to pay off his debts 
from the previous election before winning again, spent the last years of his life in a debtors' gaol, much of 
his wealth having gone into the pockets of Beverley voters. R. C. Burton went further and announced his 
1818 candidature whilst in gaol for debt. In 1820 James Graham decamped from Hull to St Ives, in order to 
avoid the heavy costs of a Hull seat, and desiring instead a seat where natural influence could replace 
financial exuberance. ' T. P. Thompson, bruised by previous experiences there, refused an invitation to stand 
in the 1854 Hull by-election, saying he, "would sooner think of selling his daughter for a concubine at New 
Orleans". 
This emphasis in candidature affairs on matters other than Parliamentary was also reflected in the 
types of people who became Yorkshire MPs. Most Yorkshire county MPs stood for the first time in the 
county, rather than having a borough apprenticeship. In other words, previous Parliamentary experience was 
not seen as necessary to represent even such a great constituency as Yorkshire. Rather, the emphasis was on 
local links and qualifications. Indeed, many Yorkshire MPs stood for boroughs only after being a county MP. 
This was partly to ease financial and constitutional strains. It may also have reflected the fact that, having 
had a chance to make a reputation as a Yorkshire (county), continuing to be an MP for a prestigious 
constituency was less important. 
6.7 Local links 
Given that there were important attributes other than previous Parliamentary experience that made 
someone an apparently good choice for Parliament, the low levels of voting and speaking in Parliament are 
less surprising. Such activity did not always feature in the model of what an MP should be. Local, 
honourable, respectable, a history of local service, control of some local patronage, preferably a good 
speaker and rich are traditional descriptions of the preferred characteristics of a candidate. I fence, there was 
sometimes detailed interest in the family history and links of a candidate. For example, a witness to a 
Commons committee said of Charles Barkley, who finished bottom of the York poll in 1835, "Being a 
stranger and not stating what family he was, it had an influence against him"? When the Anti-Corn Law 
' Parker, Life And Letters Of Sir James Graham, p. 52. 
2 Markham, Nineteenth-Century Parliamentary Elections, p. 13. 
3 Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p. 110. 
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League decided to fight all elections in September 1843 it quickly ran into problems finding candidates, and 
its reliance on obvious outsiders damaged its prestige. ' 
However, there were plenty of exceptions and complications. "Local" is somewhat of a misnomer. 
It was more a matter of having some connection with locals rather than being a local oneself. Owning local 
property could suffice, as could being a local landowner's son or 
nominee. 
Other links - particularly national 
fame on an issue that was important locally - existed. For example, George Hadfield, famous nationally for 
his dissenting views, contested Bradford in 1835, and was invited explicitly because of these views. In the 
jaundiced views of an opponent it was, 
an insult to the Borough ... to force upon the constituents of this Borough an entire stranger to the town 
and county, whose sole recommendation and fame was founded on a letter widely circulated throughout 
the country containing sentiments totally subversive of the constitution. 
This attack typifies the balancing acts that occurred. As the established Church was a major issue, and given 
the views of one of the incumbents (John Hardy), it made sense for dissenters to invite a leading figure such 
as Hadfield. But, though inviting an outsider to stand (albeit unsuccessfully in this case) was acceptable to 
some, it was not so acceptable as to be beyond reproach from opponents. Likewise, in York in 1837 David 
Atcherley -a law sergeant and stranger - stood. It was not simply his family home that was attacked. One of 
the pieces of publicity attacking him went, 
A Law Sergeant has addressed you as a Candidate. I ask you, What claim has he upon this City? Is he 
even a Yorkshireman? Does he contribute to our Charities - to our Benefit Clubs? Will he be found to 
support our City in any way? 3 
As with Hadfield, so with Sadler in Huddersfield in 1834, where a Tory-radical coalition was based on 
factory reform, though radicals split between Sadler and a conventional radical candidate. Given his 
involvement in factory reform Sadler was an obvious candidate, lack of local roots notwithstanding. More 
debatably, his Weslyan background may have gained some favour with local Evangelicals, at least those who 
were not Whigs. Issues also predominated in the West Riding in 1846, when Fitzwilliam preferred a 
prominent opponent of the Corn Laws (Cobden) to his own son as candidate. 
In 1843 Bradford Liberals invited T. P. Thompson to stand, should I lardy retire. The invitation was 
driven by William Byles, editor of the Bradford Observer. He firmly supported free trade and Corn Law 
repeal, issues on which Thompson's record was strong. However, this was not his only appeal. As a 
generally well-known radical, he was a good choice to join a balanced radical-moderate ticket that would 
keep dissenters, Liberals and radicals united. In this respect Thompson had no special policy-based local 
appeal that other possible radical candidates lacked. Rather, the local link came from one person (Bytes) 
having particular personal admiration for him, an admiration based on Thomspon's national fame. 
A man of different political complexion, but invited to stand for similar reasons, was the Chartist 
Ernest Jones. He stood in Halifax (1847,1852), Nottingham (1857,1859) and Manchester (1868). As a 
1 McCord, The Anti-Corn Law League, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1958, p. 157 
2 Jowitt, "Dissenters, Voluntaryism and Liberal Unity, " p. 11. 
s Letter from An Elector, 20 July 1837: 1837 York election, ACC 93, York City Archives. 
4 This is unsurprising since, in addition to being a Tory, Sadler had been Newcastle's candidate for Newark in the infamous 
1829 election. 
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nationally prominent Chartist, it was these activities that provided the link between him and the 
constituencies where he stood. Similarly, Brougham moved around the country in the course of his career as 
an MP, standing at various times in Camelford, Inverkeithing burghs, Knaresborough, Liverpool, 
Westmoreland, Winchelsea and Yorkshire. He was invited to stand in Yorkshire in 1830 precisely because he 
was a nationally famous figure. It did cause Tory comment, though this was largely aimed at his lack of 
Yorkshire land holdings, as he was the first Yorkshire MP to not own land there. 
In constituencies that were heavily influenced by one person the policy stance of a candidate could 
also appeal, though in this case appealing to the patron rather than the electors mattered. For example, Robert 
Southey was elected for Downton in 1826 as a result of Lord Radnor liking his Book of the Church. Ile was 
so keen that Radnor not merely procured Southey's return whilst the latter was absent in Holland, he also did 
it without telling him and only informed him after the election by means of an anonymous note I Radnor 
wrote that he was, 
Quite delighted with the summary on the last page of that work, and ... has therefore been anxious that 
Mr. Southey should have a seat in the ensuing Parliament; and having a little interest, has so managed 
that he is at this moment in possession of that seat under this single injunction: - 
Ut sustineat firmiter, strenne et continuo, quae ipse bene docuit esse sustineida. ' 
Only once Southey discovered his fate was he able to point out that, "A seat in Parliament is neither 
consistent with my circumstances, inclinations, habits, or pursuits in life, " and that he did not possess the 
required property qualification. 2 
Even if a candidate had local links, they may only have played a tangential role or only been poorly 
utilised. Though William Beverley was a magistrate and deputy lieutenant for the East Riding for thirty years 
his main qualification in 1812 to stand for Beverley was a willingness to do so. When he stood again in 1818 
- after friends nominated him - he actually spent his time at the other end of the country, cultivating 
Weymouth and Melcombe Regis (though it the end he did not stand there), and did not appear in Beverley. 
Charles Forbes was another Beverley MP (1812-18). Though in 1818 he moved off to the less turbulent 
pastures of Malmesbury, his friends still canvassed for him in Beverley. Similarly, though the Ramsden 
family had considerable land-holdings in Huddersfield they preferred Malton, to which they were connected 
via marriage to the Fitzwilliams, to the more tempestuous politics of iluddersfield, though a more prestigious 
county seat, if possible, could be preferable to either. 3 
A more pecuniary form of local link was evident in Hedon. MPs and candidates were expected to be 
generous to local charities, the church and school and in the provision of entertainment. Much attendance 
was required .4 However, once this level of local concern was demonstrated, electors were generous in their 
interpretation of "local". George Johnstone, I ledon MP 1802-13, who only moved to I ledon because he 
needed a new seat after the patron of Aldeburgh wished to elect someone else, claimed "lineal descent" from 
t Radnor to Southey, 10 July 1826: Southey, Robert Southey, Volume 5, p. 26 I. Roughly translated the Latin says, "That he 
should uphold firmly, strenuously and continuously, the things which he has shown well should be upheld. " 
2 Southey to Richard White, 1 July 1826: Southey, Robert Southey, Volume 3. p. 262-3. 
3 John Charles Ramsden was MP for Malton 1812-31, Yorkshire 1831.2 and then Malton again 1833-6, when he died. I lie 
was also a candidate for North Riding 1832. When he became a member of Brooks' he was nominated by Milton. 
4 E. g. see John I fall to I Iotham, 7 February 1820,1 Iotham MSS, DDI10/8, Brynmor Jones Library, I full University. 
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former Hedon MPs. This, as a claim to having a local link, was somewhat tenuous, though it did not appear 
to do him any electoral harm. ' Similarly, Anthony Browne, Hedon MP 1806-18, had the money to be 
generous and was introduced by George Johnstone, without having any other significant local claims. 
Likewise, Charles Duncombe, a failed candidate in 1807, thought only having weak local links was not 
sufficiently problematic to preclude an opportunist stab for the seat. 2 Another example is that of John 
Broadhust, Hedon MP 1813-18, who needed a new seat after being unseated from Weymouth and Melcombe 
Regis on a petition. Though his family had land all around the country, and he inherited estates in Derby, 
Nottingham and Northumberland (but not Yorkshire), his main qualification was the £4000 he paid to local 
attorney William Iveson. If someone was prepared to be suitably generous with their money, what matters it 
where they come from? Local generosity could substitute for localness. Candidates who had made, or could 
plausibly promise that they were making, a fortune - normally in commerce - could promise on this basis to 
bring more prosperity to a constituency. Though this can be seen as coded language for, "I have lots of 
money to pay for free food and drink" it did refer to the possible genuine advantages of having MPs with 
good commercial contacts, and who would be expected to do business themselves in the constituency and be 
generous to local charities and subscriptions. In Hull tales of the wealth candidates had, and could bring to 
inhabitants were always popular, though even here politics could intrude. Acland, a candidate in 1832, was a 
noted radical, and a strolling player and wandering teacher. On arriving in Bull his radical activities quickly 
made an impression. For him, his supporters and his opponents, his politics, rather than where his ancestors 
were born or owned land, were defining characteristics. This flexibility of attitude had also been 
demonstrated in 1812, when George William Denys stood in Hull. Bull electors, desperate for a third man, 
stopped him on his way to Beverley, where he was intending to stand and persuaded him to switch to Hull. 
His links with either were scanty at best; though he was a deputy lieutenant that was for Essex, and though he 
had served in yeomanry cavalry that was in Northamptonshire. 
Beverley, like Hull and other constituencies such as Amersham, Morpeth, New Shoreham and 
Reading, often saw third man candidatures3 James Graham was a third man at Hull in 1818. He was 
unknown in the constituency, but no-one else could be found. Some letters of introduction were produced, 
but could not hide his roots. He turned it into a matter of principle: "I offer myself to you as a `third man', to 
give you an opportunity to exercise your rights as Englishmen and your privileges as burgesses' .4 Further, 
whilst he wished to be an MP for his native county, standing in Bull offered him the chance to be an MP for 
a constituency where the electors agreed with his views on political issues. Others, like Denys and Blackman 
in the Hull 1812 election, simply brazened it out and made little pretence to be anything other than 
opportunistic third men. The decorous explanation was that bringing in third men forced MPs to justify their 
behaviour; a more honest one is that it brought about a contest, with all its accompanying food, drink, 
entertainment and other disbursements. 
' It did however harm his peace of mind harm as Christopher Saville, aI ledon MP 1802-6, was so irritated by these claims as 
to frequently issues challenges to a duel. 
2 Isis uncle had been a Yorkshire MP, and the family home was Duncombe Park. 
3 Candidates - usually strangers - brought into ensure a contest, and whose qualification was their willingness to undergo 
this. 
4 W. M. Torrens, The Life And Times Of The Right Honourable Sir James RG. Graham, Bart, G. CB., M. P., 2 volumes, 
Saunders, Otley, and Co., London, Volume I p. 93. 
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Some candidates were greatly lacking in any personal contact. Indeed, the Marquess of Buckingham 
wrote to Windham, on the latter's candidature for St Mawes, 
The only political tenet to which your St Mawes electors will bind you is the belief that the Pilchard is 
the best of all possible fish, which, as long as you are not obliged to taste it you may undertake for their 
sake to believe. ' 
Indeed, during the Aldborough petition arguments in 1820 the very existence of one of the recently elected 
MPs, Gibbs Crawford Antrobus, was questioned; he had gone to America shortly before the election. In the 
nearby constituency of Knaresborough the then patron (the Duke of Devonshire) went so far as to discourage 
the appearance of candidates, lest it give the impression that the constituency was an open onel2 When 
Palmerston was first elected, for Newton (Isle of Wight), one condition was, he said, "That I would never, 
even for the election, set foot in the place. So jealous was the patron lest any attempt should be made to get a 
new interest in the borough. "3 When Tierney and Mackintosh were MPs for Knaresborough a publication 
said, "The members never appear at the elections, and it is the constant practice to chair two old paupers by 
way of proxies"4 More keenly contested constituencies did, though, generally require more attendance. 
Thus, in 1826 Viscount Morpeth, desirous of attending the Tsar's coronation, turned down Fitzwilliam's 
offer to elect him for Yorkshire, and instead was returned for Morpeth. 
In the East Riding variations between constituencies show the nuances in the mosaic. Iledon usually 
had a strong local flavour to candidates. Not so in Beverley - factions were sometimes forced to look outside 
for someone willing to stand and face the cost. In Hull local links were often non-existent. Between T. P. 
Thompson's election in 1835 and Norwood's election in 1865 no local was elected. Even Thompson's links 
were dated: "Forty years ago I believe I knew almost every man in the streets and every man and boy knew 
me"s He was a local who had moved on. There was also the tradition of bringing in a third man. 
Local factors allegedly impinged far more than national issues. As these issues often had little direct 
meaning for constituencies, a candidate's general attitude could be more important than detailed policy 
positions (if they even existed). Given the number of MPs who were reelected but then did little, politics 
cannot have been the be-all and end-all of their election. However, religious attachment often resulted in a 
national issue - such as Catholic emancipation or the Maynooth grant - becoming a fierce local issue, as 
happened with Trollope's 1868 Beverley candidature; and Richard Bethell withdrew as a candidate for 
Yorkshire in 1826 because of his inability to agree with other Tories over Catholic relief. Local factors 
included doing your duty; some stood because they felt it was the concomitant of their status. For example, 
Althorp refused an offer to stand for Glasgow in 1832, preferring instead an expensive and risky contest for 
the county (Northamptonshire) in which Althorp Park was located. Doing otherwise, he said, "would be 
running away from my natural position. " 
1 Buckingham to Windham, 8 July 1802: The Windham Papers, Volume 2, p. 195. 
2 Thorne, History of Parliament, Volume 2, p. 451. 
3 Jennings, Anecdotal History, p. 268-9. 
4 Jennings, Anecdotal History, p. 397. 
5 Markham, Nineteenth-Century Parliamentary Elections, p. 18. 
6 Althorp to Brougham, 2 September 1832 (? ): E. A. Wasson, "The Spirit of Reform, 1832 and 1867, " Albion, Volume 12, 
1980, p. 169. 
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The interaction of national and local issues, national issues and local personalities and national 
issues and local circumstances was complex. For the 1832 Leeds election the Liberals picked two candidates 
- Marshall and Macaulay - who, incidentally, were opposed to factory reform. It was as a son of the flax- 
spinning Marshall family and as a bright political star that they were picked. But, one consequence was that 
some Tories and radicals went into collaboration to support Michael Sadler, a prominent proponent of 
factory reform, though also qualified by virtue of his local residence, involvement in Leeds corporation and 
the support of Newcastle. ' The combination of the staunchly Tory, anti-Catholic, anti-Parliamentary reform 
Sadler with the radicals made sense in the context of two anti-factory reform Liberals. It was this 
combination of local circumstances and personalities that made factory reform, but not other national issues 
like religion, prominent at the 1832 election. As one put it, 
Why talk about Toaries and Redigals [sic] and such like while Oastler and Sadler and them'll stand up 
for us, I care nowt about what colour they wear; it's not blue nor yellow at makes `em either better or 
warse [Sic]2 
The amount of carpet-bagging, at least by prominent political figures, further questions the 
importance of local links and what voters' attitudes to MPs were. For example, Viscount Duncannon3 stood, 
at various times, for Higham Ferres, Kilkenny County, Knaresborough, Malton, Nottingham and St Albans. 
Similarly, Sir James Graham stood for Carlisle, Cumberland, Cumberland (East), Dorchester, Bull, 
Pembroke, Ripon and St Ives. 
This point, however, should not be over-stressed. For example, Thirsk, though being firmly in the 
Frankland's grip, consistently had MPs with strong local links. In 1839 Graham was looking for a seat and 
had some hopes for Thirsk, being friendly with Frankland (who had taken the name Russell in 1837). But 
this fell through. According to Graham, writing afterwards, "As to Thirsk the difficulty is to find a Yorkshire 
candidate: I am sure Sir R. Russell would support any good Conservative connected with the County who 
was agreeable to his neighbours" 4A large number of nationally known or government members passed 
through a Yorkshire constituency at some time. There was the problem for governments that ministers had to 
be re-elected on appointment, and there were fewer proprietorial boroughs after 1832. For example, a major 
reason for Peel dissolving in 1835 was the problem of getting his ministers into the House of Commons, and, 
indeed, given this problem, getting people willing to serve. 
In addition to obvious carpet-baggers, there were numerous candidates who, superficially, had 
better local credentials in places far away from where they were standing. Many were magistrates etc. in 
other counties. David Atcherley, York candidate in 1837 and 1841, was a magistrate in Lancaster, Chester, 
Durham, Salop, Denbigh and Flint (where he was also a deputy lieutenant). Yet, it was only in York that he 
stood for Parliament. According to Gash, "Not merely the tradition but the actual profession of the borough- 
monger was still alive in early Victorian England. Without the costly and often notorious methods employed 
at Stafford, Nottingham, Ipswich, or Sudbury, there were yet ways of entering parliament by judicious 
1 Though this was also a source of criticism. See also p. 219. 
2 From a radical pamphlet: Fraser, "The Fruits Of Reform, " p. 92. 
3 Also known as John William Ponsonby. Ile was a Whig whip from 1815, and held various government posts in the 1830s. 
Ile is probably most famous for being a member of the four-man committee that drafted the Reform Bill. 
4 Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p. 225. 
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negotiation and adequate payment. "' The extent of local links, to some degree, appears also to have 
depended on the degree of national partisanship. At times of particularly keenly contested elections from the 
national perspective more effort went into finding candidates to contest seats, which resulted in more non- 
locals standing. According to Glynn the percentage of new members without local links (through birth, 
education, marriage, residence, property ownership or location of work in or near the constituency) was 16% 
in 1832, rising to 25% for both 1835 and 1837, falling back to 22% in 1841 and hitting 32% in 1847. Those 
that were non-local were largely from professions like the law. 3 These did not provide strong local links with 
anywhere. 
Though candidates might not be local, traditions were. Thus, for example, people did not have 
colours, constituencies did: candidates' colours depended largely upon the colours similar candidates had 
used in that constituency in the past. Thus, one might talk of Tories using crimson and the Whigs orange in 
Beverley. What did not happen was that a particular colour accompanied a particular person around the 
country. Candidates might not have been local, but it was local traditions into which they had to fit. 
Having strong local links did not necessitate being involved or standing locally, as three examples 
show. First, although Lord Carlisle, of Castle Howard, used exclusive dealing to back Fitzwilliam in Malton 
and had sufficient influence in Huddersfield for there to be some concern in 1831-2 at the thought of 
enfranchising it, the Howards did little politically in the locality. That is not to say they were not active 
locally, nor were not political. Frederick Howard (5th Earl), a friend of Fox, held various minor government 
posts. His son George (1773-1848) was a Cabinet minister. His son, George William (b. 1802) was a Whig 
MP elsewhere, Chief Secretary to Ireland 1835-41 and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. This family 
was of the same politics as the Fitzwilliams, and so there was no reason for them to fight the Fitzwilliam 
interest. Further, with interests elsewhere, like their estates near Carlisle, there was no compelling reason for 
the Howards to be politically active in Yorkshire. 
Second, the Ramsdens of Huddersfield were influential locally, being Lords of the Manor and 
having acquired the market rights in 1672. Though the Improvement Commissioners set up in the late 
eighteenth century were an alternative source of local power, relations between them and the Ramsdens were 
harmonious and it was only in the latter nineteenth century, with calls for incorporation, that things began to 
break down. But when it came to being MPs Ramsdens looked elsewhere. Family links with the Fitzwilliams 
were utilised, and John Charles Ramsden was first MP for Malton and then Yorkshire. 
Third, Sir Walter Stanhope of Canon Hall (five miles from Barnsley) and with estates at Horsforth 
(near Leeds) had electoral influence in the West Riding! Yet, he was at times MP for Hazelmere and 
Carlisle, constituencies in which his relative Sir James Lowther had great influence. Personal links, once 
again, predominated over localism. 
1 Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p. 164. 
2 Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament, Volume 2, Table 14. 
3 Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament, Volume 1, p. 41. 
4 A. M. W. Stirling, Annals OfA Yorkshire Mouse: From The Papers OfA Macaroni & his Kindred, John Lane The 
Bodley I lead, London, 1911, Volume 2, p. 183. 
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Despite the variability of local links, candidates were normally introduced to the electorate - 
implying that at the least acquaintance was required - and they were preferably accompanied by local 
notables. This was especially true for young candidates, who usually had to rely on personal 
recommendations rather than any track record. Such recommendations could easily overcome any drawback 
arising from inexperience. Indeed, criticism of candidates for inexperience was rare. More common was 
criticism of their lack of knowledge of, and links with, a constituency. Youth simply meant more effort was 
needed to get know, and personal recommendations, aristocratic background or family links were often 
sufficient to overcome this. It was, though, still possible for candidates to be absent. In addition to the above 
example of Antrobus and the Aldborough election of 1820 (p. 222), there were other candidates who were 
notable by their absence. For example, in the 1818 Beverley election neither William Beverley nor Burton 
appeared. Burton did at least have the good excuse of being in gaol! 
The main impact of the 1832 reform legislation was that, by trimming some of the extremes of the 
system, being able to claim some link with a constituency became increasingly important. However, this 
occurred at the same time as an increasing emphasis on policies meant that the definition of what constituted 
a link became looser. Prominent views on policies relevant to a constituency could qualify as a link, rather 
than just family or residential connections. In 1826 the Duke of Devonshire wrote to Lord John Russell, 
I find that my alternate nomination to the borough of Bandon is still at my disposal, and I have the 
greatest satisfaction in offering it to you. It may be necessary to name the member before your answer 
can have arrived, therefore I hope you will not be dissatisfied at finding yourself elected. ' 
It was this type of behaviour that fell by the wayside. 
6.8 Conclusion 
For centuries it has been the goal of English manhood, and besides those who found seats in it on the 
strength of a tradition or of a quasi-hereditary right, there were in every house many scores of men for 
whom its membership set the crown (and often the coronet) on achievements and success in other walks 
of life, 
according to Namier. 2 However, this was but one aspect of being an MP. For some it may have been true, but 
for others being an MP was not a crowning achievement, but a step on the road to other achievements and 
successes, particularly in the non-Parliamentary sphere. Indeed, in 1832-50 around 15% of MPs were, when 
elected for the first time, under twenty-five .3 
Similarly, Glynn was misleading to write, 
The middle class Members had first to prove their worth. To them membership of the House was but a 
4 crown to an otherwise successful career. 
Rather more accurately Namier wrote that, "the seat in the house was not their ultimate goal but a means to 
ulterior aims"s Being an MP could be a crown to a career, but it could also be a means of achieving that 
career. Or, as Alexander Pulling put it in 1866: 
1 Devonshire to Russell, 15 November 1826: Russell, Lord John Russell, Volume 1, p. 254. 
2 Namier, Crossroads of Power: Essays On Eighteenth-Century England, p. 3. 
3 Derived from Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament 1833-68, Volume 2, Table 1. 
4 Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament 1833-68, Volume 1, p. 151. 
5 Namier, The Structure Of Politics, p. 2. 
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The position of M. P. ... brings to men of mere wealth a social position they could in vain aspire to before 
... No matter how insignificant a figure the person elected may cut within the House, he must be 
singularly deficient or wrong headed to whom the designation of M. P. does not bring great advantages 
in the world ... he at all events gains a 'title'. 
' 
In some cases it was less a matter of aspiration than expectation. In particular, for the eldest sons of nobles 
and large landowners, a Parliamentary career was a matter of course, flowing naturally from their position in 
society. Though Pulling goes on to claim that, due to the attractiveness of having an M. P. as a company 
director, being an M. P. "affords the prospect of a speedy and profitable return" this appears to have been the 
exception, and only really applied to railway companies before the late nineteenth century. With this status 
came financial strain and intimidation. The quietness of many MPs is less surprising when the importance 
attached to Parliamentary oratory is remembered. The psychological pressure that had driven Gibbon to write 
in 1775, "I am still a Mute; it is more tremendous than I imagined; the great speakers fill me with despair, the 
bad ones with terror, "Z did not end with the end of the century. Parliamentary oratory was a serious business 
This was evidenced in numerous ways, including the dominance of Parliamentary speeches and proceeding 
in political reporting, the praise attached to good maiden speeches, the number of people urged to become 
MPs because of their oratorical ability - like James Scarlett - and the different verbal culture. I lour-long 
speeches were a normal mode of communication, and soundbites - humorous quips aside - the exception. 
The status and social benefits of being an MP required time to fully enjoy: why go to the effort of 
obtaining such an entrance to (London) society, if one did not enjoy it? These benefits, then, help explain the 
absences of MPs from their nominal job. In particular, dinner cleared out the Commons - it was no 
coincidence that a poor Parliamentary orator like Burke was nicknamed "The Dinner Bell". Membership of 
the Commons certainly gave possibilities for political participation, but they were often passed up in favour 
of enjoying the benefit of status, and the expression of successful candidates' superiority in their 
constituencies. 3 Being an active Parliamentarian could allow one to cut a dash; as Holland commented in the 
1820s, "It is the fashion among the young one to attend to Parliamentary business. "" Those unattracted by 
such fringe benefits were less likely to have become MPs in the first place for, as Grantley Berkley put it 
when asked to stand, being elected would, 
break in on my home, its retirement, and my amusements; and ... occasion me such an increased 
expenditure as would at once force me to discontinue my hounds -5 
The importance of non-political motivations, resulting in the behaviour of MPs that we have seen, 
was also reflected in the rules regarding MPs. Thus it was that when the rules on free postage for them were 
tightened in 18026 the perceived abuse was not MPs using free postage to wage political campaigns, but MPs 
1 Glynn, The Private Member OjParliament 1833-68, Volume 2, p. 258 n1. 
2 Gibbon to I Iolyroyd, 23 February 1775: P. Johnson (ed), The Oxford Book Of British Political Anecdotes, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 85. 
3 Such benefits could even be gained by losers. William Dyott wrote of his son's candidature in 1837, if he was not 
returned, the application of so influential a list of electors would naturally introduce him to the county, and place him in a 
situation of high respectability": R. W. Jeffrey (ed), Dyott's Diary 1781-1845: A Selection From The Journal Of William 
Dyott, Sometime General In The British Army And Aide-De-Camp To 11is Majesty King George 111, Archibald Constable, 
London, 1907, Volume 2, p. 258. 
4 L. Colley, Britons: Forging The Nation 1707-1837, Yale University Press, New I Laven, 1992, p. 188 
s Berkley, Life And Recollections, Volume 1, p. 345. 
6 42 Geo. 1II c. 63. 
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using free postage for their social correspondence, for their friends and relatives and for their business 
activities. ' 
Yorkshire was a mix of a few active MPs and interested families, and, rather like an iceberg, a much 
larger, submerged and hidden bulk of MPs. Still, it was perhaps not typical of the whole country in having 
several families who regularly wished to have a representative as a county MP, though such ambitions were 
frequently restrained by a lack of money. In contrast, Olney wrote of Lincolnshire that, 
There was, in fact, little competition for the honour of representing the county. More often it was a 
question of impressing his public duty upon some less than willing victim? 
Though attendance is not possible to measure directly, the voting figures suggest strongly that 
frequently many MPs were absent. Though both Houses of Parliament had resolved on 25 January 1709 that, 
"such Members as absent themselves without leave be reputed deserters to their trust and neglecters of the 
duty they owe to the House and the country, " the reality was rather more relaxed. MPs became MPs for a 
great variety of motives; being an MP was about more than exercising Parliamentary power, as indeed 
illustrated by the frequent apologies for disturbing a constituency with a contest. 3 
The number of MPs who did not vote, and the lack of decline in their numbers over the years, not 
only strongly suggests that electoral pressures did not lead to speechifying - as my regression equations also 
suggest - but also that if parties were becoming more pronounced then for many MPs either this process 
passed them by or they did not see many, if any, Commons votes as relevant to party partisanship. In 
particular, a large number of MPs never spoke - regardless of what greater trend was also taking place, be it 
electoral reform, social unrest, party development or the growth of railways. Though attendance is harder to 
judge than voting records, the evidence suggests a similar story. For example, Macaulay wrote of the Reform 
Bill's second reading, 
The House when only the Ayes were in it [302 plus possible 4 tellers and the Speaker] looked to me a 
very fair house - much fuller than it generally is even on debates of considerable interest. 
4 
There was no fundamental change in the make-up of candidates or MPs following the 1832 reform 
legislation. The impact of 1830 and 1831, followed by the landslide of 1832 meant that there was bound to 
be an apparent change in personnel, simply due to one side having won a landslide. This was exacerbated in 
contemporary eyes by the psychological impact of Peel being displaced from his usual seat by Cobbett, 
O'Connell and the Radicals. This resulted in comments such as that of the Annual Register, 
There was a great dislocation of old connections and former interests; an extensive removal of 
acknowledged talent and worth to make room for ignorant and bold empirics or for unprincipled 
knavery. 
13&4 Vict. c. 96. These postage rights were lost in 1840. 
2 R. J. Olney, Lincolnshire Politics 1832-1885, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p. 232. 
3 Although this was part of a wider social phenomenon, evidenced by the "I am very sorry to disturb you but... " tone of 
the prefaces to many publications, particularly pamphlets, addressed or dedicated to a particular person. 
4 Macaulay to Ellis, 30 March 1831: Johnson, British Political Anecdotes, p.! I S. Ile thought there were less than 300 in the 
Chamber at this time. 
5 Annual Register, 1832, p. 299. 
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It was more a change in individuals than in type. Many of the new constituencies had MPs and candidates of 
the traditional type. Indeed, sixteen (seventeen after a by-election) of the sixty-f ive places for new 
constituencies were filled by people who had previously been MPs. Of the 111 MPs whose seats were 
abolished in 1832, forty-eight returned to Parliament eventually - twenty-six in 1832; usually it was for 
somewhere near their place of residence. ' Whilst when Parliament assembled in 1833 it may have included 
the newly elected Cobbett, it also had the newly elected Beauclerk, the great-great-grandson of Charles II. 
There was no great influx of financiers, merchants and manufacturers - arguably none - nor of 
radicals. Lumping all the radicals - from O'Connell to Cobbett via Hume - together gives a total of around 
40. Amongst the 150-odd Tories returned were such die-hard opponents of the 1832 legislation as Vyvyan 
(elected for Bristol, a borough constituency with a substantial electorate) and Baring (elected for North 
Essex). MPs continued to come from an open, though not very diverse, cross-section of society, into which 
money could buy access. The resulting clubbishness had its advantages, making theoretically impracticable 
Parliamentary procedures work and facilitating a flexible interpretation of the rules. 
What did change after 1832 was MPs' behaviour. They became more active. Thus in comparing the 
first and second editions of Erskine May's guide we find a significant addition in the latter's text, which 
stated that, "a member is often called not because he was up first, but because the house desire to hear him"2 
In other words, as more MPs desired to be called to speak, the old convention that "first up, first called" 
could no longer work, regularly faced with several MPs standing (near) simultaneously. 
There was a great increase in participation by MPs, though this was not driven by electoral pressure. 
There were many aspects to growth - such as the boom in railway private members' bills - which had other 
causes, and were a reflection of the changing role of government. It was governmental rather than electoral 
changes that changed MPs' behaviour. Though the more active MPs did come from large constituencies 
(where one might expect electoral pressure on MPs and gains from Parliamentary activity to be higher), it 
was not desire for re-election that motivated their activity. Changing majorities did not produce changing 
levels of activity. Rather, it was that large constituencies attracted those types of MPs, frequently radicals, 
who were also, but coincidentally, those who made more active MPs. 
3 
Being an active MP was, like being local, a useful bonus, but not essential. So, requests to people to 
become candidates were neither dominated by, nor ignorant of, their Parliamentary records. So it was that 
appeals to Lord Hotham to succeed Bethell for the East Riding both mentioned his record in Parliament, but 
also his large land holdings and pro-agriculture stance. 4 
Even with the growth in activity that there was, there remained many MPs going to the effort of 
being elected and then doing very little, if not nothing. Politics seems to have frequently had only a small 
Woolley, "The Personnel of the Parliament of 1833, " English Historical Review, 1938, p. 255-6,259. 
2 Erskine May, Law, Privileges, Proceedings And Usage Of Parliament 1844, p. 193 and A Treatise On The Law, Privileges, 
Proceedings And Usage Of Parliament, 2nd edition, Buttcrworths, London, 1851, p. 242. 
3 Not all radical MPs were active. The London and Westminster Review lamented in 1836 (No. 1 Volume 3& 25, p. 276) 
that, "The Radical Party in Parliament has, with few exceptions, preserved its accustomed torpidity. Those who had 
formerly done something have done more than usual; but those who are accustomed to do nothing, have done it still. " 
41lotham MSS, DDIIO 8/17-18, ßrynmor Jones Library, hull University. 
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role to play in the electoral field. As a result, though there were many young candidates, for only a few was 
politics a lifelong obsession, and even then it normally derived from the expected behaviour that went with 
their position in society. Those that came from an area outside politics that did involve speech-making, 
namely the law, did generally make talkative MPs. ' The ideal of a grand Parliamentary career, particularly 
for young talents like Pitt, Peel, Gladstone and Disraeli was often articulated, both in fiction like that of 
Trollope's and in real life. But this was largely a romantic ideal in which only a few, the best, could 
participate. The more general attraction was that, as Trollope put it, 
To sit in the British Parliament should be the highest object and ambition of every educated 
Englishman. 2 
Or, as Disraeli said, 
I love fame; I love public reputation; I love to live in the eye of the country; and it is a glorious thing for 
a man who has had my difficulties to contend with. 3 
Given this diversity of motives, it is not surprising that there were frequent complaints about the 
quality of MPs and claims that it was declining. In 1830 the Quarterly Review complained that MPs, 
are not only found inferior to many private individuals among their contemporaries, but one seldom 
recognises the grasp of mind and statesmanlike qualities which the representative of a free and 
enlightened country might be expected to possess 4 
In a like vein, Blackwood's Magazine claimed in 1822, 
The old brilliant reputation of Parliament as a place of intellectual distinction, has past away since the 
wa s 
But such complaints should be treated sceptically. It is a constant refrain in English politics that the previous 
generation of politicians was better, and indeed the last great political orator dies every ten years or so. 
6 
Still, there was a distinction between active and non-active Parliamentarians, for whom being an MP 
was not a means, but an end (possibly incidental in itself), even manifest in the Cabinet, with a demarcation 
between those who held "efficient offices of real business" and those who were "sleeping partners in the 
firm. "7 In the case of the Cabinet the motivation of the sleeping members is more obvious; not only did they 
have the chance to take part in Cabinet decisions, but posts such as the Lord Privy Seal and the Duchy of 
Lancaster came with pay. But inactive MPs are no odder than silent committee members. They make up the 
numbers and are seen to be involved without actually having to do a great deal. 
' For example, Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament 1833-68, Volume 2, Table 90. 
2 P. Riddell, Honest Opportunism: The Rise of the Career Politician, l famish I lamilton, London, 1993, p. 259. 
3 Riddell, Honest Opportunism, p. 14. 
4 Quarterly Review, January 1830, Volume 42, p. 270. 
3 Blackwood's Magazine, April 1822, Volume 11, p. 468. In November 1834 it lamented a decline in quality of dcbate since 
the 1832 reforms: Volume 36, p. 674. 
6 In the days of Pitt the Younger the likes of Pitt the Elder were praised; in the days of Brougham the likes of Pitt the 
Younger were praised; in the days of Palmerston the likes of Brougham were praised; in the days of Gladstone and Disraeli 
the likes of Palmerston were praised; in the days of Salisbury the likes of Gladstone and Disraeli were praised, and so on. 
Similarly, on Jo Grimmond's death in 1993 it was him; when Michael Foot dies it will be him; when Enoch Powell dies it 
will be him; after that Tony Benn will doubtless get the title on his death, only to be followed in due course by Michael 
I lesseltine. For an example of a lament for the "good old days" see I lall, Retrospect, Volume I, p. 22. 
The phrases are respectively Grenville's and Mrs. Canning's: Aspinall, "The Cabinet Council, " p. 151. 
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7. Conclusion 
Three problems, each aspects of vitality, were raised at the beginning: was the electoral system 
opening up, what was 1832's impact and what determined participants' behaviour? Examining them has 
produced a somewhat mixed picture. Frequently high and/or increasing vitality coexisted with low and/or 
decreasing vitality, as the range of forces at work did not all move in the same direction. 
Increases in vitality were often driven by conflicts within electoral elites, producing larger 
electorates, higher turnout and more polls. Not only did elites, in the face of electoral vibrancy, have to 
struggle and organise to win, ' but their very struggles increased vitality. 
However, this occurred against a background of some reluctance on the part of the wider population 
to take advantage of the openings offered by the electoral system's vitality. Thus, non-registration rates 
remained high, and turnout declined after 1832. Legislative reforms like those of 1832 could grant more 
opportunities for participation, but could not force people to take them. 
It is these two contrasting forces - conflict and apathy - that explain the apparent paradox and 
confusion at the heart of the electoral system. Whilst in many ways the system was open, at the same time in 
other ways it was not. Hence the contrast between the rumbustious world of polls and the quiescence of 
uncontested backwaters, and between the intensity of the Reform Bill debates and the frequent absence of 
MPs from those very debates, and even from the votes. 
The elite itself had signs of vitality. Whilst certainly it was an elite, and this was not an age of mass 
politics, there were openings for those with money, time, talent or simply a good lawyer and an election 
manual. This relative openness was partly a reflection of the system's complexity, frequent poor 
administration and amateurishness. It was also a reflection of how easily elites were distracted from electoral 
politics by other considerations. Enthusiasm and participation accompanied, and even were made easier by, 
apathy and non-participation. This left plenty of room for experts, competent people or the plain enthusiastic 
to join in. With energy, persistence and information many MPs were not only better informed than the bulk 
of their peers, but also able to set the terms of the debate or achieve their aims on the sly. Yet this scope was 
often accompanied by ignorance. As with the urban penetration clauses in 1831-2, ignorance and confusion 
meant the outcome was not really in anyone's hands as no-one really knew what they were doing. 
The complexity and poor administration were exacerbated by often poor, vague and unenforced 
statutes and customs. Many were only utilised when a particularly fierce conflict led to participants looking 
for all possible implements to use. The complexity increased after 1832. Ostensibly 1832 replaced a variety 
of local franchises with national uniformity. The reality was different. Not only were the rules open to a wide 
variety of interpretation (and even misinterpretation), but also within most constituencies the franchise was 
settled before 1832; change simply produced uncertainty. But, above all, 1832 introduced electoral 
registration to England. This was a veritable heaven for electoral lawyers and enthusiastic pedants, but a 
legalistic quagmire for the rest. 
1 In Disraeli's words, "Politics is organised opinion. " 
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Simplifications and improvements of the system were restricted not merely by all the usual 
arguments against change, ' but also by the embedding of many of the problems in deeper social and political 
norms. Thus the historical bequest that only the Commons should determine its own membership greatly 
restricted the scope for reform of the petitioning procedure. In addition, there were many unsolvable 
problems (how do you unambiguously define and value property? ), and the traditional image of elections as 
a private matter between the contestants restricted the role of the state in regulating them. This fostered the 
erratic enforcement of electoral law, 2 it being largely left to participants, beset with partisan motives, to 
ensure its enforcement. 
The complexity and amateurishness also produced some surprising nooks and crannies, as with the 
use of the secret voting around the country long before even Hobhouse's Select Vestry Act 3 The breadth of 
secret voting is also a warning against assuming that participants were collected, rational and able to spot the 
obvious. During the secret ballot debates of the 1830s one of the most common hostile arguments was that 
secrecy was unmanly and foreign. Yet, supporters of the ballot did not use the apparently obvious 
counter-argument, that secret voting was already working smoothly in many parts of the country. Further, its 
opponents in these set-piece debates failed to oppose secret voting when it entered the statute book through a 
variety of means, like Hobhouse's Act .4 
The capricious and fragmented nature of the system, and changes to it, brings to mind Lloyd 
George's famous criticism of 1915 that, "We have been employing too much the haphazard, leisurely, go-as- 
you-please methods. " Even Cabinet meetings -a body without even secretarial support before 1914 - were 
frequently amateurish in execution: 
Business was not conducted with the smooth efficiency that might have been expected of the ablest 
statesmen of the day. No agenda was prepared. Often enough, Ministers, including the Prime Minister, 
had no idea why they were being summoned, or who had sent out notes. No great pains were taken to 
ensure that each Minister received the summons. Sometimes the Prime Minister announced that he 
1 For example, Canning, commenting on one of Russell's reform motions, proclaimed that, "If this Ilouse is not all that 
theory could wish it, I would rather rest satisfied with its present state, than, by endeavouring to remedy some small 
defects, run the hazard of losing so much that is excellent": Annual Register, I listory of Europe, 1822, p. 76. 
2 Arguably this was a wider social phenomena. For example, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the 
death penalty, in theory, applied to a large number of crimes, but was actually carried out much less frequently. Further, 
at times of particular stress a more literal interpretation of the law, involving the execution of more people, frequently 
occurred. For example, see 11. Porter, Hanging In Judgement: Religion and the Death Penalty in England, SCM Press, 
London, 1993, especially p. 6-10. It is tempting to draw a parallel between the erratic implementation of electoral laws 
and the views of William Paley on the judicial system. I le argued that to deter crime one should have the death penalty 
for many crimes, but only to carry it out occasionally, it being this uncertainty that allowed a reconciliation between 
wide deterrence and avoiding cruelty, which would follow from fully enforcing death: Porter, Hanging In Judgement, 
p. 13-14. 
3 1&2 Will. IV C. 60 (1831). 
4 It would be wrong, though, to attach too much importance to administrative details in isolation. For example, the use of 
"male person" in both the 1832 legislation and the Municipal Corporations Reform Act has led some to conclude that 
this was a deliberate move to exclude women from the franchise. I Iowever, both clause 18 of the England and Wales 
Reform Act - which defined the important county freeholder franchise - and all of the Scottish Reform Act did not use 
"male person. " The use of this phrase on some occasions is indicative of meaningless drafting inconsistency, rather than 
any deeper motive; if the latter were the case one would have to explain why there was no move to exclude women from 
the county franchise or from voting in Scotland. "Male person" was occasionally used, but did not (in this period and 
context) signify anything significantly different to "person" or "man. " I Icnce, when the county franchise was described 
in 1831-2 (92) XXXVI, "male person" was used on one occasion, though more normally the franchise was described 
without the use of this phrase. 
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would not trouble to attend. Only on rare occasions was any record made of decisions reached, and even 
when a formal Minute was drawn up, copies were not usually circulated. ' 
This was partly a reflection of the fact that participants, even Cabinet ministers, were rarely full-time 
politicians with no other life. Rather, the electoral system was riddled with occasions when non-electoral 
considerations predominated. Thus, for example, being an assiduous MP gave way to enjoying the social life 
and other concerns. This was exacerbated by roles being assumed out of a sense of duty rather than 
enthusiasm, such as sons of great families standing for Parliament because that was what was expected. 
Brock argued that, "Few people outside aristocratic and parliamentary circles understood politics, or 
took a continuous interest in them, "Z but even many within those circles behaved similarly. Behaviour, 
whether it be MPs not voting, deference in a Yorkshire contest or bribery in a hull election, was often driven 
by a variety of motives, with non-electoral considerations prominent. Local tradition, desire for a quiet life 
and economic self-interest all influenced behaviour. In this respect one of the most striking pieces of 
evidence is the amount of campaigning that occurred even when there was no contest, had been no contest 
for years and no-one expected a contest this side of the millennium. The speeches, balls, food and drink were 
not to sway votes, but the fulfilment of social norms, the recognition of mutual debts and aids to social 
restfulness. Elections and electoral politics did not dominate most people's lives. 
Elections mixed decorum and tumult, duty and apathy, enthusiasm and part-timeism, all bundled up 
in frequent rough and tumble, exemplified by the appeal to Conservative electors at the end of an 1835 
nomination meeting, "England expects every man to do his duty. Up Lads and at `em. "3 Elections were fun. 
In the words of one song, 
'Twas glorious to carry a flag, 
'Twas glorious to carry a drum, 
'Twas glorious to guzzle from barrels of ale, 
And follow the banners and drums ... 'Twas glorious to fuddle our noddles with ale. 
That was why poll books, prints and (at least after about 1815) novelss revelled in recording electoral 
activity, frequently in humorous fashion. As one contemporary put it, 
Electioneering is not only a political activity, and a social one - it is an art, and it is even a game. It 
illustrates our constitutional history, but it illustrates also our private life 6 
Or, as the Duke of Norfolk asked, 
What greater enjoyment can there be in life than to stand a contested election for Yorkshire and to win it 
by one? 7 
t Aspinall, "The Cabinet Council, " p. 187-8. 
2 Brock, Reform Act, p. 16. 
3 Bradford election broadsheets, DB3 c$0/3, Bradford Archives. 
4 Beverley Election 1830, p. 49. 
s Nicholas, To Ae 1lustings, Introduction. 
6 [J. I lannay), "Electioneering, " Quarterly Review, Volume 102,1857, p. 32. 
7 IL Coupland, Wilberforce, 2nd edition, Collins, London, 1945, p. 288. 
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The multiplicity of motives is one reflection of the need to understand the electoral system in 
context. The context did not merely shape the system, it also shaped interpretations of it. Thus, whilst the 
idea of judges ruling on election petitions was initially seen as a form of monarchical control, and inimical to 
Parliamentary purity, by the mid-nineteenth century it was increasingly seen as a way of ensuring 
Parliamentary purity. Similarly, whilst Parliamentary reporting was initially seen as inimical to free speech, 
as the monarch would know what everyone had said, by the nineteenth century it was seen as an essential 
part of free speech. 
In understanding the context of the electoral system, it becomes clear that the traditional Whiggish 
tale of smooth progress to a liberal and democratic constitution is now, at one level, little more than an Aunt 
Sally. ' As Williams said, 
Victorian historians assumed that the eighteenth-century political system was a dress rehearsal for their 
own polished performance, and condemned any divergence they found as failures to come up to the 
demands of the script. 2 
Such divergences are now both commonly seen and not condemned. But, the Whig orthodoxy also provided 
a framework within which meaning and import were attached to particular political and electoral actions. At 
this more subtle level it still holds significant sway, in particular in the hostility to - and crude definition of - 
bribery and a lopsided attitude towards the size of the electorate. It is arguable to what extent present-day 
values and judgements should be, or can be, avoided in studying history. But a failure to understand both 
what many contemporaries thought and believed and the difference between description and prescription, 
leaves judgements on loose foundations. So, for example, Christie has described the system as being one of 
One can "illogical absurdities" and Evans talked of the borough franchise being "irrational and arbitrary. 
4 3 
just as well call it "diverse and traditional". Indeed, 
It is not clear that moral indignation is not a dispersion of one's energies to the great confusion of one's 
judgement. 5 
There are four clear departures from Whiggish assumptions that many contemporaries held, departures which 
it is necessary to understand in order to interpret electoral and political behaviour in the light of the meanings 
attached to actions by those carrying them out. 
First, elections were largely seen as a private affair by many across the political spectrum, though 
some also saw them as a means of restraining the monarchy. Second, many saw innovation as being, in itself, 
dangerous. One may think this judgement wrong, dangerous, muddleheaded or bad, but if one accepts that 
people did believe it, it is clear why so many "oddities" and "absurdities" of the electoral system persisted: 
the gain from cleaning them up would have been outweighed by the inherent danger of innovation. (Further, 
1A further problem with this idea of smooth progress is encapsulated in the economists' theorem of the second best. This 
theorem, originating with economic analysis, at its most simple states that if there are several conditions for an optimum 
result, and one of those conditions is not met, then the second-best optimum result may be obtained by departing from 
other of the conditions too. For example, in the absence of universal suffrage, many Chartists opposed the secret ballot. 
2 E. N. Williams, The Eighteenth Century Constitution 1688 -1815: Documents And Commentary, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1960, p. xv. 
3 Veitch, The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform, Introduction. 
4 E. J. Evans, The Forging of the Modern State: Early Industrial Britain 1783-1870, Longman, London, 1983, p. 209. 
5 Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation OfI istory, p. 1. 
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as the confusion over urban penetration shows, it was often hard to forge simple and logical rules). Third, 
results rather than the process mattered. So, for example, it was not the number of electors in a constituency, 
but the quality of its MP, that mattered. Though this point of view was undoubtedly more popular with 
Tories than with others, it did occur elsewhere. Most notably, Brougham was wary of the large-scale attack 
on small constituencies carried out by the 1832 legislation for this very reason; he felt that small 
constituencies often provided high quality MPs. Fourth, equality does not have to mean one man, or even 
one person, one vote. This is certainly a system of equal input for different people, but equal output and 
equality between different groups of people do not necessarily follow. So equality of interest groups could 
be, and was, used to justify constituencies like Whitby with small electorates: the electorate may have been 
small, but the interest they were electing an MP for was large. Indeed, the anti-democratic potential of 
majority voting and means of dealing with it, was at the heart of much of the debate between Mill and 
Bagehot, ' and of the invention of electoral devices like the single transferable vote later in the century. 
The picture, then, is mixed. Not everything was vibrancy and participation, as a letter written by 
Philip Francis shortly after his election for Appleby in 1802 reminds us: 
Yesterday morning, between 11 & 12 I was unanimously elected by one Elector, to represent this 
Ancient Borough in Parliament ... There was no other 
Candidate, no Opposition, no Poll demanded, 
Scrutiny or Petition. So I had nothing to do but to thank the said Elector for the Unanimous Voice by 
which I was chosen. Then we had a great Dinner at the Castle, and a famous Ball in the evening 
for that 
part of the Community which my lady calls the Ragamuffms. On Friday morning I shall quit this 
Triumphant Scene with flying Colours, and a noble Determination not to see it again in less than seven 
years. 
By contrast, Wright has claimed, 
The extraordinarily intense quality of Victorian borough politics was a consequence of the 1832 Reform 
Act, reinforced by social and economic changes. It could be argued that between 1832 and 1885 there 
was greater popular interest than there has been since 
3 
The difference between these two pictures is only partly explained by the intervention of the reform debates 
and the 1832 legislation. Wright's picture is rather like thinking that football consists only of World Cup 
semi-finals, and neglecting Rotherham versus Barnsley on a wet Wednesday evening. The other aspect is that 
of non-registration and declining turnout. This semi-detachment between the political elite and the wider 
population was also reflected in MPs' behaviour. There was little link between their activity and their 
electoral situations. Not only did electors not see any vital link between Parliamentary activity and being a 
good MP, but many MPs similar saw no vital link between being an MP and doing things in the Commons. 
Despite signs of vitality - the increasing electorate, the scope for individual action, the spread of 
secret voting, the nuances behind deference and corruption - the point should not be over-emphasised. 
1 J. Roper, "Party and Democracy in Nineteenth-Century Britain, " Parliaments, Estates and Representation, Volume 3 
Part 1,1983, p. 24-8. 
2 To Harriet Frace, 7 July 1802: Williams, The Eighteenth Century Constitution, p. 169. 
3 Wright, Democracy and Reform, p. 103. Similarly, see Markham, Nineteenth-Century Parliamentary Elections, p. 38. 
4 In this sense, Parliament was somewhat similar to Oxford and Cambridge. In 1833-68 four-fifths of those who were 
elected to Parliament for the first time at a general election, and had been to Oxford or Cambridge, had left either with 
only a pass degree or without any degree at all: Glynn, The Private Member Of Parliament, Volume 1, p. 85. As with 
Parliament, the social attractions, despite their cost, seems to have outweighed the importance of the institutions' avowed 
purpose. 
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Vitality there was, but in the case of Philip Francis, it lasted less than a week. Vitality, participation and 
enthusiasm, often driven by conflicts within electoral elites, existed against a background of exhaustion, 
apathy and non-electoral considerations. 
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